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MODERN PROBLEMS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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MODERN PROBLEMS

DEALING WITH QUESTIONS, OLD AND NEW,
OF PERMANENT INTEREST

BY

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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

PROBLEMS do not get easier as the world grows older. The universe is amazingly full and complex ; it has to satisfy diverse multitudes and innumerable generations. Even the multiformity of animate existence on this planet is astounding, and the struggle for material or corporate existence must have some deep meaning. Moreover mankind has gradually learnt that planetary existence is but a fraction of the whole, that worlds upon worlds innumerable exist in the depths of space, and that the majesty of the universe as now conceivable by the human mind is overwhelming. This cosmic view inevitably colours our whole outlook, so that present-day humanity, even more than its predecessors, is often in a state of puzzlement, not only as to its conduct, but as to its destiny. Modern science gives to human life on the earth an almost incredible period in the future, and tells us that we are as yet only in the cradle. Our corporate blunders are the mistakes of infancy ; but they are none the less painful, and the sooner we begin to grow up the better. What humanity will be like even a thousand years hence cannot be imagined, but we may be sure that it partly depends on the exertion of each generation as it passes, and that up to our measure we are responsible.

Problems which attract attention change from time

to time, but most of them are liable to perennial recurrence ; and no one individual can hope to do more than contribute a small quota to their solution. At the end of last century materialistic philosophy seemed to be in some disrepute, perhaps still is, but materialism was scotched, not killed ; the facts upon which it was based are as true as ever. They seem to me to have been wrongly interpreted, but so far as the facts themselves go we find the materialistic position, if we eliminate any confident narrowness, strong and well established. The doctrine of evolution has extended from biology to astronomy ; the birth and death of worlds is going on before our eyes. The origin and history of a solar system can be traced. The nebulae are giving birth to fresh stars, each the possible nucleus of a planetary system. The universe is a going concern, and evidence that it had a beginning and will have an end is gradually fading. Whether its extent is infinite in space has been doubted, but no doubt has yet been thrown on its infinite extension in time. The reign of law and order is complete ; and even the atoms, which seemed to be the foundation-stones of the material universe, have been resolved into still more fundamental entities, all obedient to the forces that act upon them, and apparently requiring no other guidance. Evolution is in some sort extending to the very atoms themselves. Matter is no longer permanent in form, though the energy of which it is composed is an undoubted constant.

These views and discoveries, though they do not

constitute the problems which immediately face us—problems of a much simpler and more human character,—yet inevitably surround us with an atmosphere of speculation, which is bound to affect, though often unconsciously, our outlook on existence and on the exigencies of daily life and conduct. Meanwhile, from the material point of view, the domain of physics and chemistry has become apparently all-embracing. The nature of life and mind remains inscrutable ; but apparently every thought, every sensation, every purpose, every action, has a physical concomitant ; and there are those who think it probable that if we could follow the physical and chemical process in its entirety we should be able to dispense with any more mystical conception of life and guidance. The discoveries of the twentieth century have not simplified fundamental problems, they have only altered their aspect. Differences of opinion continue.

So also when we come to more simple human relations, the ideal of unrestricted competition is advocated by some biologists as tending to strengthen character and enhance energy. Without rivalry and competition, it is said, we should become supine, sluggish, and effete. The preservation of the weak is said to be no benefit to the state, rather baneful. The co-operative kindness of family life is not to be allowed to extend throughout the social organism. The struggle for existence, which has achieved so much in the past, is to be encouraged in the future, and constitutes the basis for what was at one time thought an enlightened political economy.

Against this view there have been storm and protest ; but in modified form, in spite of John Ruskin, it still survives.

And then there is a still more deadly contention, that we cannot really take control of or determine our actions, that we are like machines or animals, driven by the very constitution and interaction of the cells of our own bodies. Man is said to be a bundle of complexes, and his actions are determined by his surroundings ; he is controlled by external motives, and free will is an illusion : the difference between man and other animals is only one of degree, and their behaviour can be traced in accordance with the same general laws. Again, acquired characters are by some thought not to be transmitted ; so that efforts at individual improvement are not handed down to posterity. Advance is limited to the potentiality latent in some original germ plasm, which itself originated from the play of inorganic forces on extremely complicated molecules of protoplasm.

Against many of these tentative conclusions I and others have at various times contended. I believe that further knowledge will refute them. But the problems are there, and differences of opinion continue.

The immediate urgency of some of the problems has changed, even in our own time. The war changed some, social progress is already beginning to modify others. Nevertheless some of the contentions maintained in pre-war contributions to this book remain unchanged or even intensified. For instance, to refer

to a very controversial matter—far too big for me to deal with,—I venture to think that, whatever may be thought about the aims of Germany before the war, there still remains a real danger in bottling up a nation without reasonable access to the sea. It may be necessary for a time, but a safety-valve is not a thing that can be wisely sat upon for long. Fortunately the League of Nations has come into existence ; and when the time is ripe, it, or some successor, will be able to take even the most difficult international problems into rational consideration, without the utterly irrational prelude of wholesale death and destruction,—a prelude which solves nothing, but only intensifies and perpetuates difficulties, handing them on to the third and fourth generation.

Again, the position of women in the state has undoubtedly changed for the better in recent years. The old arguments against an unjust and disrespectful property-disqualification on the mere ground of sex, must now seem curiously antiquated to the present generation. The problem now is, not whether women shall have freedom and power, but what they will do with it. Enfranchisement has proceeded far beyond anything contemplated by even the most rebellious of a penultimate generation. The rush has occurred which was foreseen by some to be inevitable, once the gates were opened. There was evidently no logical halting-place, and the venture has been made in faith and hope. I believe it will be justified by the result, though we need not expect to escape mistakes in detail, perhaps

rash experimentation and occasional wrong-headedness. Depend upon it however that the aims are high and good ; and, that being so, wisdom will grow, though we may have to adapt ourselves to changed conventions, if not to some modified ideals.

Progress is so rapid nowadays that in some of the following essays the date has to be taken into account, but the fundamental principles urged remain unchanged, and so far as they ever deserved attention they deserve it still. To take an example : I should not now conclude the diatribe on the smoke nuisance, and its possible remedy, with merely urging the distribution of gaseous fuel and the utilisation of other products from the distillation of coal, though those things still remain important. But this is an age of electricity, and the distribution of electric power on a large scale will be one of the special privileges of the coming generation. Already the General Electric and other such organisations have made prodigious advances. Dynamos of huge size are constructed and in use. The infant born to Faraday has grown up portentously, and the distribution of power for manufacturing purposes over Southern England will, if it be properly managed, secure the amenities of the country in combination with the productiveness of the town. Even apart from the discovery of sources of energy other than combustion, it will be possible for the industrial enterprise of coming generations to be conducted in a pure and healthy atmosphere, without serious damage to natural beauty,—a most beneficent outcome of properly applied science,

which will have consequences only partially imagined as yet.

Among other addresses, the one on Social Reform was fortunate enough to secure the rather enthusiastic adhesion of Lord Bryce, who was present when it was delivered. The lavish expenditure of public money in unprofitable directions is a contrast to the parsimony exercised in the encouragement of aims of a loftier and more remunerative character. Unnecessary burdens are bound to consume useful energy. Unwise economies are the inevitable consequence of waste. Surely the most hopeful enterprise of our own time is the movement towards the outlawry of war among civilised nations. Such a scheme, if it could be effectively adopted, would liberate a mine of wealth and power for beneficent purposes.

Social problems remain, but our power of attacking them is increasing, and will increase. The developments which are beginning, the changes that have occurred, and the ideals already in the ascendant, justify the present generation in being full of hope. I belong to a past generation, it is true, and some of the essays exhibit the exuberance of youth, especially those on 'The Pursuit of Wealth' and on 'Competition *v.* Co-operation.' But I am not ashamed of them; such modifications as are necessary increase rather than diminish their interest. And I welcome whatever renewed attention they may attract owing to their presentation in a new and improved form.

There are indeed many other problems which might

be entered upon, but these represent my contribution to Sociology, such as it is. And I trust that professed sociologists, and even a few statesmen, may turn a kindly eye on the conscientious efforts of an amateur.

Well, we are all travelling together, both as individuals and as a race, towards some unknown destiny—I will not call it a destination, for that suggests pre-ordainment,—a destiny which depends partly on ourselves. If we go astray occasionally it is not to be wondered at, for the track is as yet untrodden, and the direction seems uncertain. Yet for better for worse we must proceed. Surely the air tends to clear as we advance. Either we can see a little further ahead, or we have learnt something from our failures. I believe that there is more guidance than appears on the surface. Perhaps the path is not so untrodden after all.

OLIVER LODGE

July 1928

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MODERN PROBLEMS

I

HUXLEY ON MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE ¹

FORTY years ago the position of scientific studies was not so firmly established as it is to-day, and a conflict was necessary to secure their general recognition. The forces of obscurantism and of free-and-easy dogmatism were arrayed against them ; and, just as in former centuries astronomy, and in more recent times geology, so in our lifetime biology, has had to offer a harsh and fighting front, lest its progress be impeded by the hostility born of preconceived opinions, and by the bigotry of self-appointed guardians of conservative views.

The man who probably did as much as any to fight the battle of science in the nineteenth century, and secure the victory for free inquiry and progressive knowledge, is Thomas Henry Huxley ; and it is an interesting fact that already the lapse of time is making it possible to bring his writings in cheap form to the notice of a multitude of interested readers. The pugnacious attitude, however, which, forty years ago, was appropriate, has become a little antique now ; the conflict is not indeed over, but it has either totally shifted its ground, or is continued on the old battle-field chiefly by survivors, and by a few complacent

zealots of a younger generation who have been brought up in the old spirit.

The truths of materialism now run but little risk of being denied or ignored, they run perhaps some danger of being exaggerated. Brilliantly true and successful in their own territory, they are occasionally pushed by enthusiastic disciples over the frontier line into regions where they can do nothing but break down. As if enthusiastic worshippers of motor-cars, proud of their performance on the good roads of France, should take them over into the Sahara or essay them on a Polar expedition.

That represents the mistake which, in modern times, by careless thinkers, is being made. They tend to press the materialistic statements and scientific doctrines of a great man like Huxley, as if they were co-extensive with all existence. This is not really a widening of the materialistic aspect of things, it is a cramping of everything else ; it is an attempt to limit the universe to one of its aspects.

But the mistake is not made solely, nor even chiefly, by those eager disciples who are pursuing the delusive gleam of a materialistic philosophy—for these there is hope ; to attempt is a healthy exercise, and they will find out their mistake in time ; but the mistake is also made by those who are specially impressed with the spiritual side of things, who so delight to see guidance and management everywhere, that they wish to blind their eyes to the very mechanism whereby it is accomplished. They think that those who point out and earnestly study the mechanism are undermining the foundations of faith. Nothing of the kind. A traveller in the deck-cabin of an Atlantic liner may prefer to ignore the engines and the firemen, and all the machinery and toil which is urging him luxuriously

forward over the waves in the sunshine ; he may try to imagine that he is on a sailing vessel propelled by the free air of heaven alone ; but there is just as much utilization of natural forces to a desired end in one case of navigation as in the other, and every detail of the steamship, down to the last drop of sweat from a fireman's grimy body, is an undeniable reality.

There are people who still resent the conclusions of biology as to man's place in nature, and try to counteract them ; but, as the late Professor Ritchie said (*Philosophical Studies*, p. 24) :

'It is a mistake, which has constantly been made in the past by those who are anxious for the spiritual interests of man, to interfere with the changes which are going on in scientific conceptions. Such interference has always ended in the defeat of the supporters of the quasi-scientific doctrines which the growing science of the time has discarded. Theology interfered with Galileo, and gained nothing in the end by its interference. Astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, historical criticism, have at different periods raised alarm in the minds of those who dread a materialistic view of man's nature ; and with the very best intentions they have tried to fight the supposed enemy on his own ground, eagerly welcoming, for instance, every sign of disagreement between Darwinians and Lamarckians, or every dispute between different schools of historical critics, as if the spiritual well-being of mankind were bound up with the scientific beliefs of the seventeenth, or even earlier, century, as if, *e.g.*, it made all the difference in man's spiritual nature whether he was made directly out of inorganic dust or slowly ascended from lower organic forms. These are questions that must be settled by specialists. On the other hand, philosophic criticism is in place when the scientific specialist begins to dogmatize about the universe as a whole, when he speaks, for example, as if an accurate narrative of the various steps by which the lower forms of life have passed into the higher was a sufficient explanation to us of the mystery of existence.'

Let it be understood, therefore, that science is one thing and philosophy another : that science most properly concerns itself with matter and motion. and

reduces phenomena, as far as it can, to mechanism. The more successfully it does that, the more it fulfils its end and aim. But when, on the strength of that achievement, it seeks to blossom into a philosophy, when it endeavours to conclude that its scope is complete and all-inclusive, that nothing exists in the universe but mechanism, and that the aspect of things from a scientific point of view is their only aspect—then it is becoming narrow and bigoted and deserving of rebuke. Such rebuke it received from Huxley, such rebuke it will always receive from scientific men who realize properly the magnitude of existence and the vast potentialities of the universe.

Our opportunities of exploration are good as far as they go, but they are not extensive; we live as it were in the mortar of one of the stones of St. Paul's Cathedral; and yet so assiduously have we cultivated our faculties that we can trace something of the outline of the whole design and have begun to realize the plan of the building—a surprising feat for insects of limited faculty. And—continuing the parable—two schools of thought have arisen: one saying that it was conceived in the mind of an architect and designed and built wholly by him, the other saying that it was put together stone by stone in accordance with the laws of mechanics and physics. Both statements are true; and those that emphasize the latter are not thereby denying the existence of Christopher Wren, though to the unwise enthusiasts on the side of design they may appear to be doing so. Each side is stating a truth, but neither side is stating the whole truth. Nor should we find it easy with all our efforts to state the whole truth exhaustively, even about such a thing as that. Those who deny any side of truth are, to that extent, unbelievers and Huxley was righteously in-

dignant with those short-sighted bigots who blasphemed against that aspect of divine truth which had been specially revealed to him. This is what he lived to preach, and to this he was faithful to the uttermost.

Let him be thought of as a devotee of truth, and a student of the more materialistic side of things, but never let him be thought of as a philosophical materialist or as one who abounded in cheap negations.

The objection which it is necessary to express concerning Materialism as a complete system is based not on its assertions but on its negations. In so far as it makes positive assertions, embodying the result of scientific discovery and even of scientific speculation based thereupon, there is no fault to find with it ; but when, on the strength of that, it sets up to be a philosophy of the universe—all-inclusive, therefore, and shutting out a number of truths otherwise perceived, or which appeal to other faculties, or which are equally true and are not really contradictory of legitimately materialistic statements—then it is that its insufficiency and narrowness have to be displayed. As Professor Ritchie said : ‘ The “ legitimate materialism of the sciences ” simply means temporary and convenient abstraction from the cognitive conditions under which there are “ facts ” or “ objects ” for us at all ; it is “ dogmatic materialism ” which is metaphysics of the bad sort.’

It will be probably instructive, and it may be sufficient, if I show that two great leaders in scientific thought (one the greatest of all men of science who have yet lived), though well aware of much that could be said positively on the materialistic side, and very willing to admit or even to extend the province of

science or exact knowledge to the uttermost, yet were very far from being philosophic materialists or from imagining that other modes of regarding the universe were thereby excluded.

Great leaders of thought, in fact, are not accustomed to take a narrow view of existence, or to suppose that one mode of regarding it, or one set of formulæ expressing it, can possibly be sufficient and complete. Even a sheet of paper has two sides: a terrestrial globe presents different aspects from different points of view; a crystal has a variety of facets; and the totality of existence is not likely to be more simple than any of these—is not likely to be readily expressible in any form of words, or to be thoroughly conceivable by any human mind.

It may be well to remember that Sir Isaac Newton was a Theist of the most pronounced and thorough conviction, although he had a great deal to do with the reduction of the major Cosmos to mechanics, *i.e.* with its explanation by the elaborated machinery of simple forces; and he conceived it possible that, in the progress of science, this process of reduction to mechanics would continue till it embraced nearly all the phenomena of nature. (See extract below.) That, indeed, has been the effort of science ever since, and therein lies the legitimate basis for materialistic statements, though not for a materialistic philosophy.

The following sound remarks concerning Newton are taken from Huxley's *Hume*, page 246:

‘Newton demonstrated all the host of heaven to be but the elements of a vast mechanism, regulated by the same laws as those which express the falling of a stone to the ground. There is a passage in the preface to the first edition of the *Principia* which shows that Newton was penetrated, as completely as Descartes, with the belief that all the phenomena of nature are expressible in terms of matter and motion:—

“Would that the rest of the phenomena of nature could be deduced by a like kind of reasoning from mechanical principles. For many circumstances lead me to suspect that all these phenomena may depend upon certain forces, in virtue of which the particles of bodies, by causes not yet known, are either mutually impelled against one another, and cohere into regular figures, or repel and recede from one another; which forces being unknown, philosophers have as yet explored nature in vain. But I hope that, either by this method of philosophizing, or by some other and better, the principles here laid down may throw some light upon the matter.”—Extract from Newton's *PRINCIPIA*.

Here is a full-blown anticipation of an intelligible exposition of the universe in terms of matter and force—the substantial basis of what smaller men call materialism and develop into what they consider to be a materialistic philosophy. But for this latter scheme there is no justification; and Professor Huxley himself, who is commonly spoken of by half-informed people as if he were a philosophic materialist, was really nothing of the kind; for although, like Newton, fully imbued with the mechanical doctrine, and, of course, far better informed concerning the biological departments of nature, and the discoveries which have in the last century been made—and though he rightly regarded it as his mission to make the scientific point of view clear to his benighted contemporaries, and was full of enthusiasm for the facts on which materialists take their stand—he saw clearly that these alone were insufficient for a philosophy. The following extracts from the Hume volume will show that he entirely repudiated materialism as a satisfactory or complete philosophical system, and that he was especially severe on gratuitous denials applied to provinces beyond our scope :

‘While it is the summit of human wisdom to learn the limit of our faculties, it may be wise to recollect that we have no

more right to make denials, than to put forth affirmatives, about what lies beyond that limit. Whether either mind or matter has a "substance" or not, is a problem which we are incompetent to discuss: and it is just as likely that the common notions upon the subject should be correct as any others. . . . "The same principles which, at first view, lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to common sense" (p. 282).

'Moreover, the ultimate forms of existence which we distinguish in our little speck of the universe are, possibly, only two out of infinite varieties of existence, not only analogous to matter and analogous to mind, but of kinds which we are not competent so much as to conceive,—in the midst of which, indeed, we might be set down, with no more notion of what was about us, than the worm in a flower-pot, on a London balcony, has of the life of the great city' (p. 286).

And again, on pages 251 and 279:

'It is worth any amount of trouble to . . . know by one's own knowledge the great truth . . . that the honest and rigorous following up of argument which leads us to "materialism" inevitably carries us beyond it.'

'To sum up. If the materialist affirms that the universe and all its phenomena are resolvable into matter and motion Berkeley replies, True; but what you call matter in motion are known to us only as forms of consciousness; their being is to be conceived or known; and the existence of a state of consciousness apart from a thinking mind is a contradiction in terms.

'I conceive that this reasoning is irrefragable. And therefore, if I were obliged to choose between absolute materialism and absolute idealism, I should feel compelled to accept the latter alternative.'

Let the jubilant but uninstructed and comparatively ignorant amateur materialist therefore beware, and bethink himself twice or even thrice before he conceives that he understands the universe, and is competent to pour scorn upon the intuitions and perceptions of great men in what may be to him alien regions of thought and experience.

Let him explain, if he can, what he means by his

own identity, or the identity of any thinking or living being, which at different times consists of a totally different set of material particles. Something there clearly is which confers personal identity and constitutes an individual: it is a property characteristic of every form of life, even the humblest; but it is not yet explained or understood, and it is no answer to assert gratuitously that there is some fundamental substance or material basis on which that identity depends, any more than it is an explanation to say that it depends upon a soul. These are all forms of words. As Hume says, quoted by Huxley with approval, in the work already cited, page 194:

'It is impossible to attach any definite meaning to the word "substance," when employed for the hypothetical substratum of soul and matter. . . . If it be said that our personal identity requires the assumption of a substance which remains the same while the accidents of perception shift and change, the question arises, What is meant by personal identity? . . . A plant or an animal, in the course of its existence, from the condition of an egg or seed to the end of life, remains the same neither in form, nor in structure, nor in the matter of which it is composed: every attribute it possesses is constantly changing, and yet we say that it is always one and the same individual' (p. 197).

And in his own preface to the Hume volume Huxley expresses himself forcibly thus—equally antagonistic as was his wont to both ostensible friend and ostensible foe, as soon as they got off what he considered the straight path:

'That which it may be well for us not to forget is, that the first-recorded judicial murder of a scientific thinker [Socrates] was compassed and effected, not by a despot, nor by priests, but was brought about by eloquent demagogues. . . . Clear knowledge of what one does not know is just as important as knowing what one does know. . . .

'The development of exact natural knowledge in all its vast

range, from physics to history and criticism is the consequence of the working out, in this province, of the resolution to "take nothing for truth without clear knowledge that it is such"; to consider all beliefs open to criticism; to regard the value of authority as neither greater nor less, than as much as it can prove itself to be worth. The modern spirit is not the spirit "which always denies," delighting only in destruction; still less is it that which builds castles in the air rather than not construct; it is that spirit which works and will work "without haste and without rest," gathering harvest after harvest of truth into its barns, and devouring error with unquenchable fire' (p. viii).

The harvesting of truth is a fairly safe operation, for if some falsehood be inadvertently harvested along with the grain, we may hope that, having a less robust and hardy nature, it will before long be detected by its decaying odour; but the rooting up and devouring of error with unquenchable fire is a more dangerous enterprise, inasmuch as flames are apt to spread beyond our control; and the lack of infallibility in the selection of error may to future generations become painfully apparent. The phrase represents a good, healthy, energetic mood, however, and in a world liable to become overgrown with weeds and choked with refuse, the cleansing work of a firebrand may, from time to time, be a necessity, in order that the free wind of heaven and the sunlight may once more reach the fertilized soil.

But it is unfair to think of Huxley even when young as a firebrand, though it is true that he was to some extent a man of war, and though the fierce and consuming mood is rather more prominent in his early writings than in his later work. A fighting attitude was inevitable forty years ago, because then the truths of biology were being received with hostility, and the free science and philosophy of a later time seemed likely to have a poor chance of life. But the world has

changed or is changing now, the wholesome influences of fire have done their work, and it would be a rather barbarous anachronism to apply the same agency among the young, green shoots of healthy learning which are springing up in the cleared ground.

II

THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN THE STATE¹

AN effort towards widening the scope and political and professional importance of women has been a leading feature of the quiet revolution that has been going on for the past half century.

Early memories can recall episodes characteristic of the low estimate of women's intelligence and public spirit formed by average people, and some of us can also recall memories of the resentment felt and expressed by women of ability and latent power at the occurrence of such episodes. Improvement was inevitable ; and already a great deal has been accomplished. The tone of the youthful male is no longer so offensive and patronizing as it used to be ; and the eminence to which women have attained in certain fields of work is recognized by all. The advance is likely to continue, for there is still much room for improvement, though the unwisdom of some of its less eminent but specially energetic supporters seems likely to cause a premature reaction.

Sooner or later, however, a reaction is bound to come, and it behoves all who wish the movement well to pause and consider from time to time what it is that they really wish achieved, what it is that can be

¹ Partly from a Preface to a volume of collected addresses on the subject.

permanently retained in accordance with the fullest appreciation of natural fact, and when and in what direction the movement is becoming lawless and in need of curb. By such consideration it may be possible to diminish the tendency which all enthusiastically supported movements exhibit to run into extravagance in certain directions ; whereby a protective swing of equal unwisdom and perhaps greater deleteriousness is liable to occur in the opposite direction ; of greater deleteriousness, in all probability, because, like all reactionary movements, it is loaded with the inertia of ancestral prejudice. Such dangers can only be avoided by wisdom and knowledge and foresight. To rush blindly on without regard to past history and racial experience, and heedless of dangers ahead, is fanatical rather than heroic ; it is to imitate the activity of the runaway horse which brings itself and all connected with it to destruction.

An attempt, therefore, coolly and dispassionately to survey the general position, to discuss the rational claims which can be made, the admitted diversities which must be recognized, and the historical and scientific aspect of the whole question, is called for in the name of common sense, both by those who think the movement has already gone far enough and by those who wish it to go further.

People who sympathize largely with the latter group may yet recognize certain dangers and defects in the system of training at present in vogue, and may doubt whether as a preparation for life it is the best that can be given. Every one must realize that women can perform a service to the State more vital, more arduous, and therefore more honourable, than any other ; many believe that their instincts would lead the majority of women to fulfil this duty adequately and

responsibly and heartily, if the State were wise enough to free them and educate them for its due accomplishment ; and some are impressed with the conviction that a right understanding of the laws of heredity, the management of infancy, and the judicious training of childhood, would have a more direct and beneficent influence on the future of the human race than any other reform that is within reach of accomplishment.

But the whole subject is a large and difficult one, and is full of problems which cannot be solved by the intellect alone. To coerce sane people into arrangements made in accordance with statistical and medical advice alone is quite impracticable, and would lead to furious revolt. Besides, even if practicable, the attempt would be unwise ; Love is a spirit which rises superior to human understanding, and in its majesty affords a surer and diviner guide than any law or system. The spirit can appear in many disguises—strict justice, public service, organizing energy, social work, among others—and can assume unexpected shapes ; already it achieves more than is generally recognized, it must ultimately dominate all human activity ; and when the affairs of the world are really controlled in harmony with the spirit of Love the millennium will have come.

Meanwhile the great essential to all sound development, among creatures endowed with will and purpose and self-control, is freedom—freedom to choose a career, freedom to impose self-restrictions, freedom to plan and to act—such legitimate and balanced freedom, subject to full civic responsibility, as was pleaded for by John Stuart Mill ; such removal of external restraints and artificial disabilities from women as is now seriously demanded and cannot long be withheld.

So far all may be fairly agreed, but many are pre-

pared to go further. Every one must recognize the splendid work which has been done by women in social and educational fields: and it will, I believe, come more and more to be recognized that in some respects women are specially fitted for government and for official and municipal life. In the highest Office in the kingdom a woman has proved pre-eminent, and it is absurd to adduce disabilities and disqualifications in the face of that and other only less brilliant examples. We should always mistrust artificial and arbitrary disqualifications. The simpler and freer our arrangements can be, the better, and it is a highly artificial disqualification to disfranchise property because it is owned or occupied by a woman. So long as property votes, so long as there is a franchise due to ownership or occupation of land or house, so long the owner or responsible occupier should exercise the right, quite irrespective of sex or of whether married or single, or of any other question not recognized by law as disqualifying from full ownership. All such questions are merely impertinent—that is to say, beside the mark. The vote itself is a trivial affair, but its artificial withholding is a gratuitous insult: we need not be surprised that the arbitrary withholding of that small function is one that galls out of all proportion to its importance. Let us recognize the desirability of doing away with artificial obstacles, and giving to every one a clear field and an equal chance—a fair share in education, an open entrance to the professions, and a fair and reasonable opportunity of service in every direction. For it is a wholesome feature of the times that opportunities for public service are what are being contended for; these are the privileges now most craved, and it is a sign of high civilization that it should be so. By the self-

sacrificing efforts of many noble women those rights of service have been at length largely conceded, the opportunity most recently granted being membership of county and borough councils. Ratepayers are now no longer prevented from returning whom they will to manage their affairs. The progress made towards the freedom and recognition of women's public work during the last fifty years has been prodigious : and their service to the community in a direction of home rule or local administration will surely prove of great importance. The future development of local self-government will prove the salvation of England, if England is to be saved : it could not go on much longer as it has placidly been going on of late. The administrative councils of counties, and soon, I hope, the Senates of greater districts or Provinces, will become dignified bodies of supreme capacity for the control of local business ; thereby liberating Imperial Parliament for the attractive, but after all less vital and less pressing, problems of Imperial federation and management of half the world. Less vital and less pressing, because a nation cannot hope to continue that high mission unless it is able to set its own house in order and manage its own affairs in such a way as to satisfy the heart and conscience of its best and most intelligent citizens.

III

THE FUNCTIONS OF MONEY¹

BY money I do not mean coin alone, of course ; any stamped document, whether on metal or on paper, is equally money, provided it is able to obtain in exchange a certain portion of human labour, whether of brain or of muscle. It is chiefly in the petty affairs of housekeeping that coin passes from hand to hand. All large mercantile transactions are conducted on a basis of bookkeeping, and no coin is, as a rule, actually paid over by anybody.

It will be thought that the word 'money' in the title should be replaced by 'riches,' and indeed the change might avoid some momentary misconception, but one of my theses—no doubt an elementary one—is that the ready possibility and existence of riches is due to a secondary or accidental attribute or function of *money*. After dealing with this consequence, and some conceivable modes of avoiding it, I do in the sequel chiefly mean 'riches' (inequality of possession), though nowhere do I mean that which in the true sense is 'wealth' (real and absolute value to the commonweal). I feel that I owe an apology to professed Economists for presuming to write on a subject outside my province ; they are, however, well accustomed to have their domain taken an interest in by

¹ An article which appeared in the *Economic Review* for October 1898.

outsiders, and they will not be unduly hard on another vagrant.

A thing is of value when it has cost human labour to produce it and when it can be put to some use, whether of ornament or utility. Mere scarcity is not a criterion of value. Helium is scarce enough, but it would fetch a poor price in the market. If it subserved a useful purpose, the lack of price would not matter; but the scarcer a thing is, the less likely is it to be generally useful.

The ultimate standard of value is human labour, but as a practical standard certain valuable counters are used. A sovereign is not a *mere* counter; it is a valuable commodity. It satisfies the two criteria of value: it cost human labour, perhaps life, to find it, and it can be used for dentistry and acid pans and wedding rings. As practical and proximate standards of value sovereigns serve, but the ultimate standard is human labour. If gold could be picked up like stones it would have to be demonetized; it would no longer serve as a practical standard of value, because its relation to human labour would have altered. Every large discovery of gold acts in this direction, and depreciates the value of a sovereign. Whether this is to be considered a calamity or not depends upon how we regard society. I shall not enter into that question.

My first point is that the standard of money value is the amount and quality of human labour it can procure; and if, as Mr. Ruskin suggested, half a crown were inscribed one man's unskilled labour for one day, and a sovereign were inscribed one man's labour for a week, a five-pound note a week's labour of a skilled artisan and his family, it would tend to bring home to unthinking persons the meaning of what they may be squandering. Indeed, other labels could be put

upon a sovereign, of some import to society : subornation of perjury is one function of money ; temptation to other forms of dishonour is another. I shall let those functions alone.

A labouring man who receives five shillings has done his day's work therefor, and when he expends the five shillings in beer or in boots he practically binds himself to do another day's work for that beer or those boots. He can choose his own wages in kind, up to a certain limit of value ; the money leaves choice open, but defines the amount of his claim. Suppose, at the end of many years of toil, he has saved £300 ; he has now the choice whether he will cease to work for the remainder of his old age, and live on his savings, or whether he will buy something, say a picture, with them, at the cost of having to continue to work or beg till death ; or, a third alternative, unfortunately only too possible in practice, whether he will entrust his savings (the savings, namely, of his future labour) to Jabez Balfour and his kin. In practice the buying of a picture would be a lunatic act for him, but, nevertheless, in practice people do buy pictures, for £300 and even more. They are thereby handing over to the artist, or more usually to the dealer or middleman, an accumulated stock of human labour, which, if they had to redeem it themselves, would involve them in a good deal of hard work, either past or future. Redeemed in labour somehow it must be, but devices have been found whereby the labour need not be performed by the purchaser himself. He is perhaps a tax-gatherer, or rent-collector, or coupon-cutter, or monopoly-owner, or descendant of a royal favourite, or possessor of some other profitable sinecure, whereby it has been secured that the fruits of the earth belong to him and the labour of it to others.

This is a matter of social arrangement, and has nothing to do with the ordinary purchasing power of money. It is a social arrangement which still has many years of life before it, no doubt, but it is an arrangement on which the spread of education is likely to shed some light, and, when well illuminated, it is an arrangement which may perhaps be changed. I said that it had nothing to do with the purchasing or exchanging power of money, but it has arisen from another very curious property or function of money to which I shall shortly proceed.

Money began as a medium of exchange, a convenient practical standard of universal value, one whose exchanging power could remain dormant and be exercised at will in a way impossible to perishable commodities. This power of exchange is the one legitimate and useful and wholesome function of money, and will, I suppose, last a long time, for it defines the relative claim of each individual upon society, and indicates to him when he is stepping near the limit of his permissible demands. It is difficult to imagine that a check of this kind will ever cease to be necessary, but it is too much our habit to suppose that what has lasted ten centuries must henceforward be eternal. It is usual for human systems to have their day and cease to be ; it is hardly likely that money is so nearly divine in its essence and action that it will prove an exception to the rule. The institution of money as defining relative claims does not even now obtain in the family. The claim of a member of the family who is lame or blind or chronically ill may be very great ; on the other hand, the service rendered by a member who is well and strong and able may be very great ; but one does not *pay* the other. Co-operation and mutual help is the rule. To some extent it is the rule in any

friendly association—even an association for profit, at least when the profit is not that of the workers. One member is sick or incapacitated by accident—others do his work for a time. On board ship, for instance, I suppose this happens, without any question of money.

So when, some day, the human race or a nation has become a family, its members may manage to serve and be served according to their real necessities and powers, and not according to some conventional code carefully checked off and limited by means of counters. Utopian! doubtless, but several things taught by Christianity are utopian. By aiming at perfection something far short of it may be attained. It would be strange if, in an ideal Christian State, it should be necessary to check and limit the demands and services of its members by a system of tallies and bookkeeping. Indeed, even now a person in illness or other bodily need is taken care of, independently of his means; and that in no grudging spirit, so long as his need is not the result of old age.¹ In that last evil case, indeed, the assistance afforded him is of the most grudging and ignominious kind; but if afflicted with disease, especially if it be an interesting ailment, no inquiry is made as to whether it arose from indolence or vice; he is taken skilful care of by society until dead or reasonably well. So that even now the purchasing power of money is in some cases dispensed with, and direct service rendered according to need. Nor is the effect of hospital aid on its recipient found to be evil; on the contrary, it has often proved regenerative, and has done something to humanize the rebellious feelings which other forms of social activity had sown and fostered.

Press this a little further, into rooms of health in-

¹ This was written before the Introduction of Old Age Pensions.

stead of only into rooms of sickness, and an approach to one aspect of William Morris's *Nowhere* will have been attained. Far be it from me to press that Utopia in detail, or to praise it as entirely desirable; all I need show now is that the idea of dispensing with money is not so hopelessly fanciful and impracticable as at first it sounds.

Once more, in certain cases it makes but little practical difference whether a community says to an artist or musician or philosopher, 'Come and live among us, and edify or interest us, and we will supply your needs in the way of modest house-room, and service, and recreation,' or whether it says, 'Come, and we will adjudge to you the optional distribution of so many hundred counters annually.' The latter method is the more business-like, but, so long as it is only a question of spending and not of saving up for a future day, there is no great difference.

The real and extraordinary use and abuse of money arises from its happening to possess that collateral and at first unsuspected and unintended power of which I have already spoken—namely, the power to be stored and accumulated almost without limit, and afterwards passed on from owner to owner, without service necessarily rendered by the recipient, but always with the power of compelling labour on the part of the bulk of humanity: a kind of magic-wand, compelling homage, obedience, and service to the accidental possessor for the time being.

This secondary function of money has entirely eclipsed its mere exchange function in national and international importance. It has given rise to a new and extraordinarily powerful class, the millionaire and financier class, who 'own,' as they call it, the land, and the instruments of production, and very nearly

own the labour itself. Such accumulation would be impossible save for the existence of money. No man could store food, or provender, or clothes, or hardware. Moth and rust would corrupt. No man can conveniently or safely hoard sovereigns in any great quantity. Thieves would be too likely to break through and steal. But the ingenuity of man has got over these ancient difficulties, and by aid of stocks and shares it is now quite possible to have our treasure where our heart is.

The result is regarded with equanimity, but it cannot be considered altogether happy and peaceful. Disputes arise between the man who owns the property and the workmen who have to use it. The man who owns is not, indeed, nowadays always a man: he is often a many-headed monster—*société anonyme*, as they call it in France; and being free from individual feeling and responsibility, is frequently greedy, unimaginative, and thoughtless. A man of means to-day may be at the same time—of course, by deputy—a manufacturing chemist, a coal proprietor, an iron founder, a timber merchant, a shipowner, a landlord, and a farmer; and not one of these businesses shall he even pretend to understand or touch with the tips of his fingers, so long as he possesses a competent agent to superintend it.

By no possibility could one man's labour result in a great accumulation of wealth. Let him be as industrious as a whole colony of ants, and work twenty-four hours a day, he could not for any day-wage earn a million. By steady work a man can earn a living, perhaps a good living, but no more. Fortunes are not made in that way. The fact that fortunes can, and indeed must, be otherwise made, is not an encouragement to steady industry. I believe that it

exerts an extremely depressing and unwholesome influence on steady industry.

But it may be said that the personal labour of some men of genius is of vast worth to the human race ; and the saying is indeed true ; but worth of this kind is seldom rightly estimated by the public, and the coin in which they pay for it is sometimes of a strange kind. Did Kepler or Milton leave a fortune ? What price do we offer for the services of a Mazzini or a Gordon ? It is not one of the functions of money to pay for such services as those. As I have said elsewhere, death was the only fitting *payment* for the Sermon on the Mount.

No more on that subject. Return to our rich men.

Has not a millionaire worked for his fortune ? Has he not taken thought for it, and striven early and late, and been clever and strong ? Yes, indeed, in many cases it is so ; and in any state of society one cannot help admiring the architect of his own fortunes, even if he is the architect of nothing else. But how many there are who are much else ! Do we not know of men, noble men in all reality, whose desire is to spend and be spent in the public service, who are foremost in good works, not only with their purses but with their living interest, with themselves ?

But what then : has not every condition of society its saints ? Ill would it be for the world if the bright powers and heart-goodness of humanity could not anywhere or at all flourish, because of the harmfulness of the social atmosphere. There are delicate exotics which may show rare beauty if properly cultivated ; these we shall not see in an untended garden ; but strong and hardy plants which rear their heads and flourish in almost any climate are evidence, not of the goodness of the climate, but of the vitality and

perfection of their seed and sap. Such men are among the best hopes of humanity, the eye of the needle is their opportunity, and, whether it be hard or easy, through it they go.

We may take a lower level than that, however, and say, further, that if every rich man had really been the architect of his own fortune, things would not be so bad. Such a man must have character, there must be some natural fitness between him and his surroundings which has resulted in the accumulation of so much of the world's wealth in his hands. It is well, it is at least permissible, that the man who has accumulated wealth should also exercise the power of it, and have the option of dispensing it. But in nine cases out of ten the maker of the fortune is not its dispenser. He may have no time, he may have no inclination ; he passes it on to a successor ; he is allowed to do so by the social institution of inheritance.

What natural fitness is there now about this new possessor ? Where is his grit, and strong character, and born mastery of men and things ? It is an affair of chance. He may be a peaceful, virtuous citizen ; he may be a riotous sot : he may be an industrious labourer for the public good ; he may spend all his hours in bed, and think of no one but himself. It is no matter to his fortune ; men work while he sleeps, he ' employs ' much labour, his property increases of itself : and if he will only abstain from a few rash amusements, like horse-racing or gambling, ordinary vices will in no way damage his property, and he can pass it on to his nephew when he chooses, or when it is time for him, too, to go.

' Work mun ha ' gone to the getting wherever money was got.' Yes, truly it must, but not necessarily the work of the owner nor even the getter of the money.

An ingenious person knows how to direct streams of wealth into his direction without expending much labour (witness some transactions connected with South African and other company promoting); and by the institution of the unearned increment, and the further institution of inheritance, it is possible for the idlest scamp on the planet to become a multi-millionaire, for the most vicious to become the patron of twenty livings, for an unscrupulous and selfish scoundrel to have the disposal of a considerable portion of the world's wealth. Is there any consolation in the thought that an unwieldy property is no blessing to the man who possesses it? Is not this an aggravation of the misfortune? Evil to everybody else and a curse to the man himself? Surely it is time to reconsider the institution of inheritance of property?

Constantly one meets the ghastly fallacy that it matters not who has the money, because it can only be spent, and so every one must share it sooner or later. I want to attack this fallacy. The 'sooner or later' is part of it; time is of the essence of any contract to a short-lived race like ourselves; if decent income is postponed till too late in life, it does make a difference. But the question of time is the most obvious, and so the least deadly, part of the fallacy; the deadly part is not seeing that it is the transfer of money, *the power of directing the transfer*, that is important, and not the money itself. Service can be demanded and may have to be rendered for each transfer, and it is the power of directing the transfer and determining the service that constitutes the wealth. Otherwise money would be infinite; a sovereign can be handed on and on and on, and is there all the time. Is it, then, a hundred sovereigns?

No ; but one. It is one at each transfer, and that is the meaning of a sovereign. A millionaire has the transferring power of a million sovereigns ; he can transfer them when, where, and how he likes : and that is his wealth. By the institution of interest it is indeed more, for by that means he can purchase £40,000 worth of labour every year, and his son and grandson can do the same for ever, if they are only wary and chary of the principal ; but that is not my point at present. My point is, that riches consist in the control of the transfer of the money *once*.

When transferred, of course somebody has it, and that somebody has now his portion of transferring power, *i.e.* purchasing power, to exercise ; but it has made all the difference to him whether he has had to work in a yard for five years to get the power, or whether it was his to start with. To say that it does not matter who owns the money is nonsense, only possible to a purblind and confused view of the case. This error is not made in respect of other commodities. It is not thought immaterial who has the gunpowder and the bullets, even though the human race is sure to get the benefit of their distribution sooner or later. Their aim and direction of transfer is attended to.

But there is another fallacy, a secondary outcome of the institution of interest. It is said that the capital of a scamp is, after all, invested in remunerative employment, and that though he may waste the income in debauching himself and his fellows, the capital is honestly employed, and results in much labour and profit. But now consider whence comes the profit : why is there a dividend each year in a manufacturing business ? and why does money thus grow, as if it possessed vegetable or animal life ? Is it not because animal life indeed is at work ? Is it

not because of the brains, and arms, and fingers of a thousand able and industrious workers? Is it not the enterprise and the labour that has really produced the dividend? Would there be any such fruits without labour?

No; but, it will be said, neither could there be any profit without capital. 'What capital?' let us ask. Papers in a lawyer's office, figures in a banker's book, gold bars in somebody's cellar? No, not these, but real capital—ships and engines, and land and tools, and all the instruments of production; of which land and sun and air are, after all, chief. Are not these needful to profit? Most certainly they are. But why on earth should they be owned by that hypothetical sluggard or scamp? 'Que diable allait-il faire dans cette galère?' Why do they not belong to those who use them, or to those who made them, or to the community whose needs they serve? Suppose that sluggard and his bank books and his title-deeds were all blown into extinction, blown out of human memory, and ceased to be, in a sane universe; what would be the difference? Not much difference to the land and the sunshine and the air, not much difference to the engines and the ships and the tools, not much difference to the manager, and farmer, and artisan, and labourer: but, oh great perplexity, nobody to receive the dividend! What on earth is to be done with it? Try and recollect the persons who would have indirectly received it had its late owner not so untimely disappeared. Let those persons come for it—a motley crew, not altogether respectable, not an army of whom society is very proud; let them come to the manager of the factory, to the steward of the ships, to the accountants in the various businesses dependent on the departed owner's capital,

and receive the dividend direct, without pandering to the body of the defunct heir. The spectacle would be an instructive one. The dividend would be really a dividend now, otherwise the difference would not be great. Perhaps, in the light of the instruction afforded by the spectacle, more difference might accrue in time; perhaps the profits resulting from the industry might come to be otherwise distributed.

So far, however, the effects of the gigantic individual fortunes encouraged by our modern money system have been of comparatively small area, and almost individual in scope; but there is now a larger function of money to be considered—the tendency of monetary interests to dominate the political world.

I am not touching on party politics—it has nothing to do with one party more than another, but every one must be convinced that the developments of the British Empire for good or ill are regulated and controlled by financial interests. A savage country is conquered, and its king, as we say, ‘punished,’ when his territory is required for trade purposes—not before; nor very much after: for we are a pushing race, and Maxim guns are fine things, automatic empire-extenders. The motives which induce the unfinancial part of the British public to acquiesce in such violences are not the motives really at work. The destruction of idols and the prevention of human sacrifices are not the real reasons for expensive expeditions. If these were the motives, such expeditions would be crusades. The time for crusades has for the present gone by—the near East is witness enough to that.¹

We hold whatever is of value in city quotations: we attack when foes are weak, we crouch when foes are strong: we are learning to enslave free though

¹ Written in 1898.

uncivilized people, and make them work for the good of a London company ; we have long taught them our vices, and administered to them our diseases ; in time we shall exterminate them : and by judicious meekness whenever we have a chance of really dangerous warfare, we may ultimately hope to inherit the earth.

I care not if it is opportune or appropriate to touch on such things here and now. Some of our doings in Africa have been bad enough, but our policy in Crete and Armenia, and every one of our dealings with Turkey I loathe and detest. It was not the policy of the nation—the nation was for once ready for a strong, upright, and disinterested policy. Owners of stocks and shares might quake, but the heart of the nation was sound ; it wanted no longer an ignominious and bastard peace, a peace not born of love and pity for humanity, but the offspring of covetousness and fear of the consequences of past misdeeds. The country was ready for an unselfish act, it was ready to use its great naval strength in support of struggling nationalities. It did not fear the German or any other emperor ; it did not want to ask permission of the discord of Europe or any other agglomeration of conflicting interests ; and if the nation had been called upon, it would have risen with a spontaneous enthusiasm that would have renewed its youth, shaken off the fat lethargy begotten of its recent commercial prosperity, and placed it once more in a position of dignity and honour in European councils. If our inaction, our misaction rather, and our craven yield, was not the policy of the nation neither was it the wish of the Government. We were told that any other action was too dangerous. In every way it is clear that what we did, we did not wish to do, and that we wished to see many things done which some-

thing, some interests, forbade us to do. What interests were those? The Prime Minister told us in so many words, his position was that of a Trustee. The interests at stake were too great. Decided acts would have been dangerous—not to army and navy, but to finance. The world is ruled by financiers. Wars are made by those who provide the immediate money for them. Neither Cretan nor Armenian (nor Greek either, for that matter) was in financial favour;¹ so the rulers of the earth decided to obliterate and weaken, so far as it seemed to them good. And we, we who had assumed the responsibility for keeping the Turk in Europe, and for placing the Armenians under his rule—we, whose pride it has been to sympathize with people struggling to be free and revolting against oppression—we, who sicken at the thought of massacre in cold blood, what did we do?

Seven miles of warships, and dare not lift a finger: dare not make up our own minds and stick to it! In face of a righteous and simple cause, retreat; in face of a weak or small nationality, bluster: this is the outcome of government from the Stock Exchange. There would have been no war, had we been righteously strong, had we shown that what we did was not done in favour of some miserable petty interest, was not done because we wanted another backstairs Cyprus. Hard, perhaps, to convince people of disinterestedness now, after years of—diplomacy; but it could have been done. Those who think otherwise, will hold that one of the functions of money has been to keep the peace; fear of disturbed securities has been a potent peace preserver. Well, we shall see how long

¹ And indeed they do not appear to be the salt of the earth,—centuries of misgovernment seldom develop admirable racial qualities; but the question was not whether they should be admired, but whether they should be slaughtered.

it will last. Our masters will let us know in good time, and when they choose the time for fighting I doubt if the people will have much heart for the business.

Dread of war at all costs is not the best security for a noble and worthy peace ; nor is it seemly for this country with its great traditions, to be subservient to any masters, contrary to its own sense of right, its own horror of injustice.

‘Our masters the Emperors,’ some of the papers say : but those are not our real and true masters ; there is a power behind the Emperors, to which even they must submit though they do so with less grace and habitual ease than ourselves. Newspapers are owned, opinion is manufactured, nations are governed, in one interest, the interest of property. There is a fifth estate of the realm now, more powerful than any of the other four, and the nation bows down before it. The supreme power is the power of the purse. The latest of the functions of money is to rule the modern world.

The following propositions may serve as a summary of the contentions in this chapter :

1. That human labour is the ultimate standard of value, and that coins might instructively be inscribed in terms of labour.

2. That by the institution of banks, stocks, and shares, and of inheritance, the original exchange power of money has become subordinate to its secondary and accidental but now supreme and unlimited storage power.

3. That the possession of money means the control of one transfer of it ; *i.e.* the determining of when and how it shall become active and influential on life.

4. That since wealth is the power of determining the direction of human activity, the personality of the owner is a vitally important factor.

5. That large fortunes are a menace to society by reason of the contrasts they emphasize, the power they confer, and the uncertain character of their owners.

6. That the present frequency of large fortunes is due to artificial social arrangements, which may be altered; and that it is desirable to reconsider and modify the law of inheritance.

7. That steady industry and moderate income are wholesomer, both for a nation and for an individual, than feverish activity and rapid acquisition.

8. That financial interests play a greater part in national and international politics than is desirable.

IV

THE PURSUIT OF WEALTH¹

IN speaking to the adult students of a college like this, persons who are engaged in the ordinary business of life, and for whose special benefit classes are held in the evening, one may adopt a tone different from that suitable to youths who have the whole day at liberty for study, and whose attendance here is often as much due to the influence of parent or guardian as to individual judgment and free will. I may assume that every one who comes to an evening class comes with a full understanding of the reasons for coming, and of the object to be gained.

Now, I want to ask what are those reasons, and what is that object. Are your reasons for coming here in harmony with the main purpose of the life of this city and country, or are they altogether discordant with that purpose?

I suppose the main purpose of the English nation at the present time would be said to be the pursuit of Wealth. I am by no means satisfied that this is a true statement of the average Englishman's main purpose, in fact I am pretty certain that it is not a true statement if understood accurately, but I do think it is his own idea of his main purpose. His principal aim is to 'get on,' and his idea of getting on

¹ An Address to Evening Students at University College, Liverpool, in 1886.

is to acquire more money than his neighbours. This it is which prompts the major part of commercial enterprise, and rewards the energy of the business man.

Well, what is the result of all our commercial prosperity and worship of the goddess of getting on? We are reckoned a wealthy nation. Liverpool is a wealthy city. But a foreigner, landing at a northern dock, after he has admired the river and the line of docks—true wealth of which the city is justly proud—may be a little staggered at the aspect of the rest of that region, and depressed by the unrelieved squalor which surrounds him on all hands. If he ask to see the largest building in the city, he must, I suppose, be taken to the top of Brownlow Hill, and shown, not the college, but the workhouse; and he may come to the conclusion that the wealth and prosperity of the city are, to say the least, very unequally distributed. The glaring thing, in a place like this, is not the wealth, but the extraordinary inequality of wealth: extreme riches, and extreme poverty. It may indeed be conjectured that what the average man is really pursuing is not so much national wealth as individual riches, *i.e.* inequalities of wealth; and that a great part of modern trade consists in endeavouring to establish an inequality of wealth in our own favour, *i.e.* to make ourselves rich at the expense of others.

Perhaps something like this is the main purpose of many energetic citizens; and perhaps it is not altogether a satisfactory purpose, or one that very greatly tends to enhance the happiness and comfort of the people.

Let us try and look back at the pursuit of some famous peoples in past times. Many here can do it for themselves. I can only roughly try to indicate my meaning.

The main purpose of an Athenian in the time of Socrates seems to have been to discuss schemes of philosophy, and to probe to the ultimate nature of things. Highly unpractical objects, and a great waste of time, such occupation would seem to the modern Englishman, whose object in life, whatever it may be, is certainly not this. Yet we do not find that the Athenians of this date take a low position in the general estimate of the world, and their writings and talkings on philosophy seem likely to be about as immortal as anything connected with their city, unless it be the hills upon which it was built.

The result of their life and thought is a permanent and rich possession to mankind ; its effect when re-discovered after centuries of oblivion was informing and stimulating in the highest degree ; and we may conjecture that never again will the human race allow this possession to be buried in even temporary oblivion.

A permanent and rich possession I have called it, and you allow the words. Are not permanent and rich possessions wealth ? And were these idle and talkative Athenians engaged in the pursuit and manufacture of wealth ? It does not seem improbable. It is, in fact, difficult to deny the applicability of these terms : and if so their occupation cannot after all have been quite so wasteful and unpractical as, to a modern Englishman, it at first sight appears.

What again was the main purpose of an Englishman in the time of Elizabeth ? Was it not in the fullest and freest sense to live, to develop his life and that of others in the largest manner, to travel and see the world, to depict human life in the drama, to enjoy fresh air and open country and scenes of joyousness. Professor Bradley has told us how men's minds were filled with the sense of largeness and beauty in the

world, which new discoveries and the opening of ancient literatures had almost created anew for them. Life was a thing to be rejoiced in and made much of ; even the life of the common people seemed joyous, and its development a worthy theme for poetry and romance. And the result was a patriotism capable of repelling an Armada, and a literature which, in some respects, surpasses everything that has been done in the world, before or since.

Are Shakespeare and Milton wealth to the human race, or are they not ? If you deny the term ' wealth ' to such perennial sources of enjoyment to unborn generations, and yet grant it to a piece of furniture, or a collection of minerals, you cannot surely be attending to the real meaning of the term.

What is this thing we call wealth ? In answering this question I have no wish to dogmatize. I merely wish to suggest the answer that commends itself to me, and to leave the question with you for your own consideration. I believe there are few more vital ones if it be properly understood.

First, I want to distinguish it not only from money, but from riches. The English language abounds in words which are roughly used as synonyms, which are really not synonyms, but are capable of being accurately defined and used each in its special and distinctive sense. In Physics we have happily discovered this, and continually make use of common words, defining them so as to convey an accurate meaning, and distinguishing between words which in common speech have the same, or a very definite, signification. Thus force, energy, momentum, impulse, power, activity, and a host of others, have now all accurate and well-defined meanings in Physics, though by no means in daily life. Even speed and

velocity are in science no longer exact synonyms. Undulation, wave, and ripple differ essentially.

This apprehension and fixing of English words, instead of inventing some barbarous Greek compound, is much to be commended ; and it would be probably very conducive to clear and precise understanding of other matters if *terms* were studied and used far more carefully than they at present are. Few things are more truly educative than a careful and precise use of language. 'Wealth,' and 'riches,' and 'money,' 'value,' 'price,' and 'cost,' are terms all capable of definite and distinct meanings, but at present they are very loosely used.

Now, 'Money' is defined by Mr. Ruskin as a documentary claim to the possession of wealth : it matters not whether it be stamped upon metal or upon paper, it is essentially of the nature of a stamp. It is true that the metal has other uses, and possesses intrinsic worth for other purposes, but *as money* its value lies in its durability and in its stamp : it is essentially a document.

The term 'Riches,' properly used, signifies inequality of wealth ; it is a purely relative term, one can only be rich by reason of other people being poor. If they don't want your money the possession of it gives you no power over them. But to hungry and needy persons a handful of sovereigns is an object of intense desire, and the fortunate possessor of them can obtain much servile labour in exchange for them.

There are thus two ways of getting rich, either by increasing our own wealth, or by diminishing that of other people : inequality of possession is the essence of riches. Wealth is a human thing ; riches are purely individual, and can be attained by mere transfer, or by gambling, without the production of any wealth

whatever. You cannot have riches without there being also poverty. It need not necessarily be excessive or grinding, but relative poverty the idea of riches, accurately considered, implies; and seldom has the lowest form of poverty failed to be both grinding and degrading.

But 'Wealth,' what is that? Is it not the possession of valuable things by persons capable of appreciating them? And are not valuable things those which 'avail' in developing a complete human life? This is Mr. Ruskin's form of expression,—I do not insist upon any form of expression,—but taking the word in its strict etymological sense, as allied with 'weal' or 'well-being,' we have only to think for ourselves what are those things which conduce to our true well-being, and those things are to us 'wealth.'

The majority of mankind seem to consider that cash, and other property so far as it has a cash value, is an object peculiarly conducive to well-being, and they accordingly have called this pre-eminently 'wealth.' I by no means deny that is one form of wealth; as a secondary adjunct, a means of enlarging one's life, and of enhancing the power of other and more primary forms of wealth, it is vitally important; but I doubt its pre-eminence. Time, health, a large human interest and sympathy, these surely conduce to the well-being of an individual or society, quite as much as the possession of gold, or houses, or land, or works of art. Though these also are true wealth to those who can use them.

For wealth has a twofold aspect, an objective and a subjective. A thing must not only be valuable in itself, it must be capable of being appreciated by its possessor; and to those who can appreciate it, to them only is it wealth. All these things are urged upon

us by Mr. Ruskin, and the illustrations which follow are largely borrowed from him.

A picture is not wealth to a dealer, or at least is only latent or potential wealth ; it is a mere medium of exchange, a documentary evidence of so much money which some one may be willing to give for the possession of that picture. A man who only owns things that he may sell them at an enhanced price is in fact a dealer or a storekeeper, whatever he may call himself.

Really to possess a thing we must be capable of appreciating it, we must have it for use and not for sale. A volume of Plato, or Newton, or Ruskin, on one's shelves, is no wealth to us unless we can use and appreciate it. A man who buys the Kelmscott Chaucer for £20, simply because he thinks that in a few years he can resell it for £80, and meanwhile never looks at it except with this thought in his mind, is a retailer of second-hand goods, and for him the book has been printed in vain.

The essence of wealth, again, does not always consist in its absolute amount ; its twofold aspect is still prominent. A small absolute amount may become of priceless value in special circumstances. A half-crown may represent true wealth to a poor woman whose sick child may be enabled, by its purchasing power, to tide over the crisis of an illness. A hundred sovereigns may be no wealth, but the direst filth, to the drowning wretch in whose pockets they serve only as a load to drag him to destruction. Such a man cannot be said to have the gold ; the gold has him. Is he, after all, so exceptional a case ?

What is the greatest wealth of a city like Liverpool ?

First, surely the energy and public spirit of its

inhabitants, without which all else were barren and unprofitable.

Second, its river frontage and line of docks ; then, perhaps, its library, museum, and picture gallery ; or perhaps its college and its schools ; and so on. It is unnecessary to particularize further ; but it is manifest that all these things have a twofold aspect, they imply the power of use and of appreciation ; so more particularly do great books, great discoveries, great works of art and natural scenery.

A mountain, a lake, a streamlet, are wealth to the man with soul and eyes to feel their beauty, whether he has a title-deed at his lawyer's for them or not ; to the man whose eyes are dark, whose ears are stopped, and whose heart is dull, the most beautiful things in the world exist in vain. Such a man may be rolling in coin, and yet, as Mr. Ruskin says, he may be no more wealthy than the locks of his own strong boxes ; he is inherently and eternally incapable of possessing wealth. He collects coin as a child might collect marbles, or a school-boy postage-stamps. He has no real tastes. Everything he possesses he reckons as worth so many additional gold counters, and that is all their value to him.

A poem, or a proposition in Mathematics, is worthless rubbish to some people : to the trained intelligence it may give the keenest delight. The quantity of things in the world, thus capable of *becoming* wealth, is nearly or quite infinite : all that is wanted, to make all this potential wealth actual, is the seeing eye and the understanding heart. The development of *these* is the real function of higher education, and by means of these alone is the possession of true wealth possible.

How should we reckon the value of things, if not in money ?

There are some things altogether invaluable. What was the value of Caxton's printing press to England? Suppose it had been possible to sell it and all its progeny out of the country—to sell away the right of printing for say three centuries for some hundred million pounds or the like: would it have been a good bargain? Suppose it were possible for Liverpool to sell its birthright sea-arm to Manchester: could it be made a profitable transaction? Suppose, by withholding labour and capital, it allowed the Mersey to silt up: would not all England be the poorer? These things are not to be reckoned in money. This is the nature of all the highest forms of wealth. The Alps to the Swiss are not a part of his wealth, they are the whole of it; without them they could never have preserved their independence and remained a nation. What is the value of Dante or Michael Angelo to Italy; of Shakespeare and Milton, of Tennyson and Morris, to England? The power of England we are sometimes told is coal! Nay, rather, is it not that which

‘though the whole world turn to coal
Then chiefly lives’?

If you grant me then that wealth, so far from being money, is not necessarily to be reckoned in money value at all; that wealth is that which is valuable in developing a complete human life, individual and social, and that certain kinds of it are altogether invaluable; that fresh air and sunshine are wealth, that beautiful country and mountains and green fields are wealth, that great books and pictures and serviceable commodities are wealth, in the hands of those who rightly understand and appreciate them; if you further grant me that wealth unappreciated and

unpossessed is but potential or latent, and that to bring out its true character demands the seeing eye and the understanding heart; that persons must be trained in order to be capable of really and truly possessing wealth, and that without such training or natural gift a man may be inherently incapable of any wealth whatever, though he live in a world full of beauty, surrounded by the productions of the wise and inspired of all ages, and with a ledger containing any number of ciphers after the one: if you grant all this, then I think you must feel with me that the pursuit and true understanding of wealth is the most important sublunary occupation in which men can engage, and that the functions of this college are very closely connected with it indeed.

What are these classes all for? Why do you come to study literature, and art, and philosophy, and economy, and mathematics, and history, and classics, and science, and all these things?

I asked you this question before, but this time I want to answer it. Is it not that you may become capable of possessing true wealth; that you may develop your heart and brain and soul, to be able to appreciate the great discoveries that are made in science, to sympathize with human struggle and effort, to perceive the beauty and order of nature, to take a worthy part in the life around you, and to participate in the highest aspirations of man?

You learn languages, that the learning and wisdom of the past may be open to you, and that you may better understand and use your mother tongue—the instrument by which you not only communicate with others, but without which it is doubtful whether you could think, in general terms, at all.

You learn history and literature, and try to under-

stand and sympathize with great men and great movements in the past, that by their aid you may better understand, and more wisely act, in the corresponding, but more perplexing, movements of to-day. You are thus no longer limited to the experience of your own lifetime, nor of your own country ; all the preserved experience of the world is before you : a rich endowment on which you have only to enter and take possession.

Again, you study art, that you may discern the meaning of all this helpless and futile effort after beauty and decoration, which goes on all round you at the present time, and which signally fails to attain any result on a large scale other than a sullen ugliness. You go back to the times when magnificent art was really possible, and you try to learn why it was possible then and not possible now. What was the different tone in society which enabled poor men to produce, and rich men to appreciate art ? Then, scarcely a house-window, or cottage-roof, could be built, except in some form of grateful beauty ; now, we build factories, and chimneys, and furnaces, and bridges, and our jerry builders run us up houses by the score, but they are not beautiful, they are often not even comfortable or water-tight.

Why has this palsy fallen upon art ? And why is the highest modern literature, as it seems to me, a literature of a kind of despair, not of a high and hopeful outlook into a land of promise ? Can it be that we are mistaking riches for wealth, that we are merely struggling to set up inequality of possession, and that for true wealth and wisdom the bulk of the nation care very little, and have no notion of really striving for it ? I do not answer the question, I only suggest it. I say the reason of the decline of art, and the

conditions under which it may again be possible, are questions which, if you come here, you *must* study, whether you do so explicitly and consciously or not.

You come here, once more, to study science and mathematics, that some glimpse of the magnificent discoveries of the present age may be gained by you, and that you may not go out of the world having never really lived in it, having never known the conceptions towards which men are striving, the truths they are dimly beginning to perceive. The horizon of scientific truth is broadening and brightening, and you are living in the midst of it. It is your right to know and see something of it. It is not to be seen without an effort; it is not to be felt equally in all moods, nor by all minds: but the times when a clear perception of some wide embracing law is attained, when the splendid harmony and correlation of the universe are even dimly glimpsed, these times more than compensate for years of arduous but not ungrateful struggle; and if asked, as indeed sometimes you *are* asked, practically though not directly, whether these high gains are worth a thousand pounds, or fifty thousand pounds, you scoff, as though offered money for your eyes, or for your life, or for your dearest friend. Wisdom is more to be desired than rubies! aye truly is it: it is an old saying, but the world does not yet really believe it.

Many of the inhabitants of a city like this labour on year after year, some in pitiable and yet pitiless poverty; others, enriched by this very poverty and by the power which it gives over the souls and bodies of their fellows, employing them or disemploying them as it suits their convenience, accumulating possessions and faring sumptuously every day. But the wealth of the universe around them—some at least know

nothing of it : with eyes unopened, and ears quite deaf to the harmonies of nature, they accumulate coins and add up figures in their ledgers and are accounted wealthy men. Everything they have they reckon in terms of money ; and the world reckons them also by their own standard, and, without felt sarcasm, says they are ' worth ' half a million pounds, or, it may be, less.

Their time, they say, is money. Their health is money. They will willingly part with these real goods for gold. Hear what Mr. Ruskin says in *Time and Tide* on this head.

"Time is money"—so say your practised merchants and economists. None of them, however, I fancy, as they draw towards death, find that the reverse is true, and that "money is time"! Perhaps it might be better for them in the end if they did not turn so much of their time into money, lest, perchance, they also turn Eternity into it! There are other things, however, which in the same sense are money, or can be changed into it, as well as time. Health is money, wit is money, knowledge is money ; and all your health, and wit, and knowledge may be changed for gold ; and the happy goal so reached, of a sick, insane, and blind, auriferous old age ; but the gold cannot be changed in its turn back into health and wit.

"Time is money" ; the words tingle in my ears so that I can't go on writing. Is it nothing better, then? If we could thoroughly understand that time was—*itself*,—would it not be more to the purpose? A thing of which loss or gain was absolute loss, and perfect gain. And that it was expedient also to buy health and knowledge with money, if so purchasable ; but not to buy money with *them* ?

I have asked why you come to these and the like classes, or why you study earnestly, as best you may, at home ; and I have also virtually asked why a vast number of others in this populous city do not also come, and take advantage of the very remarkable and really splendid opportunities which the insight of

a few enlightened citizens has provided for them, and crowd these lecture rooms to overflowing, as they ought to be crowded ; and provisionally and partially I have ventured to suggest at least one answer to both these questions. But some may object that the reasons I have suggested for being in earnest about self-culture, are not the true ones in their case : they may even think that aiming at a complete development of our own life is a selfish aim, and that their wish is rather to be useful in their day and generation ; they judge that by learning, say, engineering, or physics, they can do their handicraft work better, or by learning languages they can do their business better and more usefully, and so on. Good and worthy aims, against which no one has a word to say ; and, if carried out in that spirit, just as capable of developing your life as any other pursuit. But I deny that the development of one's highest self can be in any sense selfish. The test of true wealth is that it is essentially unselfish, it must be shared with others. A discovery, a symphony, a poem : we do not feel that we really possess them until they are imparted and made common property. Whatever tends to be hoarded up, and selfishly retained, may be individual riches, but it is not national wealth.

We may not see exactly how what we are engaged in is to benefit humanity ; it is not necessary that we should. It may be in small ways, it may be in large ; a man does not always know the full effect of his own actions. When *Hamlet* and *Othello* were being written, I suppose their author was thinking mainly of the audience in the Globe Theatre, certainly not at all of us good people on the verge of the twentieth century. When Newton pondered over his mathematics, and problems in gravitation and optics ; or when Darwin

made his voyages in the *Beagle*, and patiently accumulated those stores of information which were destined afterwards to establish so magnificent a generalization ; he could not know what was to be the outcome of all the patient toil which had to be gone through. Nothing great is accomplished, even by a genius, without continuous and severe labour—to people not geniuses the labour must be still more arduous ; but its outcome is in no case manifest beforehand. We can only work on with steady patience ; allowing ourselves, not only often, but constantly, to lose sight of the ultimate objects for which we work ; and just get ourselves into a good, steady habit of plodding : encouraging ourselves at times, may be, by lifting our eyes and surveying the ground already traversed, and the general lie of the country in front of us ; but, after such occasional survey, falling back into the same routine of steady work : work not by any means in its own way unenjoyable, but very far ordinarily from being either exciting or exceptionally brilliant.

It is possible that some might be inclined to give as a reason for coming to these classes, or for otherwise struggling after knowledge, that they hope by that means to increase their income.

I trust this is not a primary object. A secondary result of increased culture, it is indeed not unlikely to be ; but to set it up as the primary object of education shows a complete misapprehension of the relative value of things. One may well strive for money to get education ; not surely for education in order to get money.

True, some people have to struggle for a bare subsistence ; to them I do not presume to speak. I deeply deplore the dire need there is, in what used to be 'merrie England,' for such a baneful struggle for

the necessities of life, among by far the greater number of the population ; and I would willingly act with others in helping forward such much-needed reforms as may abate it. It is ill talking between a full man and an empty—it is ill lecturing to a man insufficiently supplied with the necessities of life—it behoves us rather to be silent in his presence, and to think earnestly what action may be taken to remove this blight of poverty from our land—not by partial charity, but by reform of those great and patent abuses which we believe (rightly or wrongly) are responsible for it.

There have been cases where the fire of learning has burnt so hot that it could cope even with physical hunger ; and a piteous tale is told by Smiles of a common soldier who, having only a penny in the world, bought a primer with the half of it, and his supper with the other half. But the majority of men cannot be expected to think much about self-culture until the ordinary comforts of life are supplied. This standpoint reached, however, knowledge and money are no longer co-ordinate, and should not be put into competition with each other.

The old rule—that it is unnecessary to take much thought for increasing salaries, or for food and clothing, provided we do give most earnest thought to doing whatever work we are engaged in, in the best possible way ; and that, if we do this, then all those other things will be added to us—seems to me a doctrine literally and precisely true, and to be a far more really practical and salutary rule than many maxims believed in by self-styled, practical persons.

In all these matters we have to consider what it is we really want. What is the meaning of life ? What shall we make our primary aim, and what our secondary ? If getting on is our primary aim, surely it is

politic to ask what do we want to get on for? What do we ultimately expect?

Take commercial England at the present time, and ask what is its most urgent aim? It would seem to be 'markets.' All over the world we hunt about for places to shoot our commodities into, as if they were so much rubbish quite useless at home; and yet multitudes at home are ill-clad, unshod, and vilely housed. Surely there is something wrong here? What it is I confess I do not know, unless it be that we have some quite mistaken ideal.

We long for better trade; suppose we got it? Suppose Manchester spread over six times its present area; suppose Widnes and St. Helen's crawled up to Liverpool, and Lancashire smoke penetrated more thickly than it yet does to Windermere and Coniston. Suppose the mineral wealth of the Lake district began to be exhumed, and fresh beds of coal were discovered, and the whole face of England became like the tract between Wolverhampton and Birmingham; and forges and anvils rang night and day, and all our goods were shipped out of the country, quick, to China and to Burmah: much food, and articles of luxury for the rich, being imported in exchange. And suppose the whole people slaved hard to supply the Chinese with railways, and clothing, and hardware, and all manufactured articles; and had no leisure, and no fresh air, but good wages, and plenty of bread to eat, and beer to drink. Then the rich people, who under our present system would reap a fine harvest from all this labour, finding England no longer pleasantly habitable, would emigrate somewhere to foreign climes, and would come over now and then to inspect this scene of activity, and source of all their riches; putting on respirators to keep out the smoke, and stuffing their ears to keep

out the din ; and as speedily as possible returning to their quiet retreat, away from this busy manufacturing country.

Suppose all this actually achieved : it would be a commercial millennium ! To hear people talk, this seems the sort of thing they would really like—this the kind of thing which they lament is so slow in arriving. And this would be prosperity for England ! This would be ‘wealth’ for the English population ! It is a singular ideal.

I have not consciously misstated anything. This *does* seem the kind of thing people wish for ; not to the full extent perhaps, but to a much larger extent than at present. Any endeavour to preserve natural scenery, and fresh air, and blue sky, and leisure to enjoy life for the poorest native of England, this is unpractical and sickly sentiment.

Practical considerations multiply furnaces, and factories, and labour, and all manner of manifest hardship ; and all for what ? That is the thing so difficult to understand. I can quite see that the Chinese or Burmese may be benefited by our taking all this trouble for them, but I am quite sure it is not goodwill to them which prompts the sacrifice ; I can also see that the capitalist who receives the cash, and is able to live in the south of France or somewhere out of the way, I can imagine that he, if he be sufficiently selfish, or stupid (a very good substitute for selfishness), will have a first-rate time ; and if they were the only people who wished for the state of things, all would be clear enough. But they are not : the singular thing is that the poorest classes, the tradesmen class, the great bulk of the people of the country, who have no thought of leaving it to live elsewhere, want it too : or act and talk as if they did.

I can only believe that we have an altogether false standard in these matters. We have lost the sense of the real meaning and value of life itself, and have set up some of the artificial and unessential appendages of life, as the real things to be pursued, the valuable things for which any sacrifice may be rationally demanded. I believe that people's eyes must be opened by higher education ; they must learn to set up an altogether different standard of wealth and value, before the world can grow wiser and better, and before the inexhaustible potentialities of the universe can become to us real and actual possessions.

I do not wish you to take my view of this matter, I only ask you to think for yourselves ; and if what is now known as the pursuit of wealth then seems to you to be either a melancholy chimera, or else the pursuit of something the precise opposite of wealth, surely you will try yourselves to form a truer estimate of the relative value of things, and of the true meaning and nature of wealth ; and having thus satisfied yourselves that the goal is a worthy one, an end really worth striving for, then by all means pursue it with your might.

V

PUBLIC WEALTH AND PRIVATE EXPENDITURE¹

‘PUBLIC WEALTH’ means wealth belonging to a community or corporate body; and the possessor of such wealth can utilize and administer it as corporate expenditure. By ‘Corporate Expenditure’ I mean not municipal expenditure alone, nor trades union expenditure alone, nor benefit society expenditure alone, but something of all of them; combined expenditure for corporate ends, as distinguished from private and individual expenditure. I wish to maintain that more good can be done, and greater value attained, by the thoughtful and ordered expenditure of corporate money, than can be derived from even a lavish amount distributed by private hands for the supply of personal comfort and the maintenance of special privileges.

It sounds like a secular subject, but no subject is really secular, in the sense of being opposed to sacred, unless it is a subject intrinsically bad; and if the truth be as I imagine myself now to conceive it, the subject I am endeavouring to bring forward has possible developments of the most genuinely sacred character. I shall not have time to develop this fully, but I can make a beginning.

¹ An Address to the Ancient Order of Foresters at their Annual Gathering in Birmingham Town Hall, on Sunday, 9th October 1904.

CARELESS SPENDING

First, I would direct your attention to a fact, and ask you to observe how little thought is expended by mankind in general on the spending of money, and how much time and attention are devoted to the earning of it. That may seem natural ; it is considered easy to spend and hard to earn. I am by no means sure that it is easy to spend wisely. Men who have much money to spend—and few of us are in that predicament—if they are conscientious and good men, feel the difficulty seriously ; they realize that it is so easy to do harm, so difficult to know how to do real good. Charity may seem a safe and easy method of disbursing, and much of it at present, alas, is necessary, but few things are more dangerous : it is an easy salve to the conscience, but it by no means conduces to fullness and dignity of life.

But eliminating men of large fortunes, let us attend to our own case. We, the ordinary citizens, how little time do we find to consider our manner of spending ; we mostly do it by deputy, all our time is occupied in earning. It may be said roughly that men earn the money and that their wives spend it : a fair division of labour. They spend it best : and if the man insists on retaining and spending much of it, he is liable to spend it very far from wisely or well.

PUBLIC v. PRIVATE EXPENDITURE

I will not labour the point ; we get something by private expenditure undoubtedly : we get the necessities of life, and we get some small personal luxuries in addition. We do not get either in the most econo-

mical fashion. Buying things by the ounce or by the pint is not the cheapest way of buying ; nor is a kitchen fire in every household the cheapest way of cooking, especially in the summer. Without going into details, and without exaggerating, we must all see that individualism results in some waste. If each man pays for the visits of his own doctor it is expensive. If each man provides his own convalescent home it is expensive. If each man goes on his own excursion or travels it is not so cheap as when several club together and run the journey on a joint purse. Private and solitary travel may be luxurious, but it is not cheap. A cab is dearer than an omnibus ; a private garden is far dearer in proportion than a public park. Of private expenditure altogether it may be said : some of it is necessary, much of it is luxurious, but none of it is economical.

Corporate or combined expenditure achieves a greater result, not only for the whole, but actually for each individual. 'Each for himself' is a poor motto ; the idea of 'Each for all' is a far more powerful as well as a more stimulating doctrine than 'Each for himself.' Thus already, you see, our subject shows signs of losing its secular character and of approaching within hailing distance of the outposts of Christianity.

THE OBJECTS OF THRIFT

Very well, now go on to consider the subject of *thrift*—not personal spending, but personal saving. What is the saving for ? There are two chief objects :

(1) To provide for sickness, for old age, and for those who are dependent upon us, and whom we should otherwise leave helpless when we go. This is

clearly the chief and especially forcible motive for saving : it is the mainspring and original motive power of this and all other benefit societies. But there is also another not at all unworthy motive, though it is one less generally recognized or admitted, and to this I wish incidentally to direct attention.

The second great motive for thrift and wise accumulation is—

(2) To increase our own power and influence and effective *momentum* in the world.

THE POWER OF WEALTH

The man of wealth is recognized as a force in the world, sometimes indeed a force for evil, sometimes for good, but undeniably and always a power. People often complain of this, and abuse the instinct which recognizes wealth as being such a power. But it is inevitable. It does not indeed follow that great wealth need be concentrated in a few hands, or that one single individual shall have the disposal of it ; it is an accidental and, as I think, an unfortunate temporary arrangement of society which brings about that result ; but, whether in many hands or in few, wealth is bound to be a power. It is no use abusing what is inevitable, we must study and learn how to utilize the forces of nature. Wealth is one of those forces.

Why is it so powerful ? Because it enables its owner to carry out his plans, to execute his purposes, to achieve his ends. He has not to go cap in hand to somebody and ask permission ; he can do the thing himself. He cannot do everything indeed, his power is limited, but he can do much. So also the members of a wealthy, corporate body, if they want to do

something, if they want to meet elsewhere than in a public-house, for instance, encounter no difficulty, they can have a hall of their own, or they can hire one. Wealth is accumulated savings. Considered as power, it does not matter whether the wealth is in many hands or in few. The owners of it are important people ; and if they mean to do good the material accessories are at their command. A rich man, like a rich corporation, has great power. Suppose he wants to bring out an invention, his own or somebody else's, he has the means. Suppose he wants to build a laboratory or endow a university, he can do it. Suppose he wants to plant waste land with forest trees, who will stop him ? But he cannot do everything. A genius has powers greater than his. A rich man's power is great, but it is limited ; for suppose he wants to compose an oratorio, to paint a picture, to make a scientific discovery, and has not the ability ; his wealth is impotent, he cannot do it. No, his power is strictly limited, but it is not so limited as that of the poor man.

THE WEAKNESS OF POVERTY

We are poor men, and some of us want to renovate the Black Country and cover up its slag heaps with vegetation and with forests—a beautiful and sane ideal—but it is a difficult task. I do not own a square foot of soil, nor do most of you. What right have we to go and plant trees on some one else's land ? We should be trespassers ; and, at a whim of the owner, they might be rooted up. The owners of the soil, however, may be willing for the reafforestation of the Black Country, they may give us assistance, they may enable us to carry out the scheme. I sincerely hope

they will, but we must go and ask them. Without wealth we are powerless. We see so many things that might be done if we had the means: for instance, we helplessly lament the existence of slums, we see numerous ways in which to improve cities, we would like to suppress smoke and show how the air could be kept pure for the multitudes herded in cities to breathe and enjoy; but we cannot do it, we are not rich enough. Moreover, if we did, what would happen—at least at first? Rents would rise, and the improved property would become too dear for the present inhabitants to live in. Clear and purify the air of towns—and they would at once, with their good drainage and fine sanitary conditions, become the best and healthfullest places to live in. Now they are too dirty; then they would be too dear.

But, if the land near all large towns belonged to the community, if we had corporate ownership of land, what could we not do? Then improvements would be both possible and profitable and the community who made them would reap the benefit.

Some day: some day an approach to this condition of things is bound to come. It feels to me almost like part of the meaning of that great prayer 'Thy Kingdom come'; and if so we are again not far away from the atmosphere of Christianity.

PUBLIC WEALTH AND PUBLIC DEBTS

For accumulation of wealth to be really beneficial it should contribute to the common weal, it should conduce to well-being, and so be worthy of the name of *weal-th*.

The only way probably you and I can ever become wealthy is by becoming corporately wealthy, by club-

bing our savings and becoming an influence and a power in the land.

Already I see, by your report, that this organization or corporate body owns more than seven millions : not seven millions free to be dealt with as you like, it is all ear-marked to good and beneficent objects, and all needed for the achievement of those objects ; but still it is a substantial sum, and it can increase. Roll it up to seventy millions, apply it to other objects than sickness and death, and you will become capitalists, able to execute your behests, an influence and a power in the world.

Would this be a good thing ? Ah, that is a large question. There are always dangers in great capital, it is a serious responsibility ; and if badly and domineeringly used, it may become a fearful evil. In unwise and unscrupulous hands, or even in ignorant and foolish, it is far from safe. But let it come gradually, let it be owned by mankind or by the community at large, and I for one would trust them—we are bound to trust mankind—would trust them at first to endeavour to make a good use of it, and ultimately to succeed in so doing.

I believe in public capital and public expenditure, so it be clean and honest and well managed ; everything depends upon that ; but in this fortunate city that is already accomplished. What is known as a public debt is really a public investment ; and anything not spent in the waste of war should have public works, or elevated humanity, or other good results, to show for it. Then it at once becomes capital, and is no more appropriately called debt ; it has not been spent, but invested. ' Funds ' is a better name for it.

THE ECONOMY OF RISING RATES

That is why I believe in Rates—not altogether in the Poor Rate, for I am unable to feel that the Poor Law is on a satisfactory basis, though it is administered with the best intentions by the guardians ; the system is, as I think, in some respects mistaken, but I will not go into that now ; I only say parenthetically that the Poor Rate I do not welcome—but rates for public works, education rates, rates for municipal and corporate services generally, rates for museums and libraries and recreation grounds and parks and rational amusements, all these I would welcome and wish to grow.

We should not try to economize in these things, we should put our heads together so as to spend the public money wisely and well, and then we should spend it. Private thrift, public expenditure ; that is the way to raise a town or a nation in the standard of civilization.

The spendings of an individual, what are they ? They are gone in his individual comfort and luxury. The spendings of a community are Capital : they result in public works, in better housing, in good roads, in thorough lighting ; they open up the country, they develop its resources, they educate the citizens, they advance all the amenities of existence, in an economical because corporate or co-operative manner.

Good management is required ; and that is why you take pains to send good men to the City Council to look after your interests : your interests, not in screwing and economizing, but in spending wisely and honestly and well, getting the most they can for your

money, and looking out for improvements and for good schemes worthy of encouragement. And when they do this well, be ready to trust them with more ; see that not only the municipal but the national purse also is properly supplied. Our National Government is for all good purposes miserably poor. I fear there is sad waste somewhere, and that before the taxes can be judiciously raised the sources of waste must be discovered and checked. I trust that already this labour is being put in hand. You have fine public servants who are trying to do their best with an ancient and very cumbrous and over-centralized machine ; much revenue has to be spent in various unprofitable ways, wars and other, but in every good and noble direction of expenditure the country is miserably poor. Where it is economical it should be lavish ; and where it is lavish it should be economical. That is an exaggeration, but there is a kind of truth underlying it. Our national economy in higher education is having disastrous results, it is a real danger to the Nation. While other nations are investing millions of public money on higher education and research, we prefer to keep the money in our pockets in order to spend it privately ; and the result is that while the State is poor the individual is rich. Individuals are over rich in this country ; money breeds money on our present system with very little work, and it is apt to roll itself up into portentous and top-heavy fortunes. The result is, I fear, a state of things that some people say is becoming a scandal. I do not know. But however that may be, I should like to see this wealth owned by communities ; I should like to see it in corporate hands and expended for the general good.

UNEARNED INCOMES

Do not think that the original making of a fortune is easy. Most fortunes began by thrift and enterprise ; it is not the making of a fortune that is easy : it is the transferring and the inheriting of it that are so fatally easy and so dangerous. If the maker of the fortune himself had the disbursing of it, there would be but little harm done, and there might be much good. No fortune can be honestly *made* without strenuous industry and character. But a fortune can be inherited, *can* be inherited I say, though I hope it seldom is, by a personification of laziness and folly and vice.

That, however, is not my point. My point is that self-denial is the beginning of capital and the essence of thrift—present self-denial for future good. This self-denial for future good you of this and kindred societies are already exercising in a small way, but it is possible and indeed likely that it will come to be exercised in a larger way, and so gradually a considerable fraction of the property of the world may ultimately pass into your hands. Wake up to this possibility, and do not abuse capital or capitalists, for some day you will be capitalists yourselves. Then it will strain your energies to know what to do with it, and how to use it for the best and highest good of humanity—the ascertainment of which is a noble aspect of human endeavour.

I do not expect agreement in all that I have to say, nor do I speak with authority ; I am anxious to admit that I may be mistaken ; I only ask you to consider and weigh my message, the more so if you disagree, as I know many will, especially in what follows :—

THE CHEAPNESS OF HIGH SALARIES

The tendency of public bodies is to economize in salaries. People look askance at highly-paid public servants ; whereas it is just from those that you do get something for your money. You don't get much service as a rule from ordinary shareholders, but you do as a rule from salaried officers. That is the danger of municipalities and other democratic corporations : they will not realize with sufficient clearness that the manager and administrator is worthy of large remuneration, that to get the best man you must pay him well, and that to put up with a second-rate article when you can get the best is but a poor policy, and in the long run bad economy. Cheap men are seldom any good. In a large concern they may waste more than their annual salary in a week. Some people want to pay all men alike. It will not work. It is a subject full of controversy, I know, and I do not wish to dogmatize, but so far as I can see, and I have no personal interest in the matter, I say that the principle of inequality of payment must be recognized—as long as there is payment at all—and that it is a necessary consequence of inequality of ability.

Some organizations seem to think, too, that the available work of the world is limited, and that you must each be careful not to do too much of it lest work becomes scarce. The truth is, that the work potentially required by mankind is essentially unlimited ; and if we could only get better social conditions there would be work and opportunity and scope for all, each according to his grade and power and ability.

Stand shoulder to shoulder and help each other, and

form a banded community for mutual help, by all means ; let all co-operate together, and let not one human being be idle except the sick and insane ; but allow for different kinds of work, and put the false glamour of the idea of artificial equality out of your minds. In any organization, as in any human body, there must be head and there must be hands, there must be trunk and limbs : the good of the whole is secured by each doing his apportioned task and obtaining his appropriate nourishment : not every part alike, though each sufficient for his need : each brought up to his maximum efficiency.

And what is true of property is true of personal service also. That which is spent for the individual is of small value compared with service done for the race. It is on the pains and sacrifice of individuals that a community is founded. ' The pleasures of each generation evaporate in air ; it is their pains that increase the spiritual momentum of the world ' (J. R. Illingworth, in *Lux Mundi*.) The blood of the martyrs was the seed of the Church ; it is by heroism and unselfish devotion that a country rises and becomes great.

THE RESULTS OF PUBLIC SPIRIT

Witness the magnificent spectacle of Japan to-day : the State above the individual ; common good above personal good ; sacrifice of self and devotion to the community ; these great qualities, on which every nation has risen to glory, were never displayed more brightly in the history of the world than now before our eyes. It is a nation which is saturated and infused with public spirit, the spirit of the race, enthusiasm for the community and for the welfare of humanity.

This is the spirit which elevates cities ; it is this which makes a nationality ; it is this which some day will renovate mankind.

A splendid article in the *Times* [now well known] calls it 'the soul of a nation,' a translation of the Japanese term Bushido. It is a sort of chivalry, but the term 'chivalry' does not convey it ; our nearest approach to it is 'public spirit,' public spirit in a glorified form, the spirit which animated the early Christian Church, so that prison, suffering, death itself, were gladly endured so that the gospel might be preached and humanity might be saved—a spirit which must be near akin to the divine idea of Sacrifice for the salvation of the world. To lose your life as the highest mode of saving it ; to lose the world but retain the honour and dignity of your own soul ; that spirit which animated the apostles, prophets, martyrs, is alive in Japan to-day. Is it alive in us as a nation ? If not, if we have replaced it to any extent by some selfish opposite, by any such diabolically careless sentiment as 'after me the deluge,' then we as a nation have lost our soul, sold it for mere individual prosperity, sold it in some poor cases for not even that, for mere liquid refreshment, and we are on the down grade.

I trust it is not so, but sometimes I greatly fear it. It is surely not too late to arrest the process of decay ; the heart of the Nation is sound enough : the men, as they said in South Africa, the men are splendid. Give them a fair chance, introduce better conditions, set forth high ideals, and be not ashamed to speak of these ideals and to follow them : then we shall find that there is plenty of the spirit of unselfishness still, the spirit which calls men to harder tasks than momentary spurts of bravery, calls us all to the long and persistent

effort of educating ourselves in the facts of the universe, grasping the real truth of things, and then, with patience and self-control, applying our energies to the material betterment and spiritual elevation of the world.

VI

SOME SOCIAL REFORMS¹

THE necessary preliminary or precursor of wise and effectual reform is knowledge—knowledge both wide and accurate of the state of society and of the conditions of action : though at the same time we must, as Professor Percy Gardner has said,

‘Guard ourselves against a too narrow interpretation of the scientific study of history, and bear ever in mind the great variety in human motives. All attempts at dealing with the problems of poverty have hitherto failed, because they have not taken into account certain psychological facts, so that in many cases they have increased the evil they were meant to remedy.’

In fact, the problems before us are so complex, and so strangely intermingled with surprising elements in human nature, that it is easy for people with the best intentions to do harm rather than good ; especially, as I myself think, if they proceed to attack an institution or an abuse in too direct and narrowly concentrated a manner.

Nevertheless, whatever may be the faults and foibles of a social expert in detecting abuses and advocating reforms, his aid is indispensable if the mere blind struggle for existence is to be suspended and progress to become conscious and moderately quick. As

¹ A Presidential Address to the Social and Political Education League in 1905.

Charles Kingsley said, adopting words akin to some used by Huxley :

‘For five-and-twenty years my ruling idea has been that the reconstruction of Society on a scientific basis is not only possible, but the only political object much worth striving for.’

So to this end a long-continued and devoted study of the human problem, as a branch of science, is as necessary as is the intuitive and energetic zeal of the reformer. The art of government cannot continue to be the one department of activity for which no training is supposed to be necessary. We train doctors, we train engineers, we are beginning to train teachers ; some day politicians must be trained too : that is to say, youths must be trained in social studies before becoming legislators ; in spite of the fact that in all these professions some few men are born with such extraordinary ability that training seems almost superfluous in their favoured case. And as a preliminary to training, a body of systematized knowledge is necessary, which must be the work of trained inquirers and social experts, such as are only now beginning to exist. Nor is there any subject in which the result of study and research is likely to be more immediately useful and directly repaying. Most of our scientific applications result in indirect benefit ; but in this human region of research the applications are direct and immediate to the advancement of life. To quote Professor Gardner again :

‘Discoveries in physics, electricity and the like help mankind in certain outward ways, satisfy material needs. Discoveries in medicine may make life more free from pain. But discoveries in human nature may enable whole communities to live at a higher level, may have a bearing upon happiness direct and immediate, . . . And unless our increased power over nature tends in the long run to increase human

happiness, it does not seem after all much to boast of. . . . It is a very great thing to be able to carry out one's will in the material world, but it is also important to have within purposes which are worth carrying out. If one has nothing to say worth saying, telegraph and telephone become only instruments of vanity.'

EDUCATION OF THE AVERAGE MAN

We are therefore faced with such questions as these : How can the general level of mankind be raised ? What steps are necessary to this end ? and How far are we fundamentally falling short of the necessary efforts and proper methods now ? Is it possible to reconstruct society on a scientific basis ?

That ingenious and able writer, Mr. H. G. Wells, devotes himself seriously to these questions, and I believe it is generally admitted that he has provided this country with a good deal to think about.

The construction of a Utopia is an enticing, and I believe not an altogether unprofitable, exercise ; because it is often a good, practical method of procedure to form an ideal, and then to see how near in practice it is possible to attain to it. That is the way of great inventors ; it is, I believe, consciously and admittedly, the method which Lord Kelvin, for instance, has pursued in brooding over his inventions ; and, being based in his case upon a deep knowledge of the problems and of possible methods of solution, it has resulted in many devices of the utmost originality.

So it may be with social problems also ; but it is not my purpose to-day to attempt to rival Mr. Wells, nor to formulate or even to discuss any Utopian scheme. I want to point out, what every one is really aware of, how grievously in many respects we fail to organize lives in anything like a reasonably happy, healthy,

human way, and then how it is possible almost at once to make a beginning in at least one or two directions, if we are minded so to do. Knowledge is a necessary preliminary to reform, but in the exigency of life people cannot wait, as in the applications of Chemistry or Physics they can, for a fully established and systematic theory before they take action ; they must get what knowledge they can, they must encourage experts to devote their lives to serious study and to accumulate and dissect and assimilate facts, but meanwhile they must themselves proceed tentatively and experimentally to put their ideas into practice, to bring them to the test of experience, to apply the methods of trial and error, to learn by mistakes, trying only to make those mistakes as few as possible, not hoping to avoid them altogether. And so must the theory and the practice, the acquisition of knowledge and its application, go hand in hand and simultaneously ; one cannot wholly precede the other, but each must react on the other, amid the storm and stress of actual existence. The practical man and the theorist must live side by side, and both must be active ; often, indeed, their attributes can be combined in one and the same person.

Moreover, the knowledge of the expert is not the only knowledge at which we must aim. The education of the average citizen is to be considered. It is no use going too fast for him, no use being too far ahead of the time ; anything achieved under those conditions is likely to be upset by the return swing of the pendulum.

Social progress is only sure and lasting when the average citizen is ripe for it, when he is carried along by the reformers and realizes the benefit of what has been done. Society cannot be reconstructed from out-

side, it must be reconstructed from within, it must in a manner reconstruct itself, or it will be unstable. This is the whole problem, this is the real and noble difficulty in dealing with self-conscious material and free agents. They cannot with wisdom be coerced, they must be led ; and this process takes time, and is the reason why progress is so slow. Machines can be managed on the coercion principle, but not men.

Looked at with seeing eyes this doctrine bears pressing very far ; it can be applied even to Divine dealings with humanity, and accounts for the amount of sin and misery still existing in the world. Omnipotence itself could not with wisdom reform mankind faster than they desire to be reformed, nor can it permanently impose upon them conditions which they are incompetent to assimilate. A momentary outburst into intellectual splendour might be accomplished, as it was once in Athens, but it would be followed by centuries of falling back and comparative degradation.

But the time was never so ripe as it is now for the education of the average man. The hopelessness of effecting any permanent reform without his concurrence is the chief reason, indeed, which leads many of us to lay so great a stress upon education, upon real education and the reform of the schools, and upon reconsideration of the orthodox methods of imparting knowledge and stimulating thought and inquiry in use up till now.

IDEALS OF YOUTH

If social problems and difficulties and reforms could be introduced to and contemplated by ingenuous youth, before they became sophisticated by false traditions and imbued with selfish and pecuniary interests, much

might be achieved. For it could then be realized how far we now are from anything like an approach to perfection, the true meaning of civilization and social existence could be emphasized, and the desperately backward and uncivilized condition of our present state perceived. It is a matter of common observation that young people have many of them a keen and generous appreciation of, and feel a yearning towards, a more ideal state of things ; until they get dazed and bewildered and disheartened by the selfish condition of life as it is, and fall back into the customary routine of conventional concurrence with the general trend of Society.

Take a few instances. What is the customary attitude to foreign politics on the part of our legislators ? I do not wish to generalize unduly, but a cynic might say, with just sufficient truth to make us uncomfortable, that our foreign policy is to let things be, to refrain from studying questions and looking ahead, as long as people are quiet ; and only to attend when they become a nuisance, especially when they threaten, or seem to threaten, our pecuniary interests. Then, to act in a sudden, spasmodic, excited manner, and enter upon operations which are very costly before they are completed.

Such assertion might be made by a cynical observer ; but he would have to admit a few brilliant exceptions, due to our leaders, exceptions which I gladly and gratefully acknowledge. The Anglo-French *entente* is one of them ; the Japanese Alliance is conspicuously another ; certain honourable dealings with America are a third ; and our behaviour in Egypt, both in war and peace, is a fourth. There may be others ; and what I wish to point out is that whenever our statesmen and leaders do thus look ahead and achieve

something in a peaceful and progressive and meritorious direction the populace appreciate it ; the people are ready for this mode of dealing with foreign affairs, they are generous and hopeful, and willing to sacrifice something for the good of the world ; they are indeed usually more unselfish and more ' Christian,' if I may use that expression, than our rulers and financiers have imagined them or always proved themselves to be.

Hence, on the principle that the average man must be carried with us if progress is to be permanent, I say that the conditions are hopeful.

I am one of those who are beginning to contemplate the possibility of a national or citizen army, each one in his youth devoting a certain time to the acquisition of drill and discipline and the use of weapons for national defence. I believe it will make for peace, inasmuch as it will bring home the danger and responsibility of war to every hearth in the kingdom ; for a people whose ordinary avocations are upset by active service will not rush into it as rashly as do a people who maintain a professional fighting class, whose career and opportunities for distinction are essentially involved in the occurrence of hostilities.

Through the half century of my own life we have fought certain wars which to the best of my judgment we should not have fought. The Crimea was the first of them ; few now think that we should have fought the Russians, at the behest of Louis Napoleon, for the purpose of maintaining the domination of an Asiatic race over a controversial portion of Europe, in order to close the natural maritime outlet of a great nation. And the last instance is very recent. I know that there is always something to be said on both sides. I trust that the verdict of history may be on our side, but I much fear it will go against us in several cases. Yet

these wars have retarded the growth of civilization and entailed terrible suffering—a depressing thought if no adequate good has come of it all.

On the other hand, I believe we should have put down our foot strongly, and been ready to fight, if need be, in protection of certain maltreated people whose existence we had contracted to maintain. A nation which rushes into battle for selfish causes only, and which refrains, and is known to be certain to refrain, from the expense and trouble of contest for any unselfish or noble cause or in protection of the weak, does not, any more than an individual, earn the respect of the world ; nor does it really strengthen its position, not even its sublunary position, among the nations. ' There is that scattereth and yet increaseth ' in this sphere also ; and ' prestige ' is an asset not to be acquired on the grounds of financial and territorial considerations alone. If our devotion to material security is too concentrated, we run the risk of losing even that which we have. Let the British Empire uphold the right and the truth, and it may hope and deserve to be prosperous and perpetual ; let it exhibit itself to the world in purely selfish guise, and decadence will assuredly set in.

I am convinced that young people will realize this ; I feel assured that greed and sophistication are acquired characters, and that they are fortunately not transmitted to offspring by inheritance, though by example and precept they may be and are gradually instilled.

CONTROL AND ALTERATION OF ENVIRONMENT

Well, then, take the condition of Society at home. The people for the most part, in Britain, are now aggregated into great cities and towns, and the

country is becoming depopulated. Are the cities admirable and attractive places, and are the conditions of existence in town and country such as they might readily be made, with our present knowledge of, and control over, natural forces?

We must answer with conviction, assuredly no!

The towns are subject to a blight of squalor and poverty and dirt: the West-End may live in forgetfulness of them, but the slums of a town cover a great area, and they are hideously depressing. To think of people living there, year in year out and all their lives, is unspeakably repellent. We who get away, for travel and holidays and change, do not realize all that it must mean towards the dwarfing and degradation of the human soul. The fact that good and decent and exemplary lives are lived in these dismal surroundings is again a most hopeful feature and speaks well for humanity. It proves itself superior to its environment, it dominates its surroundings, and blossoms as we see a flowering shrub sometimes blossoming amidst material ruin and decay.

And what we have to teach, throughout, is that in no sort of way is man to be the slave of his environment. No longer is he to adapt himself to surrounding circumstances, changing colour with them as do the insects and plants. It is not himself which is to suit the environment, but he is to make the environment suit him. This is the one irrefragable doctrine that must be hammered into the ears of this generation till they realize its truth and accept it. The struggle for existence, supplemented by other great facts and laws, some of them partially known, some quite unknown, has brought us to what we are. It has done its slow and painful and beneficent work. All through the ages of the world's history, the blind

and inevitable facts or forces—struggle for existence and survival of the fittest—have been operating, so as to *clinch*, as it were, and perpetuate every favourable variation, which, either by accident or by design, has arisen ; and thus has animal nature been confirmed and strengthened and improved, until it has risen to the altitude of conscious and controlling man.

There, however, the function of these blind forces begins to cease. Man progresses now, not by exterminating the weak, but by caring for them ; not by wars and fierce competition, but by the unobtrusive pursuits of peace, and by the development of families and firms and communities organized for mutual help and co-operation. And this element of higher progress—already foreshadowed as it was in the animal kingdom—we have now consciously to recognize and intensify, till we land at length in the friendly co-operation and brotherhood of the whole human race.

It is not human nature that must be altered to suit circumstances, nor need it be adapted to material surroundings ; it must be obedient to the laws of nature certainly, but within their sway we have entered on the period of *conscious* evolution, and have begun *the adaptation of environment to organism*. It is thus that all progress in the rearing of domestic animals has been accomplished. The Procrustean system of unaided nature is over ; and, under the fostering care of man, results are achieved which else would have been impossible. Hitherto man has applied processes associated with care and culture to the quadrupeds and to the birds, he has not yet applied it to the fish of the sea, nor has he altogether learnt how to apply it to his own species. A beginning of intelligent treatment of humanity has been made, but for the most part men are still left to struggle up against adverse

circumstances as best they may, and the weakest still go to the wall. There are some who indulge in the enervating and dangerous fallacy that this is the best way, that a policy of masterly inactivity and *laissez-faire* is best for the race, and that any interference will result in weakness and decadence.

There may be some here present who think so; for the fallacy still exists among thoughtful men. Nevertheless I wish to maintain that it is a deadly fallacy, and that our constant endeavour should be to continue the process of extermination of this fallacy begun by Professor Huxley in the famous Oxford 'Romanes Lecture.' The surface of the earth is to be amended by us, the forces of nature are to be first understood, and then curbed, controlled, and utilized. Higher aims are to replace mere survival in a struggle for subsistence. We have entered on the epoch of conscious control, and must assume our full dignity as man. As Huxley said, in *Evolution and Ethics* :—

'Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process. . . . It is from neglect of these plain considerations that the fanatical individualism of our time attempts to apply the analogy of cosmic nature to society. . . . Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it' (pp. 81-83).

'The most highly civilised societies have substantially reached [a position where] the struggle for existence can play no important part within them' (p. 36).

IDEALS FOR TOWN AND COUNTRY

And now a word as to method.

The first thing to learn is that evils are often not to be attacked too directly, that the most obvious

and direct way is seldom the wisest or the most effective: the wisest policy is often indirect.

When a gardener sees his flowers droop and wither, when he sees the fruit decay or remain sour and shrivelled, he does not always attend to the blooms alone, nor even to the buds and blossoms: he goes deeper than that, he surmises that there is some canker at the root, and he searches for the parasite that is poisoning or draining the life blood from the tree; or he makes laboratory experiments in vegetable pathology, of a character apparently quite wide of the mark.

So, I advocate, we should deal with such evils as the dirt, disease, and drunkenness of our towns, with the perennial problem of the unemployed, and with all the manifold evils which still cling like a canker to our wealth and civilization. We should treat these evils as we treat diseases and cankers affecting fruit, and should seek for the causes deeply and pertinaciously, with the object of removing them by indirect and permanent means.

First of all, we must bring home the evil to people, otherwise they get so accustomed to it that they begin to think that it is the normal and necessary condition of society. They even quote biblical authority for it, saying, 'The poor ye have always with you'—as if that meant that the grime and wretchedness of city slums were to be always with us (although they do not exist in such countries as Sweden and Tyrol); whereas its real meaning is that poor people requiring help and assistance, people bowed down by trouble and sickness and accident and sorrow, people who require the kindly aid of the good Samaritan, the healing influence of ointment—these we shall have always with us; and no era would be an era of pro-

sperity from which the sympathy and help of man to man should be a thing of the past. The community of human nature, and dependence upon mutual aid, will be eternal ; but to maintain that the grimy and soul-destroying wretchedness of human outcasts, that death by starvation, and the transmission of disease by ignorance and dirt and sin—to maintain that these are permanently decreed Divine ordinances, otherwise than as the necessary outcome of neglect and mismanagement, is essential blasphemy.

To realize what a city ought to be—might be, if we thought it worth while to set the ideal before us and strive to reach it—we can contemplate the visions of painters and poets. These are the seers of humanity, and their visions are only the precursors of what it is for us, after laborious generations, to make real and actual. To think that the ideal is impossible is to show a lack of faith ; it cannot be achieved quickly, but if each generation will endeavour to contribute its quota to the common amelioration, something like a millennium may arrive before people at present think it at all likely. Nature will co-operate with us : we have only to learn her ways and to set ourselves to work in accordance with natural laws and not against them, and we shall find the task easier than we think. Here is a picture of city life as seen by Burne-Jones, in the form of a design for one of two pictures inspired by Rossetti's poem 'The Blessed Damosel.' It must not be pressed prosaically into detail, it is a dream-city, but it is more inspiring than a smoky slum :—

'In the first picture I shall make a man walking in the street of a great city, full of all kinds of happy life ; children . . . and lovers walking, and ladies leaning from windows all down great lengths of street leading to the city walls ; and

there the gates are wide open, letting in a space of green field and cornfield in harvest ; and all round his head a great rain of swirling autumn leaves blowing from a little walled graveyard.'—(*Memorials of Edward Burne-Jones*, vol. i. p. 153.)

There is nothing far-fetched or impossible about it. Nature will do her part readily enough towards this picture. It is man's selfish and misguided aims that are at fault, not the nature of things.

And then as to country life, at present it is said to be dull and depressing and monotonous ; it need not be so. The utilization of leisure is a vitally important feature, far too much neglected hitherto. I commend the efforts of the ' Social Institutes' Union ' to your notice. I am convinced that the provision of opportunities for wise utilization of leisure will be a great means of improvement, the greatest opponent of the mere drinking den. Education is doing much for life in towns, it will do much also to make life interesting in the country. In summer it can hardly fail to be stimulating ; and in winter no village need be without its electric light, its recreation room, its library, and even its laboratory, in which winter study may be pursued by the more studious, and much information gained for application to actual husbandry, or to fill the vacant hours of manual labour with worthy thoughts, when the season of long days comes round. A developed system of agriculture is full of interest, but it has been shamefully neglected, until almost the last and dimmest use to which land can be put, in some places, is the growth of crops—the growth of that food on which the whole livelihood of the people necessarily depends.

CONDITIONS OF LAND-OWNERSHIP

The salvation and restoration of land to its right use is a great difficulty. Why do these difficulties exist? What is the root cause of our present disabilities? It is for experts to say, not for me. But in so far as I have been able to form any tentative and provisional opinion, I cannot help thinking that the custom of allowing absolute ownership of land to individuals, instead of to communities, is responsible for a good deal. To me it is somewhat surprising that it is quite legal and ordinary for a person to be able to sell a portion of England for his own behoof. It does not seem to be reasonable, in any high sense, that a bit of the country itself should belong absolutely to some individual, so that he has the right to cut down trees on it, to dig up the minerals in it, to sell either it or its coal, to lay it waste and desolate as a deer forest, or a cinder-heap, if it so pleases him, and to levy a heavy tax on building enterprise; to do, in fact, what he likes with his own, and live elsewhere on the proceeds in idleness and luxury.

I do not say that landowners actually do this, but it is legal for them to do it. That is the system under which we have grown up, and are absurdly accustomed to; and that individuals refrain from exercising their full rights, that they recognize duties and responsibilities and devote themselves to such schemes of betterment as may commend themselves to their intelligence, is all to the good as far as it goes; but I do not think that matters of such vital importance should be left to the caprice of an individual, nor that any abuse of his rights should be permissible.

If ownership of land is permitted by law, the owner

should be a trustee, not a parasite. Whether there be any parasites now, merely draining the fruits of the labour of others and claiming a butterfly existence for themselves and their successors, I do not presume to say, but I conjecture that there are some, though I hope few.

INHERITANCE

Then, looking at society as an outsider, it has long appeared to me that there is another matter that may have to be considered some day—viz., the law of inheritance, whereby a person can acquire a competence and live luxuriously without necessarily doing a stroke of work of any kind all his life. It is not an easy problem, how to regulate inheritance, indeed it is a supremely difficult one ; but the idea that life is intolerable without some inherited background or cushion of property, the idea that people may live without working and yet without disgrace, is responsible for much incompetence and some misery. It is good neither for the youth brought up in that idea, nor for those whose labour has to supply him with what he demands : it acts badly all round ; and even though the looked-for competence is small, it has contributed to the ruin of sons or nephews in cases known to most of us.

But it will be said, would you have no men of leisure ? On the contrary, I would have no men without leisure. Leisure—time at our own disposal, time to live and do something worth doing, wholly for its own sake—is the most valuable asset in life. All should have leisure, but then also all should work. No one should be idle, completely idle, save on pain of starvation or the disciplinary drill of prison.

But then the term 'work' should be interpreted wisely and liberally ; it would be no kindness, no improvement, and perfect folly, to insist that every one should make things with his hands. The world would be cluttered up with useless products : man does not live by bread and furniture and material implements alone, nor even by pictures and statues and works of art alone. The poet, the musician, the artist, the author, the explorer, the student, the thinker, the statesman—all these are workers ; and a country, even our country, is not so deadly poor but that it can afford to support people engaged in these and many other superficially unsubstantial occupations. The preposterous error of the French Democracy in executing Lavoisier, because ' the Republic had no need of chemists,' is hardly likely to be repeated ; if it were, then, to any such short-sighted folly as that, the present conditions of competition and endowed idleness are infinitely to be preferred ; because, among the people so provided for, a genius or a saint, of the utmost importance to the race, may here and there arise. The community should have the sense to maintain people of every worthy kind ; and if it can be shown that the present indirect plan of doing so is the best and most appropriate, well and good. I do not deny it : I only say that it is a question that demands thought and consideration and cannot be answered off-hand. Not by any means is inheritance always an evil, sometimes it is a great good. The fruitful activity of some strenuous men, William Morris, for instance, and John Ruskin, has been made possible by inherited property. Many of the highest workers in science also have been similarly provided for by their parents or ancestors, and without that aid would have been badly handicapped and perhaps

reduced to impotence. Hence the question is a complicated one.

But that being so, and reform being surrounded with difficulties, what is there that can be tackled at once? What reforms are possible when everything is so complicated, and when everybody is free to think as he pleases, and within limits to do what he thinks right?

Is there any class on which the hand of reform may at once be laid?

CLASSES READY AND WAITING FOR REFORM

I say there are two such classes.

There are the people whom society has for its own protection deprived of their freedom, and, by actual manual force, taken under its own control; and there are the people who, for the sake of bare subsistence, have voluntarily surrendered their individual freedom for a time. In other words, there are the criminals and there are the paupers. These classes are subject to drill and discipline, and upon them experiments in improvement and organization can be tried.

Now I contend that hitherto, in these two directions, society has by no means yet risen to a sense of its power and its responsibility. It is too deeply imbued with the idea of punishment, too faithless about efforts towards reformation and improvement.

I ask for a serious study of these two great classes, and some perception of the splendid opportunity for direct treatment which they afford.

TREATMENT OF PAUPERS

So far as it is permissible for me to have an opinion, I suggest that we should do well to remove the stigma of disgrace and deterrence attaching to the poorhouse, and regard it as a place not only for maintaining the impotent and aged in fair comfort, as at present, but also for dealing efficiently with the able-bodied of weak character ; and so try to convert it into an instrument of instruction and discipline and organization for those mental and moral invalids who are unable or unwilling to organize their own lives. Competent people, who can organize themselves, will stay outside : incompetent people, who cannot organize themselves, who are deficient in energy and will-power, will drift inside—inside the working of the system I mean, not necessarily inside a building—to take advantage of the organizing power of society ; just as workmen enter a factory to take advantage of the organizing and administrative ability of its head.

Very well, by so drifting under the organization and discipline exercised by a community, they acknowledge, or are supposed to acknowledge, failure of a sort : and the same sort of disgrace attaches to them as attaches to a man who fails in business—no more and no less. It may be their own fault, it may be the fault of their parents, it may be the fault of social conditions ; it is a fruitless quest to seek judicially and seriously to administer praise or blame. The medical profession is wise : it does not seek to blame, it seeks to cure its patients. These are the patients of society : in their present state they are useless, and they are very likely deserving of blame. Anyway, they have failed, and they require help.

What sort of help? Not material help alone, though that doubtless in the first instance, but intellectual and moral help chiefly. They must be shown how to live, how to work, how to develop their faculties. They must be content to be treated in some respects as children, helpless and sad, but not yet rebellious children, for whom life has been too hard. To put them to a hopeless task, like oakum-picking or breaking stones, is to disgust them with labour; to give them things like this to do, for which a machine is the proper agent, if it is ever now done—this treatment is not only folly, it is wickedness. I solemnly believe that it is wickedness; and if in this I am mistaken, I trust that experts—not conventional ones, accustomed and inured to the system and incapable of original thought, but real experts—will point out my error.

We should not try to degrade men, however low they may have sunk: when they come to our house of refuge, our establishment for the relief of the poor, we should seek to raise them, to put heart into them, to treat them kindly and as human beings. Guardians, doubtless, often endeavour to do this, and to administer the law in a kindly spirit, but it is not in accordance with the system: the system aims at exclusion of what are called 'the undeserving' by harshness applied all round. Why should society set upon weak people and try to crush them into hopelessness and rebellion? That is not the object for which we pay poor rates. At present the poor rate is rather a mockery: it does not help people till they are quite down and destitute, and then it tries to degrade them. Gentlemen, we ought not to stand this; the time has come for reconsideration and reform. If we could but feel assured that our contributions went to making happier and healthier and more hopeful the

poor folk who, either by defective character or defective education, or rough street influences or deficient industry, have drifted into a condition of idleness as bad and useless as that of some specimens of our loafing, gilded youth—if we could feel that our poor-law contributions would result in their being helped, disciplined, and encouraged to get their foot once more on the ladder which they have slipped off, so as to earn enough—the very small pittance needed—to keep them from starvation until hope and humanity began once more to dawn in their spirits, if they could be shown a way of escape from the down-grade on which they are drifting, then each of us would gladly pay the rate demanded.

Moreover, it would be a profitable investment for society. By placing the people on land, on unreclaimed or unfertile land calling out for labour, under skilled supervision, they might, I believe, be made self-supporting before long;¹ but even failing that, some of them could be rescued from the slough of despond into which they have fallen, and prevented from drifting into that most expensive of all classes—more expensive to maintain than even the landed gentry, and far less picturesque—the criminal class.

TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS

Whatever may be the case with paupers, concerning the criminal class I am perfectly certain we are doing

¹ It may be suggested that there is scope for the uncompetitive organization of abundance of cheap labour in works adapted to resist the wastage of English land by encroachment of the sea. But much can also be done in preparation for agriculture or market gardening. The municipal experiment, conducted at Murieston near Edinburgh, of reclaiming derelict land by city refuse dug into it by the unemployed—thus evolving fertility out of three waste products—is worthy of close attention. It seems to have been most successful.

wrong. We are seeking to punish, not to educate, stimulate, reform. Punishment is not our function. We think it is, but it is not. It comes in incidentally, in accordance with the laws of nature, but it should not be our primary aim. We have a right to protect ourselves, but we have no right to break a man's spirit and undermine his intelligence and character. Solitary confinement does that. Hopeless idleness and degradation do that.

We behave as if we assumed that criminals are already so low and degraded that nothing we can do to them will damage them further. We do not really assume anything of the kind. We know that such an idea is false ; but society prefers not to contemplate the conditions of prison life, and leaves the painful subject alone. The government of gaols is a convenient form of pension for Officers retired from active service ; and a severe military form of discipline, we appear to hope, may be the right sort of thing. Very well, then, I think it is not ; I ask for reconsideration of the question, and I believe that it will be found that, however *penally* successful it may be, it is a thoroughly bad and incompetent system of administration from the point of view of any good outcome or profitable result.

Prisoners should be put under industrial conditions, and should be organized into useful members of society. Remember they are not the incompetent weaklings of the casual ward : some of them are men of ability, some have succumbed to temptation, some of them have been born and bred as criminals, as to a profession, and have never had a fair chance. Some, doubtless, are brutal and hopeless, but these are the exceptions ; these should be treated medically and psychologically, like other interesting abnormalities :

the whole system should not be organized on their behalf. Criminals should be made gradually self-supporting, their labour should be useful ; and self-respect—the natural outcome of self-support—should be encouraged. Unless they are reformed should they be set free ? It seems stupid to release them in order knowingly to reinforce the ranks of the criminal classes. Prisons should be reformatories, but in order to be effective they must be humanely and wisely administered ; it is a most difficult task, demanding earnest and self-sacrificing and constant attention ; and the present system should be radically overhauled.

It is not so much emendation as revolution of the present system that is needed : and if any Trade Unions, or other corporate bodies of workmen, object to the utilization of prison labour and the production of useful commodities, even for internal consumption—then it should be made clear to those Trade Unions or other bodies, that the object of prison discipline is not primarily the manufacture of goods, but the reform and manufacture of human beings from the refuse of humanity—a utilization of ‘ shoddy ’ eminently worthy of this Divine Factory, the Earth. They must be taught that so long as a man retains a spark of humanity, and so long as society takes away his liberty and makes itself responsible for his future, no consideration of trumpery material, no question of immediate apparent profit or loss, should prevent every effort to turn him out a respectable and worthy citizen. Nor do I believe that the Trade-Union leaders would object to this, if it were properly presented to them ; any more than they object to rate-aided, technical evening schools, municipal educational institutions, and other machinery for swelling the ranks of the competent and the trained and the respected

artisan. Workmen leaders have not shown themselves selfish nor foolish when properly informed. Sometimes they lack information, and then they naturally take a wrong view ; but even selfishly, opposition would be unwise. The people have to be maintained ; surely something should be got out of them, they should not be maintained in idleness. Enforced idleness may be a cruel punishment, but it is an expensive one to apply.

I hope that any initial opposition which workmen may feel to the proposal will disappear when they realize :—

(1) That the test to be applied to every social institution and to every social scheme—the way to see whether an alteration is really useful and valuable or not—is to consider what is the ultimate end and aim of existence, what is the ultimate product for which activity and labour and enterprise are worthily expended. Then they will perceive that the worthiest output is, humanity, fulness of life, high and noble manhood ; there is no product which excels that in value ; the manufacture of all else must be subordinate to the manufacture of that.

That is the first proposition which they should realize ; and the second is :—

(2) That the great social organizations called workhouses and gaols might be manufactories of human beings—hospitals, as it were, for the ill and warpings not of body but of mind and character—receptacles for refuse and converters of it into manhood and womanhood. Let them realize even the possibility of such a change, and they will welcome any arrangements which could bring about this much-needed reform.

It must surely be held that direct agencies—Prisoners' Aid Societies, and the like—are but palliatives, temporarily necessary, no doubt, but quite incompetent to deal with the root of the evil. There is not time to deal with people when they come out of prison, broken and disgraced : it is too late then. No, it is all the time, the months or years, that they are in prison, that furnishes the opportunity for getting at them and putting them through such a course of study, discipline, and wholesome and interesting work, as shall fit them to take their place in the army of citizens when they emerge.

To say that the army of workers is already overstocked is no answer : if it were, it is equivalent to throwing up the sponge and admitting that this planet cannot support its present population. It is absurd to suppose that ; when as yet science has not been to any large extent applied to agriculture, when scientific organization and material have never yet been seriously applied to human problems, when the bulk of people even of good position are seriously under-educated, when we are only emerging from the region of individual competition and *laissez-faire*, only just escaping from the time when legislation was governed by class interest, and when the populace, though nominally free, were really serfs, and when, as some urge it should be even now, the whip of starvation was held over them lest they should fail to do their quota of work to maintain those above them in leisured ease.

Time enough to acknowledge defeat and take refuge in despair when a few centuries of really intelligent study and unselfish legislation have been tried.

A beginning of the new state of things is being made. Municipal and socialistic enterprises are in the

air. They are running the gauntlet of criticism and suspicion, as all good things have to do, before they are purged of their dross ; undoubtedly they must justify themselves, and by admirable management must make good their claim to be the beginning of better things ; but this I will say, that never was the outlook so hopeful. Never were all classes so permeated by the spirit, not the phrases but the essential spirit, of brotherhood and co-operation ; never was there such universal recognition of the beauty of the spirit of real and vital Christianity, far above the differences and dogmas of the sects.

With the extension of local self-government, call it devolution or what you will, legislative progress may be more rapid ; the best men will throw themselves into public service with more heart and energy than now, when in an overloaded and centralized Assembly progress is so slow and the machinery so old and cumbersome that the output is quite incomparable with the time and labour involved in getting it through.

[ADDED LATER].—There will be a further advantage in dividing the country into a moderate number of local self-governing provinces, each presided over by a senate. Experiments in social legislation can then be tried on a smaller scale, and so with less disaster in case of failure ; while in case of success, the experience gained can be applied elsewhere. The principle of Federation is far from alien to the English-speaking race.

VII

THE POOR LAW¹

DURING the three-quarters of a century which have elapsed since 1834, the process of evolution has changed every department of human life, and has modified the whole social organism. But the officially recognized methods of dealing with the poor, with trifling exceptions, remain unchanged. The guardians of the poor have had laid upon them the thankless task of administering the law of 1834, under a condition of affairs to which it is totally inapplicable. It is, indeed, doubtful whether the principles of those days were ever really suited to any condition of society.

Now, at length, a Royal Commission has reported in unanimous favour of 'widening, strengthening, and humanizing' all those social arrangements which have hitherto been grouped together in one comprehensive and overweighted system. Any levy made upon society for relief of the helpless, and for assistance of those who are still capable of exertion and self-help, ought to be a public charity of a peculiarly well-administered and efficient kind. Its officers should be trained for their task, and experts should elaborate the plans upon which humane action in the various branches could best be taken. The conscientious brutality of economic officials should be checked.

¹ Written in 1909 with reference to the Reports of the Royal Commission.

If only the public could feel that its poor rate was wisely and helpfully and humanely expended, surely the tax would be felt not as a tax but as a welcome opportunity of indirect service, and we should pay it with satisfaction and even joy as our contribution to the help of weaker brethren. At present the condition of the lowest of the people is literally an ache felt by the sympathetic among all classes: it hinders legitimate enjoyment, it makes life ugly, and it is only tolerated by shutting it out from thought. The poor rate does nothing to mitigate this feeling, for it is an impost with an atmosphere of repulsion surrounding it on all sides. It is actually intended to be even more repulsive to the receiver than it is to the giver! Reformers who see their way to a better and more hopeful system of treatment must surely be welcome.

But it is not to be supposed that legislation alone, however enlightened, nor administration alone, however efficient, can do everything. Human beings are the object of attention, and they can only be dealt with by human beings. The spirit of the willing and self-sacrificing worker must be alive, whether in official or in voluntary organization, and there will always be great need of personal service. In this sense—in the sense of the weak, the sick, the unfortunate, the distressed—the poor we shall always have with us. But the deadly modern evils of deteriorating and grinding poverty, with insufficiency of the simplest means of life in the midst of plenty, we need not and should not have to encounter.

Moreover, if workers are to be efficient, they must be trained, they must have knowledge and experience, and must take pains to acquire them. Universities and colleges are beginning to recognize the need for

instruction of this kind, and are establishing not only lectures but practising schools wherein some preliminary power of dealing with problems of this sort can be acquired.

Lastly, the urgently needed reform—the revolutionary reform—of our present Poor Law system should not be regarded from the point of view of party politics. It too vitally concerns the welfare of the nation to be treated as a subject in which party advantage can be gleaned. It should be dealt with in the same spirit as that in which foreign politics are dealt with—all citizens as well as all statesmen combining to think what is good for the country as a whole, and endeavouring to pursue a consistent and continuous policy of beneficent activity and foresight. Fortunately the recent Commission was appointed by one Government and has reported under another, and its leading members are recognized as social authorities by prominent members on both sides of the House.

The only fear is lest the feeling of satisfaction at the report, and at the consensus of opinion in favour of reform, may lead to a sort of apathy, as if what everybody would like to see accomplished would get itself achieved without effort. The bulk also of the documents which have been issued tends to militate against their being read. Hence a careful and balanced summary of their proposals, such as is contained in a volume called *By What Authority*, written by my colleague, Professor J. H. Muirhead, with the motto ‘The destruction of the poor in their poverty,’ will, it is hoped, be useful.

VIII

CHARITY ORGANIZATION¹

WE must all regret that work of this kind is necessary, but so long as charity of the pecuniary sort is needed by the unhealthy condition of society, so long it will need administration. There may be too much charity of one variety or another, but of the true kind there is never too much.

True charity helps people to help themselves, it strives to give everybody a fair chance ; it lends those who are in danger of falling a helping hand, and does not wait till they are down. A great deal of this true charity and personal help has no eleemosynary character at all. Education, freely distributed, comes under this head ; so do nursing the sick and taking care of the disabled. This kind of assistance is needed by all grades of society. It is personal service, not necessarily connected with money, and it would have to go on equally if there were no such thing as money ; though, under present conditions and customs of society, money is needed to aid its performance.

Now, of all forms of charity, that connected with the Poor Law is the least satisfactory. So deeply is this recognized that it is not thought of as charity at all. Yet it is a kind of public or impersonal or official charity. It is the provision which society makes, not always successfully, against any one starving in its

¹ An Address to the Charity Organization Society at Birmingham in 1901.

midst. Poor Law relief reaches only the failures of society. In order to qualify for relief they must be absolute paupers, and they must continue to be paupers in order that the relief may continue. If they get employment, or rather if they are known to get employment, or if they begin to rise—if in any way they get on the lowest rung of a ladder of progress, and do not lie successfully about it, they become disqualified for relief from the rates. Their pauperism must be complete, or pretend to be complete, and it must be public and unshamed. It is a miserable system on which to administer the public charity of the nation ; but it is the system, and has been the system for some time, though it must be depressing to the good men and women who give their time and energy to Poor Law guardianship. No one can pay the poor rate with any feeling of satisfaction, hoping that his money may really help somebody ; for it does not ‘ help,’ except in some epoch of dire emergency, and then it needs supplementing. It does help indeed to keep body and soul together, but under conditions which make existence hardly worth while. It cannot help people to rise ; if they rise they rise in spite of it ; its tendency is rather to keep them down, to ensure their being absolute failures. This is no fault of the guardians, or of the officials ; it is the fault of the system. The essence of the Poor Law is that the failures of society are to be maintained at public cost, but only on condition of the loss of their self-respect. Loss of self-respect is the test—that and the general unpleasantness of surroundings and the personal time-wasting applications necessary. If people are poor enough to put up with all that, they are to be assisted, otherwise not.

True charity would, however, seek first of all to

prevent people from falling into this last state, and, next, would try to raise them out of it. Assistance by the Charity Organization Society begins where Poor Law relief leaves off. When people make an effort and rise, even by very little, from absolute pauperism, they require assistance ; and that assistance they can obtain here. Much of the effort of private charity is devoted to preserving self-respect, and keeping people away from the need of public relief.

Private charity organizes itself so as to assist the deserving : public relief is organized so as to maintain the worthless. A curious division of labour this, and a demarcation hard to make. It is difficult indeed to tell who is deserving and who is worthless. A line of demarcation between deserving and undeserving is one impossible for human beings to make properly. 'Use every man after his desert, and who shall escape whipping!' I trust that this Society does not act as a pharisaical invigilator, and set up as a hard and therefore necessarily unjust judge. The work of inquiry is most delicate, and should be conducted with the utmost care and method. If a mistake is made it should be on the side of leniency, because the result of the opposite mistake may in some cases be deadly.

But I say it is unreasonable to deny assistance except to those with virtue and strength of character enough to qualify them for the directorship of a company or a seat on the Bench. Any such demand can only lead to hypocrisy and lying. The Poor Law tempts people to lie about their property ; the C.O.S. inquiry, unless wisely undertaken, tempts people to lie about their virtues, to make themselves out, not paupers, but what Kipling calls 'plaster saints.'

Doubtless the poor must be at fault somewhere,

or at least they must be unsuited to their environment, but the environment itself is by no means faultless and free from blame. Who is? What we seek to do is to recognize this, to expect no high measure of desert but some measure of hopefulness, and to give friendly and sympathetic aid, after careful and strict inquiry—an inquiry conducted in no pharisaical spirit, but simply to guard against sheer imposture and professional mendicancy—that abominable vice which does more than anything else to sap the strength and choke the stream of private charity. Part of our work is to undertake private inquiry, and to report to members and would-be donors concerning individual cases, whom, when the report is favourable, they gladly help. All our help is to be given in a personal manner, and so long as the Society works on these lines it deserves generous support.

For myself, and I expect many another busy man, the existence of a Society like this, in which volunteers and skilled officers seek to understand and relieve distress judiciously, is a great comfort. If there were no such organization it would be heartrending to resist appeals even in the street, although one is assured that miscellaneous and random gifts of that kind do no good at all, but rather do harm to the self-respecting poor by encouraging a mendicant class who absorb the outcome of the good nature of the public. But the 'spare a copper' of the professional mendicant is sometimes ingeniously improved until it becomes very hard to resist; and if we made no other effort to cope with the poverty which we know exists round us, poverty not by any means always due to vice or slovenliness or sloth, we should be bound not to resist even these appeals, for fear lest we should rebuff the small percentage of genuine cases which would have

no other access to us. To inveigh against indiscriminate charity, and to do nothing else—to do nothing to relieve real distress, and to make no effort to improve the state of society which causes the distress—that would lead to mere hard-heartedness and greed. Every self-respecting citizen must recognize this, and will doubtless act accordingly.

Meanwhile we of the overworked classes have to leave the problem of the unemployed not exactly unnoticed but relegated to a sort of background. The existence of this background of civilization is a painful thing. I wonder sometimes that our men of leisure and influence do not proceed to tackle it in a more whole-hearted manner, with a view to getting rid of it. We cannot be a light-hearted and fully enjoying nation so long as this background of avoidable misery and grinding poverty lies close all round us. We have got so accustomed to it that, perhaps, we regard it as inevitable. It is not inevitable, because in some countries it does not exist. It exists in the most highly-developed countries, but it is not a necessary consequence of their development. It is a consequence of their lop-sided development, it is a sign that on one side they are not developed at all. So long as violent poverty exists in the cities of a new country like America, for instance, the extraordinary excrescences of gigantic personal fortunes over there are a deformity, they are no more a sign of health than are the growths of elephantiasis, or the tumours and swellings sometimes seen on plants. A crop of sickly and stunted ears, with here and there some swollen and redundant growth, is not a crop to delight a farmer.

As civilized or specialized society is now constituted, large fortunes tend automatically to increase; but life is hard for the average man, even for the employed

clerk or artisan in good health—to take a high class of worker. He has to work many hours a day in order to get a living, and there is very little margin in case of illness. Moreover, most of our handworkers are busy on some one else's concerns. Even in the best cases it is *our* houses they are building, or *our* gardens they are tilling, or *our* furniture they are making; they will not have the pleasure of using what they make, or of knowing who uses it, nor can they take the personal interest in it which a man feels in making things for his own or his friend's use. It is very seldom that the thing made is sufficiently a work of art to carry with it any individual reputation or recognition. This may be inevitable, but it is a fact to be recognized; and, though it never becomes very prominent, it does, I believe, constitute part of the dullness of existence, which seeks to relieve itself by drinking-bouts and other animal lapses. And when we remember how early in the morning this 'other-people's work' has to be begun, and how strenuously it has to be gone on with all the working day, I, for one, never feel surprised at what is called the 'idleness' of some members of the working class, nor is it to be wondered at that a certain proportion drop out of the race and gradually sink till they have to be relieved by either public or private charity.

Charity organization and City Aid are not the last words on the social problem—there is a better kind of organization open to statesmen and social reformers—but they are words of need for the present, until those greater, those really vital, reforms can be brought about.

We owe a debt of gratitude to the workers in this field, who carry our share of social burdens as well as their own, and immerse themselves in this mass of

misery and incipient or threatening degradation, in hope that they may raise individuals out of it. We are all waiting for the time when the mass itself, by wise statesmanship and a more widespread feeling of social responsibility, may gradually cease to exist, and when the face of English towns and of Englishmen may wear a happier and gladder expression, as if life contained some promise, some hope higher and more invigorating than the dull, spiritless existence of the average man to-day,

IX

COMPETITION *v.* CO-OPERATION ¹

THERE is a deadly fallacy abroad that competition is always a good thing, and that without it life would be harder and worse than it is. I call it a fallacy, and thereby doubtless beg a large question : I wish to treat it as a fallacy, and if therein wrong to be enlightened.

Economists I believe teach, or have taught, that competition is healthy, and that if you destroy it you sap the springs of energy and reduce life and civilization to a less developed state.

Without the spur and stimulus of competition the man of business would not be so early or so long at his office, would not work at fever heat all day, would not watch with such anxiety every opening for a market and every fluctuation in prices ; and as a consequence trade and commerce would not flourish as they do. Or, as I should prefer to put it, other and less able and energetic people could make a livelihood without so keen a struggle.

I wish to maintain that many kinds of competition, so far from benefiting us or increasing our wealth, are among the curses of civilization, and that substantial progress will be impossible till they are got rid of. That competition increases our true wealth, in the sense of weal or well-being, I suppose few would be

¹ Read to the Philalethian Society of Liverpool in 1894.

hardy enough to maintain ; but it is questionable whether it even conduces to material prosperity—such prosperity as the economists themselves contemplate.

What is the good to me that I can buy a hat in any one of twenty shops in the town ; I don't want twenty hats. I don't want to be bothered with a great selection of hats. One good shop is enough. I don't mean that it might not have local branches for distribution, just as it might have carts, but one system of management is enough, and by it hats could be sold at a fair price.

When I buy a cake of soap or a pill, why should I pay for a number of posters on tramcars and hoardings, or—incomparably worse—for large boards set up in country meadows, emphasizing its merits. Pay for them I certainly must, since it can hardly be held likely that some one sets up these boards from philanthropic motives, being really anxious that you should use only the very best, and putting himself to great expense to let you know which it is. [Boards disfiguring the landscape along railway lines are growing more numerous. Can it be that any one buys the products thus detestably obtruded ! At one of the leading theatres in Birmingham the audience is similarly insulted, by a lantern display of advertisements on the curtain, during an interval between the acts. It is amazing that people stand it.] All advertisements, all cadging and touting and commercial travelling, must be paid for by the consumer. Everything must be paid for by him ; and part of this everything is due to competition, though some of a travelling agent's work is helpful.

The halfpenny book postage to Russia and America is astonishing, though I suppose not remunerative. A letter can, however, be profitably carried for a penny

from here to Aberdeen, and delivered with regularity and promptitude. How could that be done if we had a number of rival carriers all touting for custom, if different patterns of postage stamps had to be advertised, and if the price of them were liable to jump up and down according to some fantastic law of supply and demand?

The only possible use of a fluctuating price in stamps would be this, that they might become objects of speculation, and a number of human beings might be maintained by strenuously watching the market and buying or unbuying largely at every fluctuation; a crew of sweaters whose futile occupation would in the absence of competition be gone.

But, it will be said, if you don't have competition you will have monopoly, and surely that is worse?

I don't know that it is worse; it is clearly worse in the obvious sense, but then it is so much easier to deal with. That society should allow itself to be ridden by a monopolist, only shows that society is an ass. When an abuse has only one neck it is not difficult to deal with.

But there is no doubt that, at present, society is in a state of lethargy or blindness. As a whole it is only in process of acquiring eyes. Either it has not yet grown the sense, or its eyes have been bandaged all these centuries. Lucidity is all that is wanted, and there are signs that it is coming. A little book by Robert Blatchford called *Merrie England* is one of the signs. It does not strike a high note; there is little ideal about it. Others have painted Utopias; this tries to see things as they are, to tear some of the blinkers from the eyes of society. Brutal and blundering I fear it will be for some time after the bandages are removed. A period of revolution is never pleasant

to live in, for folk who want peace and quiet, but it must come. It need not be bloody, like the French, or the impending Russian revolution—the evils are not irremediable enough for that—but it will be a time of upheaval and unrest. Perhaps we are in the beginning of it now.

The recent scarcity of coal opened some people's eyes to the blind folly of permitting the underground wealth of earth to become private property and aggrandize the family happening to own the surface. And this 'owning of surface' is a matter that will not brook long delay.

Thus, then, with monopoly I say an awakened society will make short work—but how can it deal with competition?

How without it can it secure that soap, for instance, shall be both good and cheap? How supply the enterprise that has evolved the article of Pears or Lever? How raise humanity from the crude yellow bar?

Well, it is a simple matter. I assume that the production of soap is a chemical process, presided over by a chemist; presided over at any large works by an actual chemist, usually imported from Germany (quite properly so, since they are better chemists than we are); and all the improvements are really made by that gentleman, who is paid a very modest salary and is seldom a partner with a share in the profits.

Now then, suppose the firms making soap were really a social community, with no private ends to serve or fortune to make, but managed the concern as a postmaster manages his department; and suppose the soap were not felt to be quite up to the mark, what should the nation do? Why should it not pay

a competent chemist, and provide him with suitable appliances, to make experiments and devise a better material? Why should it not, if he succeeded, give him a peerage?

The power of society to stimulate individuals and get excellent work out of them is something stupendous when it chooses to exert it. What labour and harassments will not be gone through for a simple knight-hood? What toil and danger and hardship is sometimes endured with no recognition but a medal—an iron cross perhaps—and sometimes not even that; ten shillings from the poor-box sometimes!

Emulation is not competition.

Emulation is wholesome and right as a stimulus. It is not the beef and the pudding of life, but it may well be considered the salt and the mustard.

Competition is the wrangling of savages round a table at which they might sit at peace and pass each other victuals; it is the grabbing of the dishes as they are brought on by the waiters of Providence—the laws of nature; it is the filching from weaker neighbours of their portion, so that one is hungry and another is drunken.

Emulation is the aspiration of a soldier to lead a forlorn hope, the desire of a student to make a discovery, the ambition of a merchant to develop a new country or establish a new route. Competition is the snarling of dogs over the same bone.

Emulation is the desire to do a thing better than it has been done by others. Competition is the desire to do instead of others that which is now equally well done by them.

That one University or College should emulate another, is wholesome enough; that it should send touts with handbills for distribution in her gates or

corridors, that it should underbid and seek to ruin its sister college : that would be competitive.

Co-operation is the rule at the meal-table, co-operation is the rule at college ; and what is the result ? Meals are an enjoyable time of reasonable converse, and collegians have leisure wherewith to pursue their studies beyond anything demanded of them by their immediate functions ; they are encouraged to take their place in the advance guard, among the pioneers of human knowledge.

Well, to return to my fable concerning the attainment of quality and cheapness without competition ; having got the good soap, several varieties of soap for different purposes, soap that won't wash clothes and soap that will, then let it be on sale at convenient places at a properly fixed and reasonable price. If there is any doubt about the price that will pay for the material, the labour, the organization, and the distribution, then, once more, let society pay an arbitrator (what is a judge but an arbitrator), and let it be fixed for ten years, or twenty years, or any reasonable time ; and for that season let the nation clear its mind of soap and all that appertains unto it, and think of something better.

But, with such a system as that, the needful soap would be made and distributed with so great ease and simplicity—as postage stamps are made and distributed now—that for every dozen men now employed perhaps six would then be enough, or else the dozen need only work at soap for a few hours a day and use the rest of the time in some other way ; while an army of advertisers and travellers would lose their occupation.

But is that an evil ? Their occupation was, by hypothesis, useless—is useless labour a blessing ?

Simply and straightly, all useless labour is a curse. Of all the labour that man doeth under the sun, how much is useless ; how little is really serviceable to the true objects of life !

Use their time in something better, I said—and the ready scoff leaps up as to the way the working classes use their leisure now.

Too true, but what then ? whose is the fault ? must it be always so ? If so, it is an arraignment of the Deity ; perhaps necessary, but not lightly to be undertaken.

Did He make human nature of this low order, or have we made it so ? Think of the life of the working classes. How should the term working man be defined ? There are a number of grades ; and of the highest artisans I do not speak. Taking the term in its lowest denomination, it signifies those engaged in dull occupations in which they take no interest. They are not a lovely or inspiring spectacle. They will make, I fear, shocking bad masters, and the books addressed to them are rather wretched reading. But, whether we like them or not, there they are, and they form a large part of humanity. How much of their unloveliness is the fault of their work ; not of the work itself, but of their mode of employment and remuneration ?

When I am looking over a great bulk of examination papers, I am one of the working classes, working for pay and nothing else. Were this my life work, without hope of release, I too might be liable to get drunk, or do anything else that was the idiotic fashion of the time. When I am writing a book or giving a lecture or trying an experiment or making a calculation, I am not one of the working classes. The work is interesting, and I like to do it well. So it may be with

many of the higher artisans. So I know it is with some. Very good then, theirs is a happy lot. They have no need to repine, and they do not. The labour we delight in not only physics pain, but immensely prolongs endurance. Put a man on a bicycle and he will go blithely for hours or even days ; put him on a treadmill and he is dead beat in twenty minutes. The action is much the same. Measured mechanically the rate of working is similar. To your Political Economist of old it would be all one. But in spite of the Political Economist there is such a thing as soul, spirit, verve, zest. In a word, there is life, and this the Political Economist in his theory of living has omitted.

When a professional man or a merchant is sarcastic about the Eight Hours' Bill, and how many hours *he* works, he is talking egregious nonsense, and I suppose he knows it. When a man is his own master, one of 'them as has coats to their backs and takes their regular meals,' working, therefore, either for relaxation or for luxuries, he can work twelve hours a day if it pleases him. And even if he takes up the occupation of a workman for a time—a gentleman, let us say, finds joinering, or ploughing, or even stone breaking, a healthy and not unpleasant occupation for a few hours or days—he need not jump to the conclusion that to do nothing else for ten hours a day throughout life would also be a pleasant and satisfactory occupation for a developing human being : for that would be neither lucid nor fair.

That professional men do work hard, however, is true enough ; and the fact should silence those who hold that without the stimulus of hunger, and the misery of those dear to you, no work should be got out of mankind. On the contrary, of every high and

decent sort of work, *more* can be got from a man well fed and happily circumstanced.

Did Sir Andrew Clark, or Sir Henry Thompson, or do some of my readers, work themselves to death for the sake of filthy lucre? I trow not. The lucre in all cases of high and noble work is an adjunct, an accessory; it is among the things that are 'added unto you.'

And as for low and ignoble work, let us have less of it. Let us, indeed, if so it may be, aim at having none of it.

But mind that scavenging, or tailoring, or house building, is not low and ignoble work; nor is any other mode of really serving humanity. Some of the work of a surgeon is little better than scavenging in point of physical pleasantness. Whatever view we take of mankind, it is clear that the majority are not great artists or great philosophers or great anything—there will always be plenty to do the simple humdrum weaving and bricklaying and carpentering. Let it be done honourably and peacefully and pleasantly, without the spur of starvation and the goal of the workhouse. They, too, are ministers of humanity, to be honoured as doing good work after their kind. The really low and ignoble work is the useless work, the work deadly to the spirit and dwarfing to the intellect of man. Work such as this exists in all too great plenty at present; exists, some of it, among what are conventionally styled the upper and middle classes; and the world's rewards go to the doers of some of this kind of work.

But if we are to look for a regenerated humanity—if life on this planet is ever to become pleasant, invigorating, and genuinely happy—none of such workers are wanted. If they must exist in the universe, if

souls of this calibre must find some spot for their development, let it be on some other planet, not here.

But this is a vain contention ; there are no such souls by nature. It is we who grow them. There are, I fear, a few criminal and mad distorted souls—there are no gambling, touting, scamping souls by nature ; or I hope there are not.

But if so much work is knocked off, and rendered unnecessary, how are folk to get food ?

Even as they get food to-day ; out of the soil. Is agriculture an unnecessary occupation ? It is the one occupation which we fools are abandoning ; flocking into anthills to do every other thing but that.

Agriculture is a vital art and industry and science. How has the science of it been neglected ! the reclamation of barren soils, the increased fertility of others—it matters not much whether in England or Canada or elsewhere—can furnish food for millions more than at present exist. There is no lack of food at the banquet, if only the guests would cease to scramble and snatch but would pass things reasonably.

The food supply would come just the same if every atom of needless and unholy labour were obliterated. And if the food is there, the people can be fed. If the clothes are there, the people can be clothed. If the houses are there, the people can be housed. Housed and fed and clothed they are not at present. With all this struggle and toil and fierce competition, the result is a depressing state of destitution for a large mass of mankind.

A momentous social revolution waits to be accomplished : fortunate are they who feel fit to lend a hand towards its achievement.

In conclusion, I suggest the following propositions :

1. That much of human labour is unnecessary.
2. That unnecessary labour is that which provides neither for

The necessities of the body ;
The enlightenment of the mind ;
The enjoyment of the soul ; or,
The development of the spirit.

3. That much of this labour would automatically cease in the absence of competition.

4. That the stimulus of competition is apt to spoil the life even of the successful man, by diverting his energies into useless channels and tending to degrade his character, while for the weak it makes life impossible, and for the average man a severe strain.

5. That by friendly co-operation all needful work could be better accomplished, with less friction, than at present ; that life might become simpler and more enjoyable, not only for the few of the fortunate classes, but for the many of the overburdened—of whom all but the criminals (including the criminally lazy, who are by no means confined to one class) might and should be reasonably happy and healthily intelligent even on this planet.

6. That a fully developed life is a happier one, and a better training for future existence, than a dwarfed and stunted life.

7. That co-operation tends to promote such development, while competition tends to retard it.

[This early article has been put into circulation by a Liverpool organization, but originally it was a paper read at a private discussion society, and for that purpose was worded strongly and one-sidedly. The central theses, however, and especially the summary of conclusions, still seems to me true.]

RUSKIN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY¹

THE untoward theoretical basis on which Society has for so long been founded—a basis of individualism and competitive accumulation—is believed to be responsible for many evils ; it must certainly be held responsible for diverting the heaven-sent genius of John Ruskin from his primary task—the enlightenment and education of the human race in the perception of beauty and the religion of Art—and inflicting upon him the thankless and burdensome role of a prophet amid a faithless and perverse generation. He became penetrated with the conviction that he must at all costs get his message delivered to a dislocated world ; and, until he had so disburdened himself, no unrestrained enjoyment in natural beauty and artistic excellence was any more possible for him.

The year 1860 marks a turning-point in his life. Up to that time he had written about Art and Architecture almost exclusively ; but about 1857 we find his thoughts turning to what he called the Political Economy of Art, and troubling themselves not only about the spiritual meaning of human works, but about the conditions under which they were produced and distributed, and especially about the mistaken ideals which were rendering true spiritual meaning impossible.

¹ An Introduction to a volume in Dent's Library.

Lectures on these subjects, delivered at Manchester in 1857 and published in the same year, were afterwards republished under the somewhat sarcastic title of *A Joy for Ever, and its Price in the Market*.

But by 1860 the colour of his thoughts had acquired a sadder and deeper tinge. He no longer limited himself to the conditions underlying the production and distribution of works of Art alone, but began to brood over the conditions determining the production and consumption of commodities of all kinds. He was led to perceive that the ultimate test of varieties of production and consumption was their influence upon human life itself; that after all the human soul itself was the most vital and essential kind of manufacture with which a nation could concern itself; and that to this kind of production, when properly regarded, all else must be only subsidiary. He saw, moreover, that the foundations of our Society were laid on a basis of conquest and exaggerated inequality, inherited from more barbarous times, with a total disregard of his primary axiom.

He did not arrive at these conclusions without much sorrow and searching of heart. He had been brought up a Tory, and considered himself a Tory to the end; nor was it in anything but pain and grief that he set himself to think out a basal scheme for political economy, truer and sounder than the mere unrestricted competition and cultivated acquisitiveness which hitherto had been treated as the foundation on which an abstract theory of Society could be built.

After publishing his views, and thereby rousing almost universal hostility and opposition, he went abroad to meditate further on the subject; and in

March 1863 we find him writing from his retreat at Mornex :

'The loneliness is very great, and the peace in which I am at present is only as if I had buried myself in a tuft of grass on a battlefield wet with blood—for the cry of the earth about me is in my ears continually, if I do not lay my head to the very ground.'

And, a few months later :

'I am still very unwell, and tormented between the longing for rest and lovely life, and the sense of this terrific call of human crime for resistance and of human misery for help, though it seems to me as the voice of a river of blood which can but sweep me down in the midst of its black clots, helpless.'

The old Economy had treated growing trade and material prosperity as the main object of life ; as if output of cotton and coal were an end of existence. The basis of the old theory was, that whereas individuals differed among themselves in every kind of mental and spiritual quality, they all agreed in possessing one fundamental instinct, the instinct of gain or acquisitiveness—they all united in an enlightened selfishness as the motive power and organizer of life : and it was assumed that this universal quality would serve as the foundation for an abstract science.

Ruskin perceived clearly, what many economists have since developed, that such a narrow basis neglected the larger part of human nature, and reduced the motive power of humanity to its lowest terms. Abstraction in a science is all very well, and some amount of abstraction is necessitated by our limited faculties : we cannot bring the whole universe to bear on any particular problem ; but abstraction which cuts away essential features, and deals with a fraction as if it were the whole, is liable grossly to mislead.

All admit it now, and it is difficult for us to imagine a time when such preachings could be regarded as obnoxious and heretical ; but the outcry which arose when his essays on the subject appeared under the editorship of his friend Thackeray in the *Cornhill Magazine*, and the suppression of the articles, first in the *Cornhill* and subsequently in *Fraser*, are proof positive of the novelty as well as the unwelcomeness of the higher note.

After three chapters of what is now called ' Unto this Last ' had appeared in the *Cornhill*, Thackeray wrote to say that they were so unanimously condemned and disliked that, with all apologies, he could only admit one more ; so with a fourth chapter, which was made a little longer than the rest, the series was hastily brought to a conclusion, and the author silenced for a time.

The reason of the outcry is not far to seek. So long as his heretical principles were applied only to Art, says a biographer, Society could afford to be amused ; but when they aimed at the working creed, the comfortable scheme of all Society, the sanction of property as then held and constituted, and the justification of life as then lived, Society became indignant. And not only society, but his father, who was only destined to live another year, and ' whose eyes had glistened over early poems and prose eloquence,' expressed strong disapproval of the heresies now promulgated by his idolized and only son.

The attack, however, on the orthodox principles of political economy was after all really parallel to his previous attack on the old orthodoxy in art ; and so it happened that in both phases of his life he was consistently leading a revolt against ancient traditions, and preaching the new and unexpected. But in spite of appearances, and contrary to the impression at the time

he was essentially sane and really moderate throughout. His friend and biographer, Mr. Collingwood, truly says of him : ' He did not demand—and this is important to note—he did not demand a state of society hopelessly unlike the present . . . he took human nature as it is, but at its best ; not, as the older economists did, at its worst. He tried to show how the best could be brought out, and what the standards should be towards which education and legislation should direct immediate public attention.'

But it must not be supposed that in every detail Ruskin worked out his perceptions to correct conclusions. The outcry and fierce opposition served the purpose of giving him still clearer insight into the actual conditions of the time, and he continued the interrupted series of articles in a more detailed and laborious form now called *Munera Pulveris* ; but in the execution of this difficult and specialized work he must be assumed to be liable to correction. In so far as the opposition of experts was due to these doubtful idiosyncrasies, it was partially justified ; but unfortunately they did not till some time later admit that the main principles which he laid down were essentially and permanently true.

Mr. Ruskin is always very precise in his use of language ; every word employed by him is employed with due thought given to its meaning and history and uttermost significance. Words in common use, like money, price, value, wealth, riches, are all by him carefully discriminated, and used each in its proper and distinctive sense. So one of his theses is that ' riches ' depend on inequality of possessions, and on the possibility of transfer from one who has to one who needs :—

' Men nearly always speak and write as if riches were absolute, and it were possible, by following certain scientific precepts, for everybody to be rich. Whereas riches are a

power like that of electricity, acting only through inequalities or negations of itself. The force of the guinea you have in your pocket depends wholly on the default of a guinea in your neighbour's pocket. If he did not want it, it would be of no use to you.'

Riches are in fact the power of controlling service and directing transfer of goods ; and this leads him to draw a perfectly scientific analogy between riches and electricity. Electricity all at one level or potential has no power whatever, it can do nothing. To get work out of it, it must be allowed to flow from a place of high to a place of low potential. Elevation of some portion confers energy. Depression of another portion equally confers energy. The greater the inequality the greater the riches. Not by any means the greater the *wealth* : that is a totally different matter. Wealth is that which contributes to the common weal or well-being ; it is really weal-th ; while the possession of great riches is, in an extreme case, compatible with severe poverty—not only poverty of soul, but actual material poverty. One method of making a preposterous Cræsus would be for every one else in the world to be on the brink of starvation. Yet what man could wish to live amid surrounding misery ? Is it not proverbial that the menials who minister to the rich are pampered ? not for their own sake, but to add to the comfort of the rich person. ' Among the blind one-eyed is king ' ; yes, but who would wish to be monarch of a nation of blind ? The kingdom is not worth having ; nor is a kingdom of the solitary rich among a nation of depressed poor.

Another thesis maintained by Mr. Ruskin is that honour is given to various employments, in recognition of and in proportion to the spirit of sacrifice which is supposed to enter into them. On this basis it is sometimes held that the merchant's profession cannot be

pecially honourable, because it is supposed that, although his work may be necessary to the community, the motive of it is wholly personal.

Whereas, on the contrary, the business of the true merchant, and of righteous commerce, is of the most vital significance to men, and is really of more value than that of the highly honoured professions of the lawyer and the soldier. Rightly regarded, it will be found 'that commerce is an occupation which gentlemen will every day see more need to engage in, rather than in the businesses of talking to men, or slaying them; that in true commerce, as in true preaching, or true fighting, it is necessary to admit the idea of occasional voluntary loss; that sixpences have to be lost, as well as lives, under a sense of duty; that the market may have its martyrdoms as well as the pulpit; and trade its heroisms, as well as war.'

But the call to honour, on Mr. Ruskin's principles, is a severe one, being the part which belongs to any other devoted and responsible leader of men :—

'And as the captain of a ship is bound to be the last man to leave his ship in case of wreck, and to share his last crust with the sailors in case of famine, so the manufacturer, in any commercial crisis or distress, is bound to take the suffering of it with his men, and even to take more of it for himself than he allows his men to feel; as a father would in a famine, shipwreck, or battle, sacrifice himself for his son.'

Lastly, and chiefly, the central doctrine of Mr. Ruskin's writings is this: that as consumption is the end and aim of production, so development or expansion of life is the end and aim of consumption—the criterion by which the usefulness of production must be judged.

'Consumption absolute is the end, crown, and perfection of production; and wise consumption is a far more difficult art

than wise production. Twenty people can gain money for one who can use it ; and the vital question, for individual and for nation, is never "how much they make?" but "to what purpose do they spend?"'

And in his chapter on the 'veins of wealth' he contrasts real and spurious national wealth as follows :—

'In fact, it may be discovered that the true veins of wealth are purple—and not in rock, but in flesh—perhaps even that the final outcome and consummation of all wealth is in the producing as many as possible full-breathed, bright-eyed, and happy-hearted human creatures.'

In all our manufactures and commercial activity at present we are blindly seeking, what? It is a question somewhat hard to answer. We seem to expend energy by instinct rather than by reason, and to be satisfied with much exertion without great regard being paid to the direction in which it is being expended.

Upon all this blind and ant-like activity Mr. Ruskin flashes the light of his analysis, and shows that the true wealth of a nation may depend in the long run upon quite other activities :

'It is open, I repeat, to serious question, which I leave to the reader's pondering, whether, among national manufactures, that of Souls of a good quality may not at last turn out a quite leadingly lucrative one?'

This idea runs as a guiding thread through the whole of his life and writings : his life message may almost be summed up in some such sentence. He says indeed that his object is 'to leave this one great fact clearly stated : **THERE IS NO WEALTH BUT LIFE.** Life, including all its powers, of love, of joy, and of admiration.'

That is the great truth at the root of all his diatribes—a truth which he expressed in a hundred different ways ; sometimes by utterances humorously exaggerated in

tone, sometimes in words forced from him by painful recognition of the difference between what is and what so easily might be. The artificial ugliness of portions of England, after visions of Switzerland and Italy, the strange ambition of English leaders to convert their own garden into a manufacturing desert, the clear and strong perception of the truth that, after all, the supply of food and necessities must come out of the land, lead him to speak thus :—

‘All England may, if it so chooses, become one manufacturing town ; and Englishmen, sacrificing themselves to the good of general humanity, may live diminished lives in the midst of noise, of darkness, and of deadly exhalation. But the world cannot become a factory, nor a mine.’

The world cannot support its population by manufactures alone. Wherefore, he rejoices to think, though one country may sacrifice itself, still,

‘So long as men live by bread, the far away valleys must laugh as they are covered with the gold of God, and the shouts of His happy multitudes ring round the wine-press and the well.’

So Ruskin leaves with us what is virtually a plea for the simple life : all sharing in quiet pleasures, not competing in a miserable struggle for subsistence, or for extravagant luxury. No outrageous and unattainable ideal does he set before us, far away though it seems from the conditions of to-day. But the scales are already beginning to fall from our eyes ; and now one, now another, is perceiving that things as they are are stupid and wrong ; that they conduce to the happiness neither of the rich nor of the poor : that violent inequality and unbrotherliness lead to pain and misery among all but the selfish—even among those who ‘have’ ; while, among those who ‘have not,’ it leads to stunted souls and a degrading search after forgetful-

ness and oblivion—so that there is taken away from them even that which they have.

‘What is chiefly needed in England at the present day is to show the quantity of pleasure that may be obtained by a consistent, well administered competence, modest, confessed, and laborious. We need examples of people who, leaving Heaven to decide whether they are to rise in the world, decide for themselves that they will be happy in it, and have resolved to seek—not greater wealth, but simpler pleasure ; not higher fortune, but deeper felicity ; making the first of possessions, self-possession ; and honouring themselves in the harmless pride and calm pursuits of peace.’

XI

SQUANDERING A SURPLUS¹

THERE are no party politics in this prosaic article, and no party feeling. There is nothing peculiar to any one party in the mania that has infected the nation as a whole for many years—the idea that the only thing to do with a surplus is to disperse it, that the only use of strength is to discard it. Both parties are alike in their unquestioning deference to a system which years must have ingrained into permanent officialdom, and which may be supposed to possess the approval of the nation.

Can it be because we are so used to manufacturing goods for no object but rapid distribution of them, that we think the process appropriate to income also?

Taxes, it will be said, must be kept down. Yes, certainly, when they impinge harshly and are severely felt—as part of the income tax certainly is—but taxes need not be kept below the standard needed for revenue nor need they be remitted easily and gratuitously, when they pinch nobody, merely because there is a surplus.

One would have expected that a surplus should be an occasion for rejoicing, and a feeling that now at last some of the many good objects that have been waiting will have a chance of being attended to. But no; the

¹ Written in 1906 about recent Budgets, and published in the *Contemporary Review* for July in that year.

question ' What will the Chancellor do with it ? ' means not how will he spend it, but how will he succeed in getting rid of it, and how will he ensure that it shall not occur again ?

The Government of the country does not bethink itself what quiet and unobtrusive enterprises may be aided or initiated. It has no standing committee for scientific advances and the furtherance of knowledge ; nor has it one for the encouragement of art, and for all the many methods of raising the status of a nation. It does not even seriously set to work to consider how to improve the condition of the people, to check the manufacture of human wreckage, and to temper the consequences of rapid modifications in civilization to hand-workers and the unguarded poor. Such a book as that on *Industrial Efficiency*, by Dr. Arthur Shadwell, points to reforms in many directions, but the national surplus is never available for any such purposes ; and without means reformers are helpless.

Our national income is chiefly consumed in providing bare necessities, such as the defence of the Empire and the repression of crime ; a minimum of support being given to other objects only when they are noisily clamorous. And when we have a surplus we pour it down the gutter, as if it were a valueless or noxious product of civilization.

If a registration duty on corn which has not been grown by the inhabitants of the country had been collected with ease and naturalness for years from those who imported it—so that an income of over two millions a year is readily forthcoming—that at once becomes an opportunity for lavishness ; that income can be forthwith discarded.

It has been the custom to charge the owners of underground England 1s. a ton for any part of it which they

sell to foreigners, so that the national exchequer has reaped a little benefit from the export of that national material for which foreign navies are clamouring. Behold another opportunity for misplaced generosity ; this very natural source of income is forthwith to be dried up. Henceforth either private individuals, the so-called ' owners ' of the coal, will reap an increased profit, or else foreigners will get their coal cheaper ; there is no other alternative.

I wish to express myself forcibly on the subject, because either it is right and just to behave as we are behaving, or else it goes rather near to lunacy.

Municipalities sometimes do bethink themselves of public service, of open spaces, of picture galleries, of museums, of local educational institutions, of improved methods of locomotion, and what not, besides attending to necessities such as gas, water and electricity ; and they are accused of extravagance. In some cases no doubt they might manage things more wisely, but at any rate they do attempt to manage them, and I never heard of their being afflicted with a surplus. If they were, they would either do something with it or else lower the rates.

But a Government surplus in recent years has seldom been applied effectively even to lessen indirect taxation. If all the tax were taken off some one commodity, tea for instance—something definite and substantial of that kind—the loss of income might be lamented, but it could be urged as necessary and justifiable. But these fidgety readjustments of duty, it stands to common sense, are apt to be largely taken up by dealers—affecting chiefly the re-arrangements of stock and the haggling of the market ; or, at best, merely promoting the consumption of more fashionable grades. They cannot effectively benefit the consumer in the way of

appreciably relieving his poverty. Moreover, it is almost certain that if we were to set to work seriously to bethink ourselves what reforms really are wanted, what enterprises might be set on foot, and what improvements in the condition of the people could be effected, extreme slavish penury could before long be struck out of existence.

It is impossible to deny this with any force, because the experiment has never been tried. All the attempts to benefit the very poor have been *direct*—by charity, by trivial remission of taxation, and such like; but direct methods are seldom efficient: the proper mode of tackling all such problems is indirect, and must be the result of a wider and higher outlook; it can only be accomplished when proper authorities, guided by expert knowledge, are put into action and empowered by the necessary financial means.

It is all nonsense to behave as if we were nationally poor. A couple of millions per annum, which would amount perhaps to a farthing in the pound of our aggregate national earnings, could be expended easily on enlightened objects each year of peace, without conscious effort on the part of anybody; and people would feel they were getting something for their taxes. The need for extreme economy is not really felt, so long as there is no waste and so long as something tangible is obtained by the expenditure. At present it is resented because there is so little to show for it beyond necessities. Expenditure in right directions would be popular enough.

In the current discussion on the Education Bill, for instance, it has been noticeable that scarcely any one has urged, as an adverse argument of any weight, the expensiveness of the extra million a year involved in carrying out its provisions; every one rightly feels that

the question is solely whether an improvement can be effected or not. If a substantial improvement can be attained it would be a pity to forgo it merely because it is not cheap. The same thing could be asserted, still more confidently, about the much-needed expenditure of two millions on higher education and research. Properly expended, as we may hope it would be if nationally provided, such a sum would command services of the highest order, and speedily justify itself not only as a good bargain but as a brilliant speculation.

Why should we pay taxes and get nothing for them but bare necessities? Are we never to use a surplus for the good of the country, for developing its possibilities, for encouraging all their energies on the part of its citizens? At present, what the people get, besides necessities, for the larger part of their contribution to the national exchequer, is some pleasure in the Royal Family, and some opportunity for spectacular display in army and navy. But all this is common to the rest of Europe; it is on what we do over and above this that the status of the nation depends, so far as it depends upon material accessories at all. Of course material resources without the *personnel* would count for nothing; but we have that, indubitably we have that, although some of it we may have managed to crush. Individual character and energy are, and have been, and will remain, among the highest of our assets: the longing for service and the enthusiasm of humanity are tightly strung and are full of nerve and muscle; but they are sadly enfeebled by a pitiful deficiency of sinew—their efforts are frustrated by 'that eternal want of pence which vexes public men.'

The world, as managed by man, is a strange spectacle: it is full of earnest desire for the amelioration of society and the good of mankind; private people are willing

to give not only their labour, but largely of their means also, to help on this cause and that ; but in spite of all this admirable effort the world seems smitten with a mania for just spoiling every effort at improvement by withholding the financial condition of success. In the midst of any amount of self-sacrificing labour for the good of the community, this is the blight. Every public and beneficent enterprise is hampered by poverty, and is left to the capricious goodwill of the benevolent.

Organized corporate expenditure is mistrusted ; people prefer to expend their wealth privately, and to do things casually and wastefully rather than co-operatively ; so they have grown into the habit of giving away large sums to such objects as appeal to them, and of objecting to the equivalent taxation of others—except in the rather comic form of ‘ if 99 others will do the same ’—a formula which shows that a rational instinct is only latent. By our present plan all the best citizens are mulcted heavily, though voluntarily, while the selfish ones escape with a minimum ; and even against that they clamour, not for the legitimate reason that it is perhaps wastefully administered, but that it is required for administration at all.

At present it is the fashion to sustain essentially national enterprises by the grotesque and time-wasting machinery of meetings and speeches and circulars and touts. Over and over again we are pestered by solicitations for private donations and subscriptions to this and that good object, in addition to our compulsory disbursement in the way of taxes ; and we seem to think that the wasteful and unorganized and capricious channel of private munificence is a good way to manage charitable undertakings. As a matter of fact it is a very extravagant method and gives rise to much overlapping.

Some men are asked not only to give but to speak on platforms and persuade others to give. The objects are often good ones, but the demands are so heavy that they would amount to an income tax of 19s. 6d. in the pound if they were yielded to. Any prominent man who gave to all the objects that righteously appeal to him would be reduced to penury. Why cannot he pay his taxes with a good will, and feel that something will be done with the money by wiser heads than his own, or by his own too, in consultation with others?

The essentially national subject of the health of the people is taken up by an admirably intentioned 'League,' which sends round the inevitable hat to increase the taxation of the public-spirited and well-disposed—that is, of just those whose money anyhow would do good and be usefully employed. The best of the citizens are being taxed almost to impotence by this constant devolution of national burdens on to individual shoulders. Another circular is now going out for the much-needed study of criminology and a reformed treatment of criminals. But how is a subject like that to be dealt with by private benevolence? There is a remarkable industrial movement also, in an early stage of development, claiming more and better education for working men and women—a movement possibly of profound historic significance, if it takes root and flourishes.

Many public-spirited persons are anxious to set the higher education of the country on a more wholesome and substantial basis, and a large amount of young energy is seeking an opportunity for training and for investigation; but they have to beg fruitlessly, as if they were engaged in some charitable undertaking. Half the energy of university organization at the present day is consumed in thinking not how best to do the

work, but how to get the money wherewith to do it at all.

Agriculture, again, the feeding of the people, the reclamation of unfertile soil, bacteriological problems connected with dairy work and with manures, the stemming of diseases in plant and animal, the study of blights and pests of all kinds, and, perhaps most important, the discovery of a mode of increasing the fertility of our soil until it can compete with virgin soils elsewhere and feed the inhabitants in case of need—all these problems are awaiting greater scientific knowledge ; they are well within the scope of research, and there are trained men who would undertake the research for a pittance, if they had the material appliances ; but nothing is done, save where some enlightened individual expends his private fortune, as well as his personal effort, in making some attempt to examine into the causes of things.

Then there is the whole subject of pathology, and the investigation of obscure diseases. Here, ever since Pasteur, is territory crying out for exploration : discoveries must be lying ready to be picked up, almost. Splendidly trained young fellows will sacrifice their lives in eager wish to get at the root of diseases which kill people like flies, but they are hampered by lack of means. In tropical medicine something has been begun largely by private and university enterprise, but there are many other branches also. I cannot think that people really prefer to die, or see others die, of cancer rather than pay for a proper investigation of it.

We have a superstition that by getting the money out of charitable individuals we are getting something for nothing. That is an illusion ; something is not got for nothing ; the question is, first, whether certain work

shall be undertaken ; and, second, how it shall be paid for ; for paid for it must inevitably be.

I feel sure that some result—meteorological and other—would result from the electrification of the atmosphere on a large scale. Growing crops might be assisted ; rain might be produced ; fog might be dissipated. No one can tell for certain what would happen until the experiment is tried ; it would be costly, but laboratory experiments sufficiently justify the attempt, and the result may be one of considerable importance in some regions of the British Empire.

I do not touch on housing questions, and the unemployed, and underfed children, and old age pensions ; for all these are difficult and painful subjects, the treatment of which demands detailed knowledge ; but unless we apply wisdom and enterprise to public expenditure, the nation will have to immerse itself in wretched problems such as these, which it ought to have overcome long ago : else it will become decadent.

I shall be told, what at any rate I often tell myself, that finance is not my business, and that I had better stick to my 'last.' But then I cannot but remember that my business is to cobble at the higher education of a part of England, and to try and waken up a portion at least of the old country to a sense of her vital deficiency in this respect. In carrying on this business certain materials are necessary, and those have never yet been adequately supplied, notwithstanding the quite extraordinary exertions of localities and of individual citizens, and the partial recognition of those exertions by Chancellors of the Exchequer and their advisory committees ; nor is it at all likely that they will be adequately supplied during my life-time. That being so, it is easiest to remain quiet, take what is given one, ask no questions, and do the best one can ; or

rather it would be easiest if, at sight of all there is to do, and of the good men and true who are waiting and anxious to do the work, it did not occasionally become intolerable to witness the flinging away of money which would raise the nation in the scale of civilization : yes, and raise civilization itself. For it is just the upper or surplus expenditure which would do good. It is just this that a rich nation ought to afford—this is its weapon by which it can peacefully surpass others. By the judicious administration of its superfluous revenue it could contribute its quota towards elevating the standard and increasing the spiritual momentum of humanity.

XII

THE SMOKE NUISANCE¹

IT is very appropriate that The Royal Sanitary Institute should have joined with the Coal Smoke Abatement Society to summon this conference, held under their joint auspices ; for nothing can be more insanitary, in the long run, than the sun-obscuring atmosphere in which we artificially arrange to live. Those who try to imagine that coal smoke exerts a disinfecting influence are deceiving themselves. The amount of disinfectant fatal to disease-germs would assuredly also be fatal to higher organisms ; and, besides, who wants to live in the midst of a plague of disinfectant, diffused through the common atmosphere, any more than in a plague of anything else ?

Moreover, coal smoke contains many other products : besides coal tar, asphalt, manures, and useful material, it contains sulphurous acid, an ingredient of the most noxious character, which speedily becomes oxidised into oil of vitriol. But all this is well known and commonplace, although it can hardly be repeated too frequently so long as the barbarous combustion of crude coal in a savage and unorganized manner is permitted in the midst of the semi-civilization we have so far attained.

Assuming that people are awake to the evil, the pro-

¹ An Address to a Conference on Smoke Abatement in Dec. 1905.

blem is to find a remedy. One remedy that has been suggested is the electrification of the air on a large scale, a plan which I have brought within measurable distance of application, and believe to be the appropriate method for dealing with river and sea mists and other temporary obstructions to traffic, and in general for dealing with fogs of a non-avoidable kind. It ought also to be useful for the deposition of valuable metallic and chemical fumes, the product of manufacturing processes. This last is most certainly true.

But as a permanent method of dealing with town fog caused by imperfect combustion it would be a very expensive method. It is expensive to produce a town fog, and it would be expensive to dissipate it. The double expense ought not to be tolerated. The right way of dealing with a town fog is not to produce it. If it were only country mist it would not be nearly so deleterious: it would be disturbing to traffic, but it would not enter houses nor lungs; consequently it would do no particular harm, and, moreover, it would soon be dissipated. But the fog which contains products of imperfect combustion is in the first place far denser, in the second place far more readily formed, and in the third place much more permanent. No ordinary warmth will evaporate it, and it retains its character even in houses and in lungs, where it causes a dirty and damaging acid deposit.

The right plan is not to produce it, that is to say, not to permit imperfect combustion in large cities, but only to permit combustion planned and executed in such a way that no half-burned products shall escape; and likewise to insist that the combustible material shall attain a moderate average of purity, the amount of sulphur especially being kept down, since sulphur is even more noxious when thoroughly burned than when

half-burned or not burned at all, thus constituting an exceptional case requiring special attention and treatment.

PROBLEM OF COMBUSTION

To take the problem of combustion, therefore, there are three things to be attended to—

- I. Purification of the material to be consumed.
- II. The proper means of effecting its complete combustion, under conditions of easy regulation and avoidance of dust and dirt.
- III. The utilization of the heat due to that combustion, without waste.

I. The scientific and satisfactory combustion of crude coal, as it is dug out of the pits, is an impossibility ; it ought first to be subjected to some chemical treatment. Its solid and its gaseous constituents ought to be separated from one another. The solid constituents in the form of coke, when properly made, are of exceeding value for smelting and manufacturing operations ; and it is the solid portions which will contain the ash and dirt. Other products of its destructive distillation are of high value.

The processes involving the use of solid fuel should not be carried on in a big city, but should group themselves round a coalfield, so that the cost of carriage may be small. The gaseous product, on the other hand, readily lends itself to purification and chemical treatment, and can then be *easily transmitted to any distance*, and there burned in a scientific and proper manner under easy regulation, being turned on and off as wanted.

Another scientific method of dealing with coal is to turn almost the whole of it into gas, *i.e.*, all except the

ash, by a judicious supply of air and steam, and then to utilize the whole of this gaseous product, purified up to a certain point. Gas of this kind, sometimes called water-gas, sometimes producer-gas, sometimes Mond-gas according to various details of its preparation, can be made very cheaply and plentifully; but its large amount makes purification of it rather more difficult, and moreover it has not the same heating power, bulk for bulk, as coal-gas proper possesses, without so great an admixture of nitrogen. However, all those details are matters for careful consideration. There are advantages and disadvantages in every plan that has been suggested; but there is not one plan for the combustion of gas that does not far eclipse the uncivilized and essentially savage method of heaping a pile of crude coal together and setting a light to it.

Consider what the burning of house-coal in a city means—

1. The getting of coal in the pit.
2. The raising of it to the surface.
3. The loading of it into railway trucks.
4. The unloading of it on wharves.
5. The shovelling of it into carts or sacks.
6. The carrying of it on men's backs or wheelbarrows, and storing it in coal cellars.
7. The shovelling of it into scuttles, and carrying about the house.
8. The putting of it by hand on to fires.
9. The distillation of a great part of it up the chimney, and the half-burning of the rest.
10. The raking out and carrying down of the ashes.
11. The carting of them away and dumping them to form the foundation of a future house.

A long and troublesome series of operations, even

apart from the fouling of the air, which has not been mentioned, but which is the worst condition of all.

Now consider what the supply of gaseous fuel would entail—

1. The getting of the coal as before.
2. The conversion of it into gas, either at the bottom of the pit or near its mouth.
3. The conveying away of the coke and the manual products to where they are wanted.
4. The transmission of gas in great pipes to the distant town, just as water is now transmitted; with such occasional pumping stations as may be necessary, driven by the power of a small portion of the same gas.
5. The underground distribution of all this fuel, and its utilization by the turning of a tap, in a manner which will insure complete combustion, with no smoke, no ash, no dirt, no trouble, and no residual product to carry away either in carts, or clothes, or lungs.

Against all these conveniences we have to set the influential and constantly-encountered parrot-cry, 'We do not like gas fires.' The people who say this do not realize that every coal fire is to some extent a gas fire, though a very bad one. When coal is put on, a quantity of it is necessarily turned into gas—impure and badly-made gas, but gas at any rate; which before long catches light and flames, burning with a smoky flame, but burning and giving what is called a coal fire, though it is really a gas fire, the gas being made on the premises, and made badly, and only half burned because mixed with carbonic acid from the red-hot material below.

There is some justification for the prejudice, of course; and the justification is that when people speak

of gas fires they think of the imperfect arrangements at present in vogue for burning gas at 3s. or 3s. 6d. a thousand ; burning very little of it therefore, and burning that imperfectly, sometimes without causing sufficient draught in the chimney to carry away the products of combustion, which therefore enter the room. When the products from a *coal* fire enter the room people say the chimney smokes, and regard it as intolerable ; but when the same thing happens from an imperfect gas fire they are liable to abuse gas fires in general, as if the defects were a necessary condition of their existence. Moreover, some people go so far as to put a gas fire into a chimney which has troubled them by smoking, because, the products being invisible and somewhat less noxious than the coal fire products, they think they may be tolerated ; though at the same time the reputation of the gas fire suffers irretrievably.

None of these things would happen if gas were supplied in large quantities, for use all day for cooking and heating purposes, at a very low price. Sufficient would then be burned to make a good chimney ' draw ' properly ; and the general use of such arrangements would stimulate invention to the production of appropriate gas fires, such, for instance, as some of those used in Pittsburg, where natural gas is, or was, cheaply available, and where no one thought of burning coal.

It would seem to be wise for municipal authorities, or others interested in gas, to superintend the proper erection of gas fires, and to encourage their use by supplying them cheaply and inspecting them gratis if inefficient.

II. But now what are the conditions of complete combustion ? First of all, there must be no cold surfaces to interfere with ignition. Gas must be raised to a certain temperature before it will ignite, the simple theory of a flame is that the combustion of each portion

has to ignite the next ; and it cannot do that if the temperature is lowered beyond a certain point by cool solid conductors introduced into the flame. In many domestic grates there is far too much iron : there ought by rights to be none, nothing but non-conducting material, within reach of the flames ; otherwise the portion of the flame in contact with the good conductor is necessarily extinguished, whether visibly extinguished or not, and the material escapes unburned.

Because the products which escape up the chimney are invisible it does not follow that there has been complete combustion. Many of the products of incomplete combustion are gaseous, and it is just as wasteful to allow chemically combustible material to escape unconsumed as it is to allow heat to escape when it has once been generated by combustion. This fact, is, however, often forgotten ; and so long as all the heat generated is utilized, it is thought that there can be no waste. On the contrary, there can be very much waste, and in many cases there is. This matter is important and can be illustrated by experiment. It is easy to extinguish a flame by a cold surface. The miner's safety lamp depends on this very fact.

The avoidance of cold surfaces in open fire-places and stoves is not difficult, and there is no excuse for such surfaces there ; nor is it difficult to avoid them in many manufacturing processes, such as the baking of pottery, and other furnaces dealing with incandescent material. But there is one great application where the introduction of cool surfaces into the flame seems almost unavoidable, viz., the *firing of boilers*. It is to be hoped that gradually gas-engines will replace steam-engines, and enable us to dispense with the rather primitive and unsatisfactory arrangement of obtaining power by the boiling of water. It is *impossible* to transfer heat with

real economy from a furnace into a boiler. It is usually thought to be sufficient if all the heat generated is absorbed by the boiler, though even that is never fully accomplished. But suppose it were accomplished, there would be two great sources of loss still left ignored: one is the escape of unburned material, already mentioned, and the other, and much greater in amount, is the drop of temperature between furnace and boiler. Concerning the last item there is much to be said, but briefly this: that it alone entails loss of a great amount, not of heat, but of available energy—more than seventy per cent. of the whole—for which there is nothing whatever to show.

Another condition for complete combustion is the adequate supply of air, unmixed with carbonic acid or other material. If enough air is not supplied, then the fire, stove, or furnace becomes a sort of gas retort; the only difference being that in a gas retort no air is supplied at all, and the products are simply distilled away unburned. This happens in the early or black stages of a coal fire, but it is especially liable to happen in closed stoves and in other furnaces with doors. A quantity of coal is put on and gives off gas which bursts into flame, then the door is shut, the flame promptly goes out, and the gas is distilled up the chimney. If the door is opened it may catch alight again with a small explosion. Consequently the attendant takes care not to open the door until the gas is all gone, and he is left with nothing but smouldering coke. Then he can open the door and repeat the process. The amount of senseless incombustion that goes on in common hand-fed stoves is something almost incredible, and only to be accounted for by a recognition not only of the dense ignorance of uninstructed human beings, but of their obstinate stupidity also in being unwilling to learn, and

thinking that their own habits are perfect and unimprovable.

Furnace stoking is managed much better, for its evident importance has directed a considerable amount of scientific attention to it. It is known that fresh fuel must be introduced either under or in front of a burning and red-hot mass, so that the products of distillation may be raised up to combustion temperature before they escape. It is known also that sufficient air must be admitted if they are to be properly burnt, and that this air ought properly to be warmed by waste flue heat before introduction. Automatic stokers are made continually to feed in fresh fuel in the right place and way, but probably no automatic stoker can compete with highly intelligent hand feed. Stoking is an art, and a good stoker is a skilled artisan well worthy of appreciation.

In boiler furnaces, however, there is this difficulty, that if too much air is introduced combustion is too perfect, and the flame has insufficient *radiating power*. Moreover, even though the air is previously warmed up, as it ought to be, it exerts a considerable cooling influence, the cooling being mainly due to the great bulk of nitrogen in proportion to the active ingredient of the air.

III. Thus we arrive at the third of the fundamental things to be attended to in the problem of combustion—the utilization of the heat. The utilization of the heat produced in boiler furnaces is most important, and demands illustration.

HEATING BY RADIATION

The right way, and indeed the only way, of conveying heat from a flame to a cool surface is by radiation. It is *impossible* to bring a flame into real contact with a

cool surface : the flame is extinguished where it touches and a layer of non-conducting gas necessarily intervenes, across which the heat *can only pass by radiation*. Now, a luminous flame is a far better radiator than a blue flame. Radiation is emitted from incandescent solids much more plentifully than from any gas. Accordingly a luminous and somewhat smoky flame is necessary inside a boiler, unless the walls of the boiler are so thick or so covered with studs that the surface exposed to the flame may become red-hot and above the temperature of ignition. In that case the flame need not be extinguished, but may play upon them properly. This is a condition hard to satisfy, however, and so in some cases a luminous and to some extent smoky flame is necessary, and the combustion must be completed by air introduced beyond the boiler and before the smoke-stack.

A better plan is to introduce special solid material into the flame and keep it at a white heat so as to utilize its radiating power, on the principle of the gas 'mantle.' A mantle radiates far more heat than even a luminous flame, and immensely more than the blue flame of perfect combustion ; but the blue flame is the right one for keeping solid materials thoroughly hot, and these solid materials may in some cases be the walls of a combustion chamber, provided that the boiler surfaces are exposed to its glare. I shall not mention any specific device ; I am dealing only with general scientific principles, but it is well known that more or less efficient methods of effective boiler-firing are growing in number. For steady work some of them suffice, but the difficulty of regulating the combustion of a coal-fed boiler under *variable* conditions is excessive ; and whereas with a gas-fed boiler it would be easy to turn the gas on and off, with a coal-fed one the fire has to be banked up and

kept in a black condition when not wanted, which is exactly the condition for smoke and destructive distillation without combustion.

There are many more things to say, and some points need more detailed treatment. Boiler furnaces and annealing furnaces, where comparatively cold masses have to be heated, constitute the only really difficult problem. Separate combustion chambers should be used for tubular boilers, so that cold surfaces shall not put out the flame. The radiating power of solid particles in flame is important, but there are ways of supplying such solids without smoke, though smoke is the easiest method when you are burning crude coal. So the main moral is : Don't allow crude combustion of coal in towns, but supply then all day long with cheap gas from a distance.

XIII

UNIVERSAL ARBITRATION, AND HOW FAR IT IS POSSIBLE¹

NOW that Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Balfour have joined hands with President Taft in an effort towards the gradual attainment of universal peace, in the hope that ultimately civilization may be relieved of the growing intolerable burden caused by national fears and jealousies, it behoves all persons to bethink themselves whether they can in any small degree assist in this weighty business. Not only diplomatists and politicians are concerned, the man in the street has an influence too, and cannot be altogether disregarded : for if in any country a mania of mistrust and suspicion is engendered, or if any nation feels its honour seriously wounded by any proposal, the best-laid schemes of its rulers are likely to be futile. It is as a man in the street, only, that in this matter I venture to claim a hearing.

In cold blood, and in the light of sanity and reason, the settling of disputes by means of bodily violence is manifestly uncivilized and barbarous. Through these preparatory epochs our forefathers have gone, and we owe them a debt of gratitude for what was doubtless in their day a natural and praiseworthy and at any rate inevitable form of human activity. But now that we have entered upon an age of science, now that we realize

¹ An article contributed to the *Westminster Gazette* in April 1911.

human brotherhood, now that we recognize the age-long pathetic struggle of humanity towards something higher, now that we realize that we can help or hinder the process of evolution, now that all our sympathies are called out by the pain and suffering we see around—surely we would not wish to add to the labour or to increase the pain.

There are those who hold that the struggle for existence has not only been beneficent in the past, but that it must be encouraged to continue in the future. There is no need for encouragement, the struggle is hard enough anyhow, and human progress will be more assisted now by friendliness and mutual aid than by savage and ruthless destruction. The energy and ingenuity which have gone to construct engines adapted to destruction—exceedingly well adapted, beautiful and complex structures of lavish excellence—would have sufficed to advance prodigiously the arts of peace. The nations are all linked together now, and what benefits one benefits all. So also what injures one injures all, and fratricidal warfare is not only cruel—it is suicidal. Every war between civilized nations is nowadays a civil war ; they trade together, they explore nature together, they reap the fruits of the earth together, they visit each other and understand each other now, quite as freely as the different provinces of a single country did in the Middle Ages. Destroy or weaken one country of Europe, and all Europe suffers ; not Europe only, but the world.

There is no real ' winning ' in war. To suppose that other nations benefit by the downfall of one, is surely akin to the fallacy that the smashing of crockery is good for trade ! If the destruction of beautiful and useful things, the result of human pains, is good for anything, that thing is thereby proved to be evil. And if a nation

appears to benefit by a successful career of fratricidal warfare, then those benefits will in the long run prove to be dead-sea fruit. The world is so constructed that far-reaching happiness is not attained by anything which is essentially evil ; thistles do not produce figs.

Granting all this, what is the immediate outcome ? Can a nation contribute to the securing of peace by disbanding its army, and proclaiming that henceforward under no conditions will it fight ? Clearly not. No nation can act individually in this way with any wisdom ; any more than a man can dispense with locks and bolts, and leave his house open, until humanity in general is far more civilized. Mutual distrust and suspicion are far from a state of ideal perfection, but, until the human race has become the human family, full precautions are necessary.

It is not practical to announce that you will not hit back if attacked. On the contrary, in a just cause—if only we can be sure that it is a just cause—we shall do well to strike as hard as we can. Indeed, some of us have had an uneasy sense, not so much of the power, as of the occasional futility, of our splendid Navy—a futility not in the least due to the Navy itself. We have felt sometimes that we would like to interfere—as Cromwell and Milton did on behalf of the Waldenses—when helpless people were being attacked ; and yet, apparently because no financial interests were involved, we struck no blow—we did not even effectively threaten to strike one. Whether it was right or wrong to abstain when we did, or to fight when we did, we men in the street never really knew. Information in such matters is difficult to obtain. Strangely enough, it is but seldom that the verdict of history has been given in our favour ; and that has made us uneasy. The outcome of all this differs with different people, but in my

own case it may be summed up thus : by all means let us retain the power to act vigorously in the cause of justice, and then let it be known that we intend so to act ; only let the justice of our cause be carefully and anxiously decided, and not left to the heat and ignorance and prejudice of the moment.

What, then, about arbitration ? Can we agree to refer every cause to arbitration and abide by the result ?

Here we enter on the citadel of the position ; and here it behoves us to walk warily, with full knowledge of what we are doing and what we intend to do. On everything arbitrable surely we should arbitrate, so as to settle things humanly and judicially and not ferociously and blindly. Sooner or later civilized nations will agree to that ; and every effort that can be made to bring that time nearer—every effort like that which is now being made—should assuredly be strengthened to the utmost. But does this proposition cover the whole ground ? As a man in the street it appears to me that it does not. There are certain things which no nation would consent to submit to arbitration, and before deciding on a universal arbitration treaty it would be well to face these things and make up our minds as to what the list of them includes.

On all such matters as Newfoundland fisheries and Alabama claims we have already shown a willingness to arbitrate. We are not likely to go back on an advance like that. It may be necessary to go to law with a friendly nation like America, I trust to goodness that it may never be necessary to go to war, on any issue that may ever crop up between us on the whole North American Continent. And yet there may be some delicate matters to be discussed, some of those which the carelessness of our predecessors has left in a very unsatisfactory condition.

There is the boundary of the State of Maine, for instance, and the still worse and quite preposterous boundary cutting off the northern part of British Columbia from the sea. If this does not raise bad blood between the citizens of friendly nations, much Christian virtue on both sides will be needed to keep it down. Still, those are matters on which arbitration is possible ; and of the same kind will be those which may some day arise in connection with the Panama Canal. But suppose a difficulty arose with Mexico, and suppose some European Power were unwise enough to interfere, would the United States consent to arbitrate ? Would it not say that it was a domestic affair which it must settle alone ? I expect it would. Whether trouble will ever arise about one of the West Indies, or about the Philippines, we need not conjecture, but the developing continent of South America must contain a variety of difficult problems which, let us hope, may be all peaceably settled.

Coming nearer home—suppose some foreign nation interfered on behalf of Ireland and insisted on Home Rule. Should we be ready to submit that question to arbitration ? I trow not. We may grant Home Rule or we may withhold it—that is not the question—the question is, should we not regard it as a thing to be decided by ourselves alone, without foreign intervention, and should we not be prepared to fight rather than submit such a matter to alien jurisdiction ? Well, I don't know, but I expect we should.

Again—to make another absurd and only typical supposition—suppose our neighbouring friend and Ally were to put in a claim for the re-possession or management of Egypt, and asked us to arbitrate about it. I expect we should decline. And we are surely not the only nation which will have reserves of that general sort.

Pass, then, to the Mediterranean, where for my part I fully expect the next temptation to go to war may arise—a temptation which I earnestly trust may be strenuously resisted to the utmost, when the time comes—quite independently of whether a question can be submitted to arbitration or not. It may be a delicate matter to refer to, and probably a statesman could hardly do so with propriety ; but no one attaches importance to the guesses and assumptions of an outsider. I venture to assume, therefore, as a matter of gratuitous hypothesis, that some day, when changes occur in the Austrian Empire, an effort will be made by Germany to secure a seaport in the Mediterranean—probably, let us say, on the Adriatic, since that part of the coast could be united with Germany by a minimum of annexation ; and Italian Tyrol could be bartered to Italy. Let us suppose that it is a matter of high German policy, of long standing, and quite beyond any question of arbitration. To such a proposal, what would be our attitude ? We cannot pretend to be intelligent friends of Universal Peace unless we face it.

The German argument will be that such an outlet is needed in the interests of national expansion, that some of the North Coast of Africa is fallow for re-civilization, that German Colonial development is in progress, and that they have as much right to colonies as ourselves. France and Italy may at first strongly object, but the German Navy may be sufficient to overawe them and carry the operation through peacefully, in spite of their protests, if they are unaided. That, in my judgment, is what the German Navy is for ; nothing to do with the North Sea or a preposterous highway-robbery invasion of any country, *so long as it does not interfere.*

Let us suppose such a state of things, by way of hypothesis ; for if this does not occur something else

will, and we may as well look at the matter in cold blood beforehand, and not wait for the passion of the moment. What will be our own attitude? The arguments on our side will be that we do not want another Power in the Mediterranean, that we have interests there, in Gibraltar and Malta and Cyprus, not to speak of Egypt; that is our highway to India; and that at all costs the Colonial ambition of Germany so far as it affects the Mediterranean must be curbed.

That line of argument will undoubtedly be put forward. Is it a righteous one? It was tried before on Russia, and successfully applied: the Crimea was invaded, the Black Sea exit was blocked, and a great land-bound nation was practically excluded from our seas.

Is it legitimate thus to check the expansion and development of a nation? Is it wise? Has it lessened our anxiety? Have not the suppressed expanding instincts continually striven towards a maritime outlet somewhere else—Persia and India, if it might be, and if not there, then towards Japan? Lord Salisbury told us that in the Crimea we backed the wrong horse; and that appears to be the general feeling now. Earnestly I trust that when the time comes we shall be wise enough to hold aloof from a Mediterranean quarrel, and shall not plunge Europe into blood and tears for the sake of a route to India, which, after all, would really remain as open as before. Asiatic burdens are not worth so fearful a catastrophe. Manfully have we shouldered them, though occasionally they have been staggering, and not lightly shall we give them up. But we are not asked to give them up: not for long yet, when unforeseen contingencies will have arrived, and when Asia herself may be able to control her own destinies.

Not ours is the whole world. Our race is dominant in

America, in Australia, and in most of Africa. In the long run that may surely suffice for our governing and legislative and civilizing ambition. Meanwhile in Asia we have done what we could, and on the whole have done it well, but we must not allow our work there to annihilate the peace and prosperity of Europe, we must not let the East embroil us in what would undoubtedly be the most fearful war—the most fearful perhaps of all time.

But now I am appearing to argue. That is not my object at present. My object is to test the reality of our peaceful protestations. Let us face this or any other reasonably contingent controversy, and determine, so far as we can determine, how we should behave in it. And if we can happily decide, as I for one would most assuredly decide, then let us enter the peaceful arena with open eyes and open hands, ready to welcome with heartiness the friendly overtures of every nation on the globe.

[At this period, I admit, I was far too hopeful and optimistic about the possible rightness of German intentions. Highway robbery, to be conducted with ruthless and scientific savagery, we now find was in their minds ; but they cloaked their intentions with hypocritical ingenuity, and their friends were terribly deceived.]

XIV

THE IRRATIONALITY OF WAR¹

OR, SCIENCE AS AN ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPING OF
INTERNATIONAL GOOD WILL AND UNDERSTANDING

HUMANITY is a race of workers, and on its output of energy the well-being of the planet now largely depends. The work of the human race is directed towards

- (1) Sustenance,
- (2) Advancement :

and on the whole the work is conducted at high pressure and there is little margin to spare. The more energy that has to be expended on mere existence the less is available for progress and development. Consequently it is in moderately fertile countries and peaceful times that the greatest steps in Art and Science have been made. When existence is threatened there is neither time nor opportunity for advance.

Humanity works in sections, and it is possible for these sections to quarrel and seek to injure or destroy each other ; thereby interfering with each other's bare subsistence, and taking attention off higher things. It

¹ Written in 1912 at the request of Nicolas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University.

is notorious that in such disputes much energy can be unprofitably consumed, or, more accurately, degraded ; and also that even if there is no active quarrel between two sections, still the possibility of it entails severe preparation and anxiety and much unprofitable caution and disabling fear. So it used to be at one time between families, then between tribes, and now between nations ; yet the sub-division of the Race into nations with differing facilities and a variety of customs and traditions, ought to have a beneficent influence as well as add greatly to the interest of life. So long as the sections co-operate and mutually help each other, all is well ; each benefits by the discoveries and advances of the rest, and a valuable spirit of Emulation is aroused. But when emulation degenerates from wholesome rivalry into a spirit of envy, hatred, malice and all uncharitableness—so that the sections wage an internecine conflict—then the warring among the members is a calamitous evil, and humanity as a whole is bound to suffer.

In some departments of civilized life the risk of unwholesome and mutually destructive contest is more rife than in others. Certain fields of labour there are in which the spirit of rivalry never now degenerates into hostility and mistrust. These are the cosmopolitan enterprises and labours to which every nation can contribute, and in the results of which every nation can share. Of all these cosmopolitan efforts, those included under the general head Science are among the chief. Literature is more of a national product, the literature of one nation necessarily appeals less forcibly to another nation ; alien language is a bar to complete enjoyment. But scientific discovery can be made at once interesting, can be assimilated and its fruits reaped by all. Any discovery made by a group or by an individual becomes

thereafter the property of humanity, and the world is advanced a step higher. And, short of catastrophe, such a discovery is made for ever : it is not liable to decay like a picture or a statue ; it is in the spirit, so to speak, it is not incarnate. Many discoveries are not only world wide but cosmic, and if ever we are able to communicate with another planet they could be appreciated there too. This is especially the case in such subjects as Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry, and is probably true of a great part of Biology also. These great fundamental sciences are cosmic in their scope and significance. These and all other sciences are at least international. Science tends to weld the nations together : and even though petty jealousies and personal rivalries exist for a time, they seldom survive a generation : personal quarrels are felt to be unworthy and unseemly, and the successful worker sooner or later meets with a world-wide appreciation.

But it needs all the energy, all the spirit, all the encouragement that can be given, to pursue this work ; the labour of peace times is indeed strenuous, the problems to be solved demand the keenest intelligence, the most indomitable patience ; and they represent a strain on the highest powers of a nation. To produce a Helmholtz or a Kelvin is a demand on national vigour : a feeble nation cannot as a rule produce great men. Appreciation also is necessary. Appreciation from other nations is especially welcome and is usually forthcoming ; it is a sign and token of civilization when such is the case ; and the fact of appreciation reacts with especial benefit and stimulus on the otherwise solitary worker. For such a man must be in advance of his contemporaries, and yet must not be too hopelessly and utterly beyond the appreciation of them all ; the career

of a great genius becomes wellnigh impossible when the general standard is low.

To cultivate science demands high qualities and strong character, it is a task of difficulty ; whereas to rush into a quarrel and fight is easy enough. A savage in this art is an adept. No demand is made on self-control, no lofty national spirit is needed in order to cultivate misunderstanding or the pangs of envy and of greed. And yet it is in the encouragement of this facile mood that the greatest national enthusiasm and Patriotism are felt ; merely because the condition recurs at intervals, like an appetite ; whereas the steady strain of work for the common good excites no enthusiasm, calls forth no encouragement, and but little recognition or praise. Smooth, indeed, is the path to a quarrel, easy is the descent to war, night and day the gates stand open ; but to take up again the works of peace, to climb the steep ascent of science, that is the burden, that the toil.

Nevertheless, it is often claimed that high qualities are demanded by modern warfare ; and the claim is well founded. Qualities of mind and body are indeed evoked by it, and the nobler the nature the more it can respond to the demand, when the special call comes. That is what is asserted, and that is surely true. But this is only one aspect of the universal struggle for existence, it is a natural result of all corporate effort towards a common end : such qualities should be called out by every kind of emulation between nations ; and would be, if only the pressure were occasional and episodic instead of constant and steady. Use and wont blunt the feelings, and sap the energy of the average man ; but it is not a different set of qualities that are needed in war, it is the same qualities raised to incandescence by the momentary burst of national feeling.

For consider what it is in war that evokes high faculties. Not the mere killing—the killing is an episode, almost an accident: the actual fighting is a small part of a campaign. The rage to kill may have a survival value, but it is rapidly becoming obsolete: there is no real lust of slaughter in modern warfare, it is regarded as a grim inevitable necessity. Modern fighting is mostly done by machinery—especially naval fighting. No personal animosity lies behind it; skill and prowess are evoked, but it is engineering skill and the prowess born of peaceful practice and essays of sport. The strenuous effort is akin to that which leads to success in games. One essential element of ancient human warfare is absent from any modern battle; there is no hate, often no vision, of the foe. Triggers are pulled, or guns fired, and unseen distant men drop; and this may continue till a battle is won; but the triumph is due to the inventive skill that has devised the instruments, and the vigour that has brought them to the right place at the right time. Modern warfare is a great organization—a great industrial organization, it involves transport, complex machinery, supplies of food and clothing, and many another peace necessity. All these arrangements and faculties and powers are also called for and trained and developed in times of peace. Wars are not now won, as they used to be, by extermination, but by successful management and organization; and ultimate victory is largely dependent on the pertinacious power of the purse. It was not so in old times, when men fought face to face and used their muscles to give blows. Then the feelings cultivated by Christianity were in abeyance, then the wounded were slain, non-combatants were rigorously dealt with; then there might be war to extermination. Those were the logical and rational times, so far as war is concerned. Killing was a savage

business, and was appropriately conducted in a savage manner. Now the whole outlook has changed, and the rationality of war has departed ; we fight by machinery and industrial organization. Scientific ingenuity devises constantly new apparatus, and skilled manufacturers execute it. A battleship is a scientific laboratory. Thus science is applied to an alien use—a use which would have to be stigmatized as unholy were it not that in the present unhappy state of European civilization these things are essential to defence.

The power to produce ingenious things and use them is excellent ; the gratuitous bringing about of catastrophes by their means is diabolic. That is what war does : it brings about, on purpose, disasters which in peace we regard with special abhorrence—destruction of crops, railway accidents, shipwrecks, explosions, wounds and violent deaths. The nations are naturally horrified at what they are doing, even while they are still at war; and they send surgeons and nurses to repair the damage done, even to the enemy, as quickly and as painlessly as possible.

Then, why should we continue our rivalry into this illogical and brutal extremity ? The only excuse that can be made is that our ancestors did it. But our ancestors had no other way of competing ; practically they only came into contact with foreign nations for the sake of bloodshed and plunder. But engineering progress has made travel and international intercourse easy, and we can go abroad now with more facility than they could then travel across England. Language is still a barrier, and is responsible for many misunderstandings, but in all essentials it is easy now to be on friendly terms with every civilized nation. We trade together, we study the same problems, and encounter

the same natural difficulties. In thousands of ways we can help each other : in one way and one way alone can we do each other serious damage. Exertion is good, and fighting is strenuous exertion, but why not fight now solely by means of organization and enterprise and scientific skill and ingenuity ? Why not show emulation and high spirit in the various industries and arts of peace ? Why destroy and ravage the property of humanity ? Why should one section seek to destroy another, when all can co-operate together for the common good, and when all are members of a common brotherhood, so that if one is injured all suffer ? Why not give to humanity the benefit of the whole combined enterprise and conjoined cultivated skill : why not discourage the artificially fostered and quite impersonal hate, and omit the too successful and unmeaning butchery ? If the end sought were extermination, war would be intelligible ; though in these days of mutual interests and commerce, to kill off your customers is surely unwise. But when the nations are working hand in hand in scientific discovery and invention, as well as in Arts and Crafts of every kind, when they recognize each other's good work with real enthusiasm, and hand each other medals and dine together and feel friendly and rejoice in each other's progress—then suddenly to reverse this attitude, at the bidding of a few frenzied newspaper-writers, and convert the weapons which scientific investigation has made possible into engines of desolation and slaughter—that is monstrous and detestable.

Fortunately, there is hope in the prospect before us ; the craftsmen of every land are finding out that their interests are common, they are beginning to realize that it is madness to seek to destroy and ruin each other. The educated people, and especially the men of Science,

have long known this. By interchange of periodicals, by frequent international visits, by the action of great Societies, and by making use everywhere of all knowledge wherever it be acquired, they have long practically realized the solidarity of humanity; and, in spite of such political hostilities as are forced upon their notice, their attitude to all co-workers is necessarily and essentially one of fellow-feeling, sympathy, mutual admiration, and brotherhood. No warlike enthusiasm is needed, no alien excitement is called for, to break the monotony of scientific work. In work such as this there is no monotony: excitement and thrill are provided by the prospect of a discovery. There is plenty of room also for effort and strenuous exertion. There is danger too to be encountered, dangers of disease and accident—witness the self-sacrifice of many an investigator, whether he be a geographical explorer, or an X-ray worker, or a student of tropical disease. There is very little monotonous toil, though there is much steady work. An eruption of barbarism would be no relief, it would be a discord, an interruption as painful and perturbing as an earthquake.

It is the deadly monotony of the ordinary life of the multitude that constitutes a civic, a national, danger. It is this that drives people to drink and unworthy relaxation. It is this that makes people welcome the feverish excitement of a catastrophe or of the imminence of war. It is this which is responsible for much of the gambling that goes on. The deadly monotony must be broken, daily life must be made more interesting, work more joyous, human nature must be given a fair chance of equable development. The nation which first realizes the magnitude of the opportunity afforded by earth existence, and the responsibility resting upon those who co-operatively waste it in the mere apparatus and

material of bodily life ; the nation which by social reform liberates the spirit of humanity—that nation will arouse in its citizens a fervour of patriotism hitherto unknown ; and to it will belong, not by military conquest but by divine right, the supremacy of the future and the gratitude of the human race.

XV

HUXLEY'S LAY SERMONS¹

IT has been fortunate for the intellectual interest of life that the peace-loving Darwin and the self-effacing Wallace should have had a coadjutor more vividly touched with earthly fire, like the mortal charger who, champing more fiercely in the battle's fray, kept pace with the two undying steeds of Achilles. But we must remember that Professor Huxley's trenchant polemic has cast a kind of glory about the mere fact of man's ignorance which cannot possibly be kept up for long. Battles there will always be ; but never again perhaps such a plunging through half-armed foemen, such an *ἀγῶν* of the Agnostic as we associate with that brilliant name.—F. W. H. MYERS (Essay on 'Charles Darwin and Agnosticism.')

Yes, battles there will always be, and Huxley was a splendid fighter, but the ostensible cause for which he fought—insistence on our present ignorance and on the folly of pretending to know what in truth we do not—is not a cause of satisfying fullness. Ignorance it is right to confess, but it is never a thing to glory in. Only in an age in which rash assertion and mistaken tradition dominated thought too strongly was the flag of the Agnostic a conquering and triumphant emblem. The battle has already shifted to other grounds ; and before the end of his life Huxley realized that a great part of his warfare on the negative side was accomplished, and that it remained to restrain his camp-followers from prowling too savagely among the dead and wounded.

The essential and permanent aspect of his teaching,

¹ An Introduction to a volume in Dent's Library.

like the teaching of all men of science, lies on the positive side; and here effort is still necessary, for, though a great deal has been accomplished, the scientific training and interest of the average educated man is still lamentably deficient. Nor are the attempts to remedy the deficiency, as carried out in schools and colleges, always of the wisest and happiest kind. Nevertheless an effort is being made; and when things have settled down into their due proportion, future generations will recognize how much they owe to the preachings and teachings, the lay sermons and lectures, of Huxley.

The supremacy of truth, the reality of things, the cultivation of the senses, the need for realistic education and understanding of the physical universe in the midst of which man is set, the folly of yielding to mere glamour, and the sin of sophisticating what we can perceive of truth by hope of reward or dread of consequence—all this he strenuously fought for; and surely we may say that on the whole he won. No recognized branch of natural knowledge is now excluded from contemplation by reasonable men, nor is stringent inquiry cursed or dreaded, even by those to whose general purview it appeared at one time to be alien. The universe is recognized as one, and loyal allegiance must be accorded to every proven fact.

The battle is now transferred from this general contention to a more special one:—What range of facts can we admit into the category of positive knowledge? How much wider can we make the area of rational contemplation? Shall the human race be for ever limited to the domain of ether and atoms alone—as W. K. Clifford imagined—or are there other existences, just as real, just as important, just as well worthy of study, just as deserving of scrutiny by scientific methods?

It was no attack on religion that Huxley led, it was

an attack on the *præjudicia* of religion—the bland assumptions which did duty for reasoning, the self-interested arguments which concentrated attention on the past, attempted to despise the present, and held out illusory hopes for the future.

Study the universe before you, the living universe, with its traditions and history incorporated in it ; cease to limit yourselves to the fancies and speculations of more ignorant times : that was Huxley's message.

A piece of chalk, he said, rightly interpreted, will tell you more about the physical history of the world than myriads of books. Try and learn the language of the chalk—' it is easier than Latin,' so he said ; and whoso knows the true history of a bit of chalk in a carpenter's pocket ' is likely, if he will think his knowledge out to its ultimate results, to have a truer, and therefore a better, conception of this wonderful universe, and of man's relation to it, than the most learned student who is deep-read in the records of humanity and ignorant of those of nature.'

This is the language appropriate to intellectual warfare. It is part of his battle-cry, it is an emphatic statement of one side of the truth, it is not the whole truth. Its comparative side is its weak side : it is not really necessary to decry other forms of learning in order to exalt one—and Huxley showed later that he did not think so ; it was only because one side was being neglected, and the other was in possession of the field, that he stood up manfully for the outcast, and dragged it into a prominent position.

The comparative side of his utterance was pugnacious and therefore temporary, but the positive side is eternally true. Every bit of chalk is related to all the rest of the universe ; and he who would know all about it—the life of the creatures whose remains compose it, its

past, present, and future in all its phases—must have a grasp of the universe beyond the present scope of man. Tennyson said the same thing, more poetically, in his 'Flower in the Crannied Wall.'

But granting all this, what then? Because we are not to jump to conclusions too rapidly, because we must make our bearings and foundations sure, because our hopes and predictions must be well founded—is there to be no future, no hope, for the human race? Is the end of all human struggle and effort to coincide with the probable end of the solar system—a dark, dead, lifeless lump careering through the depths of space? It were to reason too curiously to reason so.

Darwin could not contemplate such an ending—his instinct rebelled against it. In a notable passage he expresses the placid disbelief of an open-eyed investigator in such a conclusion—an investigator to whom the avenues of knowledge were in this direction closed, and who therefore would make no assertion one way or the other, but who instinctively felt that there must be some other answer. This he says :—

'Believing as I do that man in the distant future will be a far more perfect creature than he now is, it is an intolerable thought that he and all other sentient beings are doomed to complete annihilation after such long-continued slow progress.'

And Tennyson in his poem, 'Despair,' has dramatically and impersonally voiced a violent development of the same feeling :—

'Why should we bear with an hour of torture, a moment of pain,
If every man die for ever, if all his griefs are in vain,
And the homeless planet at length will be wheel'd through
the silence of space.

Motherless evermore of an ever-vanishing race,
When the worm shall have writhed its last, and its last
brother-worm will have fled
From the dead fossil skull that is left in the rocks of an earth
that is dead?'

And again in 'Vastness':—

'What is it all, if we all of us end but in being our own corpse-coffins at last,
Swallow'd in vastness, lost in silence, drown'd in the deeps of
a meaningless past?'

But in the fighting age such instincts and feelings and longings had rigorously to be suppressed. They were too perilously near the old bulwarks of superstition, which were to be broken down. Hence the side of assured positive knowledge was to be kept in the van—there was indeed plenty to do—and a more comprehensive understanding of the puzzles of existence might wait until some positive knowledge began to appear, throwing the light of day upon them also.

While things remain in the dark they must be ignored. This is the fortress of the Agnostic position. Flashes of sheer speculation sometimes burst from it, and the hope was not lacking that 'out of the molecular forces in a mutton chop Hamlet or Faust could be deduced by the physics of the future.' But this enthusiastic and more than half playful utterance of Tyndall (*Life and Letters of Huxley*, i. p. 231) is showing itself baseless—as baseless and as alien to the truly agnostic position as any of the superstitions that were then being attacked. Nevertheless, it is an interesting sign of the enthusiasm kindled by the physical discoveries of the nineteenth century—interesting and quite intelligible, and in its way legitimate; for readers of the present day should learn where to emphasize, and where to discount, the utterances of the teachers of an enthusiastic and a fighting age.

Here, for instance, is the conclusion that Huxley draws from his piece of chalk, which, like lime exposed to the oxy-hydrogen flame, had become luminous under his scrutiny, so that 'its clear rays, penetrating the

abyss of the remote past, have brought within our ken some stages of the evolution of the earth. And in the shifting 'without haste but without rest' of the land and sea as in the endless variation of the forms assumed by living beings, we have observed nothing but the natural product of the forces originally possessed by the substance of the universe.'

Yes, that is a narrowly logical position. Keep rigidly to scrutiny of the material universe, and nothing beyond matter and force shall you discover. The conclusions that you draw will be entirely appropriate to the data. Things belonging to Cæsar will be rendered unto Cæsar. Of things not so belonging it need not yet be the time to discourse.

It would be a great mistake to assume that in all his contentions Huxley was right: we can imagine his sarcasm at the notion of infallibility in connection with his utterances. In a few cases he went, in my judgment, seriously wrong; led astray by controversial successes, he occasionally inflicted undeserved blows upon causes which had much good in them, and which might have flourished with his help—upon such a cause as the early efforts at social work of the Salvation Army, for instance. And, by his concentrated insistence on the material side of things, he sometimes led his hearers to imagine that it was the only side that mattered, or even the only one that existed. Nevertheless it was not really against religion that Huxley was wielding his battle-axe! it was against the Fetishism, the Polytheism, the theism or atheism, and many other isms, with the relative merits and demerits of which, as he said, he had nothing to do:—'But this it is needful for my purpose to say, that if the religion of the present differs from that of the past, it is because the theology of the present has become more scientific than that of the past; because it has not

only renounced idols of wood and idols of stone, but begins to see the necessity of breaking in pieces the idols built up of books and traditions and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs: and of cherishing the noblest and most human of man's emotions, by worship 'for the most part of the silent sort' at the altar of the unknown and unknowable.'

Here, again, we encounter a glorification of the unknown god, which, as was implied before, cannot for ever, nor for long, be an object of rational worship. The intellectual business of the human race, and of scientific investigators, is to attack the unknown, and to make it, so far as possible, gradually known. Never completely known, nor at all adequately known, but never unknowable. Infinite things cannot be grasped by finite comprehension—in that sense unknowable, yes, but in no other. The universe itself is unknowable, in the sense of being infinite; but the human aspect of it is open to our examination and comprehension—with that we have kinship and instinctive affinities—and it would only confuse the issue, and muddy the stream of scientific exploration, if we were to start on our quest with the idea that anything whatever was in any real and practical sense 'unknowable.'

To be able to ask a question is the first step towards getting an answer. There must be myriads of things in the universe about which it has never occurred to a human being to formulate any sort of idea. Those truly are outside our present ken; but anything of which we can discourse and think—that is on the way, by patience and perseverance and rigorous care and truthfulness, to become known.

The discourse of Huxley's on 'A Liberal Education,' which he gave to working men, is worthy of close atten-

tion, especially among the higher artisans who are determining to get for themselves, if so they can, and for their children still more, the advantages of some approach to a liberal education.

It is not the whole truth which he there expresses, it is one aspect of the truth—an aspect that then needed emphasis more than it does now. It is the view of an individual man, but of a profoundly wise and cultivated man, who would never wish us to limit our grasp of truth to an understanding of his own utterance, but would ask us to listen and progress further. What he is anxious about is that we shall not lag behind.

The metaphor of a game of chess is employed by Huxley as a parable of life :—

‘The chess-board is the world, the pieces are the phenomena of the universe, the rules of the game are what we call the laws of nature. The player on the other side is hidden from us. We know that his play is always fair, just, and patient. . . . My metaphor will remind some of you of the famous picture in which Retzsch has depicted Satan playing at chess with man for his soul. Substitute for the mocking fiend in that picture a calm, strong angel, who is playing ‘for love,’ as we say, and would rather lose than win, and I should accept it as an image of human life.’

A little further on comes a passage, often quoted, about the strict discipline of physical nature :—

‘Ignorance is visited as sharply as wilful disobedience—incapacity meets with the same punishment as crime. Nature’s discipline is not even a word and a blow, and the blow first ; but the blow without the word. It is left to you to find out why your ears were boxed.’

And presently comes that magnificent sentence about control of the passions, which I quote in order to draw to it special attention.

‘That man, I think, has had a liberal education who has been so trained in youth that his body is the ready servant of his will. and does with ease and pleasure all the work that as

a mechanism it is capable of ; whose intellect is a clear, cold, logic engine, with all its parts of equal strength, and in smooth working order ; ready, like a steam engine, to be turned to any kind of work, and spin the gossamers as well as forge the anchors of the mind ; whose mind is stored with a knowledge of the great and fundamental truths of nature and of the laws of her operations ; one who, no stunted ascetic, is full of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to heel by a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience ; who has learned to love all beauty, whether of nature or of art, to hate all vileness, and to respect others as himself.

‘Such an one and no other, I conceive, has had a liberal education.’

The petty Agnostics who, invoking the shade of Huxley, look out of their little holes and corners, peer through a foggy atmosphere, and deny the stars, have no support from their great precursor. He would counsel them to see life steadily and see it whole, and to remember that the greatest men are not those who blink difficulties and claim that they have done more than they have, but those who modestly admit every difficulty, and where they are ignorant conspicuously avow it.

To those, for instance, who imagine that Darwin discovered the whole truth about the origin of species, by his undoubtedly just emphasis on struggle for existence and survival of the fittest—since these influences tend to clinch and make permanent the variations which otherwise arise—to those who imagine that we understand fully the origin of those variations, without which natural selection would have nothing to work upon—let us quote the following from Darwin himself :—

‘Our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound. Not in one case out of a hundred can we pretend to assign any reason why this or that part varies more or less from the same part in the parents.’

Lastly, in these days when women have come so much to the front, and are showing signs of occasionally even over-complete emancipation, it is well to remember that only half a century ago the cause of their rational and higher education had to be fought. Huxley's article on 'Emancipation—Black and White,' an outcome of the American Civil War, is a plea for giving a fair field and no favour.

'Emancipate girls,' he says. 'Let them, if they so please, become merchants, barristers, politicians. . . .

'Women will be found to be fearfully weighted in the race of life. . . .

'The duty of man is to see that not a grain is piled upon that load beyond what nature imposes ; that injustice is not added to inequality.'

So, then, we come to the more technically scientific lectures, the biological teaching of which he was a master. He discusses, among other things, the probable origin of the human race—whether it spread from one centre or from many—and evidently inclines to the view that human evolution took place at only one point of the earth's surface, and was distributed over it by migration. But on this he does not dogmatize: the alternative views have difficulties of their own. The nascent stages of humanity must have been delicate and dangerous in the extreme, and it seems unlikely that the process of evolving man would be often repeated at different places on a planet. But then it is difficult to contemplate any form of uncivilized migration which from a centre in, say, Asia could reach and populate the American continent down to Patagonia.

'The whole tendency of modern science is to thrust the origination of things further and further into the background ; and the chief philosophical objection to Adam [is], not his oneness, but the hypothesis of his special creation.'

A prominent part of his teaching at this time consisted of a course of lectures on the skull and its development. The various stages of the human skull, and of the animal skull, are dealt with, and their points of similarity and difference emphasized. To any one who doubts the physical ancestry of man, as part of the animal world, these chapters will bear the meaning which they are intended to convey.

But if any one at this time of day thinks that physical ancestry is the last work, and exhausts the meaning of human genesis and of what may be meant by 'Adam,'—any one who thinks that spirit and genius and inspiration offer no field for investigation, furnish no clue to interpretation, and are foreign to any rational study of the human race, the possibilities of which are exhausted by an exemplary scrutiny of dry bones—such an one would wrest the teachings of the learned among mankind and apply them to his own stultification. It is not by denying and restricting that we progress, it is by examining the ground and advancing, without haste, without rest, till we reach fresh woods and pastures new. Admitting those things which are behind, and reaching forward to those things that are before—that is the attitude of the genuine explorer of nature, for all time.

The truth of one set of things is quite compatible with the truth of many another set of things. Only let the truth in every age be established, and let no corner of the universe—physical, mental, moral, spiritual—be closed to patient and reverent investigation.

To those few unfaithful pastors who dare not admit the plain teachings of modern science, and to those many pathetic half-educated strivers after knowledge who think it their duty to deny everything else, I say:—

Oh, race of men, be worthy of thy heroes. Recollect

that bones and lowly ancestors alone are far from exhausting the truth of the universe ; learn the lessons these things can teach, and bethink yourself also of the triumphs of mind over matter ; realize the dominion of music and poetry and science and art ; and remember, when tempted to take a low and depressed view of humanity, that during our own days we have had living with us on this small island a Darwin, a Tennyson, and a Huxley.

XVI

THE ATTITUDE OF TENNYSON TO- WARDS SCIENCE¹

HENRY SIDGWICK wrote in 1860 concerning Tennyson that he 'regarded him as pre-eminently the poet of science'; and to explain his meaning he contrasts the attitude of Wordsworth, to nature, with that of Tennyson:

'The nature for which Wordsworth stirred our feelings was nature as known by simple observation and interpreted by religious and sympathetic intuition'

—an attitude which left science unregarded. But, for Tennyson,

'the physical world is always the world as known to us through physical science; the scientific view of it dominates his thought about it, and his general acceptance of this view is real and sincere, even when he utters the intensest feeling of its inadequacy to satisfy our deepest needs.

It is probable that what was then written is now a commonplace of letters, and requires no insistence, but as a professed student of science, whose life has extended over the greater part of the time which has elapsed since 'In Memoriam' was published, I welcome the opportunity of adding my testimony in continued support of the estimate made by Professor Sidgwick half a century ago.

¹ An article contributed at the request of Lord Tennyson to a volume called *Tennyson and his Friends*, published in 1911.

It is generally admitted, and has been recently emphasized, that wherever reference is made to facts of nature, in the poems, or the fringe of science touched on—as it so often is—the reference is satisfying and the touch precise. Observers of nature have often called attention to the beautiful accuracy with which natural phenomena are described, with every mark of first-hand personal experience, as distinct from merely remembered conventional modes of expression. And the same sort of feeling is aroused in the mind of a student of science as he comes across one after another of the subjects which have kindled discussion during the Victorian epoch; he is inevitably struck with the clear comprehension of the fundamental aspects of the themes treated which the poems display, he sees that the poet is never led into misrepresentation or sacrifice of precision in the quest for beauty of form. The two are wedded together ‘Like perfect music unto noble words.’

To quote examples might only be tedious, and would assuredly be misleading. It is not that the bare facts of science are recorded—such record could not constitute poetry—certainly not high poetry—it is not merely his acquaintance with contemporary scientific discovery natural to a man who numbered leading men of science among his friends;—it is not any of this that arouses our feeling of admiring fellowship, but it is that with all his lordship of language and power of expression so immensely superior to our own, he yet moves in the atmosphere of science not as an alien but as an understanding and sympathetic friend.

Look back upon the epoch in which he lived—what a materialistic welter it seems! The mind of man was going through a period of storm; antiquated beliefs were being jettisoned, and everything spiritual seemed

to be going by the board ; the point of view of mankind was rapidly changing, and the whole of existence appeared capable of reducing itself to refined and intricate mechanism.

Poets generally must have felt it as a terrible time. What refuge existed for a poet, save to isolate himself from the turmoil, shut himself into his cabin, and think of other times and other surroundings, away from the uproar and the gale. Those who did not thus shelter themselves were liable to bewail the time because the days were evil ; as Arnold did, and Clough. But thus did not Tennyson. Out through the tempest he strode, open-eyed and bare-headed, with figure erect, glorying in the conflict of the elements, and summoning the men of his generation to reverence and worship.

Doubt ? yes, doubt he justified—doubt, so it were straightforward and honest. Forms and accessories—these he was willing to let go, though always with respect and care for the weaker brothers and sisters to whom they stood for things of value ; but faith beyond those forms he clung to, faith fearless and triumphant, uprising out of temporary moods of despondency into ever securer conviction of righteous guidance throughout creation and far-seeing divine purpose at the heart of things.

Other men retained their faith too, but many only attained security by resolutely closing their eyes and bolting the doors of their water-tight compartments. But the glory of Tennyson's faith was that it never led him to be unfaithful to the kinds of truth that were being revealed to his age. That, too, was an age of revelation, and he knew it ; the science of his epoch was true knowledge, as far as it went ; it was over-emphatic and explosive, and to weaker or less inspired minds was full of danger, but it was genuine cargo, nevertheless,

which must be taken on board ; there was a real overload of superstition which had to be discarded ; and it was his mission, and that of a few other nobler souls, to help us to accomplish with calmness and something like wisdom the task of that revolutionary age.

In the conflict between science and faith our business was to accept the one without rejecting the other : and that he achieved. Never did his acceptance of the animal ancestry of man, for instance, upset his belief in the essential divinity of the human soul, its immortality, its supremacy, its eternal destiny. Never did his recognition of the materialistic aspect of nature cloud his perception of its spiritual aspect as supplementing and completing and dominating the mechanism. His was a voice from other centuries, as it were, sounding through the nineteenth ; by his strong majestic attitude he saved the faith of thousands who else would have been overwhelmed ; and his writings convey to our own age a magnificent expression of that which we too have still not fully accepted, but which we are on the way to believe.

If asked to quote in support of this statement, I will not cite more than the titles of some of the chief poems to which I appeal. Not always the greatest poems perhaps do I here refer to, but those which most clearly uphold the claim of the poet's special service to humanity during the period of revolution in thought through which mankind has been passing.

Let me instance, therefore, first and most obviously, ' In Memoriam ' ; and thereafter poems such as ' De Profundis,' ' The Two Voices,' ' The Ancient Sage,' ' Ulysses,' ' Vastness,' ' By an Evolutionist,' ' Demeter and Persephone,' ' Abkar's Dream,' ' God and the Universe,' ' Flower in the Crannied Wall,' ' The Higher

Pantheism,' 'The Voice and the Peak,' 'Wages,' and 'Morte d'Arthur.'

If I do not add to this list the great poem 'To Virgil,' who in his day likewise assimilated knowledge of diverse kinds and in the light of spiritual vision glorified all he touched, it is only because the atmosphere of the ancient poet is so like that of the modern one that it is not by any single poem that their sympathy and kinship has to be displayed, but rather by the similarity of their whole attitude to the universe.

By the term 'poet of science' I understand one who assimilates the known truths of science and philosophy, through the pores, so to speak, without effort and with intuitive accuracy—who bears them lightly and raises them above the region of bare fact into the realm of poetry. Such a poet is one who transfuses fact with beauty, he is ready to accept the discoveries of his age, no matter how prosaic and lamentable they seem, and is able to perceive and display the essential beauty and divinity which runs through them all and threads them all together. That is the service which a great poet can perform for science in his day and generation. The qualities beyond this—exhibited for the most part perhaps in other poems—which enable him to live for all time, are qualities above any that I have the right or the power to estimate.

To be overwhelmed and mastered by the material and the mechanical, even to the extent of being blind to the existence of every other aspect, is common and human enough. But to recognize to the full the reign of law in nature, the sequence of cause and effect, the strength of the chain-armour of necessity which men of science weave, and yet to discern in it the living garment of God,—that is poetic and divine.

XVII

FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM

THE conflict between Free Will and Determinism depends on a question of boundaries. We commonly ignore the fact that there must be a subjective partition in the Universe separating the region of which we have some inkling of knowledge from the region of which we have absolutely none ; we are apt to regard the portion on our side as if it were the whole, and to debate whether it must or must not be regarded as self-determined. As a matter of fact, any partitioned-off region is in general not completely self-determined, since it is liable to be acted upon by influences from the other side of the partition. If the far side of the boundary is ignored, then an observer on the near side will conclude that things really initiate their own motion and act without stimulation or motive, in some cases ; whereas the fact is, that no act is performed without stimulus or motive, whether it be rational or irrational. Madness and delirium are natural phenomena amenable to law.

But in actual life we are living on one side of a boundary, and are aware of things on one side only ; the things on this side appear to us to constitute the whole universe, since they are all of which we have any knowledge, either through our senses or in other ways. Hence we are subject to certain illusions, and feel

certain difficulties: the illusion of unstimulated and unmotivated freedom of action, and the difficulty of reconciling this with the felt necessity for general determinism and causation.

If we speak in terms of the part of the universe that we know and have to do with, we find free agencies rampant among organic life; so that 'freedom of action' is a definite and real experience, and for practical convenience is so expressed. But if we could seize the entirety of things and perceive what was occurring beyond the range of our limited conceptions, we should realize that the whole was welded together, and that influences were coming through which produced the effects that we observe.

Those philosophers, if there are any, who assert that we are wholly chained, bound and controlled by the circumstances of that part of the Universe of which we are directly aware—that we are the slaves of our environment and must act as we are compelled by forces emanating from things on our side of the boundary alone—those philosophers err.

This kind of determinism is false; and the reaction against it has led other philosophers to assert that we are *lawlessly* free, and able to initiate any action without motive or cause—that each individual is a capricious and chaotic entity, not part of a Cosmos at all!

It may be doubted whether any one has clearly and actually maintained either of these theses in all its crudity; but there are many who vigorously and cheaply deny one or other of them, and in so denying the one conceive that they are maintaining the other. Both the above theses are false; yet Free Will and Determinism are both true, and in a

completely known universe would cease to be contradictories.

The reconciliation between opposing views lies in realizing that the universe of which we have a kind of knowledge is but a portion or an aspect of the whole.

We are free, and we are controlled. We are free, in so far as our sensible surroundings and immediate environment are concerned ; that is, we are free for all practical purposes, and can choose between alternatives as they present themselves. We are controlled, as being intrinsic parts of an entire cosmos suffused with law and order.

No scheme of science based on knowledge of our environment can confidently predict our actions, nor the actions of any sufficiently intelligent live creature. For ' mind ' and ' will ' have their roots on the other side of the partition, and that which we perceive of them is but a fraction of the whole. Nevertheless, the more developed and consistent and harmonious our character becomes, the less liable is it to random outbreaks, and the more certainly can we be depended on. We thus, even now, can exhibit some approximation to the highest state—that conscious unison with the entire scheme of existence which is identical with perfect freedom.

If we could grasp the totality of things we should realize that everything was ordered and definite, linked up with everything else in a chain of causation, and that nothing was capricious and uncertain and uncontrolled. The totality of things is, however, and must remain, beyond our grasp ; hence the actual working of the process, the nature of the links, the causes which create our determinations, are frequently unknown. And since it is necessary for practical purposes to treat

what is utterly beyond our ken as if it were non-existent, it becomes easily possible to fall into the erroneous habit of conceiving the transcendental region to be objectively as well as subjectively non-existent.

XVIII

BALFOUR AND BERGSON¹

MORE than thirty years ago, when many of us were still in the unfledged student period, Mr. Balfour published a book which rebelled to some extent against the orthodox philosophy of that day. Its aim was to show that the most positive science was based on a tacit system of axioms and postulates—and, for that matter, of intuitions—which were no whit stronger in reality than those on which some of the main religious doctrines are based. But the title, *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, deceived many of the public; they took it to be a defence of religious scepticism—the popular word ‘doubt’ being almost more alarming than the technical term ‘scepticism’ which had been discarded from the title;—so the timid orthodox ignored it, while the few who were attracted rather than repelled by the suggestion soon found it useless for their purpose. Nevertheless, the advance of modern thought certainly tends in the direction advocated by that book; and it is natural for Mr. Balfour, in approaching a criticism of M. Bergson, to preface his remarks by an allusion to this book and a repetition of part of its thesis:

‘that the theory of experience and of induction from experience needs further examination; that the relation between a series of beliefs connected logically, and the same beliefs

¹ An Article in the *Hibbert Journal* for January 1912 in response to an Article in the preceding issue, by Mr. Balfour, commenting on and partly criticizing the philosophy of Professor Bergson.

mixed up in a natural series of causes and effects, involves speculative difficulties of much interest; and that investigations into the ultimate grounds of belief had better begin with the beliefs which everybody holds, than with those which are held only by a philosophic or religious minority.'

He also quotes a proposition from his later book, *Foundations of Belief*, where he claims

'that in accepting science, as we all do, we are moved by "values," not by logic. That if we examine fearlessly the grounds on which judgments about the material world are founded, we shall find that they rest on postulates about which it is equally impossible to say that we can theoretically regard them as self-evident, or practically treat them as doubtful. We can neither prove them nor give them up.'

I have been asked to contribute to the friendly discussion which Mr. Balfour has opened—indeed, to reply to his criticism in an interim manner, until such time as M. Bergson himself may be able to write further on the subject. But if I thus presume to intervene, it is obviously necessary for me to speak from the side of science rather than from the side of philosophy; and it is only because I regard M. Bergson's philosophy as peculiarly acceptable and interesting to men of science that, amid the press of duties, I welcome the invitation.

IS THERE ANY INFALLIBLE KNOWLEDGE?

I wish to prelude my remarks by acceptance of the main part of Mr. Balfour's contention, as above set forth: though truly there is nothing peculiar or venturesome in that acceptance now, since many physicists would say—some indeed have said—the same sort of thing.

The usual index set up in the contrary direction is attached to the finger-post of mathematical axioms and theorems. For instance, it is said that the three angles

of a triangle do really equal two right angles, and there is no hypothesis or approximation or uncertainty about it. About the abstract plane triangle, No. But what about a concrete triangle—one traced on the surface of a calm sheet of water, for instance? The surface is part of a sphere, and the proposition is not true. Or the lines of least distance between three stars?—I should not venture to doubt it in that case myself, but that brilliant mathematician, W. K. Clifford, maintained¹ that we could not be sure that there was not some discrepancy, increasing in proportion to area of triangle, such as had been studied by great modern geometers, and which we may call, roughly, a possible curvature of space, which would make the proposition appreciably inexact for a sufficiently gigantic triangle.

In other words, abstract mathematical propositions are infallibly true for the abstractions with which they deal, but when applied to concrete realities they involve an element of contingency in no respect differing from the rest of human knowledge. The following quotation from Clifford (*loc. cit.*) will forcibly illustrate the fact that mathematicians are not blind to this view:—

‘The conclusions to which these investigations [those of Lobatschewsky and Gauss, of Riemann and Helmholtz] lead is that, although the assumptions which were very properly made by the ancient geometers are practically exact—that is to say, more exact than experiment can be—for such finite things as we have to deal with, and such portions of space as we can reach; yet the truth of them for very much larger things, or very much smaller things, or parts of space which are at present beyond our reach, is a matter to be decided by experiment, when its powers are considerably increased.’

And in order to illustrate the matter further, in what may seem almost a frivolous way, I would contend that

¹ Lecture to British Association Meeting at Brighton in 1872. See *Lectures and Essays of Clifford*, edited by Leslie Stephen and Sir Frederick Pollock, vol. 1. p. 155.

whereas the proposition that one added to one makes two is abstractedly beneath controversy, it need not be true for the addition of concrete things. It is not true for two globules of mercury, for instance, nor for a couple of colliding stars ; not true for a pint of water added to a pint of oil of vitriol, nor for nitric oxide added to oxygen, nor for the ingredients of an explosive mixture ; not necessarily truer, either, for snakes in a cage, or for capital invested in a business concern, flourishing or otherwise ; nor is it true, save in a temporary manner, for a couple of trout added to a pond. Life can make havoc of arithmetic.

The moral of all which is, that propositions can be clear and simple and sure enough, indeed absolutely certain, as long as you deal with abstractions ; but that when you come to concrete realities, and have all the complexities of the universe behind you—nor only behind but in front and among and intermingled with every simplest thing—then we perforce step out of the realm of positive dogmatic security into the region of reasonable and probable inference, the domain of pragmatic conviction, of commonplace intuition, of familiar faith.

This surely is analogous to what is maintained by William James, and also by Professor Bergson. They claim that the philosophy of the past has formulated a complete scheme too speedily ; that in the present stage of our knowledge a thoroughly unifying philosophy is not attainable ; but they fully admit that unification should shine before us as an ideal, and that we should carve our way towards it by the best steps immediately possible. Theirs is a tentative and groping philosophy, just as ours is a tentative and groping science : no scientific man imagines that he understands the universe bottom up and through and through.

There may be men in the street who do so, but in all worthy judgment we are only beginning our task of exploration ; our organized system of truth is but a sample of what it will grow to be in the future ; and, however far we look ahead, there will still be an infinitude of existence uncharted and unexplored.

To suppose that we have absolutely infallible security for some of our beliefs, extreme probability for others, and only practical conviction based on experience for some more, may be needlessly to raise up barriers against our own progress. Facts of existence ought to be allowed their due weight and be tentatively accepted, even though we cannot adduce superhuman testimony for their truth, and even though we cannot at present see how to weld them into one completely unified and comprehensive scheme.

But effort at unification must be made, and any system which accomplishes one stage, or opens out one avenue, towards that ultimate goal, without pretending that it has done more than prepare and make ready a portion of the way—such a system of thought is very welcome ; and that is exactly what M. Bergson's system claims to do.

In comparison with this effort of his, some of the old philosophers—so far as an outsider may judge—have seemed to be beating their heads against a locked door to which no key could be found. With inadequate scientific equipment for the most part, and sometimes with elaborate complications of theory, they have led us up to the door again and again, but we have got no further. The barrier between mind and matter has remained unshaken. The conflict between freedom and necessity has waged as fiercely as ever. The two opposing sides clamour against the barrier, or try to fly over it, but the door remains locked. Some, like

William James, recall us to common sense, and bid us cultivate both sides of our garden in peace and quietness, not worrying about the impassable barrier in its midst. Through mind and body, both sides are accessible to us, both are of practical service ; and although they form two irreconcilable tracts of land, what of that ? In all probability the door will never open ; it has always been locked. Locked the door is still ; but M. Bergson has found something that to me, at any rate, from a distance, looks very like a key. We have yet to clamber to its hiding-place, to clear away the marl with which it is encrusted, and then try whether it will fit the lock.

MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS

For I conjecture that one of the features of the Bergsonian philosophy, though it is only dimly sketched in or barely indicated at present, is that the clue to the relation and interaction between matter and mind is contained in the idea that they have a common ancestry—that they are related somewhat as animals are to plants.

Widely divergent as the animals and vegetable kingdoms have now become during the long course of evolution, it is well known, or at any rate admitted without controversy, that they must have arisen from a kind of cell which was neither the one nor the other, but which incorporated the principle of life in its simplest most essential germ, and thus enabled life to gain a foothold on this planet, and gradually to manifest, through association with matter, the vast variety of which it was capable.

Taking this as a sort of parable, may we not conjecture that the faint beginnings of consciousness, and

the fundamental rudiments of matter—utterly divergent as they are now, so that it is surprising that there can be any sort of relation between them—may have arisen from something which was neither conscious nor material, but which had within it the potentiality of the development of both attributes.

To take another illustration : common salt is neither sodium nor chlorine, nor has it any of the properties of either of those vigorous elements, but Davy taught us its constitution, and showed us how the separation might be effected. So, on an altogether higher plane, this unknown x , let us say, had constituents or aspects of mechanism, and aspects or elements of freedom, in combination ; and at a certain stage in evolution it became plain that they could develop better in mutually sustaining, and mutually opposing, independence. Consequently a separation took place—part of x became inert matter, absolutely controlled by *vis a tergo* forces, dependent wholly on the past and on surroundings ; and part of it became life, with an incipient anticipation of the future, guided by perceptions rather than urged by force, influenced by habits and character rather than by external circumstances alone, and possessing nascent power of self-determination and choice.

Through this subdivision or bifurcation, regarded from a human point of view, part might be said to have become elevated in the scale of existence and part degraded ; the degradation serving a useful purpose and being justified, just as the degradation of energy is frequently justified—the degradation of some often elevates the rest—since thereby an instrument, a vehicle, a staircase was provided, steps on which the other portion could rise to higher things.

For by separation of the two entities or constituents of the universe, freedom and mechanism, an arena of

conflict and struggle and effort was provided ; and the result was that vigorous vitality appeared in the universe,—it has appeared at least on this planet,—an output far more profitable, of far greater value, than the dead level of inactivity and beatific torpor which might otherwise have been the sole representative of Existence. Life, with all its potentialities, both of suffering and of enjoyment, came into being, and has continued to interact with and incarnate itself in matter ever since ; making use of its many advantages, overcoming its many defects, obstructed and defeated by its passive resistance, yet coercing it into works of art, stimulating itself always to greater and higher effort to overcome inherent difficulties, and to realize, sooner or later, some of its own far distant ideals.

To sustain such a thesis, or to hold even tentatively such a position, we must admit Evolution to be a great reality, and Time an entity of profound significance. For progress must really depend on Duration ; and the condition of things in the far past must have been inferior, as a whole, to conditions which subsist to-day.

If it be asked how such a notion can be reconciled with the idea of Eternity, the only reconciliation I can suggest lies in the conception of possible alternations of phase, extending over vast regions of space and through great tracts of time. For it is conspicuously true that apparent waste and long periods of preparation—lavish provisions for ultimate ends—are not eschewed by Nature.

To illustrate the meaning of phase-alternation in this connection, the alternation of summer and winter will serve. To an organism living only in the spring, the world would seem bursting with youth and hope, an era of rising sap and expectation ; to an organism living only in the autumn, over-maturity, decay, and despair

would be the dominant feature. But, to creatures whose life is long enough, both phases are welcome, and are recognized as parts of a larger plan.

Just as the planet has gone through millennia of development, ages before a human race made any signs of appearing, so, without any knowledge of what is happening elsewhere, we may surmise that this region of space known to us has been evolved on fairly terrestrial lines, or on lines not utterly discordant, during this present vast era, of say a billion centuries. But what has happened to it at epochs so remote that imagination boggles at the conception of them, who is to say? Similarly, we know nothing of what is happening in the unimaginable depths of space, beyond the range of the most powerful telescope and most sensitive photographic plate. The process of evolution, in some of its many possible forms, cannot be limited to our portion of time and space alone; it may have gone through many phases in its majestic transformations, and may have achieved unknown and inconceivable results.

Speculation beyond our limits of time and space seems hardly likely to be fruitful—is not really legitimate save as a warning against a narrow view: its only merit lies in suggesting such an enlargement of scope as to remind ourselves that not even by so novel a conception as the common ancestry of mind and matter—not even by discovering the nature of the unknown x , and recognizing the Cause which may have guided and be still guiding the special phase of evolution which moulds us and which we can dimly contemplate—not even so can we presume to be engaged in formulating any valid conception of the Ultimate, Omnipresent, Dominating, Eternal Influence, the Nameless, worshipped under a thousand names, and here best referred to in reverent silence as I AM.

What we can study in the highest Philosophy must really be as limited as that which we can study in the highest Science. Data there must be, boundaries and terminology there must be, to make things tractable or ideas expressible. The data of one branch of science are sometimes the objects scrutinized by another. The data of the Biologist are cells and nuclei and protoplasm. The data of Chemistry are atoms and molecules and forces of affinity. The data of Physics are matter and energy, ether and motion. The data of Philosophy are Space and Time, Mind and Matter, Life and Consciousness; and its problems concern their interrelation. The solution of these problems—distant as that solution now seems—will leave plenty more unsolved. A fair comprehension of the nature of life, and the way it is able to interact with matter, must surely be within our human grasp. We are not near it yet, but the effort to reach it is worth while.

GUIDANCE OF ENERGY

The crux, the essential puzzle to be faced, comes out very clearly in Mr. Balfour's article. As M. Bergson has truly said, life utilizes solar energy to store organic explosives, and then pulls a trigger, a frictionless easy trigger, that requires only a nearly infinitesimal force. That is indeed a not unusual way of formulating its function, except among those who try to consider that life is itself a form of energy. But, says Mr. Balfour, to pull even a hair trigger *some* force is required, no matter how small. How is life or mind to exert force on matter? By what process is a mental idea translated into terms of physical motion? It is not enough that in organic life accumulated energy is released. 'What is really essential,' says Mr. Balfour, 'is the

manner of its release. If the release is effected by pure mechanism, fate still reigns supreme.'

M. Bergson says that Life is

'something which avails itself of a certain elasticity in matter—slight in amount as this probably is—and turns it to the profit of liberty by stealing into whatever infinitesimal fraction of indetermination that inert matter may present.'

I confess I cannot myself take refuge in this supposed slight indetermination of matter, this slight inaccuracy in the laws of physics. When we really find the key, its efficacy will depend not on any peculiarity or inadvertence, to be excused by reason of its smallness, but on some satisfactory and complete subservience to vital action potentially existing in and displayed by sufficiently complex organic molecules.

The interaction of mind and matter is a real and ancient puzzle. The brain and nervous system evidently constitute the mechanism by which it is accomplished, but the theory of the process is as yet incomplete—whether the result is purposed movement, or the translation of air-waves or ether-tremors into sensation of sound of definite pitch or light of definite colour. The transition from mind to matter, and *vice versa*, is an affair of everyday experience, but it is not understood.

There is nothing surprising in that, nothing that ought to tempt us to deny the existence of mind and take refuge in materialistic monism; it is stupid to deny merely because we do not understand. The much simpler occurrence of the fall of an apple is not understood either. Newton knew that well enough; and though he applied it to astronomy, he never explained gravitation itself. Its nature remains unknown. This problem, however, is quite thinkable; it can be definitely formulated—at least by those who admit the existence of an Ether—and by some is thought to be begin-

ning to show signs of being tractable by reason, even if not yet by experiment ; while the other problem, the interrelation between mind and matter, is still excessively obscure.

My own view is that life does not exert force—not even the most microscopic force—and certainly does not supply energy ; that the whole of its control over muscular movements is what is involved in the terms ‘ aim ’ and ‘ timing ’ ; that it utilizes the spontaneous activities and processes of nature, and determines occasionally when they shall occur and for how long they shall be retarded. It can water one plot of ground and screen the sun from another.

Much guidance may be exercised by mere adjustment of relative phase in any pair of synchronous alternations which are already going on. Imagine an intermittent mountain-stream near a watershed above the Engadine, and let it work a synchronously oscillating sluice-valve. By merely adjusting the phase of its oscillations, the whole stream might be transmitted to the Danube, or the whole might be deflected into the Rhine.

By coupled alternation of phase, I signify such concordance or discordance between two rhythmical processes as shall combine them either for acceleration and advance, or for regress and retardation. For instance, to a physicist, the electric and the magnetic constituents of an electro-magnetic wave is a well-known case ; but a simple example is the slide valve and piston of a steam-engine. They are usually in accelerative or adjuvant phase, but by throwing them out of step the engine may be stopped or it may be reversed. Such readjustment may be brought about by the machine's own energy, and may be done either automatically or in response to an intelligent arrangement or act of will.

What, then, I want to suggest is, that the special changes produced in matter by will and intelligence are explicable by a process of timing—a process adapted to the directing of energy, quite independent of any alteration in its amount, and without any interference with—indeed with full assistance from—the laws of physics. The cells of the brain are presumably not stagnant until the will acts on them; the cells of a living body must be as active as atoms of radium. Energetic instability of structure is essential to protoplasmic molecules. Withdraw the controlling influence of life, and they speedily work havoc and devastation.

Illustrations abound. A pointsman may pull his lever over at the wrong moment and send a train to destruction, or at the right moment and send its passengers to their homes. They depend on the man's good will, and are safe until by habit or weariness his actions become mechanical, and one day mistaken. With insufficient food, it is true, he may not be able to act at all; but it is not his lack of energy that has to be inquired into in case of an accident, but his misdirection—the use he has made of it. The right lever, at the right time, is the essential thing.

Thus it is that a gun is aimed and fired by a sportsman. All the energy is in the powder and the man's breakfast. He determines what shall be done with it, and brings about a desired extinction of life. In a cannonade, just as much energy and mental activity are needed to aim and fire at a friend as at a foe; the nicety of this difference is not physical at all. Whether a bill is read now or this day six months is all the same as regards the work of reading, but not all the same as regards the bill, and perhaps not all the same to the nation. Liberation of the energy of compressed air

can be so timed by an organist as to re-awaken the thoughts of Bach.

All this can be admitted, and yet the question will remain—How does man pull the lever or press the key? How do I move any muscle of my body by an act of will? Physics and Physiology are expected to explain the whole of the material circumstances, both outside and inside my body; and roughly speaking they succeed in doing so; but neither will explain, nor does Psychology explain, how the mental idea translated itself into the necessary brain-cell-stimulus and nerve-impulse. There let us leave that problem at present, and enter on a new one; for the problem of the interaction of mind and matter is not yet solved.

TELEOLOGY

‘Inert matter,’ says M. Bergson, ‘is subject to mathematical necessity; but with the coming of life we see the appearance of indetermination. A living being, no matter how simple, is a reservoir of indetermination and unforeseeability, a reservoir of possible actions, or, in a word, of *choice*. And in it, too, we find that faculty of imagining future eventualities (or, speaking more generally, of anticipating the future), and at the same time of storing up the past for that purpose, which is the faculty of consciousness.’

No differences arise between the authors on this latter contention. They both agree practically as to freedom; but a divergence begins with respect to the ideas of ultimate aim and of control by the future—the question of teleology and far-reaching design. Mr. Balfour says that M. Bergson

‘objects to teleology only less than to mechanical determinism. And, if I understand him aright, the vital impulse has no goal more definite than that of acquiring an ever fuller volume of free creative activity.’

Well, but that is a good enough goal, a real end in view, a sufficiently controlling and stimulating impulse. Is it not the goal of every great artist? The teleology suggested by Mr. Balfour's simile of a river is an external teleology—control by external forces. Although said to 'press ever towards the sea,' a river is not really making 'free endeavour' towards a goal, it is merely driven by the slope of its bed along a permanent channel to a fixed destination: while a flood or an eruption of lava takes the path of least resistance with no aim at all. But M. Bergson is appealing for what may be called an immanent teleology; and the simile he employs, for something working in the dark yet not without ultimate aim, is a tunnel:—

'the image of a current of consciousness which flows down into matter as into a tunnel, which endeavours to advance, which makes efforts on every side, thus digging galleries, most of which are stopped by a rock that is too hard, but which, in one direction at least, prove possible to follow to the end, and break out into the light once more.'

Why should it do this? asks Mr. Balfour; why should consciousness immerse itself in matter? Why have anything to do with matter? Well, let us consider what it is that consciousness is striving for. If it be thought that its aim is to inoculate matter with its own freedom, and that it is smitten with failure in so far as 'a huge mass of matter remains what it has always been—the undisputed realm of lifeless determinism'—an entire misunderstanding is exhibited. The aim of life and consciousness is self-development, not the development of matter; the aim is to bring into full activity every fibre of our being. 'Never, most equal sisters,' writes Ben Jonson in his dedication of *Volpone* to the two Universities, 'had any man a wit so presently excellent as that it could raise itself; but there must

come both matter, occasion, commenders and favourers to it.' Matter is a means to that end ; it is used in the process and discarded, and remains as it was before.

Matter has provoked effort and rendered it possible. Force cannot be exerted where there is no resistance ; you cannot give a violent push to a floating feather. The fruitless violence of 'missing the globe' is a familiar and wasteful expenditure of energy in a well-known game. The ball must obstruct the club to just the right amount in order to yield any satisfaction to the player.

So the very inertia and obstructiveness of matter, the resistances which it offers to the realization of ideals, contribute to the development of incarnate consciousness, and enable it to rise in the scale of existence.

'The thought which is only thought, the work of art which is only in the conceptual state, the poem which is only a dream, costs as yet no effort : what requires an effort is the material realization of the poem in words, of the artistic conception in a statue or a picture. This effort is painful, it may be very painful ; and yet, whilst making it, we feel that it is as precious as, and perhaps more precious than, the work it results in ; because thanks to it, we have drawn from ourselves not only all that was there, but more than was there : we have raised ourselves above ourselves.'

That is the aim of the whole process, and that is how matter, by its very inertness, can contribute to the result ; its very necessity makes of organized matter an instrument of liberty ; and the fact that there has been a real aim all the time is proved by the sense of joy which follows its accomplishment. And surely joy is felt also during the effort, and is an indication of right progress and good work.

Values must truly be taken into account, as Mr. Balfour says, but such efforts are surely not aimless. There is no ignorance or uncertainty as to the desired goal, though there is contingency as to its being reached

in any attempted direction ; and there is always a danger lest the current of consciousness shall be ensnared by association with matter, enfolded and converted to its own automatism, as M. Bergson expresses it, and lulled into its own unconsciousness. In the vegetable kingdom this has happened, and in the animal kingdom there is constant risk of like degeneration. Hence genuine anxiety may be felt by Higher Powers, and constant help given from instant to instant, in the effort to shape our rough-hewn ends and carry out as far as possible a pre-conceived plan. Absence of complete predestination is not the same as absence of plan ; a *desired* goal is not identical with a *destined* goal—a chess player is in no doubt on that score ; and moderate and interesting and stimulating contingency is quite consistent with pursuit of a longed-for and eagerly expected end. ‘ Journeys end in lover’s meeting,’ but there may be many accidents by the way.

Complete Indifference as to final result would be irrational and absurd, and cannot be admitted for a moment by any creatures who have risen to the knowledge of what foresight and love and benevolence are. On the other hand, complete passive Security as to result would likewise savour too much of mere inert mechanism, and would be quite inconsistent with the spirit and meaning of life. We must surely feel that the whole is striving together towards some end. Organisms are known to help each other—mother-love is a blessed reality—why should we draw a line and exclude such attributes from the heights of existence ?

There is plenty of room for guidance, amid the laws of physics ; and the effort need not be a blind effort, save perhaps to the particular organism which is struggling with its difficulties and finding that its best course is to do the duty nearest and have faith. Super-

vision and assistance may be realities, and yet the struggle may be a real one, involving uncertainty as to measure of success, and real risk of failure. The path to be followed need not be laid down like a line of rails, nor need the precise form of the destination be pre-determined.

Evolutionary progress is not like a river-bed, flowing in a predestined channel ; nor is it like the march of the land-crabs in exorable straight lines over and through every obstacle and danger ; no, but it is like an Anabasis. Each marching day so many *parasangs*, so many *stadia*, halts of given duration by the way, natives questioned, hostilities avoided, difficulties overcome; and at length the sea which washes the shores of the homeland is sighted, with the bursting forth of shouts of joy.

To maintain a rational conception of teleology, M. Bergson warns us, we must beware the analogy of mechanical construction to a design. The 'artificer' notion must be got rid of, not only as regards the workshop, but as regards the drawing-office. The real kind of teleology is difficult to conceive, and we may often overpress an analogy. Very likely ! Why should it not be difficult for us to understand the mode of working of higher intelligence ? We are constitutionally hampered by our purely mobile conception of power and activity. We ourselves are limited to movement of objects ; so far as the external world is concerned, we put things together and trust to their inherent properties ; but Life is working the inherent properties themselves. We place an egg in an incubator and a chicken results. Nature or life works in a totally different way from us : it does not directly *move* things at all, though it may cause them to move each other, and it achieves portentous results.

We perceive this best in cases of instinct, or of such

unconscious processes as those to which we owe the growth and sustenance of our own bodies. It is easy to illustrate the futility of intelligence as compared with the unconscious activity of an organism. When we seek to do things by our brain and muscle alone, how limited our scope, how helpless we are ; how much more powerful is our instinct—instinct of all grades, rising to the instinct of genius ! Compare the futility of a dog's parlour-tricks with the superhuman skill of a sheep-dog or a bloodhound, yes, or a carrier pigeon. So it is with all our highest functions—the best of them are semiconsciously performed. Who, by taking thought, can write a great poem or paint a great picture if the gift is not born in him ? To manufacture a new human being is an impossible task ; but hand the problem over to life, and it is absurdly easy. And even our most intellectual senses—how saturated they are with instinct ! Take vision. The retina has a pattern of ether-tremors focused upon its rods and cones, and from the distribution of that mosaic of sensation a whole landscape is perceived—it cannot be said to be 'inferred.' Ordinary sight is not an affair of intellect, any more than the intellect of the newly-hatched chick enables it to descry and peck at a seed. We are still far more dependent on intuition than on reason.

The subliminal super-consciousness, to which in our highest state we attain access, is not to be confused with the dull narcotic influence of matter. The rapt inspired mood of the poet is furthest removed from enslavement by matter, and the unconsciousness to material surroundings thus experienced is 'utter clearness' of pure thought,

'and thro' less of Self
The gain of such large life as match'd with ours
Were Sun to spark.'

Is there not more fundamental Freedom, also, about instinct than about intelligence? Birds are proverbially free, but so are most animals—even insects. Few working men are as free as the working bee. It can take up its work at any stage, and pass from one cell to another doing a little job at each. If no wax is provided it sets to work to make some. If wax is supplied it begins by moulding it. If it is partially moulded or stamped out into incipient cells, it draws out the walls and completes them. If ready-made cells are introduced into a hive, the bee saves all this preliminary labour and begins to fill them, gathering its honey from where it will.

Yet there is clearly an aim in all this, and life is always subject to its own laws. There is a controlling entity in a seed whereby the same product results, no matter amid what surroundings. If an acorn can grow at all, an oak results.

There is thus a 'finalism' even about life, but it is not Liebnitzian finalism, it is not 'radical finalism' as Bergson calls it. That was the kind of teleology to which he was objecting, not the kind for which Mr. Balfour is pleading, and which I feel reasonably sure M. Bergson would heartily concede. If not, we shall hear in due time: and of course he is not responsible for any misrepresentation or modification of his meaning, which I may have occasionally assumed to be more like my own than it is. [M. Bergson has written approving my presentation of his views, in general terms.]

It is the trace of mechanism lingering in mechanical finalism that Bergson objects to. Both mechanism and finalism are standpoints, so he contends, to which the human mind has been led by considering the work of men. We must get beyond both points of view. A workman, he says,

'proceeds by the assemblage of parts, with a view to the realization of an idea or the imitation of a model. Mechanism, here, reproaches finalism with its anthropomorphic character, and rightly. But it fails to see that itself proceeds according to this method—somewhat mutilated! True, it has got rid of the end pursued or the ideal model. But it also holds that nature has worked like a human being by bringing parts together, while a mere glance at the development of an embryo shows that life goes to work in a very different way. *Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division.*'

The universe, as we perceive it, does not set to work after our conscious manner and put things together to a design—no; but that is no adequate reason for denying an aim, a super-consciousness, and an ultimate goal.

Yet, though there must be a plan, it is a plan impossible to formulate; for

'Evolution creates, as it goes on, not only the forms of life, but the ideas that will enable the intellect to understand it, the terms which will serve to express it. Its future, therefore, overflows its present, and cannot be sketched out therein in idea.'—(*Creative Evolution*, p. 108).

Whether the ancient appearance of inconsistency between freedom and foreknowledge can thus be removed, whether sequence and duration can ever be resolved by some lofty apotheosis into an equivalent simultaneity, whether complete and absolute foreknowledge—based on thorough acquaintance with the character of every creature at every instant—can be evaded, or need be evaded, by relegating such ultimate perception solely to an existence so high as to be inconceivable—far above the proximate agents and controllers of this present scheme—all this is more than doubtful; but, for my own part, I am impressed with two things—first, with the reality and activity of powerful but not almighty helpers, to whom in some direct and

proximate sense we owe guidance and management and reasonable control ; and next, with the fearful majesty of still higher aspects of the universe, culminating in an immanent Unity which transcends our utmost possibility of thought.



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the better self *in posse* which directs the operation. Instead of being clumsily and vaguely aimed at from without, it is then itself the organizing centre. What then must the person do? "He must relax," says Dr. Starbuck, — "that is, he must fall back on the larger Power that makes for righteousness, which has been welling up in his own being, and let it finish in its own way the work it has begun. . . . The act of yielding, in this point of view, is giving one's self over to the new life, making it the centre of a new personality, and living, from within, the truth of it which had before been viewed objectively."¹

"Man's extremity is God's opportunity" is the theological way of putting this fact of the need of self-surrender; whilst the physiological way of stating it would be, "Let one do all in one's power, and one's nervous system will do the rest." Both statements acknowledge the same fact.²

To state it in terms of our own symbolism: When the new centre of personal energy has been subconsciously incubated so long as to be just ready to open into flower, 'hands off' is the only word for us, it must burst forth unaided!

We have used the vague and abstract language of psychology. But since, in any terms, the crisis described is the throwing of our conscious selves upon the mercy of powers which, whatever they may be, are more ideal than we are actually, and make for our redemption, you see why self-surrender has been and always must be regarded as the vital turning-point of the religious life, so far as the religious life is spiritual and no affair of outer works and ritual and sacraments. One may say that the whole development of Christianity in inwardness

¹ STARBUCK, p. 115.

² STARBUCK, p. .

has consisted in little more than the greater and greater emphasis attached to this crisis of self-surrender. From Catholicism to Lutheranism, and then to Calvinism; from that to Wesleyanism; and from this, outside of technical Christianity altogether, to pure 'liberalism' or transcendental idealism, whether or not of the mind-cure type, taking in the mediæval mystics, the quietists, the pietists, and quakers by the way, we can trace the stages of progress towards the idea of an immediate spiritual help, experienced by the individual in his forlornness and standing in no essential need of doctrinal apparatus or propitiatory machinery.

Psychology and religion are thus in perfect harmony up to this point, since both admit that there are forces seemingly outside of the conscious individual that bring redemption to his life. Nevertheless psychology, defining these forces as 'subconscious,' and speaking of their effects as due to 'incubation,' or 'cerebration,' implies that they do not transcend the individual's personality; and herein she diverges from Christian theology, which insists that they are direct supernatural operations of the Deity. I propose to you that we do not yet consider this divergence final, but leave the question for a while in abeyance — continued inquiry may enable us to get rid of some of the apparent discord.

Revert, then, for a moment more to the psychology of self-surrender.

When you find a man living on the ragged edge of his consciousness, pent in to his sin and want and incompleteness, and consequently inconsolable, and then simply tell him that all is well with him, that he must stop his worry, break with his discontent, and give up his anxiety, you seem to him to come with pure absurdities. The

only positive consciousness he has tells him that all is *not* well, and the better way you offer sounds simply as if you proposed to him to assert cold-blooded falsehoods. 'The will to believe' cannot be stretched as far as that. We can make ourselves more faithful to a belief of which we have the rudiments, but we cannot create a belief out of whole cloth when our perception actively assures us of its opposite. The better mind proposed to us comes in that case in the form of a pure negation of the only mind we have, and we cannot actively will a pure negation.

There are only two ways in which it is possible to get rid of anger, worry, fear, despair, or other undesirable affections. One is that an opposite affection should overpoweringly break over us, and the other is by getting so exhausted with the struggle that we have to stop, — so we drop down, give up, and *don't care* any longer. Our emotional brain-centres strike work, and we lapse into a temporary apathy. Now there is documentary proof that this state of temporary exhaustion not infrequently forms part of the conversion crisis. So long as the egoistic worry of the sick soul guards the door, the expansive confidence of the soul of faith gains no presence. But let the former faint away, even but for a moment, and the latter can profit by the opportunity, and, having once acquired possession, may retain it. Carlyle's Teufelsdröckh passes from the everlasting No to the everlasting Yes through a 'Centre of Indifference.'

Let me give you a good illustration of this feature in the conversion process. That genuine saint, David Brainerd, describes his own crisis in the following words : —

"One morning, while I was walking in a solitary place as usual, I at once saw that all my contrivances and projects to effect or procure deliverance and salvation for myself were utterly in

vain ; I was brought quite to a stand, as finding myself totally lost. I saw that it was forever impossible for me to do anything towards helping or delivering myself, that I had made all the pleas I ever could have made to all eternity ; and that all my pleas were vain, for I saw that self-interest had led me to pray, and that I had never once prayed from any respect to the glory of God. I saw that there was no necessary connection between my prayers and the bestowment of divine mercy ; that they laid not the least obligation upon God to bestow his grace upon me ; and that there was no more virtue or goodness in them than there would be in my paddling with my hand in the water. I saw that I had been heaping up my devotions before God, fasting, praying, etc., pretending, and indeed really thinking sometimes that I was aiming at the glory of God ; whereas I never once truly intended it, but only my own happiness. I saw that as I had never done anything for God, I had no claim on anything from him but perdition, on account of my hypocrisy and mockery. When I saw evidently that I had regard to nothing but self-interest, then my duties appeared a vile mockery and a continual course of lies, for the whole was nothing but self-worship, and an horrid abuse of God.

“ I continued, as I remember, in this state of mind, from Friday morning till the Sabbath evening following (July 12, 1739), when I was walking again in the same solitary place. Here, in a mournful melancholy state *I was attempting to pray ; but found no heart to engage in that or any other duty ; my former concern, exercise, and religious affections were now gone. I thought that the Spirit of God had quite left me ; but still was not distressed ; yet disconsolate, as if there was nothing in heaven or earth could make me happy. Having been thus endeavoring to pray — though, as I thought, very stupid and senseless — for near half an hour ; then, as I was walking in a thick grove, unspeakable glory seemed to open to the apprehension of my soul. I do not mean any external brightness, nor any imagination of a body of light, but it was a new inward apprehension or view that I had of God, such as I never had before, nor anything which had the least resemblance to it. I had no particular apprehension of any one person in*

the Trinity, either the Father, the Son, or the Holy Ghost; but it appeared to be Divine glory. My soul rejoiced with joy unspeakable, to see such a God, such a glorious Divine Being; and I was inwardly pleased and satisfied that he should be God over all for ever and ever. My soul was so captivated and delighted with the excellency of God that I was even swallowed up in him; at least to that degree that I had no thought about my own salvation, and scarce reflected that there was such a creature as myself. I continued in this state of inward joy, peace, and astonishing, till near dark without any sensible abatement; and then began to think and examine what I had seen; and felt sweetly composed in my mind all the evening following. I felt myself in a new world, and everything about me appeared with a different aspect from what it was wont to do. At this time, the way of salvation opened to me with such infinite wisdom, suitableness, and excellency, that I wondered I should ever think of any other way of salvation; was amazed that I had not dropped my own contrivances, and complied with this lovely, blessed, and excellent way before. If I could have been saved by my own duties or any other way that I had formerly contrived, my whole soul would now have refused it. I wondered that all the world did not see and comply with this way of salvation, entirely by the righteousness of Christ.”¹

I have italicized the passage which records the exhaustion of the anxious emotion hitherto habitual. In a large proportion, perhaps the majority, of reports, the writers speak as if the exhaustion of the lower and the entrance of the higher emotion were simultaneous,² yet

¹ EDWARD'S and DWIGHT'S *Life of Brainerd*, New Haven, 1822, pp. 45-47, abridged.

² Describing the whole phenomenon as a change of equilibrium, we might say that the movement of new psychic energies towards the personal centre and the recession of old ones towards the margin (or the rising of some objects above, and the sinking of others below the conscious threshold) were only two ways of describing an indivisible event. Doubtless this is often absolutely true, and Starbuck is right when he says that 'self-surrender' and 'new determination,' though seeming at first sight to be such different

often again they speak as if the higher actively drove the lower out. This is undoubtedly true in a great many instances, as we shall presently see. But often there seems little doubt that both conditions — subconscious ripening of the one affection and exhaustion of the other — must simultaneously have conspired, in order to produce the result.

T. W. B., a convert of Nettleton's, being brought to an acute paroxysm of conviction of sin, ate nothing all day, locked himself in his room in the evening in complete despair, crying aloud, "How long, O Lord, how long?" "After repeating this and similar language," he says, "several times, *I seemed to sink away into a state of insensibility*. When I came to myself again I was on my knees, praying not for myself but for others. I felt submission to the will of God, willing that he should do with me as should seem good in his sight. My concern seemed all lost in concern for others."¹

Our great American revivalist Finney writes: "I said to myself: 'What is this? I must have grieved the Holy Ghost entirely away. I have lost all my conviction. I have not a particle of concern about my soul; and it must be that the Spirit has left me.' 'Why!' thought I, 'I never was so far from being concerned about my own salvation in my life.' . . . I tried to recall my convictions, to get back again the load of sin under which I had been laboring. I tried in vain to make myself anxious. I was so quiet and peaceful that I tried to feel concerned about that, lest it should be the result of my having grieved the Spirit away."²

But beyond all question there are persons in whom, quite independently of any exhaustion in the Subject's capacity for feeling, or even in the absence of any acute

experiences, are "really the same thing. Self-surrender sees the change in terms of the old self; determination sees it in terms of the new." Op. cit., p. 160.

¹ A. A. BONAR: Nettleton and his Labors, Edinburgh, 1854, p. 261.

² CHARLES G. FINNEY: Memoirs written by Himself, 1876, pp. 17, 18.

previous feeling, the higher condition, having reached the due degree of energy, bursts through all barriers and sweeps in like a sudden flood. These are the most striking and memorable cases, the cases of instantaneous conversion to which the conception of divine grace has been most peculiarly attached. I have given one of them at length — the case of Mr. Bradley. But I had better reserve the other cases and my comments on the rest of the subject for the following lecture.

LECTURE X

CONVERSION — *Concluded*

IN this lecture we have to finish the subject of Conversion, considering at first those striking instantaneous instances of which Saint Paul's is the most eminent, and in which, often amid tremendous emotional excitement or perturbation of the senses, a complete division is established in the twinkling of an eye between the old life and the new. Conversion of this type is an important phase of religious experience, owing to the part which it has played in Protestant theology, and it behooves us to study it conscientiously on that account.

I think I had better cite two or three of these cases before proceeding to a more generalized account. One must know concrete instances first; for, as Professor Agassiz used to say, one can see no farther into a generalization than just so far as one's previous acquaintance with particulars enables one to take it in. I will go back, then, to the case of our friend Henry Alline, and quote his report of the 26th of March, 1775, on which his poor divided mind became unified for good.

“As I was about sunset wandering in the fields lamenting my miserable lost and undone condition, and almost ready to sink under my burden, I thought I was in such a miserable case as never any man was before. I returned to the house, and when I got to the door, just as I was stepping off the threshold, the following impressions came into my mind like a powerful but small still voice. You have been seeking, pray-

ing, reforming, laboring, reading, hearing, and meditating, and what have you done by it towards your salvation? Are you any nearer to conversion now than when you first began? Are you any more prepared for heaven, or fitter to appear before the impartial bar of God, than when you first began to seek?

“It brought such conviction on me that I was obliged to say that I did not think I was one step nearer than at first, but as much condemned, as much exposed, and as miserable as before. I cried out within myself, O Lord God, I am lost, and if thou, O Lord, dost not find out some new way, I know nothing of, I shall never be saved, for the ways and methods I have prescribed to myself have all failed me, and I am willing they should fail. O Lord, have mercy! O Lord, have mercy!

“These discoveries continued until I went into the house and sat down. After I sat down, being all in confusion, like a drowning man that was just giving up to sink, and almost in an agony, I turned very suddenly round in my chair, and seeing part of an old Bible lying in one of the chairs, I caught hold of it in great haste; and opening it without any premeditation, cast my eyes on the 38th Psalm, which was the first time I ever saw the word of God: it took hold of me with such power that it seemed to go through my whole soul, so that it seemed as if God was praying in, with, and for me. About this time my father called the family to attend prayers; I attended, but paid no regard to what he said in his prayer, but continued praying in those words of the Psalm. Oh, help me, help me! cried I, thou Redeemer of souls, and save me, or I am gone forever; thou canst this night, if thou pleasest, with one drop of thy blood atone for my sins, and appease the wrath of an angry God. At that instant of time when I gave all up to him to do with me as he pleased, and was willing that God should rule over me at his pleasure, redeeming love broke into my soul with repeated scriptures, with such power that my whole soul seemed to be melted down with love; the burden of guilt and condemnation was gone, darkness was expelled, my heart humbled and filled with gratitude, and my whole soul, that was a few minutes ago groaning under mountains of death, and crying to an unknown God for help, was now filled with

immortal love, soaring on the wings of faith, freed from the chains of death and darkness, and crying out, My Lord and my God ; thou art my rock and my fortress, my shield and my high tower, my life, my joy, my present and my everlasting portion. Looking up, I thought I saw that same light [he had on more than one previous occasion seen subjectively a bright blaze of light], though it appeared different ; and as soon as I saw it, the design was opened to me, according to his promise, and I was obliged to cry out : Enough, enough, O blessed God ! The work of conversion, the change, and the manifestations of it are no more disputable than that light which I see, or anything that ever I saw.

“ In the midst of all my joys, in less than half an hour after my soul was set at liberty, the Lord discovered to me my labor in the ministry and call to preach the gospel. I cried out, Amen, Lord, I’ll go ; send me, send me. I spent the greatest part of the night in ecstasies of joy, praising and adoring the Ancient of Days for his free and unbounded grace. After I had been so long in this transport and heavenly frame that my nature seemed to require sleep, I thought to close my eyes for a few moments ; then the devil stepped in, and told me that if I went to sleep, I should lose it all, and when I should awake in the morning I would find it to be nothing but a fancy and delusion. I immediately cried out, O Lord God, if I am deceived, undeceive me.

“ I then closed my eyes for a few minutes, and seemed to be refreshed with sleep ; and when I awoke, the first inquiry was, Where is my God ? And in an instant of time, my soul seemed awake in and with God, and surrounded by the arms of everlasting love. About sunrise I arose with joy to relate to my parents what God had done for my soul, and declared to them the miracle of God’s unbounded grace. I took a Bible to show them the words that were impressed by God on my soul the evening before ; but when I came to open the Bible, it appeared all new to me.

“ I so longed to be useful in the cause of Christ, in preaching the gospel, that it seemed as if I could not rest any longer, but go I must and tell the wonders of redeeming love. I lost

all taste for carnal pleasures, and carnal company, and was enabled to forsake them.”¹

Young Mr. Alline, after the briefest of delays, and with no book-learning but his Bible, and no teaching save that of his own experience, became a Christian minister, and thenceforward his life was fit to rank, for its austerity and single-mindedness, with that of the most devoted saints. But happy as he became in his strenuous way, he never got his taste for even the most innocent carnal pleasures back. We must class him, like Bunyan and Tolstoy, amongst those upon whose soul the iron of melancholy left a permanent imprint. His redemption was into another universe than this mere natural world, and life remained for him a sad and patient trial. Years later we can find him making such an entry as this in his diary: “On Wednesday the 12th I preached at a wedding, and had the happiness thereby to be the means of excluding carnal mirth.”

The next case I will give is that of a correspondent of Professor Leuba, printed in the latter’s article, already cited, in vol. vi. of the *American Journal of Psychology*. This subject was an Oxford graduate, the son of a clergyman, and the story resembles in many points the classic case of Colonel Gardiner, which everybody may be supposed to know. Here it is, somewhat abridged:—

“Between the period of leaving Oxford and my conversion I never darkened the door of my father’s church, although I lived with him for eight years, making what money I wanted by journalism, and spending it in high carousal with any one who would sit with me and drink it away. So I lived, sometimes drunk for a week together, and then a terrible repentance, and would not touch a drop for a whole month.

¹ *Life and Journals*, Boston, 1806, pp. 31–40, abridged.

“In all this period, that is, up to thirty-three years of age, I never had a desire to reform on religious grounds. But all my pangs were due to some terrible remorse I used to feel after a heavy carousal, the remorse taking the shape of regret after my folly in wasting my life in such a way — a man of superior talents and education. This terrible remorse turned me gray in one night, and whenever it came upon me I was perceptibly grayer the next morning. What I suffered in this way is beyond the expression of words. It was hell-fire in all its most dreadful tortures. Often did I vow that if I got over ‘this time’ I would reform. Alas, in about three days I fully recovered, and was as happy as ever. So it went on for years, but, with a physique like a rhinoceros, I always recovered, and as long as I let drink alone, no man was as capable of enjoying life as I was.

“I was converted in my own bedroom in my father’s rectory house at precisely three o’clock in the afternoon of a hot July day (July 13, 1886). I was in perfect health, having been off from the drink for nearly a month. I was in no way troubled about my soul. In fact, God was not in my thoughts that day. A young lady friend sent me a copy of Professor Drummond’s *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, asking me my opinion of it as a literary work only. Being proud of my critical talents and wishing to enhance myself in my new friend’s esteem, I took the book to my bedroom for quiet, intending to give it a thorough study, and then write her what I thought of it. It was here that God met me face to face, and I shall never forget the meeting. ‘He that hath the Son hath life eternal he that hath not the Son hath not life.’ I had read this scores of times before, but this made all the difference. I was now in God’s presence and my attention was absolutely ‘sold’ on to this verse, and I was not allowed to proceed with the book till I had fairly considered what these words really involved. Only then was I allowed to proceed, feeling all the while that there was another being in my bedroom, though not seen by me. The stillness was very marvelous, and I felt supremely happy. It was most unquestionably shown me, in one second of time, that I had never touched the Eternal: and

that if I died then, I must inevitably be lost. I was undone. I knew it as well as I now know I am saved. The Spirit of God showed it me in ineffable love ; there was no terror in it ; I felt God's love so powerfully upon me that only a mighty sorrow crept over me that I had lost all through my own folly ; and what was I to do ? What could I do ? I did not repent even ; God never asked me to repent. All I felt was ' I am undone,' and God cannot help it, although he loves me. No fault on the part of the Almighty. All the time I was supremely happy : I felt like a little child before his father. I had done wrong, but my Father did not scold me, but loved me most wondrously. Still my doom was sealed. I was lost to a certainty, and being naturally of a brave disposition I did not quail under it, but deep sorrow for the past, mixed with regret for what I had lost, took hold upon me, and my soul thrilled within me to think it was all over. Then there crept in upon me so gently, so lovingly, so unmistakably, a way of escape, and what was it after all ? The old, old story over again, told in the simplest way : ' There is no name under heaven whereby ye can be saved except that of the Lord Jesus Christ.' ' No words were spoken to me ; my soul seemed to see my Saviour in the spirit, and from that hour to this, nearly nine years now, there has never been in my life one doubt that the Lord Jesus Christ and God the Father both worked upon me that afternoon in July, both differently, and both in the most perfect love conceivable, and I rejoiced there and then in a conversion so astounding that the whole village heard of it in less than twenty-four hours.

" But a time of trouble was yet to come. The day after my conversion I went into the hay-field to lend a hand with the harvest, and not having made any promise to God to abstain or drink in moderation only, I took too much and came home drunk. My poor sister was heart-broken ; and I felt ashamed of myself and got to my bedroom at once, where she followed me, weeping copiously. She said I had been converted and fallen away instantly. But although I was quite full of drink (not muddled, however), I knew that God's work begun in me was not going to be wasted. About midday I

made on my knees the first prayer before God for twenty years. I did not ask to be forgiven; I felt that was no good, for I would be sure to fall again. Well, what did I do? I committed myself to him in the profoundest belief that my individuality was going to be destroyed, that he would take all from me, and I was willing. In such a surrender lies the secret of a holy life. From that hour drink has had no terrors for me: I never touch it, never want it. The same thing occurred with my pipe: after being a regular smoker from my twelfth year the desire for it went at once, and has never returned. So with every known sin, the deliverance in each case being permanent and complete. I have had no temptation since conversion, God seemingly having shut out Satan from that course with me. He gets a free hand in other ways, but never on sins of the flesh. Since I gave up to God all ownership in my own life, he has guided me in a thousand ways, and has opened my path in a way almost incredible to those who do not enjoy the blessing of a truly surrendered life."

So much for our graduate of Oxford, in whom you notice the complete abolition of an ancient appetite as one of the conversion's fruits.

The most curious record of sudden-conversion with which I am acquainted is that of M. Alphonse Ratisbonne, a freethinking French Jew, to Catholicism, at Rome in 1842. In a letter to a clerical friend, written a few months later, the convert gives a palpitating account of the circumstances.¹ The predisposing conditions appear to have been slight. He had an elder brother who had been converted and was a Catholic priest. He was himself irreligious, and nourished an antipathy to the apostate brother and generally to his 'cloth.' Finding himself at Rome in his twenty-ninth year, he fell in with a

¹ My quotations are made from an Italian translation of this letter in the *Biografia del Sig. M. A. Ratisbonne*, Ferrara, 1843, which I have to thank Monsignore D. O'Connell of Rome for bringing to my notice. I abridge the original.

French gentleman who tried to make a proselyte of him, but who succeeded no farther after two or three conversations than to get him to hang (half jocosely) a religious medal round his neck, and to accept and read a copy of a short prayer to the Virgin. M. Ratisbonne represents his own part in the conversations as having been of a light and chaffing order; but he notes the fact that for some days he was unable to banish the words of the prayer from his mind, and that the night before the crisis he had a sort of nightmare, in the imagery of which a black cross with no Christ upon it figured. Nevertheless, until noon of the next day he was free in mind and spent the time in trivial conversations. I now give his own words.

“If at this time any one had accosted me, saying: ‘Alphonse, in a quarter of an hour you shall be adoring Jesus Christ as your God and Saviour; you shall lie prostrate with your face upon the ground in a humble church; you shall be smiting your breast at the foot of a priest; you shall pass the carnival in a college of Jesuits to prepare yourself to receive baptism, ready to give your life for the Catholic faith; you shall renounce the world and its pomps and pleasures; renounce your fortune, your hopes, and if need be, your betrothed; the affections of your family, the esteem of your friends, and your attachment to the Jewish people; you shall have no other aspiration than to follow Christ and bear his cross till death;’ — if, I say, a prophet had come to me with such a prediction, I should have judged that only one person could be more mad than he, — whosoever, namely, might believe in the possibility of such senseless folly becoming true. And yet that folly is at present my only wisdom, my sole happiness.

“Coming out of the café I met the carriage of Monsieur B. [the proselyting friend]. He stopped and invited me in for a drive, but first asked me to wait for a few minutes whilst he attended to some duty at the church of San Andrea delle Fratte. Instead of waiting in the carriage, I entered the church myself to look at it. The church of San Andrea was poor, small, and

empty; I believe that I found myself there almost alone. No work of art attracted my attention; and I passed my eyes mechanically over its interior without being arrested by any particular thought. I can only remember an entirely black dog which went trotting and turning before me as I mused. In an instant the dog had disappeared, the whole church had vanished, I no longer saw anything, . . . or more truly I saw, O my God, one thing alone.

“Heavens, how can I speak of it? Oh no! human words cannot attain to expressing the inexpressible. Any description, however sublime it might be, could be but a profanation of the unspeakable truth.

“I was there prostrate on the ground, bathed in my tears. with my heart beside itself, when M. B. called me back to life I could not reply to the questions which followed from him one upon the other. But finally I took the medal which I had on my breast, and with all the effusion of my soul I kissed the image of the Virgin, radiant with grace, which it bore. Oh, indeed, it was She! It was indeed She! [What he had seen had been a vision of the Virgin.]

“I did not know where I was: I did not know whether I was Alphonse or another. I only felt myself changed and believed myself another me; I looked for myself in myself and did not find myself. In the bottom of my soul I felt an explosion of the most ardent joy; I could not speak; I had no wish to reveal what had happened. But I felt something solemn and sacred within me which made me ask for a priest. I was led to one; and there, alone, after he had given me the positive order, I spoke as best I could, kneeling, and with my heart still trembling. I could give no account to myself of the truth of which I had acquired a knowledge and a faith. All that I can say is that in an instant the bandage had fallen from my eyes; and not one bandage only, but the whole manifold of bandages in which I had been brought up. One after another they rapidly disappeared, even as the mud and ice disappear under the rays of the burning sun.

“I came out as from a sepulchre, from an abyss of darkness; and I was living, perfectly living. But I wept, for at the bot-

tom of that gulf I saw the extreme of misery from which I had been saved by an infinite mercy ; and I shuddered at the sight of my iniquities, stupefied, melted, overwhelmed with wonder and with gratitude. You may ask me how I came to this new insight, for truly I had never opened a book of religion nor even read a single page of the Bible, and the dogma of original sin is either entirely denied or forgotten by the Hebrews of to-day, so that I had thought so little about it that I doubt whether I ever knew its name. But how came I, then, to this perception of it? I can answer nothing save this, that on entering that church I was in darkness altogether, and on coming out of it I saw the fullness of the light. I can explain the change no better than by the simile of a profound sleep or the analogy of one born blind who should suddenly open his eyes to the day. He sees, but cannot define the light which bathes him and by means of which he sees the objects which excite his wonder. If we cannot explain physical light, how can we explain the light which is the truth itself? And I think I remain within the limits of veracity when I say that without having any knowledge of the letter of religious doctrine, I now intuitively perceived its sense and spirit. Better than if I saw them, I *felt* those hidden things ; I felt them by the inexplicable effects they produced in me. It all happened in my interior mind ; and those impressions, more rapid than thought, shook my soul, revolved and turned it, as it were, in another direction, towards other aims, by other paths. I express myself badly. But do you wish, Lord, that I should inclose in poor and barren words sentiments which the heart alone can understand ? ”

I might multiply cases almost indefinitely, but these will suffice to show you how real, definite, and memorable an event a sudden conversion may be to him who has the experience. Throughout the height of it he undoubtedly seems to himself a passive spectator or under-goer of an astounding process performed upon him from above. There is too much evidence of this for any doubt of it to be possible. Theology, combining this fact with the doctrines of election and grace, has concluded that

the spirit of God is with us at these dramatic moments in a peculiarly miraculous way, unlike what happens at any other juncture of our lives. At that moment, it believes, an absolutely new nature is breathed into us, and we become partakers of the very substance of the Deity.

That the conversion should be instantaneous seems called for on this view, and the Moravian Protestants appear to have been the first to see this logical consequence. The Methodists soon followed suit, practically if not dogmatically, and a short time ere his death, John Wesley wrote : —

“ In London alone I found 652 members of our Society who were exceeding clear in their experience, and whose testimony I could see no reason to doubt. And every one of these (without a single exception) has declared that his deliverance from sin was instantaneous ; that the change was wrought in a moment. Had half of these, or one third, or one in twenty, declared it was *gradually* wrought in *them*, I should have believed this, with regard to *them*, and thought that *some* were gradually sanctified and some instantaneously. But as I have not found, in so long a space of time, a single person speaking thus, I cannot but believe that sanctification is commonly, if not always, an instantaneous work.” Tyerman’s Life of Wesley, i. 463.

All this while the more usual sects of Protestantism have set no such store by instantaneous conversion. For them as for the Catholic Church, Christ’s blood, the sacraments, and the individual’s ordinary religious duties are practically supposed to suffice to his salvation, even though no acute crisis of self-despair and surrender followed by relief should be experienced. For Methodism, on the contrary, unless there have been a crisis of this sort, salvation is only offered, not effectively received, and Christ’s sacrifice in so far forth is incomplete. Methodism surely here follows, if not the healthier-minded, yet on

the whole the profounder spiritual instinct. The individual models which it has set up as typical and worthy of imitation are not only the more interesting dramatically, but psychologically they have been the more complete.

In the fully evolved Revivalism of Great Britain and America we have, so to speak, the codified and stereotyped procedure to which this way of thinking has led. In spite of the unquestionable fact that saints of the once-born type exist, that there may be a gradual growth in holiness without a cataclysm; in spite of the obvious leakage (as one may say) of much mere natural goodness into the scheme of salvation; revivalism has always assumed that only its own type of religious experience can be perfect; you must first be nailed on the cross of natural despair and agony, and then in the twinkling of an eye be miraculously released.

It is natural that those who personally have traversed such an experience should carry away a feeling of its being a miracle rather than a natural process. Voices are often heard, lights seen, or visions witnessed; automatic motor phenomena occur; and it always seems, after the surrender of the personal will, as if an extraneous higher power had flooded in and taken possession. Moreover the sense of renovation, safety, cleanness, rightness, can be so marvelous and jubilant as well to warrant one's belief in a radically new substantial nature.

"Conversion," writes the New England Puritan, Joseph Alleine, "is not the putting in a patch of holiness; but with the true convert holiness is woven into all his powers, principles, and practice. The sincere Christian is quite a new fabric, from the foundation to the top-stone. He is a new man, a new creature."

And Jonathan Edwards says in the same strain: "Those gracious influences which are the effects of the Spirit of God

are altogether supernatural — are quite different from anything that unregenerate men experience. They are what no improvement, or composition of natural qualifications or principles will ever produce ; because they not only differ from what is natural, and from everything that natural men experience in degree and circumstances, but also in kind, and are of a nature far more excellent. From hence it follows that in gracious affections there are [also] new perceptions and sensations entirely different in their nature and kind from anything experienced by the [same] saints before they were sanctified. . . . The conceptions which the saints have of the loveliness of God, and that kind of delight which they experience in it, are quite peculiar, and entirely different from anything which a natural man can possess, or of which he can form any proper notion.”

And that such a glorious transformation as this ought of necessity to be preceded by despair is shown by Edwards in another passage.

“Surely it cannot be unreasonable,” he says, “that before God delivers us from a state of sin and liability to everlasting woe, he should give us some considerable sense of the evil from which he delivers us, in order that we may know and feel the importance of salvation, and be enabled to appreciate the value of what God is pleased to do for us. As those who are saved are successively in two extremely different states — first in a state of condemnation and then in a state of justification and blessedness — and as God, in the salvation of men, deals with them as rational and intelligent creatures, it appears agreeable to this wisdom, that those who are saved should be made sensible of their Being, in those two different states. In the first place, that they should be made sensible of their state of condemnation ; and afterwards, of their state of deliverance and happiness.”

Such quotations express sufficiently well for our purpose the doctrinal interpretation of these changes. Whatever part suggestion and imitation may have played in producing them in men and women in excited assemblies,

they have at any rate been in countless individual instances an original and unborrowed experience. Were we writing the story of the mind from the purely natural-history point of view, with no religious interest whatever, we should still have to write down man's liability to sudden and complete conversion as one of his most curious peculiarities.

What, now, must we ourselves think of this question? Is an instantaneous conversion a miracle in which God is present as he is present in no change of heart less strikingly abrupt? Are there two classes of human beings, even among the apparently regenerate, of which the one class really partakes of Christ's nature while the other merely seems to do so? Or, on the contrary, may the whole phenomenon of regeneration, even in these startling instantaneous examples, possibly be a strictly natural process, divine in its fruits, of course, but in one case more and in another less so, and neither more nor less divine in its mere causation and mechanism than any other process, high or low, of man's interior life?

Before proceeding to answer this question, I must ask you to listen to some more psychological remarks. At our last lecture, I explained the shifting of men's centres of personal energy within them and the lighting up of new crises of emotion. I explained the phenomena as partly due to explicitly conscious processes of thought and will, but as due largely also to the subconscious incubation and maturing of motives deposited by the experiences of life. When ripe, the results hatch out, or burst into flower. I have now to speak of the subconscious region, in which such processes of flowering may occur, in a somewhat less vague way. I only regret that my limits of time here force me to be so short.

The expression 'field of consciousness' has but recently come into vogue in the psychology books. Until quite lately the unit of mental life which figured most was the single 'idea,' supposed to be a definitely outlined thing. But at present psychologists are tending, first, to admit that the actual unit is more probably the total mental state, the entire wave of consciousness or field of objects present to the thought at any time; and, second, to see that it is impossible to outline this wave, this field, with any definiteness.

As our mental fields succeed one another, each has its centre of interest, around which the objects of which we are less and less attentively conscious fade to a margin so faint that its limits are unassignable. Some fields are narrow fields and some are wide fields. Usually when we have a wide field we rejoice, for we then see masses of truth together, and often get glimpses of relations which we divine rather than see, for they shoot beyond the field into still remoter regions of objectivity, regions which we seem rather to be about to perceive than to perceive actually. At other times, of drowsiness, illness, or fatigue, our fields may narrow almost to a point, and we find ourselves correspondingly oppressed and contracted.

Different individuals present constitutional differences in this matter of width of field. Your great organizing geniuses are men with habitually vast fields of mental vision, in which a whole programme of future operations will appear dotted out at once, the rays shooting far ahead into definite directions of advance. In common people there is never this magnificent inclusive view of a topic. They stumble along, feeling their way, as it were, from point to point, and often stop entirely. In certain diseased conditions consciousness is a mere spark, without memory of the past or thought of the future, and with the

present narrowed down to some one simple emotion or sensation of the body.

The important fact which this 'field' formula commemorates is the indetermination of the margin. Inattentively realized as is the matter which the margin contains, it is nevertheless there, and helps both to guide our behavior and to determine the next movement of our attention. It lies around us like a 'magnetic field,' inside of which our centre of energy turns like a compass-needle, as the present phase of consciousness alters into its successor. Our whole past store of memories floats beyond this margin, ready at a touch to come in; and the entire mass of residual powers, impulses, and knowledges that constitute our empirical self stretches continuously beyond it. So vaguely drawn are the outlines between what is actual and what is only potential at any moment of our conscious life, that it is always hard to say of certain mental elements whether we are conscious of them or not.

The ordinary psychology, admitting fully the difficulty of tracing the marginal outline, has nevertheless taken for granted, first, that all the consciousness the person now has, be the same focal or marginal, inattentive or attentive, is there in the 'field' of the moment, all dim and impossible to assign as the latter's outline may be; and, second, that what is absolutely extra-marginal is absolutely non-existent, and cannot be a fact of consciousness at all.

And having reached this point, I must now ask you to recall what I said in my last lecture about the subconscious life. I said, as you may recollect, that those who first laid stress upon these phenomena could not know the facts as we now know them. My first duty now is to tell you what I meant by such a statement.

I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science is the discovery, first made in 1886, that, in certain subjects at least, there is not only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I call this the most important step forward because, unlike the other advances which psychology has made, this discovery has revealed to us an entirely unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution of human nature. No other step forward which psychology has made can proffer any such claim as this.

In particular this discovery of a consciousness existing beyond the field, or subliminally as Mr. Myers terms it, casts light on many phenomena of religious biography. That is why I have to advert to it now, although it is naturally impossible for me in this place to give you any account of the evidence on which the admission of such a consciousness is based. You will find it set forth in many recent books, Binet's *Alterations of Personality*¹ being perhaps as good a one as any to recommend.

The human material on which the demonstration has been made has so far been rather limited and, in part at least, eccentric, consisting of unusually suggestible hypnotic subjects, and of hysteric patients. Yet the elementary mechanisms of our life are presumably so uniform that what is shown to be true in a marked degree of some persons is probably true in some degree of all, and may in a few be true in an extraordinarily high degree.

¹ Published in the International Scientific Series.

The most important consequence of having a strongly developed ultra-marginal life of this sort is that one's ordinary fields of consciousness are liable to incursions from it of which the subject does not guess the source, and which, therefore, take for him the form of unaccountable impulses to act, or inhibitions of action, of obsessive ideas, or even of hallucinations of sight or hearing. The impulses may take the direction of automatic speech or writing, the meaning of which the subject himself may not understand even while he utters it; and generalizing this phenomenon, Mr. Myers has given the name of *automatism*, sensory or motor, emotional or intellectual, to this whole sphere of effects, due to 'uprushes' into the ordinary consciousness of energies originating in the subliminal parts of the mind.

The simplest instance of an automatism is the phenomenon of post-hypnotic suggestion, so-called. You give to a hypnotized subject, adequately susceptible, an order to perform some designated act—usual or eccentric, it makes no difference—after he wakes from his hypnotic sleep. Punctually, when the signal comes or the time elapses upon which you have told him that the act must ensue, he performs it;—but in so doing he has no recollection of your suggestion, and he always trumps up an improvised pretext for his behavior if the act be of an eccentric kind. It may even be suggested to a subject to have a vision or to hear a voice at a certain interval after waking, and when the time comes the vision is seen or the voice heard, with no inkling on the subject's part of its source. In the wonderful explorations by Binet, Janet, Breuer, Freud, Mason, Prince, and others, of the subliminal consciousness of patients with hysteria, we have revealed to us whole systems of underground life, in the shape of memories of a painful sort which lead a

parasitic existence, buried outside of the primary fields of consciousness, and making irruptions thereinto with hallucinations, pains, convulsions, paralyses of feeling and of motion, and the whole procession of symptoms of hysteric disease of body and of mind. Alter or abolish by suggestion these subconscious memories, and the patient immediately gets well. His symptoms were automatisms, in Mr. Myers's sense of the word. These clinical records sound like fairy-tales when one first reads them, yet it is impossible to doubt their accuracy ; and, the path having been once opened by these first observers, similar observations have been made elsewhere. They throw, as I said, a wholly new light upon our natural constitution.

And it seems to me that they make a farther step inevitable. Interpreting the unknown after the analogy of the known, it seems to me that hereafter, wherever we meet with a phenomenon of automatism, be it motor impulses, or obsessive idea, or unaccountable caprice, or delusion, or hallucination, we are bound first of all to make search whether it be not an explosion, into the fields of ordinary consciousness, of ideas elaborated outside of those fields in subliminal regions of the mind. We should look, therefore, for its source in the Subject's subconscious life. In the hypnotic cases, we ourselves create the source by our suggestion, so we know it directly. In the hysteric cases, the lost memories which are the source have to be extracted from the patient's Subliminal by a number of ingenious methods, for an account of which you must consult the books. In other pathological cases, insane delusions, for example, or psychopathic obsessions, the source is yet to seek, but by analogy it also should be in subliminal regions which improvements in our methods may yet conceivably put on tap. There lies the mechanism logically to be assumed, — but the assumption

involves a vast program of work to be done in the way of verification, in which the religious experiences of man must play their part.¹

And thus I return to our own specific subject of instantaneous conversions. You remember the cases of Alline, Bradley, Brainerd, and the graduate of Oxford converted at three in the afternoon. Similar occurrences abound, some with and some without luminous visions, all with a sense of astonished happiness, and of being wrought on by a higher control. If, abstracting altogether from the question of their value for the future spiritual life of the individual, we take them on their psy-

¹ The reader will here please notice that in my exclusive reliance in the last lecture on the subconscious 'incubation' of motives deposited by a growing experience, I followed the method of employing accepted principles of explanation as far as one can. The subliminal region, whatever else it may be, is at any rate a place now admitted by psychologists to exist for the accumulation of vestiges of sensible experience (whether inattentively or attentively registered), and for their elaboration according to ordinary psychological or logical laws into results that end by attaining such a 'tension' that they may at times enter consciousness with something like a burst. It thus is 'scientific' to interpret all otherwise unaccountable invasive alterations of consciousness as results of the tension of subliminal memories reaching the bursting-point. But candor obliges me to confess that there are occasional bursts into consciousness of results of which it is not easy to demonstrate any prolonged subconscious incubation. Some of the cases I used to illustrate the sense of presence of the unseen in Lecture III were of this order (compare pages 59, 61, 62, 67); and we shall see other experiences of the kind when we come to the subject of mysticism. The case of Mr. Bradley, that of M. Ratisbonne, possibly that of Colonel Gardiner, possibly that of Saint Paul, might not be so easily explained in this simple way. The result, then, would have to be ascribed either to a merely physiological nerve storm, a 'discharging lesion' like that of epilepsy; or, in case it were useful and rational, as in the two latter cases named, to some more mystical or theological hypothesis. I make this remark in order that the reader may realize that the subject is really complex. But I shall keep myself as far as possible at present to the more 'scientific' view; and only as the plot thickens in subsequent lectures shall I consider the question of its absolute sufficiency as an explanation of all the facts. That subconscious incubation explains a great number of them, there can be no doubt.

chological side exclusively, so many peculiarities in them remind us of what we find outside of conversion that we are tempted to class them along with other automatisms, and to suspect that what makes the difference between a sudden and a gradual convert is not necessarily the presence of divine miracle in the case of one and of something less divine in that of the other, but rather a simple psychological peculiarity, the fact, namely, that in the recipient of the more instantaneous grace we have one of those Subjects who are in possession of a large region in which mental work can go on subliminally, and from which invasive experiences, abruptly upsetting the equilibrium of the primary consciousness, may come.

I do not see why Methodists need object to such a view. Pray go back and recollect one of the conclusions to which I sought to lead you in my very first lecture. You may remember how I there argued against the notion that the worth of a thing can be decided by its origin. Our spiritual judgment, I said, our opinion of the significance and value of a human event or condition, must be decided on empirical grounds exclusively. If the *fruits for life* of the state of conversion are good, we ought to idealize and venerate it, even though it be a piece of natural psychology ; if not, we ought to make short work with it, no matter what supernatural being may have infused it.

Well, how is it with these fruits? If we except the class of preëminent saints of whom the names illumine history, and consider only the usual run of 'saints,' the shopkeeping church-members and ordinary youthful or middle-aged recipients of instantaneous conversion, whether at revivals or in the spontaneous course of methodistic growth, you will probably agree that no splendor worthy of a wholly supernatural creature fulgurates from

them, or sets them apart from the mortals who have never experienced that favor. Were it true that a suddenly converted man as such is, as Edwards says,¹ of an entirely different kind from a natural man, partaking as he does directly of Christ's substance, there surely ought to be some exquisite class-mark, some distinctive radiance attaching even to the lowliest specimen of this genus, to which no one of us could remain insensible, and which, so far as it went, would prove him more excellent than ever the most highly gifted among mere natural men. But notoriously there is no such radiance. Converted men as a class are indistinguishable from natural men; some natural men even excel some converted men in their fruits; and no one ignorant of doctrinal theology could guess by mere every-day inspection of the 'accidents' of the two groups of persons before him, that their substance differed as much as divine differs from human substance.

The believers in the non-natural character of sudden conversion have had practically to admit that there is no unmistakable class-mark distinctive of all true converts. The super-normal incidents, such as voices and visions and overpowering impressions of the meaning of suddenly presented scripture texts, the melting emotions and tumultuous affections connected with the crisis of change, may all come by way of nature, or worse still, be counterfeited by Satan. The real witness of the spirit to the second birth is to be found only in the disposition of the genuine child of God, the permanently patient heart, the love of self eradicated. And this, it has to be ad-

¹ Edwards says elsewhere: "I am bold to say that the work of God in the conversion of one soul, considered together with the source, foundation, and purchase of it, and also the benefit, end, and eternal issue of it, is a more glorious work of God than the creation of the whole material universe."

mitted, is also found in those who pass no crisis, and may even be found outside of Christianity altogether.

Throughout Jonathan Edwards's admirably rich and delicate description of the supernaturally infused condition, in his *Treatise on Religious Affections*, there is not one decisive trait, not one mark, that unmistakably parts it off from what may possibly be only an exceptionally high degree of natural goodness. In fact, one could hardly read a clearer argument than this book unwittingly offers in favor of the thesis that no chasm exists between the orders of human excellence, but that here as elsewhere, nature shows continuous differences, and generation and regeneration are matters of degree.

All which denial of two objective classes of human beings separated by a chasm must not leave us blind to the extraordinary momentousness of the fact of his conversion to the individual himself who gets converted. There are higher and lower limits of possibility set to each personal life. If a flood but goes above one's head, its absolute elevation becomes a matter of small importance; and when we touch our own upper limit and live in our own highest centre of energy, we may call ourselves saved, no matter how much higher some one else's centre may be. A small man's salvation will always be a great salvation and the greatest of all facts *for him*, and we should remember this when the fruits of our ordinary evangelicism look discouraging. Who knows how much less ideal still the lives of these spiritual grubs and earthworms, these Crumps and Stigginses, might have been, if such poor grace as they have received had never touched them at all? ¹

¹ Emerson writes: "When we see a soul whose acts are regal, graceful, and pleasant as roses, we must thank God that such things can be and are, and not turn sourly on the angel and say: Crump is a better man, with his grunting resistance to all his native devils." True enough. Yet Crump

If we roughly arrange human beings in classes, each class standing for a grade of spiritual excellence, I believe we shall find natural men and converts both sudden and gradual in all the classes. The forms which regenerative change effects have, then, no general spiritual significance, but only a psychological significance. We have seen how Starbuck's laborious statistical studies tend to assimilate conversion to ordinary spiritual growth. Another American psychologist, Prof. George A. Coe,¹ has analyzed the cases of seventy-seven converts or ex-candidates for conversion, known to him, and the results strikingly confirm the view that sudden conversion is connected with the possession of an active subliminal self. Examining his subjects with reference to their hypnotic sensibility and to such automatisms as hypnagogic hallucinations, odd impulses, religious dreams about the time of their conversion, etc., he found these relatively much more frequent in the group of converts whose transformation had been 'striking,' 'striking' transformation being defined as a change which, though not necessarily instantaneous, seems to the subject of it to be distinctly different from a process of growth, however rapid."² Candidates for conversion at revivals are, as you know, often disappointed: they experience nothing striking. Professor Coe had a number of persons of this class among his seventy-seven subjects, and they almost all, when tested by hypnotism, proved to belong to a subclass which he

may really be the better *Crump*, for his inner discords and second birth; and your once-born 'regal' character, though indeed always better than poor Crump, may fall far short of what he individually might be had he only some Crump-like capacity for compunction over his own peculiar diabolisms, graceful and pleasant and invariably gentlemanly as these may be.

¹ In his book, *The Spiritual Life*, New York, 1900.

² Op. cit., p. 112.

calls 'spontaneous,' that is, fertile in self-suggestions, as distinguished from a 'passive' subclass, to which most of the subjects of striking transformation belonged. His inference is that self-suggestion of impossibility had prevented the influence upon these persons of an environment which, on the more 'passive' subjects, had easily brought forth the effects they looked for. Sharp distinctions are difficult in these regions, and Professor Coe's numbers are small. But his methods were careful, and the results tally with what one might expect; and they seem, on the whole, to justify his practical conclusion, which is that if you should expose to a converting influence a subject in whom three factors unite: first, pronounced emotional sensibility; second, tendency to automatisms; and third, suggestibility of the passive type; you might then safely predict the result: there would be a sudden conversion, a transformation of the striking kind.

Does this temperamental origin diminish the significance of the sudden conversion when it has occurred? Not in the least, as Professor Coe well says; for "the ultimate test of religious values is nothing psychological, nothing definable in terms of *how it happens*, but something ethical, definable only in terms of *what is attained*." ¹

As we proceed farther in our inquiry we shall see that what is attained is often an altogether new level of spiritual vitality, a relatively heroic level, in which impossible things have become possible, and new energies and endurances are shown. The personality is changed, the man is born anew, whether or not his psychological idiosyncrasies are what give the particular shape to his metamorphosis. 'Sanctification' is the technical name of this result; and ere long examples of it shall be brought

¹ Op. cit., p. 144.

before you. In this lecture I have still only to add a few remarks on the assurance and peace which fill the hour of change itself.

One word more, though, before proceeding to that point, lest the final purpose of my explanation of suddenness by subliminal activity be misunderstood. I do indeed believe that if the Subject have no liability to such subconscious activity, or if his conscious fields have a hard rind of a margin that resists incursions from beyond it, his conversion must be gradual if it occur, and must resemble any simple growth into new habits. His possession of a developed subliminal self, and of a leaky or pervious margin, is thus a *conditio sine qua non* of the Subject's becoming converted in the instantaneous way. But if you, being orthodox Christians, ask me as a psychologist whether the reference of a phenomenon to a subliminal self does not exclude the notion of the direct presence of the Deity altogether, I have to say frankly that as a psychologist I do not see why it necessarily should. The lower manifestations of the Subliminal, indeed, fall within the resources of the personal subject: his ordinary sense-material, inattentively taken in and subconsciously remembered and combined, will account for all his usual automatisms. But just as our primary wide-awake consciousness throws open our senses to the touch of things material, so it is logically conceivable that *if there be* higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so *might be* our possession of a subconscious region which alone should yield access to them. The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which in the dreamy Subliminal might remain ajar or open.

Thus that perception of external control which is so

essential a feature in conversion might, in some cases at any rate, be interpreted as the orthodox interpret it: forces transcending the finite individual might impress him, on condition of his being what we may call a subliminal human specimen. But in any case the *value* of these forces would have to be determined by their effects, and the mere fact of their transcendency would of itself establish no presumption that they were more divine than diabolical.

I confess that this is the way in which I should rather see the topic left lying in your minds until I come to a much later lecture, when I hope once more to gather these dropped threads together into more definitive conclusions. The notion of a subconscious self certainly ought not at this point of our inquiry to be held to *exclude* all notion of a higher penetration. If there be higher powers able to impress us, they may get access to us only through the subliminal door. (See below, p. 515 ff.)

Let us turn now to the feelings which immediately fill the hour of the conversion experience. The first one to be noted is just this sense of higher control. It is not always, but it is very often present. We saw examples of it in Alline, Bradley, Brainerd, and elsewhere. The need of such a higher controlling agency is well expressed in the short reference which the eminent French Protestant Adolphe Monod makes to the crisis of his own conversion. It was at Naples in his early manhood, in the summer of 1827.

“My sadness,” he says, “was without limit, and having got entire possession of me, it filled my life from the most indifferent external acts to the most secret thoughts, and corrupted at their source my feelings, my judgment, and my happiness. It was then that I saw that to expect to put a stop to this disorder

by my reason and my will, which were themselves diseased, would be to act like a blind man who should pretend to correct one of his eyes by the aid of the other equally blind one. I had then no resource save in *some influence from without*. I remembered the promise of the Holy Ghost ; and what the positive declarations of the Gospel had never succeeded in bringing home to me, I learned at last from necessity, and believed, for the first time in my life, in this promise, in the only sense in which it answered the needs of my soul, in that, namely, of a real external supernatural action, capable of giving me thoughts, and taking them away from me, and exerted on me by a God as truly master of my heart as he is of the rest of nature. Renouncing then all merit, all strength, abandoning all my personal resources, and acknowledging no other title to his mercy than my own utter misery, I went home and threw myself on my knees, and prayed as I never yet prayed in my life. From this day onwards a new interior life began for me: not that my melancholy had disappeared, but it had lost its sting. Hope had entered into my heart, and once entered on the path, the God of Jesus Christ, to whom I then had learned to give myself up, little by little did the rest.”¹

It is needless to remind you once more of the admirable congruity of Protestant theology with the structure of the mind as shown in such experiences. In the extreme of melancholy the self that consciously *is* can do absolutely nothing. It is completely bankrupt and without resource, and no works it can accomplish will avail. Redemption from such subjective conditions must be a free gift or nothing, and grace through Christ’s accomplished sacrifice is such a gift.

“God,” says Luther, “is the God of the humble, the miserable, the oppressed, and the desperate, and of those that are brought even to nothing ; and his nature is to give sight to the

¹ I piece together a quotation made by W. Monod, in his book *la Vie*, and a letter printed in the work : Adolphe Monod : I., *Souvenirs de sa Vie*, 1885, p. 433.

blind, to comfort the broken-hearted, to justify sinners, to save the very desperate and damned. Now that pernicious and pestilent opinion of man's own righteousness, which will not be a sinner, unclean, miserable, and damnable, but righteous and holy, suffereth not God to come to his own natural and proper work. Therefore God must take this maul in hand (the law, I mean) to beat in pieces and bring to nothing this beast with her vain confidence, that she may so learn at length by her own misery that she is utterly forlorn and damned. But here lieth the difficulty, that when a man is terrified and cast down, he is so little able to raise himself up again and say, 'Now I am bruised and afflicted enough; now is the time of grace; now is the time to hear Christ.' The foolishness of man's heart is so great that then he rather seeketh to himself more laws to satisfy his conscience. 'If I live,' saith he, 'I will amend my life: I will do this, I will do that.' But here, except thou do the quite contrary, except thou send Moses away with his law, and in these terrors and this anguish lay hold upon Christ who died for thy sins, look for no salvation. Thy cowl, thy shaven crown, thy chastity, thy obedience, thy poverty, thy works, thy merits? what shall all these do? what shall the law of Moses avail? If I, wretched and damnable sinner, through works or merits could have loved the Son of God, and so come to him, what needed he to deliver himself for me? If I, being a wretch and damned sinner, could be redeemed by any other price, what needed the Son of God to be given? But because there was no other price, therefore he delivered neither sheep, ox, gold, nor silver, but even God himself, entirely and wholly 'for me,' even 'for me,' I say, a miserable, wretched sinner. Now, therefore, I take comfort and apply this to *myself*. And this manner of applying is the very true force and power of faith. For he died *not* to justify the righteous, but the *un*-righteous, and to make *them* the children of God."¹

That is, the more literally lost you are, the more literally you are the very being whom Christ's sacrifice has already saved. Nothing in Catholic theology, I imagine,

¹ Commentary on Galatians, ch. iii. verse 19, and ch. ii. verse 20, abridged.

has ever spoken to sick souls as straight as this message from Luther's personal experience. As Protestants are not all sick souls, of course reliance on what Luther exults in calling the dung of one's merits, the filthy puddle of one's own righteousness, has come to the front again in their religion ; but the adequacy of his view of Christianity to the deeper parts of our human mental structure is shown by its wildfire contagiousness when it was a new and quickening thing.

Faith that Christ has genuinely done his work was part of what Luther meant by faith, which so far is faith in a fact intellectually conceived of. But this is only one part of Luther's faith, the other part being far more vital. This other part is something not intellectual but immediate and intuitive, the assurance, namely, that I, this individual I, just as I stand, without one plea, etc., am saved now and forever.¹

Professor Leuba is undoubtedly right in contending that the conceptual belief about Christ's work, although so often efficacious and antecedent, is really accessory and non-essential, and that the 'joyous conviction' can also

¹ In some conversions, both steps are distinct ; in this one, for example : —

"Whilst I was reading the evangelical treatise, I was soon struck by an expression : 'the finished work of Christ.' 'Why,' I asked of myself, 'does the author use these terms? Why does he not say "the atoning work"?' Then these words, 'It is finished,' presented themselves to my mind. 'What is it that is finished?' I asked, and in an instant my mind replied : 'A perfect expiation for sin ; entire satisfaction has been given ; the debt has been paid by the Substitute. Christ has died for our sins ; not for ours only, but for those of all men. If, then, the entire work is finished, all the debt paid, what remains for me to do?' In another instant the light was shed through my mind by the Holy Ghost, and the joyous conviction was given me that nothing more was to be done, save to fall on my knees, to accept this Saviour and his love, to praise God forever." Autobiography of Hudson Taylor. I translate back into English from the French translation of Challand (Geneva, no date), the original not being accessible.

come by far other channels than this conception. It is to the joyous conviction itself, the assurance that all is well with one, that he would give the name of faith *par excellence*.

"When the sense of estrangement," he writes, "fencing man about in a narrowly limited ego, breaks down, the individual finds himself 'at one with all creation.' He lives in the universal life; he and man, he and nature, he and God, are one. That state of confidence, trust, union with all things, following upon the achievement of moral unity, is the *Faith-state*. Various dogmatic beliefs suddenly, on the advent of the faith-state, acquire a character of certainty, assume a new reality, become an object of faith. As the ground of assurance here is not rational, argumentation is irrelevant. But such conviction being a mere casual offshoot of the faith-state, it is a gross error to imagine that the chief practical value of the faith-state is its power to stamp with the seal of reality certain particular theological conceptions.¹ On the contrary, its value lies solely in the fact that it is the psychic correlate of a biological growth reducing contending desires to one direction; a growth which expresses itself in new affective states and new reactions; in larger, nobler, more Christ-like activities. The ground of the specific assurance in religious dogmas is then an affective experience. The objects of faith may even be preposterous; the affective stream will float them along, and invest them with unshakable certitude. The more startling the affective experience, the less explicable it seems, the easier it is to make it the carrier of unsubstantiated notions."²

The characteristics of the affective experience which, to avoid ambiguity, should, I think, be called the state of assurance rather than the faith-state, can be easily enumerated, though it is probably difficult to realize their

¹ Tolstoy's case was a good comment on those words. There was almost no theology in his conversion. His faith-state was the sense come back that life was infinite in its moral significance.

² American Journal of Psychology, vii. 345-347, abridged.

intensity, unless one have been through the experience one's self.

The central one is the loss of all the worry, the sense that all is ultimately well with one, the peace, the harmony, the *willingness to be*, even though the outer conditions should remain the same. The certainty of God's 'grace,' of 'justification,' 'salvation,' is an objective belief that usually accompanies the change in Christians; but this may be entirely lacking and yet the affective peace remain the same — you will recollect the case of the Oxford graduate: and many might be given where the assurance of personal salvation was only a later result. A passion of willingness, of acquiescence, of admiration, is the glowing centre of this state of mind.

The second feature is the sense of perceiving truths not known before. The mysteries of life become lucid, as Professor Leuba says; and often, nay usually, the solution is more or less unutterable in words. But these more intellectual phenomena may be postponed until we treat of mysticism.

A third peculiarity of the assurance state is the objective change which the world often appears to undergo. 'An appearance of newness beautifies every object,' the precise opposite of that other sort of newness, that dreadful unreality and strangeness in the appearance of the world, which is experienced by melancholy patients, and of which you may recall my relating some examples.¹ This sense of clean and beautiful newness within and without is one of the commonest entries in conversion records. Jonathan Edwards thus describes it in himself: —

"After this my sense of divine things gradually increased and became more and more lively, and had more of that inward sweetness. The appearance of everything was altered; there

¹ Above, p. 152.

seemed to be, as it were, a calm, sweet cast, or appearance of divine glory, in almost everything. God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to appear in everything; in the sun, moon, and stars; in the clouds and blue sky; in the grass, flowers, and trees; in the water and all nature; which used greatly to fix my mind. And scarce anything, among all the works of nature, was so sweet to me as thunder and lightning; formerly nothing had been so terrible to me. Before, I used to be uncommonly terrified with taunder, and to be struck with terror when I saw a thunderstorm rising; but now, on the contrary, it rejoices me."¹

Billy Bray, an excellent little illiterate English evangelist, records his sense of newness thus:—

"I said to the Lord: 'Thou hast said, they that ask shall receive, they that seek shall find, and to them that knock the door shall be opened, and I have faith to believe it.' In an instant the Lord made me so happy that I cannot express what I felt. I shouted for joy. I praised God with my whole heart. . . . I think this was in November, 1823, but what day of the month I do not know. I remember this, that everything looked new to me, the people, the fields, the cattle, the trees. I was like a new man in a new world. I spent the greater part of my time in praising the Lord."²

Starbuck and Leuba both illustrate this sense of newness by quotations. I take the two following from Starbuck's manuscript collection. One, a woman, says:—

"I was taken to a camp-meeting, mother and religious friends seeking and praying for my conversion. My emotional nature was stirred to its depths; confessions of depravity and pleading with God for salvation from sin made me oblivious of all surroundings. I plead for mercy, and had a vivid realization of forgiveness and renewal of my nature. When rising from my knees I exclaimed, 'Old things have passed away, all things

¹ DWIGHT: *Life of Edwards*, New York, 1830, p. 61, abridged.

² W. F. BOURNE: *The King's Son, a Memoir of Billy Bray*, London, Hamilton, Adams & Co., 1887, p. 9.

have become new.' It was like entering another world, a new state of existence. Natural objects were glorified, my spiritual vision was so clarified that I saw beauty in every material object in the universe, the woods were vocal with heavenly music ; my soul exulted in the love of God, and I wanted everybody to share in my joy."

. The next case is that of a man : —

"I know not how I got back into the encampment, but found myself staggering up to Rev. ——'s Holiness tent — and as it was full of seekers and a terrible noise inside, some groaning, some laughing, and some shouting, and by a large oak, ten feet from the tent, I fell on my face by a bench, and tried to pray, and every time I would call on God, something like a man's hand would strangle me by choking. I don't know whether there were any one around or near me or not. I thought I should surely die if I did not get help, but just as often as I would pray, that unseen hand was felt on my throat and my breath squeezed off. Finally something said : ' Venture on the atonement, for you will die anyway if you don't.' So I made one final struggle to call on God for mercy, with the same choking and strangling, determined to finish the sentence of prayer for Mercy, if I did strangle and die, and the last I remember that time was falling back on the ground with the same unseen hand on my throat. I don't know how long I lay there or what was going on. None of my folks were present. When I came to myself, there were a crowd around me praising God. The very heavens seemed to open and pour down rays of light and glory. Not for a moment only, but all day and night, floods of light and glory seemed to pour through my soul, and oh, how I was changed, and everything became new. My horses and hogs and even everybody seemed changed."

This man's case introduces the feature of automatism, which in suggestible subjects have been so startling a feature at revivals since, in Edwards's, Wesley's, and Whitfield's time, these became a regular means of gospel-propagation. They were at first supposed to be semi-

miraculous proofs of 'power' on the part of the Holy Ghost; but great divergence of opinion quickly arose concerning them. Edwards, in his *Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New England*, has to defend them against their critics; and their value has long been matter of debate even within the revivalistic denominations.¹ They undoubtedly have no essential spiritual significance, and although their presence makes his conversion more memorable to the convert, it has never been proved that converts who show them are more persevering or fertile in good fruits than those whose change of heart has had less violent accompaniments. On the whole, unconsciousness, convulsions, visions, involuntary vocal utterances, and suffocation, must be simply ascribed to the subject's having a large subliminal region, involving nervous instability. This is often the subject's own view of the matter afterwards. One of Starbuck's correspondents writes, for instance: —

"I have been through the experience which is known as conversion. My explanation of it is this: the subject works his emotions up to the breaking point, at the same time resisting their physical manifestations, such as quickened pulse, etc., and then suddenly lets them have their full sway over his body. The relief is something wonderful, and the pleasurable effects of the emotions are experienced to the highest degree."

There is one form of sensory automatism which possibly deserves special notice on account of its frequency. I refer to hallucinatory or pseudo-hallucinatory luminous phenomena, *photisms*, to use the term of the psychologists. Saint Paul's blinding heavenly vision seems to have been a phenomenon of this sort; so does Constantine's

¹ Consult WILLIAM B. SPRAGUE: *Lectures on Revivals of Religion*, New York, 1832, in the long Appendix to which the opinions of a large number of ministers are given.

cross in the sky. The last case but one which I quoted mentions floods of light and glory. Henry Alline mentions a light, about whose externality he seems uncertain. Colonel Gardiner sees a blazing light. President Finney writes : —

“All at once the glory of God shone upon and round about me in a manner almost marvelous. . . . A light perfectly ineffable shone in my soul, that almost prostrated me on the ground. . . . This light seemed like the brightness of the sun in every direction. It was too intense for the eyes. . . . I think I knew something then, by actual experience, of that light that prostrated Paul on the way to Damascus. It was surely a light such as I could not have endured long.”¹

Such reports of photisms are indeed far from uncommon. Here is another from Starbuck’s collection, where the light appeared evidently external : —

“I had attended a series of revival services for about two weeks off and on. Had been invited to the altar several times, all the time becoming more deeply impressed, when finally I decided I must do this, or I should be lost. Realization of conversion was very vivid, like a ton’s weight being lifted from my heart ; a strange light which seemed to light up the whole room (for it was dark) ; a conscious supreme bliss which caused me to repeat ‘Glory to God’ for a long time. Decided to be God’s child for life, and to give up my pet ambition, wealth and social position. My former habits of life hindered my growth somewhat, but I set about overcoming these systematically, and in one year my whole nature was changed, i. e., my ambitions were of a different order.”

Here is another one of Starbuck’s cases, involving a luminous element : —

“I had been clearly converted twenty-three years before, or rather reclaimed. My experience in regeneration was then clear and spiritual, and I had not backslidden. But I expe-

¹ *Memoirs*, p. 34.

rienced entire sanctification on the 15th day of March, 1893, about eleven o'clock in the morning. The particular accompaniments of the experience were entirely unexpected. I was quietly sitting at home singing selections out of Pentecostal Hymns. Suddenly there seemed to be a something sweeping into me and inflating my entire being — such a sensation as I had never experienced before. When this experience came, I seemed to be conducted around a large, capacious, well-lighted room. As I walked with my invisible conductor and looked around, a clear thought was coined in my mind, 'They are not here, they are gone.' As soon as the thought was definitely formed in my mind, though no word was spoken, the Holy Spirit impressed me that I was surveying my own soul. Then, for the first time in all my life, did I know that I was cleansed from all sin, and filled with the fullness of God."

Leuba quotes the case of a Mr. Peek, where the luminous affection reminds one of the chromatic hallucinations produced by the intoxicant cactus buds called mescal by the Mexicans : —

"When I went in the morning into the fields to work, the glory of God appeared in all his visible creation. I well remember we reaped oats, and how every straw and head of the oats seemed, as it were, arrayed in a kind of rainbow glory, or to glow, if I may so express it, in the glory of God."¹

¹ These reports of sensorial photism shade off into what are evidently only metaphorical accounts of the sense of new spiritual illumination, as, for instance, in Brainerd's statement : "As I was walking in a thick grove, unspeakable glory seemed to open to the apprehension of my soul. I do not mean any external brightness, for I saw no such thing, nor any imagination of a body of light in the third heavens, or anything of that nature, but it was a new inward apprehension or view that I had of God."

In a case like this next one from Starbuck's manuscript collection, the lighting up of the darkness is probably also metaphorical : —

"One Sunday night, I resolved that when I got home to the ranch where I was working, I would offer myself with my faculties and all to God to be used only by and for him. . . . It was raining and the roads were muddy ; but this desire grew so strong that I kneeled down by the side of the road and told God all about it, intending then to get up and go on. Such a thing as any special answer to my prayer never entered my mind, having

The most characteristic of all the elements of the conversion crisis, and the last one of which I shall speak, is the ecstasy of happiness produced. We have already heard several accounts of it, but I will add a couple more. President Finney's is so vivid that I give it at length : —

“All my feelings seemed to rise and flow out; and the utterance of my heart was, ‘I want to pour my whole soul out to God.’ The rising of my soul was so great that I rushed into the back room of the front office, to pray. There was no fire and no light in the room; nevertheless it appeared to me as if it were perfectly light. As I went in and shut the door after me, it seemed as if I met the Lord Jesus Christ face to face. It did not occur to me then, nor did it for some time afterwards, that it was wholly a mental state. On the contrary, it seemed to me that I saw him as I would see any other man. He said nothing, but looked at me in such a manner as to break me been converted by faith, but still being most undoubtedly saved. Well, while I was praying, I remember holding out my hands to God and telling him they should work for him, my feet walk for him, my tongue speak for him, etc., etc., if he would only use me as his instrument and give me a satisfying experience — when suddenly the darkness of the night seemed lit up — I felt, realized, knew, that God heard and answered my prayer. Deep happiness came over me; I felt I was accepted into the inner circle of God's loved ones.”

In the following case also the flash of light is metaphorical : —

“A prayer meeting had been called for at close of evening service. The minister supposed me impressed by his discourse (a mistake — he was dull). He came and, placing his hand upon my shoulder, said: ‘Do you not want to give your heart to God?’ I replied in the affirmative. Then said he, ‘Come to the front seat.’ They sang and prayed and talked with me. I experienced nothing but unaccountable wretchedness. They declared that the reason why I did not ‘obtain peace’ was because I was not willing to give up all to God. After about two hours the minister said we would go home. As usual, on retiring, I prayed. In great distress, I at this time simply said, ‘Lord, I have done all I can, I leave the whole matter with thee.’ Immediately, like a flash of light, there came to me a great peace, and I arose and went into my parents’ bedroom and said, ‘I do feel so wonderfully happy.’ This I regard as the hour of conversion. It was the hour in which I became assured of divine acceptance and favor. So far as my life was concerned, it made little immediate change.”

right down at his feet. I have always since regarded this as a most remarkable state of mind ; for it seemed to me a reality that he stood before me, and I fell down at his feet and poured out my soul to him. I wept aloud like a child, and made such confessions as I could with my choked utterance. It seemed to me that I bathed his feet with my tears ; and yet I had no distinct impression that I touched him, that I recollect. I must have continued in this state for a good while ; but my mind was too much absorbed with the interview to recollect anything that I said. But I know, as soon as my mind became calm enough to break off from the interview, I returned to the front office, and found that the fire that I had made of large wood was nearly burned out. But as I turned and was about to take a seat by the fire, I received a mighty baptism of the Holy Ghost. Without any expectation of it, without ever having the thought in my mind that there was any such thing for me, without any recollection that I had ever heard the thing mentioned by any person in the world, the Holy Spirit descended upon me in a manner that seemed to go through me, body and soul. I could feel the impression, like a wave of electricity, going through and through me. Indeed, it seemed to come in waves and waves of liquid love ; for I could not express it in any other way. It seemed like the very breath of God. I can recollect distinctly that it seemed to fan me, like immense wings.

“No words can express the wonderful love that was shed abroad in my heart. I wept aloud with joy and love ; and I do not know but I should say I literally bellowed out the unutterable gushings of my heart. These waves came over me, and over me, and over me, one after the other, until I recollect I cried out, ‘I shall die if these waves continue to pass over me.’ I said, ‘Lord, I cannot bear any more ;’ yet I had no fear of death.

“How long I continued in this state, with this baptism continuing to roll over me and go through me, I do not know. But I know it was late in the evening when a member of my choir — for I was the leader of the choir — came into the office to see me. He was a member of the church. He found me

in this state of loud weeping, and said to me, 'Mr. Finney, what ails you?' I could make him no answer for some time. He then said, 'Are you in pain?' I gathered myself up as best I could, and replied, 'No, but so happy that I cannot live.' "

I just now quoted Billy Bray; I cannot do better than give his own brief account of his post-conversion feelings:—

"I can't help praising the Lord. As I go along the street, I lift up one foot, and it seems to say 'Glory'; and I lift up the other, and it seems to say 'Amen'; and so they keep up like that all the time I am walking." ¹

One word, before I close this lecture, on the question of the transiency or permanence of these abrupt conversions. Some of you, I feel sure, knowing that numerous

¹ I add in a note a few more records:—

"One morning, being in deep distress, fearing every moment I should drop into hell, I was constrained to cry in earnest for mercy, and the Lord came to my relief, and delivered my soul from the burden and guilt of sin. My whole frame was in a tremor from head to foot, and my soul enjoyed sweet peace. The pleasure I then felt was indescribable. The happiness lasted about three days, during which time I never spoke to any person about my feelings." *Autobiography of DAN YOUNG*, edited by W. P. STRICKLAND, New York, 1860.

"In an instant there rose up in me such a sense of God's taking care of those who put their trust in him that for an hour all the world was crystalline, the heavens were lucid, and I sprang to my feet and began to cry and laugh." H. W. BEECHER, quoted by LEUBA.

"My tears of sorrow changed to joy, and I lay there praising God in such ecstasy of joy as only the soul who experiences it can realize."—"I cannot express how I felt. It was as if I had been in a dark dungeon and lifted into the light of the sun. I shouted and I sang praise unto him who loved me and washed me from my sins. I was forced to retire into a secret place, for the tears did flow, and I did not wish my shopmates to see me, and yet I could not keep it a secret."—"I experienced joy almost to weeping."—"I felt my face must have shone like that of Moses. I had a general feeling of buoyancy. It was the greatest joy it was ever my lot to experience."—"I wept and laughed alternately. I was as light as if walking on air. I felt as if I had gained greater peace and happiness than I had ever expected to experience." STARBUCK'S correspondents.

backslidings and relapses take place, make of these their apperceiving mass for interpreting the whole subject, and dismiss it with a pitying smile at so much 'hysterics.' Psychologically, as well as religiously, however, this is shallow. It misses the point of serious interest, which is not so much the duration as the nature and quality of these shiftings of character to higher levels. Men lapse from every level — we need no statistics to tell us that. Love is, for instance, well known not to be irrevocable, yet, constant or inconstant, it reveals new flights and reaches of ideality while it lasts. These revelations form its significance to men and women, whatever be its duration. So with the conversion experience: that it should for even a short time show a human being what the high-water mark of his spiritual capacity is, this is what constitutes its importance, — an importance which backsliding cannot diminish, although persistence might increase it. As a matter of fact, all the more striking instances of conversion, all those, for instance, which I have quoted, *have* been permanent. The case of which there might be most doubt, on account of its suggesting so strongly an epileptoid seizure, was the case of M. Ratisbonne. Yet I am informed that Ratisbonne's whole future was shaped by those few minutes. He gave up his project of marriage, became a priest, founded at Jerusalem, where he went to dwell, a mission of nuns for the conversion of the Jews, showed no tendency to use for egotistic purposes the notoriety given him by the peculiar circumstances of his conversion, — which, for the rest, he could seldom refer to without tears, — and in short remained an exemplary son of the Church until he died, late in the 80's, if I remember rightly.

The only statistics I know of, on the subject of the duration of conversions, are those collected for Professor

Starbuck by Miss Johnston. They embrace only a hundred persons, evangelical church-members, more than half being Methodists. According to the statement of the subjects themselves, there had been backsliding of some sort in nearly all the cases, 93 per cent. of the women, 77 per cent. of the men. Discussing the returns more minutely, Starbuck finds that only 6 per cent. are relapses from the religious faith which the conversion confirmed, and that the backsliding complained of is in most only a fluctuation in the ardor of sentiment. Only six of the hundred cases report a change of faith. Starbuck's conclusion is that the effect of conversion is to bring with it "a changed attitude towards life, which is fairly constant and permanent, although the feelings fluctuate. . . . In other words, the persons who have passed through conversion, having once taken a stand for the religious life, tend to feel themselves identified with it, no matter how much their religious enthusiasm declines."¹

¹ *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 360, 357.

LECTURES XI, XII, AND XIII

SAINTLINESS

THE last lecture left us in a state of expectancy. What may the practical fruits for life have been, of such movingly happy conversions as those we heard of? With this question the really important part of our task opens, for you remember that we began all this empirical inquiry not merely to open a curious chapter in the natural history of human consciousness, but rather to attain a spiritual judgment as to the total value and positive meaning of all the religious trouble and happiness which we have seen. We must, therefore, first describe the fruits of the religious life, and then we must judge them. This divides our inquiry into two distinct parts. Let us without further preamble proceed to the descriptive task.

It ought to be the pleasantest portion of our business in these lectures. Some small pieces of it, it is true, may be painful, or may show human nature in a pathetic light, but it will be mainly pleasant, because the best fruits of religious experience are the best things that history has to show. They have always been esteemed so; here if anywhere is the genuinely strenuous life; and to call to mind a succession of such examples as I have lately had to wander through, though it has been only in the reading of them, is to feel encouraged and uplifted and washed in better moral air.

The highest flights of charity, devotion, trust, patience, bravery to which the wings of human nature have spread

it be a question of saving her baby's life or her own. Take a self-indulgent woman's life in general. She will yield to every inhibition set by her disagreeable sensations, lie late in bed, live upon tea or bromides, keep indoors from the cold. Every difficulty finds her obedient to its 'no.' But make a mother of her, and what have you? Possessed by maternal excitement, she now confronts wakefulness, weariness, and toil without an instant of hesitation or a word of complaint. The inhibitive power of pain over her is extinguished wherever the baby's interests are at stake. The inconveniences which this creature occasions have become, as James Hinton says, the glowing heart of a great joy, and indeed are now the very conditions whereby the joy becomes most deep.

This is an example of what you have already heard of as the 'expulsive power of a higher affection.' But be the affection high or low, it makes no difference, so long as the excitement it brings be strong enough. In one of Henry Drummond's discourses he tells of an inundation in India where an eminence with a bungalow upon it remained unsubmerged, and became the refuge of a number of wild animals and reptiles in addition to the human beings who were there. At a certain moment a royal Bengal tiger appeared swimming towards it, reached it, and lay panting like a dog upon the ground in the midst of the people, still possessed by such an agony of terror that one of the Englishmen could calmly step up with a rifle and blow out its brains. The tiger's habitual ferocity was temporarily quelled by the emotion of fear, which became sovereign, and formed a new centre for his character.

Sometimes no emotional state is sovereign, but many contrary ones are mixed together. In that case one hears

both 'yeses' and 'noes,' and the 'will' is called on then to solve the conflict. Take a soldier, for example, with his dread of cowardice impelling him to advance, his fears impelling him to run, and his propensities to imitation pushing him towards various courses if his comrades offer various examples. His person becomes the seat of a mass of interferences; and he may for a time simply waver, because no one emotion prevails. There is a pitch of intensity, though, which, if any emotion reach it, enthrones that one as alone effective and sweeps its antagonists and all their inhibitions away. The fury of his comrades' charge, once entered on, will give this pitch of courage to the soldier; the panic of their rout will give this pitch of fear. In these sovereign excitements, things ordinarily impossible grow natural because the inhibitions are annulled. Their 'no! no!' not only is not heard, it does not exist. Obstacles are then like tissue-paper hoops to the circus rider — no impediment; the flood is higher than the dam they make. "Lass sie betteln gehn wenn sie hungrig sind!" cries the grenadier, frantic over his Emperor's capture, when his wife and babes are suggested; and men pent into a burning theatre have been known to cut their way through the crowd with knives.¹

¹ " 'Love would not be love,' says Bourget, 'unless it could carry one to crime.' And so one may say that no passion would be a veritable passion unless it could carry one to crime." (SIGHELE: *Psychologie des Sectes*, p. 136.) In other words, great passions annul the ordinary inhibitions set by 'conscience.' And conversely, of all the criminal human beings, the false, cowardly, sensual, or cruel persons who actually live, there is perhaps not one whose criminal impulse may not be at some moment overpowered by the presence of some other emotion to which his character is also potentially liable, provided that other emotion be only made intense enough. Fear is usually the most available emotion for this result in this particular class of persons. It stands for conscience, and may here be classed appropriately as a 'higher affection.' If we are soon to die, or if we believe a day of judgment to be near at hand, how quickly do we put our moral house in order — we do not see how sin can evermore exert temptation over us! Old-

One mode of emotional excitability is exceedingly important in the composition of the energetic character, from its peculiarly destructive power over inhibitions. I mean what in its lower form is mere irascibility, susceptibility to wrath, the fighting temper; and what in subtler ways manifests itself as impatience, grimness, earnestness, severity of character. Earnestness means willingness to live with energy, though energy bring pain. The pain may be pain to other people or pain to one's self — it makes little difference; for when the strenuous mood is on one, the aim is to break something, no matter whose or what. Nothing annihilates an inhibition as irresistibly as anger does it; for, as Moltke says of war, destruction pure and simple is its essence. This is what makes it so invaluable an ally of every other passion. The sweetest delights are trampled on with a ferocious pleasure the moment they offer themselves as checks to a cause by which our higher indignations are elicited. It costs then nothing to drop friendships, to renounce long-rooted privileges and possessions, to break with social ties. Rather do we take a stern joy in the astringency and desolation; and what is called weakness of character seems in most cases to consist in the inaptitude for these sacrificial moods, of which one's own inferior self and its pet softnesses must often be the targets and the victims.¹

fashioned hell-fire Christianity well knew how to extract from fear its full equivalent in the way of fruits for repentance, and its full conversion value.

¹ Example: Benjamin Constant was often marveled at as an extraordinary instance of superior intelligence with inferior character. He writes (Journal, Paris, 1895, p. 56), "I am tossed and dragged about by my miserable weakness. Never was anything so ridiculous as my indecision. Now marriage, now solitude; now Germany, now France, hesitation upon hesitation, and all because at bottom I am *unable to give up anything*." He can't 'get mad' at any of his alternatives; and the career of a man beset by such an all-round amiability is hopeless.

So far I have spoken of temporary alterations produced by shifting excitements in the same person. But the relatively fixed differences of character of different persons are explained in a precisely similar way. In a man with a liability to a special sort of emotion, whole ranges of inhibition habitually vanish, which in other men remain effective, and other sorts of inhibition take their place. When a person has an inborn genius for certain emotions, his life differs strangely from that of ordinary people, for none of their usual deterrents check him. Your mere aspirant to a type of character, on the contrary, only shows, when your natural lover, fighter, or reformer, with whom the passion is a gift of nature, comes along, the hopeless inferiority of voluntary to instinctive action. He has deliberately to overcome his inhibitions; the genius with the inborn passion seems not to feel them at all; he is free of all that inner friction and nervous waste. To a Fox, a Garibaldi, a General Booth, a John Brown, a Louise Michel, a Bradlaugh, the obstacles omnipotent over those around them are as if non-existent. Could the rest of us so disregard them, there might be many such heroes, for many have the wish to live for similar ideals, and only the adequate degree of inhibition- quenching fury is lacking.¹

¹ The great thing which the higher excitabilities give is *courage*; and the addition or subtraction of a certain amount of this quality makes a different man, a different life. Various excitements let the courage loose. Trustful hope will do it; inspiring example will do it; love will do it; wrath will do it. In some people it is natively so high that the mere touch of danger does it, though danger is for most men the great inhibitor of action. 'Love of adventure' becomes in such persons a ruling passion. "I believe," says General Skobelev, "that my bravery is simply the passion and at the same time the contempt of danger. The risk of life fills me with an exaggerated rapture. The fewer there are to share it, the more I like it. The participation of my body in the event is required to furnish me an adequate excitement. Everything intellectual appears to me to be reflex; but a meeting of man to man, a duel, a danger into which I can

The difference between willing and merely wishing, between having ideals that are creative and ideals that are but pinings and regrets, thus depends solely either on the amount of steam-pressure chronically driving the character in the ideal direction, or on the amount of ideal excitement transiently acquired. Given a certain amount of love, indignation, generosity, magnanimity, admiration, loyalty, or enthusiasm of self-surrender, the result is always the same. That whole raft of cowardly obstructions, which in tame persons and dull moods are sovereign impediments to action, sinks away at once. Our conventionality,¹ our shyness, laziness, and stinginess, our demands for precedent and permission, for guarantee and surety, our small suspicions, timidities, despairs, where are they now? Severed like cobwebs, broken like bubbles in the sun —

“Wo sind die Sorge nun und Noth
Die mich noch gestern wollt’ erschlaffen?
Ich schäm’ mich dess’ im Morgenroth.”

The flood we are borne on rolls them so lightly under that their very contact is unfelt. Set free of them, we float and soar and sing. This auroral openness and

•
throw myself headforemost, attracts me, moves me, intoxicates me. I am crazy for it, I love it, I adore it. I run after danger as one runs after women; I wish it never to stop. Were it always the same, it would always bring me a new pleasure. When I throw myself into an adventure in which I hope to find it, my heart palpitates with the uncertainty; I could wish at once to have it appear and yet to delay. A sort of painful and delicious shiver shakes me; my entire nature runs to meet the peril with an impetus that my will would in vain try to resist.” (JULIETTE ADAM: *Le Général Skobeleff*, *Nouvelle Revue*, 1886, abridged.) Skobeleff seems to have been a cruel egoist; but the disinterested Garibaldi, if one may judge by his ‘*Memorie*,’ lived in an unflagging emotion of similar danger-seeking excitement.

¹ See the case on p. 70, above, where the writer describes his experiences of communion with the Divine as consisting “merely in the *temporary obliteration of the conventionalities* which usually cover my life.”

uplift gives to all creative ideal levels a bright and caroling quality, which is nowhere more marked than where the controlling emotion is religious. "The true monk," writes an Italian mystic, "takes nothing with him but his lyre."

We may now turn from these psychological generalities to those fruits of the religious state which form the special subject of our present lecture. The man who lives in his religious centre of personal energy, and is actuated by spiritual enthusiasms, differs from his previous carnal self in perfectly definite ways. The new ardor which burns in his breast consumes in its glow the lower 'noes' which formerly beset him, and keeps him immune against infection from the entire groveling portion of his nature. Magnanimities once impossible are now easy; paltry conventionalities and mean incentives once tyrannical hold no sway. The stone wall inside of him has fallen, the hardness in his heart has broken down. The rest of us can, I think, imagine this by recalling our state of feeling in those temporary 'melting moods' into which either the trials of real life, or the theatre, or a novel sometimes throw us. Especially if we weep! For it is then as if our tears broke through an inveterate inner dam, and let all sorts of ancient peccancies and moral stagnancies drain away, leaving us now washed and soft of heart and open to every nobler leading. With most of us the customary hardness quickly returns, but not so with saintly persons. Many saints, even as energetic ones as Teresa and Loyola, have possessed what the church traditionally reveres as a special grace, the so-called gift of tears. In these persons the melting mood seems to have held almost uninterrupted control. And as it is with tears and melting moods, so it is with

other exalted affections. Their reign may come by gradual growth or by a crisis; but in either case it may have 'come to stay.'

At the end of the last lecture we saw this permanence to be true of the general paramountcy of the higher insight, even though in the ebbs of emotional excitement meaner motives might temporarily prevail and backsliding might occur. But that lower temptations may remain completely annulled, apart from transient emotion and as if by alteration of the man's habitual nature, is also proved by documentary evidence in certain cases. Before embarking on the general natural history of the regenerate character, let me convince you of this curious fact by one or two examples. The most numerous are those of reformed drunkards. You recollect the case of Mr. Hadley in the last lecture; the Jerry McAuley Water Street Mission abounds in similar instances.¹ You also remember the graduate of Oxford, converted at three in the afternoon, and getting drunk in the hay-field the next day, but after that permanently cured of his appetite. "From that hour drink has had no terrors for me: I never touch it, never want it. The same thing occurred with my pipe, . . . the desire for it went at once and has never returned. So with every known sin, the deliverance in each case being permanent and complete. I have had no temptations since conversion."

Here is an analogous case from Starbuck's manuscript collection : —

"I went into the old Adelphi Theatre, where there was a Holiness meeting, . . . and I began saying, 'Lord, Lord, I must have this blessing.' Then what was to me an audible voice said: 'Are you willing to give up everything to the

¹ Above, p. 201. "The only radical remedy I know for dipsomania is religiomania," is a saying I have heard quoted from some medical man.

Lord?’ and question after question kept coming up, to all of which I said : ‘Yes, Lord ; yes, Lord !’ until this came : ‘Why do you not accept it *now*?’ and I said : ‘I do, Lord.’ — I felt no particular joy, only a trust. Just then the meeting closed, and, as I went out on the street, I met a gentleman smoking a fine cigar, and a cloud of smoke came into my face, and I took a long, deep breath of it, and praise the Lord, all my appetite for it was gone. Then as I walked along the street, passing saloons where the fumes of liquor came out, I found that all my taste and longing for that accursed stuff was gone. Glory to God ! . . . [But] for ten or eleven long years [after that] I was in the wilderness with its ups and downs. My appetite for liquor never came back.”

The classic case of Colonel Gardiner is that of a man cured of sexual temptation in a single hour. To Mr. Spears the colonel said, “I was effectually cured of all inclination to that sin I was so strongly addicted to that I thought nothing but shooting me through the head could have cured me of it ; and all desire and inclination to it was removed, as entirely as if I had been a sucking child ; nor did the temptation return to this day.” Mr. Webster’s words on the same subject are these : “One thing I have heard the colonel frequently say, that he was much addicted to impurity before his acquaintance with religion ; but that, so soon as he was enlightened from above, he felt the power of the Holy Ghost changing his nature so wonderfully that his sanctification in this respect seemed more remarkable than in any other.”¹

Such rapid abolition of ancient impulses and propensities reminds us so strongly of what has been observed as the result of hypnotic suggestion that it is difficult not to believe that subliminal influences play the decisive

¹ Doddridge’s Life of Colonel James Gardiner, London Religious Tract Society, pp. 23-32.

part in these abrupt changes of heart, just as they do in hypnotism.¹ Suggestive therapeutics abound in records of cure, after a few sittings, of inveterate bad habits with which the patient, left to ordinary moral and physical influences, had struggled in vain. Both drunkenness and sexual vice have been cured in this way, action through the subliminal seeming thus in many individuals to have the prerogative of inducing relatively stable change. If the grace of God miraculously operates, it probably operates through the subliminal door, then. But just *how* anything operates in this region is still unexplained, and we shall do well now to say good-bye to the *process* of transformation altogether, — leaving it, if you like, a good deal of a psychological or theological mystery, — and to turn our attention to the fruits of the religious condition, no matter in what way they may have been produced.²

¹ Here, for example, is a case, from Starbuck's book, in which a 'sensory automatism' brought about quickly what prayers and resolves had been unable to effect. The subject is a woman. She writes : —

"When I was about forty I tried to quit smoking, but the desire was on me, and had me in its power. I cried and prayed and promised God to quit, but could not. I had smoked for fifteen years. When I was fifty-three, as I sat by the fire one day smoking, a voice came to me. I did not hear it with my ears, but more as a dream or sort of double think. It said, 'Louisa, lay down smoking.' At once I replied, 'Will you take the desire away?' But it only kept saying: 'Louisa, lay down smoking.' Then I got up, laid my pipe on the mantel-shelf, and never smoked again or had any desire to. The desire was gone as though I had never known it or touched tobacco. The sight of others smoking and the smell of smoke never gave me the least wish to touch it again." The Psychology of Religion, p. 142.

² Professor Starbuck expresses the radical destruction of old influences physiologically, as a cutting off of the connection between higher and lower cerebral centres. "This condition," he says, "in which the association-centres connected with the spiritual life are cut off from the lower, is often reflected in the way correspondents describe their experiences. . . . For example: 'Temptations from without still assail me, but there is nothing *within* to respond to them.' The ego [here] is wholly identified with the

The collective name for the ripe fruits of religion in a character is Saintliness.¹ The saintly character is the character for which spiritual emotions are the habitual centre of the personal energy; and there is a certain composite photograph of universal saintliness, the same in all religions, of which the features can easily be traced.²

higher centres, whose quality of feeling is that of withinness. Another of the respondents says: 'Since then, although Satan tempts me, there is as it were a wall of brass around me, so that his darts cannot touch me.' — Unquestionably, functional exclusions of this sort must occur in the cerebral organ. But on the side accessible to introspection, their causal condition is nothing but the degree of spiritual excitement, getting at last so high and strong as to be sovereign; and it must be frankly confessed that we do not know just why or how such sovereignty comes about in one person and not in another. We can only give our imagination a certain delusive help by mechanical analogies.

If we should conceive, for example, that the human mind, with its different possibilities of equilibrium, might be like a many-sided solid with different surfaces on which it could lie flat, we might liken mental revolutions to the spatial revolutions of such a body. As it is pried up, say by a lever, from a position in which it lies on surface A, for instance, it will linger for a time unstably halfway up, and if the lever cease to urge it, it will tumble back or 'relapse' under the continued pull of gravity. But if at last it rotate far enough for its centre of gravity to pass beyond surface A altogether, the body will fall over, on surface B, say, and abide there permanently. The pulls of gravity towards A have vanished, and may now be disregarded. The polyhedron has become immune against farther attraction from their direction.

In this figure of speech the lever may correspond to the emotional influences making for a new life, and the initial pull of gravity to the ancient drawbacks and inhibitions. So long as the emotional influence fails to reach a certain pitch of efficacy, the changes it produces are unstable, and the man relapses into his original attitude. But when a certain intensity is attained by the new emotion, a critical point is passed, and there then ensues an irreversible revolution, equivalent to the production of a new nature.

¹ I use this word in spite of a certain flavor of 'sanctimoniousness' which sometimes clings to it, because no other word suggests as well the exact combination of affections which the text goes on to describe.

² "It will be found," says Dr. W. R. INGE (in his lectures on Christian Mysticism, London, 1899, p. 326), "that men of preëminent saintliness agree very closely in what they tell us. They tell us that they have arrived at an unshakable conviction, not based on inference but on immediate experience, that God is a spirit with whom the human spirit can hold intercourse;

They are these : —

1. A feeling of being in a wider life than that of this world's selfish little interests ; and a conviction, not merely intellectual, but as it were sensible, of the existence of an Ideal Power. In Christian saintliness this power is always personified as God ; but abstract moral ideals, civic or patriotic utopias, or inner visions of holiness or right may also be felt as the true lords and enlargers of our life, in ways which I described in the lecture on the Reality of the Unseen.¹

that in him meet all that they can imagine of goodness, truth, and beauty ; that they can see his footprints everywhere in nature, and feel his presence within them as the very life of their life, so that in proportion as they come to themselves they come to him. They tell us what separates us from him and from happiness is, first, self-seeking in all its forms ; and, secondly, sensuality in all its forms ; that these are the ways of darkness and death, which hide from us the face of God ; while the path of the just is like a shining light, which shineth more and more unto the perfect day."

¹ The 'enthusiasm of humanity' may lead to a life which coalesces in many respects with that of Christian saintliness. Take the following rules proposed to members of the Union pour l'Action morale, in the Bulletin de l'Union, April 1-15, 1894. See, also, Revue Bleue, August 13, 1892.

"We would make known in our own persons the usefulness of rule, of discipline, of resignation and renunciation ; we would teach the necessary perpetuity of suffering, and explain the creative part which it plays. We would wage war upon false optimism ; on the base hope of happiness coming to us ready made ; on the notion of a salvation by knowledge alone, or by material civilization alone, vain symbol as this is of civilization, precarious external arrangement, ill-fitted to replace the intimate union and consent of souls. We would wage war also on bad morals, whether in public or in private life ; on luxury, fastidiousness, and over-refinement ; on all that tends to increase the painful, immoral, and anti-social multiplication of our wants ; on all that excites envy and dislike in the soul of the common people, and confirms the notion that the chief end of life is freedom to enjoy. We would preach by our example the respect of superiors and equals, the respect of all men ; affectionate simplicity in our relations with inferiors and insignificant persons ; indulgence where our own claims only are concerned, but firmness in our demands where they relate to duties towards others or towards the public.

"For the common people are what we help them to become ; their vices are our vices, gazed upon, envied, and imitated ; and if they come back with all their weight upon us, it is but just.

2. A sense of the friendly continuity of the ideal power with our own life, and a willing self-surrender to its control.

3. An immense elation and freedom, as the outlines of the confining selfhood melt down.

4. A shifting of the emotional centre towards loving and harmonious affections, towards 'yes, yes,' and away from 'no,' where the claims of the non-ego are concerned.

These fundamental inner conditions have characteristic practical consequences, as follows:—

a. Asceticism.—The self-surrender may become so passionate as to turn into self-immolation. It may then so overrule the ordinary inhibitions of the flesh that the saint finds positive pleasure in sacrifice and asceticism, measuring and expressing as they do the degree of his loyalty to the higher power.

b. Strength of Soul.—The sense of enlargement of life may be so uplifting that personal motives and inhibitions, commonly omnipotent, become too insignificant for notice, and new reaches of patience and fortitude open out. Fears and anxieties go, and blissful equanimity takes their place. Come heaven, come hell, it makes no difference now!

"We forbid ourselves all seeking after popularity, all ambition to appear important. We pledge ourselves to abstain from falsehood, in all its degrees. We promise not to create or encourage illusions as to what is possible, by what we say or write. We promise to one another active sincerity, which strives to see truth clearly, and which never fears to declare what it sees.

"We promise deliberate resistance to the tidal waves of fashion, to the 'booms' and panics of the public mind, to all the forms of weakness and of fear.

"We forbid ourselves the use of sarcasm. Of serious things we will speak seriously and unsmilingly, without banter and without the appearance of banter;—and even so of all things, for there are serious ways of being light of heart.

"We will put ourselves forward always for what we are, simply and without false humility, as well as without pedantry, affectation, or pride."

c. Purity.—The shifting of the emotional centre brings with it, first, increase of purity. The sensitiveness to spiritual discords is enhanced, and the cleansing of existence from brutal and sensual elements becomes imperative. Occasions of contact with such elements are avoided: the saintly life must deepen its spiritual consistency and keep unspotted from the world. In some temperaments this need of purity of spirit takes an ascetic turn, and weaknesses of the flesh are treated with relentless severity.

d. Charity.—The shifting of the emotional centre brings, secondly, increase of charity, tenderness for fellow-creatures. The ordinary motives to antipathy, which usually set such close bounds to tenderness among human beings, are inhibited. The saint loves his enemies, and treats loathsome beggars as his brothers.

I now have to give some concrete illustrations of these fruits of the spiritual tree. The only difficulty is to choose, for they are so abundant.

Since the sense of Presence of a higher and friendly Power seems to be the fundamental feature in the spiritual life, I will begin with that.

In our narratives of conversion we saw how the world might look shining and transfigured to the convert,¹ and, apart from anything acutely religious, we all have moments when the universal life seems to wrap us round with friendliness. In youth and health, in summer, in the woods or on the mountains, there come days when the weather seems all whispering with peace, hours when the goodness and beauty of existence enfold us like a dry warm climate, or chime through us as if our inner ears were subtly ringing with the world's security. Thoreau writes:—

¹ Above, pp. 248 ff.

“Once, a few weeks after I came to the woods, for an hour I doubted whether the near neighborhood of man was not essential to a serene and healthy life. To be alone was somewhat unpleasant. But, in the midst of a gentle rain, while these thoughts prevailed, I was suddenly sensible of such sweet and beneficent society in Nature, in the very pattering of the drops, and in every sight and sound around my house, an infinite and unaccountable friendliness all at once, like an atmosphere, sustaining me, as made the fancied advantages of human neighborhood insignificant, and I have never thought of them since. Every little pine-needle expanded and swelled with sympathy and befriended me. I was so distinctly made aware of the presence of something kindred to me, that I thought no place could ever be strange to me again.”¹

In the Christian consciousness this sense of the enveloping friendliness becomes most personal and definite. “The compensation,” writes a German author, “for the loss of that sense of personal independence which man so unwillingly gives up, is the disappearance of all *fear* from one’s life, the quite indescribable and inexplicable feeling of an inner *security*, which one can only experience, but which, once it has been experienced, one can never forget.”²

I find an excellent description of this state of mind in a sermon by Mr. Voysey : —

“It is the experience of myriads of trustful souls, that this sense of God’s unfailing presence with them in their going out and in their coming in, and by night and day, is a source of absolute repose and confident calmness. It drives away all fear of what may befall them. That nearness of God is a constant security against terror and anxiety. It is not that they are at all assured of physical safety, or deem themselves protected by a love which is denied to others, but that they are in a state of mind equally ready to be safe or to meet with injury. If injury

¹ H. THOREAU : *Walden*, Riverside edition, p. 206, abridged.

² C. H. HILTY : *Glück*, vol. i. p. 85.

befall them, they will be content to bear it because the Lord is their keeper, and nothing can befall them without his will. If it be his will, then injury is for them a blessing and no calamity at all. Thus and thus only is the trustful man protected and shielded from harm. And I for one — by no means a thick-skinned or hard-nerved man — am absolutely satisfied with this arrangement, and do not wish for any other kind of immunity from danger and catastrophe. Quite as sensitive to pain as the most highly strung organism, I yet feel that the worst of it is conquered, and the sting taken out of it altogether, by the thought that God is our loving and sleepless keeper, and that nothing can hurt us without his will.”¹

More excited expressions of this condition are abundant in religious literature. I could easily weary you with their monotony. Here is an account from Mrs. Jonathan Edwards: —

“Last night,” Mrs. Edwards writes, “was the sweetest night I ever had in my life. I never before, for so long a time together, enjoyed so much of the light and rest and sweetness of heaven in my soul, but without the least agitation of body during the whole time. Part of the night I lay awake, sometimes asleep, and sometimes between sleeping and waking. But all night I continued in a constant, clear, and lively sense of the heavenly sweetness of Christ’s excellent love, of his nearness to me, and of my dearness to him; with an inexpressibly sweet calmness of soul in an entire rest in him. I seemed to myself to perceive a glow of divine love come down from the heart of Christ in heaven into my heart in a constant stream, like a stream or pencil of sweet light. At the same time my heart and soul all flowed out in love to Christ, so that there seemed to be a constant flowing and reflowing of heavenly love, and I appeared to myself to float or swim, in these bright, sweet beams, like the motes swimming in the beams of the sun, or the streams of his light which come in at the window. I think that what I felt each minute was worth more than all the outward comfort and pleasure which I had enjoyed in my whole life put

¹ The Mystery of Pain and Death, London, 1892, p. 258.

together. It was pleasure, without the least sting, or any interruption. It was a sweetness, which my soul was lost in ; it seemed to be all that my feeble frame could sustain. There was but little difference, whether I was asleep or awake, but if there was any difference, the sweetness was greatest while I was asleep.¹ As I awoke early the next morning, it seemed to me that I had entirely done with myself. I felt that the opinions of the world concerning me were nothing, and that I had no more to do with any outward interest of my own than with that of a person whom I never saw. The glory of God seemed to swallow up every wish and desire of my heart. . . . After retiring to rest and sleeping a little while, I awoke, and was led to reflect on God's mercy to me, in giving me, for many years, a willingness to die ; and after that, in making me willing to live, that I might do and suffer whatever he called me to here. I also thought how God had graciously given me an entire resignation to his will, with respect to the kind and manner of death that I should die ; having been made willing to die on the rack, or at the stake, and if it were God's will, to die in darkness. But now it occurred to me, I used to think of living no longer than to the ordinary age of man. Upon this I was led to ask myself, whether I was not willing to be kept out of heaven even longer ; and my whole heart seemed immediately to reply : Yes, a thousand years, and a thousand in horror, if it be most for the honor of God, the torment of my body being so great, awful, and overwhelming that none could bear to live in the country where the spectacle was seen, and the torment of my mind being vastly greater. And it seemed to me that I found a perfect willingness, quietness, and alacrity of soul in

¹ Compare Madame Guyon : " It was my practice to arise at midnight for purposes of devotion. . . . It seemed to me that God came at the precise time and woke me from sleep in order that I might enjoy him. When I was out of health or greatly fatigued, he did not awake me, but at such times I felt, even in my sleep, a singular possession of God. He loved me so much that he seemed to pervade my being, at a time when I could be only imperfectly conscious of his presence. My sleep is sometimes broken, — a sort of half sleep ; but my soul seems to be awake enough to know God, when it is hardly capable of knowing anything else." T. C. UPHAM : *The Life and Religious Experiences of Madame de la Mothe Guyon*, New York, 1877, vol. i. p. 260.

consenting that it should be so, if it were most for the glory of God, so that there was no hesitation, doubt, or darkness in my mind. The glory of God seemed to overcome me and swallow me up, and every conceivable suffering, and everything that was terrible to my nature, seemed to shrink to nothing before it. This resignation continued in its clearness and brightness the rest of the night, and all the next day, and the night following, and on Monday in the forenoon, without interruption or abatement.”¹

The annals of Catholic saintship abound in records as ecstatic or more ecstatic than this. “Often the assaults of the divine love,” it is said of the Sister Séraphique de la Martinière, “reduced her almost to the point of death. She used tenderly to complain of this to God. ‘I cannot support it,’ she used to say. ‘Bear gently with my weakness, or I shall expire under the violence of your love.’”²

Let me pass next to the Charity and Brotherly Love which are a usual fruit of saintliness, and have always been reckoned essential theological virtues, however limited may have been the kinds of service which the particular theology enjoined. Brotherly love would follow logically from the assurance of God’s friendly presence, the notion of our brotherhood as men being an immediate inference from that of God’s fatherhood of us all. When Christ utters the precepts: “Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you,” he gives for a reason: “That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.” One might therefore

¹ I have considerably abridged the words of the original, which is given in EDWARDS’S Narrative of the Revival in New England.

² BOUGAUD: *Hist. de la Bienheureuse Marguerite Marie*, 1894, p. 125.

be tempted to explain both the humility as to one's self and the charity towards others which characterize spiritual excitement, as results of the all-leveling character of *agnostic* belief. But these affections are certainly not mere derivatives of theism. We find them in Stoicism, in Hinduism, and in Buddhism in the highest possible degree. They *harmonize* with paternal theism beautifully; but they harmonize with all reflection whatever upon the dependence of mankind on general causes; and we must, I think, consider them not subordinate but coördinate parts of that great complex excitement in the study of which we are engaged. Religious rapture, moral enthusiasm, ontological wonder, cosmic emotion, are all unifying states of mind, in which the sand and grit of the selfhood incline to disappear, and tenderness to rule. The best thing is to describe the condition integrally as a characteristic affection to which our nature is liable, a region in which we find ourselves at home, a sea in which we swim; but not to pretend to explain its parts by deriving them too cleverly from one another. Like love or fear, the faith-state is a natural psychic complex, and carries charity with it by organic consequence. Jubilation is an expansive affection, and all expansive affections are self-forgetful and kindly so long as they endure.

We find this the case even when they are pathological in origin. In his instructive work, *la Tristesse et la Joie*,¹ M. Georges Dumas compares together the melancholy and the joyous phase of circular insanity, and shows that, while selfishness characterizes the one, the other is marked by altruistic impulses. No human being so stingy and useless as was Marie in her melancholy period! But the moment the happy period begins, "sympathy and kindness become her characteristic sentiments. She displays

¹ Paris, 1900.

a universal goodwill, not only of intention, but in act. . . . She becomes solicitous of the health of other patients, interested in getting them out, desirous to procure wool to knit socks for some of them. Never since she has been under my observation have I heard her in her joyous period utter any but charitable opinions.”¹ And later, Dr. Dumas says of all such joyous conditions that “unselfish sentiments and tender emotions are the only affective states to be found in them. The subject’s mind is closed against envy, hatred, and vindictiveness, and wholly transformed into benevolence, indulgence, and mercy.”²

There is thus an organic affinity between joyousness and tenderness, and their companionship in the saintly life need in no way occasion surprise. Along with the happiness, this increase of tenderness is often noted in narratives of conversion. “I began to work for others”; — “I had more tender feeling for my family and friends”; — “I spoke at once to a person with whom I had been angry”; — “I felt for every one, and loved my friends better”; — “I felt every one to be my friend”; — these are so many expressions from the records collected by Professor Starbuck.³

“When,” says Mrs. Edwards, continuing the narrative from which I made quotation a moment ago, “I arose on the morning of the Sabbath, I felt a love to all mankind, wholly peculiar in its strength and sweetness, far beyond all that I had ever felt before. The power of that love seemed inexpressible. I thought, if I were surrounded by enemies, who were venting their malice and cruelty upon me, in tormenting me, it would still be impossible that I should cherish any feelings towards them but those of love, and pity, and ardent desires for their happiness. I never before felt so far from a disposition to judge and censure others, as I did that morning. I realized also, in

¹ Page 130.² Page 167.³ Op. cit., p. 127.

an unusual and very lively manner, how great a part of Christianity lies in the performance of our social and relative duties to one another. The same joyful sense continued throughout the day — a sweet love to God and all mankind.”

Whatever be the explanation of the charity, it may efface all usual human barriers.¹

Here, for instance, is an example of Christian non-resistance from Richard Weaver’s autobiography. Weaver was a collier, a semi-professional pugilist in his younger days, who became a much beloved evangelist. Fighting, after drinking, seems to have been the sin to which he originally felt his flesh most perversely inclined. After his first conversion he had a backsliding, which consisted in pounding a man who had insulted a girl. Feeling that, having once fallen, he might as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb, he got drunk and went and broke the jaw of another man who had lately challenged him to fight and taunted him with cowardice for refusing as a Christian man; — I mention these incidents to show how genuine a change of heart is implied in the later conduct which he describes as follows: —

¹ The barrier between men and animals also. We read of Towianski, an eminent Polish patriot and mystic, that “one day one of his friends met him in the rain, caressing a big dog which was jumping upon him and covering him horribly with mud. On being asked why he permitted the animal thus to dirty his clothes, Towianski replied: ‘This dog, whom I am now meeting for the first time, has shown a great fellow-feeling for me, and a great joy in my recognition and acceptance of his greetings. Were I to drive him off, I should wound his feelings and do him a moral injury. It would be an offense not only to him, but to all the spirits of the other world who are on the same level with him. The damage which he does to my coat is as nothing in comparison with the wrong which I should inflict upon him, in case I were to remain indifferent to the manifestations of his friendship. We ought,’ he added, ‘both to lighten the condition of animals, whenever we can, and at the same time to facilitate in ourselves that union of the world of all spirits, which the sacrifice of Christ has made possible.’” André Towianski, *Traduction de l’Italien*, Turin, 1897 (privately printed). I owe my knowledge of this book and of Towianski to my friend Professor W. Lutoslawski, author of ‘*Plato’s Logic*.’

"I went down the drift and found the boy crying because a fellow-workman was trying to take the wagon from him by force. I said to him : —

" 'Tom, you must n't take that wagon.'

"He swore at me, and called me a Methodist devil. I told him that God did not tell me to let him rob me. He cursed again, and said he would push the wagon over me.

" 'Well,' I said, 'let us see whether the devil and thee are stronger than the Lord and me.'

"And the Lord and I proving stronger than the devil and he, he had to get out of the way, or the wagon would have gone over him. So I gave the wagon to the boy. Then said Tom : —

" 'I've a good mind to smack thee on the face.'

" 'Well,' I said, 'if that will do thee any good, thou canst do it.' So he struck me on the face.

"I turned the other cheek to him, and said, 'Strike again.'

"He struck again and again, till he had struck me five times. I turned my cheek for the sixth stroke ; but he turned away cursing. I shouted after him : 'The Lord forgive thee, for I do, and the Lord save thee.'

"This was on a Saturday ; and when I went home from the coal-pit my wife saw my face was swollen, and asked what was the matter with it. I said : 'I've been fighting, and I've given a man a good thrashing.'

"She burst out weeping, and said, 'O Richard, what made you fight?' Then I told her all about it ; and she thanked the Lord I had not struck back.

"But the Lord had struck, and his blows have more effect than man's. Monday came. The devil began to tempt me, saying : 'The other men will laugh at thee for allowing Tom to treat thee as he did on Saturday.' I cried, 'Get thee behind me, Satan ;' — and went on my way to the coal-pit.

"Tom was the first man I saw. I said 'Good-morning,' but got no reply.

"He went down first. When I got down, I was surprised to see him sitting on the wagon-road waiting for me. When I came to him he burst into tears and said : 'Richard, will you forgive me for striking you?'

“‘I have forgiven thee,’ said I; ‘ask God to forgive thee. The Lord bless thee.’ I gave him my hand, and we went each to his work.”¹

‘Love your enemies!’ Mark you, not simply those who happen not to be your friends, but your *enemies*, your positive and active enemies. Either this is a mere Oriental hyperbole, a bit of verbal extravagance, meaning only that we should, as far as we can, abate our animosities, or else it is sincere and literal. Outside of certain cases of intimate individual relation, it seldom has been taken literally. Yet it makes one ask the question: Can there in general be a level of emotion so unifying, so obliterative of differences between man and man, that even enmity may come to be an irrelevant circumstance and fail to inhibit the friendlier interests aroused? If positive well-wishing could attain so supreme a degree of excitement, those who were swayed by it might well seem superhuman beings. Their life would be morally discrete from the life of other men, and there is no saying, in the absence of positive experience of an authentic kind, — for there are few active examples in our scriptures, and the Buddhist examples are legendary,² — what the effects might be: they might conceivably transform the world.

Psychologically and in principle, the precept ‘Love your enemies’ is not self-contradictory. It is merely the extreme limit of a kind of magnanimity with which, in the shape of pitying tolerance of our oppressors, we are fairly familiar. Yet if radically followed, it would involve such a breach with our instinctive springs of action as a whole, and with the present world’s arrangements,

¹ J. PATTERSON’S *Life of Richard Weaver*, pp. 66–68, abridged.

² As where the future Buddha, incarnated as a hare, jumps into the fire to cook himself for a meal for a beggar — having previously shaken himself three times, so that none of the insects in his fur should perish with him.

that a critical point would practically be passed, and we should be born into another kingdom of being. Religious emotion makes us feel that other kingdom to be close at hand, within our reach.

The inhibition of instinctive repugnance is proved not only by the showing of love to enemies, but by the showing of it to any one who is personally loathsome. In the annals of saintliness we find a curious mixture of motives impelling in this direction. Asceticism plays its part; and along with charity pure and simple, we find humility or the desire to disclaim distinction and to grovel on the common level before God. Certainly all three principles were at work when Francis of Assisi and Ignatius Loyola exchanged their garments with those of filthy beggars. All three are at work when religious persons consecrate their lives to the care of leprosy or other peculiarly unpleasant diseases. The nursing of the sick is a function to which the religious seem strongly drawn, even apart from the fact that church traditions set that way. But in the annals of this sort of charity we find fantastic excesses of devotion recorded which are only explicable by the frenzy of self-immolation simultaneously aroused. Francis of Assisi kisses his lepers; Margaret Mary Alacoque, Francis Xavier, St. John of God, and others are said to have cleansed the sores and ulcers of their patients with their respective tongues; and the lives of such saints as Elizabeth of Hungary and Madame de Chantal are full of a sort of reveling in hospital purulence, disagreeable to read of, and which makes us admire and shudder at the same time.

So much for the human love aroused by the faith-state. Let me next speak of the Equanimity, Resignation, Fortitude, and Patience which it brings.

‘A paradise of inward tranquillity’ seems to be faith’s usual result; and it is easy, even without being religious one’s self, to understand this. A moment back, in treating of the sense of God’s presence, I spoke of the unaccountable feeling of safety which one may then have. And, indeed, how can it possibly fail to steady the nerves, to cool the fever, and appease the fret, if one be sensibly conscious that, no matter what one’s difficulties for the moment may appear to be, one’s life as a whole is in the keeping of a power whom one can absolutely trust? In deeply religious men the abandonment of self to this power is passionate. Whoever not only says, but *feels*, ‘God’s will be done,’ is mailed against every weakness; and the whole historic array of martyrs, missionaries, and religious reformers is there to prove the tranquil-mindedness, under naturally agitating or distressing circumstances, which self-surrender brings.

The temper of the tranquil-mindedness differs, of course, according as the person is of a constitutionally sombre or of a constitutionally cheerful cast of mind. In the sombre it partakes more of resignation and submission; in the cheerful it is a joyous consent. As an example of the former temper, I quote part of a letter from Professor Lagneau, a venerated teacher of philosophy who lately died, a great invalid, at Paris:—

“My life, for the success of which you send good wishes, will be what it is able to be. I ask nothing from it, I expect nothing from it. For long years now I exist, think, and act, and am worth what I am worth, only through the despair which is my sole strength and my sole foundation. May it preserve for me, even in these last trials to which I am coming, the courage to do without the desire of deliverance. I ask nothing more from the Source whence all strength cometh, and if that is granted, your wishes will have been accomplished.”¹

¹ Bulletin de l’Union pour l’Action Morale, September, 1894.

There is something pathetic and fatalistic about this, but the power of such a tone as a protection against outward shocks is manifest. Pascal is another Frenchman of pessimistic natural temperament. He expresses still more amply the temper of self-surrendering submissiveness : —

“ Deliver me, Lord,” he writes in his prayers, “ from the sadness at my proper suffering which self-love might give, but put into me a sadness like your own. Let my sufferings appease your choler. Make them an occasion for my conversion and salvation. I ask you neither for health nor for sickness, for life nor for death ; but that you may dispose of my health and my sickness, my life and my death, for your glory, for my salvation, and for the use of the Church and of your saints, of whom I would by your grace be one. You alone know what is expedient for me ; you are the sovereign master ; do with me according to your will. Give to me, or take away from me, only conform my will to yours. I know but one thing, Lord, that it is good to follow you, and bad to offend you. Apart from that, I know not what is good or bad in anything. I know not which is most profitable to me, health or sickness, wealth or poverty, nor anything else in the world. That discernment is beyond the power of men or angels, and is hidden among the secrets of your Providence, which I adore, but do not seek to fathom.”¹

When we reach more optimistic temperaments, the resignation grows less passive. Examples are sown so broadcast throughout history that I might well pass on without citation. As it is, I snatch at the first that occurs to my mind. Madame Guyon, a frail creature physically, was yet of a happy native disposition. She went through many perils with admirable serenity of soul. After being sent to prison for heresy, —

“ Some of my friends,” she writes, “ wept bitterly at the hearing of it, but such was my state of acquiescence and resig-

¹ B. PASCAL : *Prières pour les Maladies*, §§ xiii., xiv., abridged.

nation that it failed to draw any tears from me. . . . There appeared to be in me then, as I find it to be in me now, such an entire loss of what regards myself, that any of my own interests gave me little pain or pleasure; ever wanting to will or wish for myself only the very thing which God does." In another place she writes: "We all of us came near perishing in a river which we found it necessary to pass. The carriage sank in the quicksand. Others who were with us threw themselves out in excessive fright. But I found my thoughts so much taken up with God that I had no distinct sense of danger. It is true that the thought of being drowned passed across my mind, but it cost no other sensation or reflection in me than this — that I felt quite contented and willing it were so, if it were my heavenly Father's choice." Sailing from Nice to Genoa, a storm keeps her eleven days at sea. "As the irritated waves dashed round us," she writes, "I could not help experiencing a certain degree of satisfaction in my mind. I pleased myself with thinking that those mutinous billows, under the command of Him who does all things rightly, might probably furnish me with a watery grave. Perhaps I carried the point too far, in the pleasure which I took in thus seeing myself beaten and bandied by the swelling waters. Those who were with me took notice of my intrepidity." ¹

The contempt of danger which religious enthusiasm produces may be even more buoyant still. I take an example from that charming recent autobiography, "With Christ at Sea," by Frank Bullen. A couple of days after he went through the conversion on shipboard of which he there gives an account, —

"It was blowing stiffly," he writes, "and we were carrying a press of canvas to get north out of the bad weather. Shortly after four bells we hauled down the flying-jib, and I sprang out astride the boom to furl it. I was sitting astride the boom when suddenly it gave way with me. The sail slipped through my fingers, and I fell backwards, hanging head downwards

¹ From THOMAS C. UPHAM's *Life and Religious Opinions and Experiences of Madame de la Mothe Guyon*, New York, 1877, ii. 48, i. 141, 413, abridged.

over the seething tumult of shining foam under the ship's bows, suspended by one foot. But I felt only high exultation in my certainty of eternal life. Although death was divided from me by a hair's breadth, and I was acutely conscious of the fact, it gave me no sensation but joy. I suppose I could have hung there no longer than five seconds, but in that time I lived a whole age of delight. But my body asserted itself, and with a desperate gymnastic effort I regained the boom. How I furled the sail I don't know, but I sang at the utmost pitch of my voice praises to God that went pealing out over the dark waste of waters."¹

The annals of martyrdom are of course the signal field of triumph for religious imperturbability. Let me cite as an example the statement of a humble sufferer, persecuted as a Huguenot under Louis XIV. : —

"They shut all the doors," Blanche Gamond writes, "and I saw six women, each with a bunch of willow rods as thick as the hand could hold, and a yard long. He gave me the order, 'Undress yourself,' which I did. He said, 'You are leaving on your shift; you must take it off.' They had so little patience that they took it off themselves, and I was naked from the waist up. They brought a cord with which they tied me to a beam in the kitchen. They drew the cord tight with all their strength and asked me, 'Does it hurt you?' and then they discharged their fury upon me, exclaiming as they struck me, 'Pray now to your God.' It was the Roulette woman who held this language. But at this moment I received the greatest consolation that I can ever receive in my life, since I had the honor of being whipped for the name of Christ, and in addition of being crowned with his mercy and his consolations. Why can I not write down the inconceivable influences, consolations, and peace which I felt interiorly? To understand them one must have passed by the same trial; they were so great that I was ravished, for there where afflictions abound grace is given superabundantly. In vain the women cried, 'We must double our blows; she does not feel them, for she neither speaks nor

¹ *Op. cit.*, London, 1901, p. 130.

cries.' And how should I have cried, since I was swooning with happiness within?"¹

The transition from tenseness, self-responsibility, and worry, to equanimity, receptivity, and peace, is the most wonderful of all those shiftings of inner equilibrium, those changes of the personal centre of energy, which I have analyzed so often; and the chief wonder of it is that it so often comes about, not by doing, but by simply relaxing and throwing the burden down. This abandonment of self-responsibility seems to be the fundamental act in specifically religious, as distinguished from moral practice. It antedates theologies and is independent of philosophies. Mind-cure, theosophy, stoicism, ordinary neurological hygiene, insist on it as emphatically as Christianity does, and it is capable of entering into closest marriage with every speculative creed.² Christians who have it strongly live in what is called 'recollection,' and are never anxious about the future, nor worry over the outcome of the day. Of Saint Catharine of Genoa it is said that "she took cognizance of things, only as they were presented to her in succession, *moment by moment*." To her holy soul, "the divine moment was the present moment, . . . and when the present moment was estimated in itself and in its relations, and when the duty that was involved in it was accomplished, it was permitted to pass away as if it had never been, and to give way to the facts and duties of the moment which came after."³

¹ CLAPARÈDE et GOTY : Deux Héroïnes de la Foi, Paris, 1880, p. 112.

² Compare these three different statements of it : A. P. CALL : *As a Matter of Course*, Boston, 1894 ; H. W. DRESSER : *Living by the Spirit*, New York and London, 1900 ; H. W. SMITH : *The Christian's Secret of a Happy Life*, published by the Willard Tract Repository, and now in thousands of hands.

³ T. C. UPHAM : *Life of Madame Catharine Adorna*, 3d ed., New York, 1864, pp. 158, 172-174.

Hinduism, mind-cure, and theosophy all lay great emphasis upon this concentration of the consciousness upon the moment at hand.

The next religious symptom which I will note is what I have called Purity of Life. The saintly person becomes exceedingly sensitive to inner inconsistency or discord, and mixture and confusion grow intolerable. All the mind's objects and occupations must be ordered with reference to the special spiritual excitement which is now its keynote. Whatever is unspiritual taints the pure water of the soul and is repugnant. Mixed with this exaltation of the moral sensibilities there is also an ardor of sacrifice, for the beloved deity's sake, of everything unworthy of him. Sometimes the spiritual ardor is so sovereign that purity is achieved at a stroke — we have seen examples. Usually it is a more gradual conquest. Billy Bray's account of his abandonment of tobacco is a good example of the latter form of achievement.

"I had been a smoker as well as a drunkard, and I used to love my tobacco as much as I loved my meat, and I would rather go down into the mine without my dinner than without my pipe. In the days of old, the Lord spoke by the mouths of his servants, the prophets; now he speaks to us by the spirit of his Son. I had not only the feeling part of religion, but I could hear the small, still voice within speaking to me. When I took the pipe to smoke, it would be applied within, 'It is an idol, a lust; worship the Lord with clean lips.' So, I felt it was not right to smoke. The Lord also sent a woman to convince me. I was one day in a house, and I took out my pipe to light it at the fire, and Mary Hawke — for that was the woman's name — said, 'Do you not feel it is wrong to smoke?' I said that I felt something inside telling me that it was an idol, a lust, and she said that was the Lord. Then I said, 'Now, I must give it up, for the Lord is telling me of it inside, and the woman outside,

so the tobacco must go, love it as I may.' There and then I took the tobacco out of my pocket, and threw it into the fire, and put the pipe under my foot, 'ashes to ashes, dust to dust.' And I have not smoked since. I found it hard to break off old habits, but I cried to the Lord for help, and he gave me strength, for he has said, 'Call upon me in the day of trouble, and I will deliver thee.' The day after I gave up smoking I had the toothache so bad that I did not know what to do. I thought this was owing to giving up the pipe, but I said I would never smoke again, if I lost every tooth in my head. I said, 'Lord, thou hast told us My yoke is easy and my burden is light,' and when I said that, all the pain left me. Sometimes the thought of the pipe would come back to me very strong; but the Lord strengthened me against the habit, and, bless his name, I have not smoked since."

Bray's biographer writes that after he had given up smoking, he thought that he would chew a little, but he conquered this dirty habit, too. "On one occasion," Bray said, "when at a prayer-meeting at Hicks Mill, I heard the Lord say to me, 'Worship me with clean lips.' So, when we got up from our knees, I took the quid out of my mouth and 'whipped 'en' [threw it] under the form. But, when we got on our knees again, I put another quid into my mouth. Then the Lord said to me again, 'Worship me with clean lips.' So I took the quid out of my mouth, and whipped 'en under the form again, and said, 'Yes, Lord, I will.' From that time I gave up chewing as well as smoking, and have been a free man."

The ascetic forms which the impulse for veracity and purity of life may take are often pathetic enough. The early Quakers, for example, had hard battles to wage against the worldliness and insincerity of the ecclesiastical Christianity of their time. Yet the battle that cost them most wounds was probably that which they fought in defense of their own right to social veracity and sincerity in their thee-ing and thou-ing, in not doffing the hat or giving titles of respect. It was laid on George Fox

that these conventional customs were a lie and a sham, and the whole body of his followers thereupon renounced them, as a sacrifice to truth, and so that their acts and the spirit they professed might be more in accord.

“When the Lord sent me into the world,” says Fox in his Journal, “he forbade me to put off my hat to any, high or low : and I was required to ‘thee’ and ‘thou’ all men and women, without any respect to rich or poor, great or small. And as I traveled up and down, I was not to bid people Good-morning, or Good-evening, neither might I bow or scrape with my leg to any one. This made the sects and professions rage. Oh ! the rage that was in the priests, magistrates, professors, and people of all sorts : and especially in priests and professors : for though ‘thou’ to a single person was according to their accidence and grammar rules, and according to the Bible, yet they could not bear to hear it : and because I could not put off my hat to them, it set them all into a rage. . . . Oh ! the scorn, heat, and fury that arose ! Oh ! the blows, punchings, beatings, and imprisonments that we underwent for not putting off our hats to men ! Some had their hats violently plucked off and thrown away, so that they quite lost them. The bad language and evil usage we received on this account is hard to be expressed, besides the danger we were sometimes in of losing our lives for this matter, and that by the great professors of Christianity, who thereby discovered they were not true believers. And though it was but a small thing in the eye of man, yet a wonderful confusion it brought among all professors and priests : but, blessed be the Lord, many came to see the vanity of that custom of putting off hats to men, and felt the weight of Truth’s testimony against it.”

In the autobiography of Thomas Elwood, an early Quaker, who at one time was secretary to John Milton, we find an exquisitely quaint and candid account of the trials he underwent both at home and abroad, in following Fox’s canons of sincerity. The anecdotes are too lengthy for citation ; but Elwood sets down his manner of feeling

about these things in a shorter passage, which I will quote as a characteristic utterance of spiritual sensibility : —

“By this divine light, then,” says Elwood, “I saw that though I had not the evil of the common uncleanness, debauchery, profaneness, and pollutions of the world to put away, because I had, through the great goodness of God and a civil education, been preserved out of those grosser evils, yet I had many other evils to put away and to cease from ; some of which were not by the world, which lies in wickedness (1 John v. 19), accounted evils, but by the light of Christ were made manifest to me to be evils, and as such condemned in me.

“As particularly those fruits and effects of pride that discover themselves in the vanity and superfluity of apparel ; which I took too much delight in. This evil of my doings I was required to put away and cease from ; and judgment lay upon me till I did so.

“I took off from my apparel those unnecessary trimmings of lace, ribbons, and useless buttons, which had no real service, but were set on only for that which was by mistake called ornament ; and I ceased to wear rings. -

“Again, the giving of flattering titles to men between whom and me there was not any relation to which such titles could be pretended to belong. This was an evil I had been much addicted to, and was accounted a ready artist in ; therefore this evil also was I required to put away and cease from. So that thenceforward I durst not say, Sir, Master, My Lord, Madam (or My Dame) ; or say Your Servant to any one to whom I did not stand in the real relation of a servant, which I had never done to any.

“Again, respect of persons, in uncovering the head and bowing the knee or body in salutation, was a practice I had been much in the use of ; and this, being one of the vain customs of the world, introduced by the spirit of the world, instead of the true honor which this is a false representation of, and used in deceit as a token of respect by persons one to another, who bear no real respect one to another ; and besides this, being a

type and a proper emblem of that divine honor which all ought to pay to Almighty God, and which all of all sorts, who take upon them the Christian name, appear in when they offer their prayers to him, and therefore should not be given to men; — I found this to be one of those evils which I had been too long doing; therefore I was now required to put it away and cease from it.

“Again, the corrupt and unsound form of speaking in the plural number to a single person, *you* to one, instead of *thou*, contrary to the pure, plain, and single language of truth, *thou* to one, and *you* to more than one, which had always been used by God to men, and men to God, as well as one to another, from the oldest record of time till corrupt men, for corrupt ends, in later and corrupt times, to flatter, fawn, and work upon the corrupt nature in men, brought in that false and senseless way of speaking *you* to one, which has since corrupted the modern languages, and hath greatly debased the spirits and depraved the manners of men; — this evil custom I had been as forward in as others, and this I was now called out of and required to cease from.

“These and many more evil customs which had sprung up in the night of darkness and general apostasy from the truth and true religion were now, by the inshining of this pure ray of divine light in my conscience, gradually discovered to me to be what I ought to cease from, shun, and stand a witness against.”¹

These early Quakers were Puritans indeed. The slightest inconsistency between profession and deed jarred some of them to active protest. John Woolman writes in his diary: —

“In these journeys I have been where much cloth hath been dyed; and have at sundry times walked over ground where much of their dyestuffs has drained away. This hath produced a longing in my mind that people might come into cleanness of spirit, cleanness of person, and cleanness about their houses

¹ The History of THOMAS ELWOOD, written by Himself, London, 1885, pp. 32–34.

and garments. Dyes being invented partly to please the eye, and partly to hide dirt, I have felt in this weak state, when traveling in dirtiness, and affected with unwholesome scents, a strong desire that the nature of dyeing cloth to hide dirt may be more fully considered.

“Washing our garments to keep them sweet is cleanly, but it is the opposite to real cleanliness to hide dirt in them. Through giving way to hiding dirt in our garments a spirit which would conceal that which is disagreeable is strengthened. Real cleanliness becometh a holy people; but hiding that which is not clean by coloring our garments seems contrary to the sweetness of sincerity. Through some sorts of dyes cloth is rendered less useful. And if the value of dyestuffs, and expense of dyeing, and the damage done to cloth, were all added together, and that cost applied to keeping all sweet and clean, how much more would real cleanliness prevail.

“Thinking often on these things, the use of hats and garments dyed with a dye hurtful to them, and wearing more clothes in summer than are useful, grew more uneasy to me; believing them to be customs which have not their foundation in pure wisdom. The apprehension of being singular from my beloved friends was a strait upon me; and thus I continued in the use of some things, contrary to my judgment, about nine months. Then I thought of getting a hat the natural color of the fur, but the apprehension of being looked upon as one affecting singularity felt uneasy to me. On this account I was under close exercise of mind in the time of our general spring meeting in 1762, greatly desiring to be rightly directed; when, being deeply bowed in spirit before the Lord, I was made willing to submit to what I apprehended was required of me; and when I returned home, got a hat of the natural color of the fur.

“In attending meetings, this singularity was a trial to me, and more especially at this time, as white hats were used by some who were fond of following the changeable modes of dress, and as some friends, who knew not from what motives I wore it, grew shy of me, I felt my way for a time shut up in the exercise of the ministry. Some friends were apprehensive that my wearing such a hat savored of an affected singularity:

those who spoke with me in a friendly way, I generally informed in a few words, that I believed my wearing it was not in my own will."

When the craving for moral consistency and purity is developed to this degree, the subject may well find the outer world too full of shocks to dwell in, and can unify his life and keep his soul unspotted only by withdrawing from it. That law which impels the artist to achieve harmony in his composition by simply dropping out whatever jars, or suggests a discord, rules also in the spiritual life. To omit, says Stevenson, is the one art in literature: "If I knew how to omit, I should ask no other knowledge." And life, when full of disorder and slackness and vague superfluity, can no more have what we call character than literature can have it under similar conditions. So monasteries and communities of sympathetic devotees open their doors, and in their changeless order, characterized by omissions quite as much as constituted of actions, the holy-minded person finds that inner smoothness and cleanness which it is torture to him to feel violated at every turn by the discordancy and brutality of secular existence.

That the scrupulosity of purity may be carried to a fantastic extreme must be admitted. In this it resembles Asceticism, to which further symptom of saintliness we had better turn next. The adjective 'ascetic' is applied to conduct originating on diverse psychological levels, which I might as well begin by distinguishing from one another.

1. Asceticism may be a mere expression of organic hardihood, disgusted with too much ease.
2. Temperance in meat and drink, simplicity of ap

parel, chastity, and non-pampering of the body generally, may be fruits of the love of purity, shocked by whatever savors of the sensual.

3. They may also be fruits of love, that is, they may appeal to the subject in the light of sacrifices which he is happy in making to the Deity whom he acknowledges.

4. Again, ascetic mortifications and torments may be due to pessimistic feelings about the self, combined with theological beliefs concerning expiation. The devotee may feel that he is buying himself free, or escaping worse sufferings hereafter, by doing penance now.

5. In psychopathic persons, mortifications may be entered on irrationally, by a sort of obsession or fixed idea which comes as a challenge and must be worked off, because only thus does the subject get his interior consciousness feeling right again.

6. Finally, ascetic exercises may in rarer instances be prompted by genuine perversions of the bodily sensibility, in consequence of which normally pain-giving stimuli are actually felt as pleasures.

I will try to give an instance under each of these heads in turn; but it is not easy to get them pure, for in cases pronounced enough to be immediately classed as ascetic, several of the assigned motives usually work together. Moreover, before citing any examples at all, I must invite you to some general psychological considerations which apply to all of them alike.

A strange moral transformation has within the past century swept over our Western world. We no longer think that we are called on to face physical pain with equanimity. It is not expected of a man that he should either endure it or inflict much of it, and to listen to the recital of cases of it makes our flesh creep morally as well as physically. The way in which our ancestors

looked upon pain as an eternal ingredient of the world's order, and both caused and suffered it as a matter-of-course portion of their day's work, fills us with amazement. We wonder that any human beings could have been so callous. The result of this historic alteration is that even in the Mother Church herself, where ascetic discipline has such a fixed traditional prestige as a factor of merit, it has largely come into desuetude, if not discredit. A believer who flagellates or 'macerates' himself to-day arouses more wonder and fear than emulation. Many Catholic writers who admit that the times have changed in this respect do so resignedly; and even add that perhaps it is as well not to waste feelings in regretting the matter, for to return to the heroic corporeal discipline of ancient days might be an extravagance.

Where to seek the easy and the pleasant seems instinctive — and instinctive it appears to be in man; any deliberate tendency to pursue the hard and painful as such and for their own sakes might well strike one as purely abnormal. Nevertheless, in moderate degrees it is natural and even usual to human nature to court the arduous. It is only the extreme manifestations of the tendency that can be regarded as a paradox.

The psychological reasons for this lie near the surface. When we drop abstractions and take what we call our will in the act, we see that it is a very complex function. It involves both stimulations and inhibitions; it follows generalized habits; it is escorted by reflective criticisms; and it leaves a good or a bad taste of itself behind, according to the manner of the performance. The result is that, quite apart from the immediate pleasure which any sensible experience may give us, our own general moral attitude in procuring or undergoing the experience brings with it a secondary satisfaction or distaste. Some

men and women, indeed, there are who can live on smiles and the word 'yes' forever. But for others (indeed for most), this is too tepid and relaxed a moral climate. Passive happiness is slack and insipid, and soon grows mawkish and intolerable. Some austerity and wintry negativity, some roughness, danger, stringency, and effort, some 'no! no!' must be mixed in, to produce the sense of an existence with character and texture and power. The range of individual differences in this respect is enormous; but whatever the mixture of yeses and noes may be, the person is infallibly aware when he has struck it in the right proportion *for him*. This, he feels, is my proper vocation, this is the *optimum*, the law, the life for me to live. Here I find the degree of equilibrium, safety, calm, and leisure which I need, or here I find the challenge, passion, fight, and hardship without which my soul's energy expires.

Every individual soul, in short, like every individual machine or organism, has its own best conditions of efficiency. A given machine will run best under a certain steam-pressure, a certain amperage; an organism under a certain diet, weight, or exercise. You seem to do best, I heard a doctor say to a patient, at about 140 millimeters of arterial tension. And it is just so with our sundry souls: some are happiest in calm weather; some need the sense of tension, of strong volition, to make them feel alive and well. For these latter souls, whatever is gained from day to day must be paid for by sacrifice and inhibition, or else it comes too cheap and has no zest.

Now when characters of this latter sort become religious, they are apt to turn the edge of their need of effort and negativity against their natural self; and the ascetic life gets evolved as a consequence.

When Professor Tyndall in one of his lectures tells us

that Thomas Carlyle put him into his bath-tub every morning of a freezing Berlin winter, he proclaimed one of the lowest grades of asceticism. Even without Carlyle, most of us find it necessary to our soul's health to start the day with a rather cool immersion. A little farther along the scale we get such statements as this, from one of my correspondents, an agnostic : —

“Often at night in my warm bed I would feel ashamed to depend so on the warmth, and whenever the thought would come over me I would have to get up, no matter what time of night it was, and stand for a minute in the cold, just so as to prove my manhood.”

Such cases as these belong simply to our head 1. In the next case we probably have a mixture of heads 2 and 3 — the asceticism becomes far more systematic and pronounced. The writer is a Protestant, whose sense of moral energy could doubtless be gratified on no lower terms, and I take his case from Starbuck's manuscript collection.

“I practiced fasting and mortification of the flesh. I secretly made burlap shirts, and put the burrs next the skin, and wore pebbles in my shoes. I would spend nights flat on my back on the floor without any covering.”

The Roman Church has organized and codified all this sort of thing, and given it a market-value in the shape of ‘merit.’ But we see the cultivation of hardship cropping out under every sky and in every faith, as a spontaneous need of character. Thus we read of Channing, when first settled as a Unitarian minister, that —

“He was now more simple than ever, and seemed to have become incapable of any form of self-indulgence. He took the smallest room in the house for his study, though he might easily have commanded one more light, airy, and in every way more suitable ; and chose for his sleeping chamber an attic which he

shared with a younger brother. The furniture of the latter might have answered for the cell of an anchorite, and consisted of a hard mattress on a cot-bedstead, plain wooden chairs and table, with matting on the floor. It was without fire, and to cold he was throughout life extremely sensitive; but he never complained or appeared in any way to be conscious of inconvenience. 'I recollect,' says his brother, 'after one most severe night, that in the morning he sportively thus alluded to his suffering: "If my bed were my country, I should be somewhat like Bonaparte: I have no control except over the part which I occupy; the instant I move, frost takes possession."' In sickness only would he change for the time his apartment and accept a few comforts. The dress too that he habitually adopted was of most inferior quality; and garments were constantly worn which the world would call mean, though an almost feminine neatness preserved him from the least appearance of neglect."¹

Channing's asceticism, such as it was, was evidently a compound of hardihood and love of purity. The democracy which is an offshoot of the enthusiasm of humanity, and of which I will speak later under the head of the cult of poverty, doubtless bore also a share. Certainly there was no pessimistic element in his case. In the next case we have a strongly pessimistic element, so that it belongs under head 4. John Cennick was Methodism's first lay preacher. In 1735 he was convicted of sin, while walking in Cheapside, —

"And at once left off song-singing, card-playing, and attending theatres. Sometimes he wished to go to a popish monastery, to spend his life in devout retirement. At other times he longed to live in a cave, sleeping on fallen leaves, and feeding on forest fruits. He fasted long and often, and prayed nine times a day. . . . Fancying dry bread too great an indulgence for so great a sinner as himself, he began to feed on potatoes, acorns, crabs, and grass; and often wished that he could live on roots

¹ Memoirs of W. E. Channing, Boston, 1840, i. 196.

and herbs. At length, in 1737, he found peace with God, and went on his way rejoicing.”¹

In this poor man we have morbid melancholy and fear, and the sacrifices made are to purge out sin, and to buy safety. The hopelessness of Christian theology in respect of the flesh and the natural man generally has, in systematizing fear, made of it one tremendous incentive to self-mortification. It would be quite unfair, however, in spite of the fact that this incentive has often been worked in a mercenary way for hortatory purposes, to call it a mercenary incentive. The impulse to expiate and do penance is, in its first intention, far too immediate and spontaneous an expression of self-despair and anxiety to be obnoxious to any such reproach. In the form of loving sacrifice, of spending all we have to show our devotion, ascetic discipline of the severest sort may be the fruit of highly optimistic religious feeling.

M. Vianney, the curé of Ars, was a French country priest, whose holiness was exemplary. We read in his life the following account of his inner need of sacrifice : —

“ ‘ On this path,’ M. Vianney said, ‘ it is only the first step that costs. There is in mortification a balm and a savor without which one cannot live when once one has made their acquaintance. There is but one way in which to give one’s self to God, — that is, to give one’s self entirely, and to keep nothing for one’s self. The little that one keeps is only good to trouble one and make one suffer.’ Accordingly he imposed it on himself that he should never smell a flower, never drink when parched with thirst, never drive away a fly, never show disgust before a repugnant object, never complain of anything that had to do with his personal comfort, never sit down, never lean upon his elbows when he was kneeling. The Curé of Ars was very sensitive to cold, but he would never take means to pro-

¹ L. TYERMAN : *The Life and Times of the Rev. John Wesley*, i. 274.

tect himself against it. During a very severe winter, one of his missionaries contrived a false floor to his confessional and placed a metal case of hot water beneath. The trick succeeded, and the Saint was deceived: 'God is very good,' he said with emotion. 'This year, through all the cold, my feet have always been warm.'"¹

In this case the spontaneous impulse to make sacrifices for the pure love of God was probably the uppermost conscious motive. We may class it, then, under our head 3. Some authors think that the impulse to sacrifice is the main religious phenomenon. It is a prominent, a universal phenomenon certainly, and lies deeper than any special creed. Here, for instance, is what seems to be a spontaneous example of it, simply expressing what seemed right at the time between the individual and his Maker. Cotton Mather, the New England Puritan divine, is generally reputed a rather grotesque pedant; yet what is more touchingly simple than his relation of what happened when his wife came to die?

"When I saw to what a point of resignation I was now called of the Lord," he says, "I resolved, with his help, therein to glorify him. So, two hours before my lovely consort expired, I kneeled by her bedside, and I took into my two hands a dear hand, the dearest in the world. With her thus in my hands, I solemnly and sincerely gave her up unto the Lord: and in token of my real *Resignation*, I gently put her out of my hands, and laid away a most lovely hand, resolving that I would never touch it more. This was the hardest, and perhaps the bravest action that ever I did. She . . . told me that she signed and sealed my act of resignation. And though before that she called for me continually, she after this never asked for me any more."²

¹ A. MOUNIN : *Le Curé d'Ars, Vie de M. J. B. M. Vianney, 1864, p. 545, abridged.*

² B. WENDELL : *Cotton Mather, New York, no date, p. 198.*

Father Vianney's asceticism taken in its totality was simply the result of a permanent flood of high spiritual enthusiasm, longing to make proof of itself. The Roman Church has, in its incomparable fashion, collected all the motives towards asceticism together, and so codified them that any one wishing to pursue Christian perfection may find a practical system mapped out for him in any one of a number of ready-made manuals.¹ The dominant Church notion of perfection is of course the negative one of avoidance of sin. Sin proceeds from concupiscence, and concupiscence from our carnal passions and temptations, chief of which are pride, sensuality in all its forms, and the loves of worldly excitement and possession. All these sources of sin must be resisted; and discipline and austerities are a most efficacious mode of meeting them. Hence there are always in these books chapters on self-mortification. But whenever a procedure is codified, the more delicate spirit of it evaporates, and if we wish the undiluted ascetic spirit, — the passion of self-contempt wreaking itself on the poor flesh, the divine irrationality of devotion making a sacrificial gift of all it has (its sensibilities, namely) to the object of its adoration, — we must go to autobiographies, or other individual documents.

Saint John of the Cross, a Spanish mystic who flourished — or rather who existed, for there was little that suggested flourishing about him — in the sixteenth century, will supply a passage suitable for our purpose.

“First of all, carefully excite in yourself an habitual affectionate will in all things to imitate Jesus Christ. If anything agreeable offers itself to your senses, yet does not at the same

¹ That of the earlier Jesuit, RODRIGUEZ, which has been translated into all languages, is one of the best known. A convenient modern manual, very well put together, is *L'Ascétique Chrétienne*, by M. J. RIBET, Paris, Pousielgue, nouvelle édition, 1898.

time tend purely to the honor and glory of God, renounce it and separate yourself from it for the love of Christ, who all his life long had no other taste or wish than to do the will of his Father whom he called his meat and nourishment. For example, you take satisfaction in *hearing* of things in which the glory of God bears no part. Deny yourself this satisfaction, mortify your wish to listen. You take pleasure in *seeing* objects which do not raise your mind to God: refuse yourself this pleasure, and turn away your eyes. The same with conversations and all other things. Act similarly, so far as you are able, with all the operations of the senses, striving to make yourself free from their yokes.

“The radical remedy lies in the mortification of the four great natural passions, joy, hope, fear, and grief. You must seek to deprive these of every satisfaction and leave them as it were in darkness and the void. Let your soul therefore turn always :

“Not to what is most easy, but to what is hardest ;

“Not to what tastes best, but to what is most distasteful ;

“Not to what most pleases, but to what disgusts ;

“Not to matter of consolation, but to matter for desolation rather ;

“Not to rest, but to labor ,

“Not to desire the more, but the less ;

“Not to aspire to what is highest and most precious, but to what is lowest and most contemptible ;

“Not to will anything, but to will nothing ;

“Not to seek the best in everything, but to seek the worst, so that you may enter for the love of Christ into a complete destitution, a perfect poverty of spirit, and an absolute renunciation of everything in this world.

“Embrace these practices with all the energy of your soul and you will find in a short time great delights and unspeakable consolations.

“Despise yourself, and wish that others should despise you.

“Speak to your own disadvantage, and desire others to do the same ;

“Conceive a low opinion of yourself, and find it good when others hold the same ;

“To enjoy the taste of all things, have no taste for anything

“To know all things, learn to know nothing.

“To possess all things, resolve to possess nothing.

“To be all things, be willing to be nothing.

“To get to where you have no taste for anything, go through whatever experiences you have no taste for.

“To learn to know nothing, go whither you are ignorant.

• “To reach what you possess not, go whithersoever you own nothing.

“To be what you are not, experience what you are not.”

These later verses play with that vertigo of self-contradiction which is so dear to mysticism. Those that come next are completely mystical, for in them Saint John passes from God to the more metaphysical notion of the All.

“When you stop at one thing, you cease to open yourself to the All.

“For to come to the All you must give up the All.

“And if you should attain to owning the All, you must own it, desiring Nothing.

“In this spoliation, the soul finds its tranquillity and rest. Profoundly established in the centre of its own nothingness, it can be assailed by naught that comes from below; and since it no longer desires anything, what comes from above cannot depress it; for its desires alone are the causes of its woes.”¹

And now, as a more concrete example of heads 4 and 5, in fact of all our heads together, and of the irrational extreme to which a psychopathic individual may go in the line of bodily austerity, I will quote the sincere Suso's account of his own self-tortures. Suso, you will remember, was one of the fourteenth century German mystics; his autobiography, written in the third person, is a classic religious document.

¹ SAINT JEAN DE LA CROIX, *Vie et Œuvres*, Paris, 1893, ii. 94, 99 abridged

“He was in his youth of a temperament full of fire and life ; and when this began to make itself felt, it was very grievous to him ; and he sought by many devices how he might bring his body into subjection. He wore for a long time a hair shirt and an iron chain, until the blood ran from him, so that he was obliged to leave them off. He secretly caused an undergarment to be made for him ; and in the undergarment he had strips of leather fixed, into which a hundred and fifty brass nails, pointed and filed sharp, were driven, and the points of the nails were always turned towards the flesh. He had this garment made very tight, and so arranged as to go round him and fasten in front, in order that it might fit the closer to his body, and the pointed nails might be driven into his flesh ; and it was high enough to reach upwards to his navel. In this he used to sleep at night. Now in summer, when it was hot, and he was very tired and ill from his journeyings, or when he held the office of lecturer, he would sometimes, as he lay thus in bonds, and oppressed with toil, and tormented also by noxious insects, cry aloud and give way to fretfulness, and twist round and round in agony, as a worm does when run through with a pointed needle. It often seemed to him as if he were lying upon an ant-hill, from the torture caused by the insects ; for if he wished to sleep, or when he had fallen asleep, they vied with one another.¹ Sometimes he cried to Almighty God in the fullness of his heart : Alas ! Gentle God, what a dying is this ! When a man is killed by murderers or strong beasts of prey it is soon over ; but I lie dying here under the cruel insects, and yet cannot die. The nights in winter were never so long, nor was the summer so hot, as to make him leave off this exercise. On the contrary, he devised something farther — two leathern loops into which he put his hands, and fastened one on each side his throat, and made the fastenings so secure that even if his cell had been

¹ ‘Insects,’ i. e. lice, were an unfailing token of mediæval sainthood. We read of Francis of Assisi’s sheepskin that “often a companion of the saint would take it to the fire to clean and *dispediculate* it, doing so, as he said, because the seraphic father himself was no enemy of *pedocchi*, but on the contrary kept them on him (*le portava adosso*), and held it for an honor and a glory to wear these celestial pearls in his habit.” Quoted by P. SABATIER : *Speculum Perfectionis*, etc., Paris, 1898, p. 231, note.

on fire about him, he could not have helped himself. This he continued until his hands and arms had become almost tremulous with the strain, and then he devised something else: two leather gloves; and he caused a brazier to fit them all over with sharp-pointed brass tacks, and he used to put them on at night, in order that if he should try while asleep to throw off the hair undergarment, or relieve himself from the gnawings of the vile insects, the tacks might then stick into his body. And so it came to pass. If ever he sought to help himself with his hands in his sleep, he drove the sharp tacks into his breast, and tore himself, so that his flesh festered. When after many weeks the wounds had healed, he tore himself again and made fresh wounds.

“He continued this tormenting exercise for about sixteen years. At the end of this time, when his blood was now chilled, and the fire of his temperament destroyed, there appeared to him in a vision on Whitsunday, a messenger from heaven, who told him that God required this of him no longer. Whereupon he discontinued it, and threw all these things away into a running stream.”

Suso then tells how, to emulate the sorrows of his crucified Lord, he made himself a cross with thirty protruding iron needles and nails. This he bore on his bare back between his shoulders day and night. “The first time that he stretched out this cross upon his back his tender frame was struck with terror at it, and blunted the sharp nails slightly against a stone. But soon, repenting of this womanly cowardice, he pointed them all again with a file, and placed once more the cross upon him. It made his back, where the bones are, bloody and seared. Whenever he sat down or stood up, it was as if a hedgehog-skin were on him. If any one touched him unawares, or pushed against his clothes, it tore him.”

Suso next tells of his penitences by means of striking this cross and forcing the nails deeper into the flesh, and likewise of his self-scourgings, — a dreadful story, — and then goes on as follows: “At this same period the Servitor procured an old castaway door, and he used to lie upon it at night without any bedclothes to make him comfortable, except that he took off

his shoes and wrapped a thick cloak round him. He thus secured for himself a most miserable bed ; for hard pea-stalks lay in humps under his head, the cross with the sharp nails stuck into his back, his arms were locked fast in bonds, the horsehair undergarment was round his loins, and the cloak too was heavy and the door hard. Thus he lay in wretchedness, afraid to stir, just like a log, and he would send up many a sigh to God.

“In winter he suffered very much from the frost. If he stretched out his feet they lay bare on the floor and froze, if he gathered them up the blood became all on fire in his legs, and this was great pain. His feet were full of sores, his legs dropsical, his knees bloody and seared, his loins covered with scars from the horsehair, his body wasted, his mouth parched with intense thirst, and his hands tremulous from weakness. Amid these torments he spent his nights and days ; and he endured them all out of the greatness of the love which he bore in his heart to the Divine and Eternal Wisdom, our Lord Jesus Christ, whose agonizing sufferings he sought to imitate. After a time he gave up this penitential exercise of the door, and instead of it he took up his abode in a very small cell, and used the bench, which was so narrow and short that he could not stretch himself upon it, as his bed. In this hole, or upon the door, he lay at night in his usual bonds, for about eight years. It was also his custom, during the space of twenty-five years, provided he was staying in the convent, never to go after compline in winter into any warm room, or to the convent stove to warm himself, no matter how cold it might be, unless he was obliged to do so for other reasons. Throughout all these years he never took a bath, either a water or a sweating bath ; and this he did in order to mortify his comfort-seeking body. He practiced during a long time such rigid poverty that he would neither receive nor touch a penny, either with leave or without it. For a considerable time he strove to attain such a high degree of purity that he would neither scratch nor touch any part of his body, save only his hands and feet.”¹

¹ The Life of the Blessed HENRY SUSO, by Himself, translated by T. F. KNOX, London, 1865, pp. 56-80, abridged.

I spare you the recital of poor Suso's self-inflicted tortures from thirst. It is pleasant to know that after his fortieth year, God showed him by a series of visions that he had sufficiently broken down the natural man, and that he might leave these exercises off. His case is distinctly pathological, but he does not seem to have had the alleviation, which some ascetics have enjoyed, of an alteration of sensibility capable of actually turning torment into a perverse kind of pleasure. Of the founder of the Sacred Heart order, for example, we read that

"Her love of pain and suffering was insatiable. . . . She said that she could cheerfully live till the day of judgment, provided she might always have matter for suffering for God ; but that to live a single day without suffering would be intolerable. She said again that she was devoured with two unassuageable fevers, one for the holy communion, the other for suffering, humiliation, and annihilation. 'Nothing but pain,' she continually said in her letters, 'makes my life supportable.'"¹

So much for the phenomena to which the ascetic impulse will in certain persons give rise. In the ecclesiastically consecrated character three minor branches of self-mortification have been recognized as indispensable pathways to perfection. I refer to the chastity, obedience, and poverty which the monk vows to observe; and upon the heads of obedience and poverty I will make a few remarks.

First, of Obedience. The secular life of our twentieth century opens with this virtue held in no high esteem. The duty of the individual to determine his own conduct and profit or suffer by the consequences seems, on the

¹ BOUGAUD : *Hist. de la bienheureuse Marguerite Marie*, Paris, 1894, pp. 265, 171. Compare, also, pp. 386, 387.

contrary, to be one of our best rooted contemporary Protestant social ideals. So much so that it is difficult even imaginatively to comprehend how men possessed of an inner life of their own could ever have come to think the subjection of its will to that of other finite creatures recommendable. I confess that to myself it seems something of a mystery. Yet it evidently corresponds to a profound interior need of many persons, and we must do our best to understand it.

On the lowest possible plane, one sees how the expediency of obedience in a firm ecclesiastical organization must have led to its being viewed as meritorious. Next, experience shows that there are times in every one's life when one can be better counseled by others than by one's self. Inability to decide is one of the commonest symptoms of fatigued nerves; friends who see our troubles more broadly, often see them more wisely than we do; so it is frequently an act of excellent virtue to consult and obey a doctor, a partner, or a wife. But, leaving these lower prudential regions, we find, in the nature of some of the spiritual excitements which we have been studying, good reasons for idealizing obedience. Obedience may spring from the general religious phenomenon of inner softening and self-surrender and throwing one's self on higher powers. So saving are these attitudes felt to be that in themselves, apart from utility, they become ideally consecrated; and in obeying a man whose fallibility we see through thoroughly, we, nevertheless, may feel much as we do when we resign our will to that of infinite wisdom. Add self-despair and the passion of self-crucifixion to this, and obedience becomes an ascetic sacrifice, agreeable quite irrespective of whatever prudential uses it might have.

It is as a sacrifice, a mode of 'mortification,' that

obedience is primarily conceived by Catholic writers, a "sacrifice which man offers to God, and of which he is himself both the priest and the victim. By poverty he immolates his exterior possessions; by chastity he immolates his body; by obedience he completes the sacrifice, and gives to God all that he yet holds as his own, his two most precious goods, his intellect and his will. The sacrifice is then complete and unreserved, a genuine holocaust, for the entire victim is now consumed for the honor of God." ¹ Accordingly, in Catholic discipline, we obey our superior not as mere man, but as the representative of Christ. Obeying God in him by our intention, obedience is easy. But when the text-book theologians marshal collectively all their reasons for recommending it, the mixture sounds to our ears rather odd.

"One of the great consolations of the monastic life," says a Jesuit authority, "is the assurance we have that in obeying we can commit no fault. The Superior may commit a fault in commanding you to do this thing or that, but you are certain that you commit no fault so long as you obey, because God will only ask you if you have duly performed what orders you received, and if you can furnish a clear account in that respect, you are absolved entirely. Whether the things you did were opportune, or whether there were not something better that might have been done, these are questions not asked of you, but rather of your Superior. The moment what you did was done obediently, God wipes it out of your account, and charges it to the Superior. So that Saint Jerome well exclaimed, in celebrating the advantages of obedience, 'Oh, sovereign liberty! Oh, holy and blessed security by which one becomes almost impeccable!'

"Saint John Climachus is of the same sentiment when he calls obedience an excuse before God. In fact, when God asks why you have done this or that, and you reply, it is because I

¹ LEJEUNE: *Introduction à la Vie Mystique*, 1899, p. 277. The holocaust simile goes back at least as far as Ignatius Loyola.

was so ordered by my Superiors, God will ask for no other excuse. As a passenger in a good vessel with a good pilot need give himself no farther concern, but may go to sleep in peace, because the pilot has charge over all, and 'watches for him'; so a religious person who lives under the yoke of obedience goes to heaven as if while sleeping, that is, while leaning entirely on the conduct of his Superiors, who are the pilots of his vessel, and keep watch for him continually. It is no small thing, of a truth, to be able to cross the stormy sea of life on the shoulders and in the arms of another, yet that is just the grace which God accords to those who live under the yoke of obedience. Their Superior bears all their burdens. . . . A certain grave doctor said that he would rather spend his life in picking up straws by obedience, than by his own responsible choice busy himself with the loftiest works of charity, because one is certain of following the will of God in whatever one may do from obedience, but never certain in the same degree of anything which we may do of our own proper movement."¹

One should read the letters in which Ignatius Loyola recommends obedience as the backbone of his order, if one would gain insight into the full spirit of its cult.² They are too long to quote; but Ignatius's belief is so vividly expressed in a couple of sayings reported by companions that, though they have been so often cited, I will ask your permission to copy them once more:—

"I ought," an early biographer reports him as saying, "on entering religion, and thereafter, to place myself entirely in the hands of God, and of him who takes His place by His authority. I ought to desire that my Superior should oblige me to give up my own judgment, and conquer my own mind. I ought to set up no difference between one Superior and another, . . . but recognize them all as equal before God, whose place they fill. For if I distinguish persons, I weaken the spirit of obedience.

¹ ALFONSO RODRIGUEZ, S. J.: *Pratique de la Perfection Chrétienne*, Part iii., Treatise v., ch. x.

² Letters li. and cxx. of the collection translated into French by BOUX, Paris, 1870.

In the hands of my Superior, I must be a soft wax, a thing, from which he is to require whatever pleases him, be it to write or receive letters, to speak or not to speak to such a person, or the like ; and I must put all my fervor in executing zealously and exactly what I am ordered. I must consider myself as a corpse which has neither intelligence nor will ; be like a mass of matter which without resistance lets itself be placed wherever it may please any one ; like a stick in the hand of an old man, who uses it according to his needs and places it where it suits him. So must I be under the hands of the Order, to serve it in the way it judges most useful.

“I must never ask of the Superior to be sent to a particular place, to be employed in a particular duty. . . . I must consider nothing as belonging to me personally, and as regards the things I use, be like a statue which lets itself be stripped and never opposes resistance.”¹

The other saying is reported by Rodriguez in the chapter from which I a moment ago made quotations. When speaking of the Pope’s authority, Rodriguez writes : —

“Saint Ignatius said, when general of his company, that if the Holy Father were to order him to set sail in the first bark which he might find in the port of Ostia, near Rome, and to abandon himself to the sea, without a mast, without sails, without oars or rudder or any of the things that are needful for navigation or subsistence, he would obey not only with alacrity, but without anxiety or repugnance, and even with a great internal satisfaction.”²

With a solitary concrete example of the extravagance to which the virtue we are considering has been carried, I will pass to the topic next in order.

“Sister Marie Claire [of Port Royal] had been greatly imbued with the holiness and excellence of M. de Langres. This prelate, soon after he came to Port Royal, said to her one day, seeing her so tenderly attached to Mother Angélique, that it

¹ BARTOLI-MICHEL, ii. 13.

² RODRIGUEZ: *Op. cit.*, Part iii., Treatise v., ch. vi.

would perhaps be better not to speak to her again. Marie Claire, greedy of obedience, took this inconsiderate word for an oracle of God, and from that day forward remained for several years without once speaking to her sister.”¹

Our next topic shall be Poverty, felt at all times and under all creeds as one adornment of a saintly life. Since the instinct of ownership is fundamental in man's nature, this is one more example of the ascetic paradox. Yet it appears no paradox at all, but perfectly reasonable, the moment one recollects how easily higher excitements hold lower cupidities in check. Having just quoted the Jesuit Rodriguez on the subject of obedience, I will, to give immediately a concrete turn to our discussion of poverty, also read you a page from his chapter on this latter virtue. You must remember that he is writing instructions for monks of his own order, and bases them all on the text, “Blessed are the poor in spirit.”

“If any one of you,” he says, “will know whether or not he is really poor in spirit, let him consider whether he loves the ordinary consequences and effects of poverty, which are hunger, thirst, cold, fatigue, and the denudation of all conveniences. See if you are glad to wear a worn-out habit full of patches. See if you are glad when something is lacking to your meal, when you are passed by in serving it, when what you receive is distasteful to you, when your cell is out of repair. If you are not glad of these things, if instead of loving them you avoid them, then there is proof that you have not attained the perfection of poverty of spirit.” Rodriguez then goes on to describe the practice of poverty in more detail. “The first point is that which Saint Ignatius proposes in his constitutions, when he says, ‘Let no one use anything as if it were his private possession.’ ‘A religious person,’ he says, ‘ought in respect to all the things that he uses, to be like a statue which one may drape with clothing, but which feels no grief and makes no resistance when one

¹ SAINTE-BEUVE : *Histoire de Port Royal*, i. 346.

strips it again. It is in this way that you should feel towards your clothes, your books, your cell, and everything else that you make use of ; if ordered to quit them, or to exchange them for others, have no more sorrow than if you were a statue being uncovered. In this way you will avoid using them as if they were your private possession. But if, when you give up your cell, or yield possession of this or that object or exchange it for another, you feel repugnance and are not like a statue, that shows that you view these things as if they were your private property.'

"And this is why our holy founder wished the superiors to test their monks somewhat as God tested Abraham, and to put their poverty and their obedience to trial, that by this means they may become acquainted with the degree of their virtue, and gain a chance to make ever farther progress in perfection, . . . making the one move out of his room when he finds it comfortable and is attached to it ; taking away from another a book of which he is fond ; or obliging a third to exchange his garment for a worse one. Otherwise we should end by acquiring a species of property in all these several objects, and little by little the wall of poverty that surrounds us and constitutes our principal defense would be thrown down. The ancient fathers of the desert used often thus to treat their companions. . . . Saint Dositheus, being sick-nurse, desired a certain knife, and asked Saint Dorotheus for it, not for his private use, but for employment in the infirmary of which he had charge. Whereupon Saint Dorotheus answered him : ' Ha ! Dositheus, so that knife pleases you so much ! Will you be the slave of a knife or the slave of Jesus Christ ? Do you not blush with shame at wishing that a knife should be your master ? I will not let you touch it.' Which reproach and refusal had such an effect upon the holy disciple that since that time he never touched the knife again." . . .

"Therefore, in our rooms," Father Rodriguez continues, "there must be no other furniture than a bed, a table, a bench, and a candlestick, things purely necessary, and nothing more. It is not allowed among us that our cells should be ornamented with pictures or aught else, neither armchairs, carpets, curtains,

nor any sort of cabinet or bureau of any elegance. Neither is it allowed us to keep anything to eat, either for ourselves or for those who may come to visit us. We must ask permission to go to the refectory even for a glass of water; and finally we may not keep a book in which we can write a line, or which we may take away with us. One cannot deny that thus we are in great poverty. But this poverty is at the same time a great repose and a great perfection. For it would be inevitable, in case a religious person were allowed to own superfluous possessions, that these things would greatly occupy his mind, be it to acquire them, to preserve them, or to increase them; so that in not permitting us at all to own them, all these inconveniences are remedied. Among the various good reasons why the company forbids secular persons to enter our cells, the principal one is that thus we may the easier be kept in poverty. After all, we are all men, and if we were to receive people of the world into our rooms, we should not have the strength to remain within the bounds prescribed, but should at least wish to adorn them with some books to give the visitors a better opinion of our scholarship.”¹

Since Hindu fakirs, Buddhist monks, and Mohammedan dervishes unite with Jesuits and Franciscans in idealizing poverty as the loftiest individual state, it is worth while to examine into the spiritual grounds for such a seemingly unnatural opinion. And first, of those which lie closest to common human nature.

The opposition between the men who *have* and the men who *are* is immemorial. Though the gentleman, in the old-fashioned sense of the man who is well born, has usually in point of fact been predaceous and reveled in lands and goods, yet he has never identified his essence with these possessions, but rather with the personal superiorities, the courage, generosity, and pride supposed to be his birthright. To certain huckstering kinds of

¹ RODRIGUEZ : Op. cit., Part iii., Treatise iii., chaps. vi., vii.

consideration he thanked God he was forever inaccessible, and if in life's vicissitudes he should become destitute through their lack, he was glad to think that with his sheer valor he was all the freer to work out his salvation. "Wer nur selbst was hätte," says Lessing's Tempelherr, in Nathan the Wise, "mein Gott, mein Gott, ich habe nichts!" This ideal of the well-born man without possessions was embodied in knight-errantry and templardom; and, hideously corrupted as it has always been, it still dominates sentimentally, if not practically, the military and aristocratic view of life. We glorify the soldier as the man absolutely unincumbered. Owning nothing but his bare life, and willing to toss that up at any moment when the cause commands him, he is the representative of unhampered freedom in ideal directions. The laborer who pays with his person day by day, and has no rights invested in the future, offers also much of this ideal detachment. Like the savage, he may make his bed wherever his right arm can support him, and from his simple and athletic attitude of observation, the property-owner seems buried and smothered in ignoble externalities and trammels, "wading in straw and rubbish to his knees." The claims which *things* make are corrupters of manhood, mortgages on the soul, and a drag anchor on our progress towards the empyrean.

"Everything I meet with," writes Whitefield, "seems to carry this voice with it, — 'Go thou and preach the Gospel; be a pilgrim on earth; have no party or certain dwelling place.' My heart echoes back, 'Lord Jesus, help me to do or suffer thy will. When thou seest me in danger of *nestling*, — in pity — in tender pity, — put a *thorn* in my nest to prevent me from it.'"¹

¹ R. PHILIP: The Life and Times of George Whitefield, London, 1842, p. 366.

The loathing of 'capital' with which our laboring classes to-day are growing more and more infected seems largely composed of this sound sentiment of antipathy for lives based on mere having. As an anarchist poet writes : —

“Not by accumulating riches, but by giving away that which you have,

“Shall you become beautiful ;

“You must undo the wrappings, not case yourself in fresh ones ;

“Not by multiplying clothes shall you make your body sound and healthy, but rather by discarding them . . .

“For a soldier who is going on a campaign does not seek what fresh furniture he can carry on his back, but rather what he can leave behind ;

“Knowing well that every additional thing which he cannot freely use and handle is an impediment.”¹

In short, lives based on having are less free than lives based either on doing or on being, and in the interest of action people subject to spiritual excitement throw away possessions as so many clogs. Only those who have no private interests can follow an ideal straight away. Sloth and cowardice creep in with every dollar or guinea we have to guard. When a brother novice came to Saint Francis, saying : “Father, it would be a great consolation to me to own a psalter, but even supposing that our general should concede to me this indulgence, still I should like also to have your consent,” Francis put him off with the examples of Charlemagne, Roland, and Oliver, pursuing the infidels in sweat and labor, and finally dying on the field of battle. “So care not,” he said, “for owning books and knowledge, but care rather for works of goodness.” And when some weeks later the novice came

¹ EDWARD CARPENTER : *Towards Democracy*, p. 362, abridged.

again to talk of his craving for the psalter, Francis said: "After you have got your psalter you will crave a breviary; and after you have got your breviary you will sit in your stall like a grand prelate, and will say to your brother: 'Hand me my breviary.' . . . And thenceforward he denied all such requests, saying: A man possesses of learning only so much as comes out of him in action, and a monk is a good preacher only so far as his deeds proclaim him such, for every tree is known by its fruits."¹

But beyond this more worthily athletic attitude involved in doing and being, there is, in the desire of not having, something profounder still, something related to that fundamental mystery of religious experience, the satisfaction found in absolute surrender to the larger power. So long as any secular safeguard is retained, so long as any residual prudential guarantee is clung to, so long the surrender is incomplete, the vital crisis is not passed, fear still stands sentinel, and mistrust of the divine obtains: we hold by two anchors, looking to God, it is true, after a fashion, but also holding by our proper machinations. In certain medical experiences we have the same critical point to overcome. A drunkard, or a morphine or cocaine maniac, offers himself to be cured. He appeals to the doctor to wean him from his enemy, but he dares not face blank abstinence. The tyrannical drug is still an anchor to windward: he hides supplies of it among his clothing; arranges secretly to have it smuggled in in case of need. Even so an incompletely regenerate man still trusts in his own expedients. His money is like the sleeping potion which the chronically wakeful patient keeps beside his bed; he throws himself on God, but *if* he should need the other help, there it

¹ *Speculum Perfectionis*, ed. P. SABATIER, Paris, 1898, pp. 10, 13.

will be also. Every one knows cases of this incomplete and ineffective desire for reform, — drunkards whom, with all their self-reproaches and resolves, one perceives to be quite unwilling seriously to contemplate *never* being drunk again ! Really to give up anything on which we have relied, to give it up definitively, ‘for good and all’ and forever, signifies one of those radical alterations of character which came under our notice in the lectures on conversion. In it the inner man rolls over into an entirely different position of equilibrium, lives in a new centre of energy from this time on, and the turning-point and hinge of all such operations seems usually to involve the sincere acceptance of certain nakednesses and destitutions.

Accordingly, throughout the annals of the saintly life, we find this ever-recurring note : Fling yourself upon God’s providence without making any reserve whatever, — take no thought for the morrow, — sell all you have and give it to the poor, — only when the sacrifice is ruthless and reckless will the higher safety really arrive. As a concrete example let me read a page from the biography of Antoinette Bourignon, a good woman, much persecuted in her day by both Protestants and Catholics, because she would not take her religion at second hand. When a young girl, in her father’s house, —

“ She spent whole nights in prayer, oft repeating : *Lord, what wilt thou have me to do ?* And being one night in a most profound penitence, she said from the bottom of her heart : ‘ O my Lord ! What must I do to please thee ? For I have nobody to teach me. Speak to my soul and it will hear thee.’ At that instant she heard, as if another had spoke within her : *Forsake all earthly things. Separate thyself from the love of the creatures. Deny thyself.* She was quite astonished, not understanding this language, and mused long on these three points, thinking how she could fulfill them. She thought she could not live without earthly things, nor without loving the creatures,

nor without loving herself. Yet she said, ‘By thy Grace I will do it, Lord!’ But when she would perform her promise, she knew not where to begin. Having thought on the religious in monasteries, that they forsook all earthly things by being shut up in a cloister, and the love of themselves by subjecting of their wills, she asked leave of her father to enter into a cloister of the barefoot Carmelites, but he would not permit it, saying he would rather see her laid in her grave. This seemed to her a great cruelty, for she thought to find in the cloister the true Christians she had been seeking, but she found afterwards that he knew the cloisters better than she; for after he had forbidden her, and told her he would never permit her to be a religious, nor give her any money to enter there, yet she went to Father Laurens, the Director, and offered to serve in the monastery and work hard for her bread, and be content with little, if he would receive her. At which he smiled and said: *That cannot be. We must have money to build; we take no maids without money; you must find the way to get it, else there is no entry here.*

“This astonished her greatly, and she was thereby undeceived as to the cloisters, resolving to forsake all company and live alone till it should please God to show her what she ought to do and whither to go. She asked always earnestly, ‘When shall I be perfectly thine, O my God?’ And she thought he still answered her, *When thou shalt no longer possess anything, and shalt die to thyself.* ‘And where shall I do that, Lord?’ He answered her, *In the desert.* This made so strong an impression on her soul that she aspired after this; but being a maid of eighteen years only, she was afraid of unlucky chances, and was never used to travel, and knew no way. She laid aside all these doubts and said, ‘Lord, thou wilt guide me how and where it shall please thee. It is for thee that I do it. I will lay aside my habit of a maid, and will take that of a hermit that I may pass unknown.’ Having then secretly made ready this habit, while her parents thought to have married her, her father having promised her to a rich French merchant, she prevented the time, and on Easter evening, having cut her hair, put on the habit, and slept a little, she went out of her chamber

about four in the morning, taking nothing but one penny to buy bread for that day. And it being said to her in the going out, *Where is thy faith? in a penny?* she threw it away, begging pardon of God for her fault, and saying, ‘No, Lord, my faith is not in a penny, but in thee alone.’ Thus she went away wholly delivered from the heavy burthen of the cares and good things of this world, and found her soul so satisfied that she no longer wished for anything upon earth, resting entirely upon God, with this only fear lest she should be discovered and be obliged to return home; for she felt already more content in this poverty than she had done for all her life in all the delights of the world.”¹

The penny was a small financial safeguard, but an effective spiritual obstacle. Not till it was thrown away could the character settle into the new equilibrium completely.

Over and above the mystery of self-surrender, there are in the cult of poverty other religious mysteries. There is

¹ An Apology for M. Antonia Bourignon, London, 1699, pp. 269, 270, abridged.

Another example from Starbuck’s MS. collection : —

“At a meeting held at six the next morning, I heard a man relate his experience. He said : The Lord asked him if he would confess Christ among the quarrymen with whom he worked, and he said he would. Then he asked him if he would give up to be used of the Lord the four hundred dollars he had laid up, and he said he would, and thus the Lord saved him. The thought came to me at once that I had never made a real consecration either of myself or of my property to the Lord, but had always tried to serve the Lord in *my* way. Now the Lord asked me if I would serve him in *his* way, and go out alone and penniless if he so ordered. The question was pressed home, and I must decide : To forsake all and have him, or have all and lose him ! I soon decided to take him ; and the blessed assurance came, that he had taken me for his own, and my joy was full. I returned home from the meeting with feelings as simple as a child. I thought all would be glad to hear of the joy of the Lord that possessed me, and so I began to tell the simple story. But to my great surprise, the pastors (for I attended meetings in three churches) opposed the experience and said it was fanaticism, and one told the members of his church to shun those that professed it, and I soon found that my foes were those of my own household.”

the mystery of veracity: "Naked came I into the world," etc., — whoever first said that, possessed this mystery. My own bare entity must fight the battle — shams cannot save me. There is also the mystery of democracy, or sentiment of the equality before God of all his creatures. This sentiment (which seems in general to have been more widespread in Mohammedan than in Christian lands) tends to nullify man's usual acquisitiveness. Those who have it spurn dignities and honors, privileges and advantages, preferring, as I said in a former lecture, to grovel on the common level before the face of God. It is not exactly the sentiment of humility, though it comes so close to it in practice. It is *humanity*, rather, refusing to enjoy anything that others do not share. A profound moralist, writing of Christ's saying, 'Sell all thou hast and follow me,' proceeds as follows: —

"Christ may have meant: If you love mankind absolutely you will as a result not care for any possessions whatever, and this seems a very likely proposition. But it is one thing to believe that a proposition is probably true; it is another thing to see it as a fact. If you loved mankind as Christ loved them, you would see his conclusion as a fact. It would be obvious. You would sell your goods, and they would be no loss to you. These truths, while literal to Christ, and to any mind that has Christ's love for mankind, become parables to lesser natures. There are in every generation people who, beginning innocently, with no predetermined intention of becoming saints, find themselves drawn into the vortex by their interest in helping mankind, and by the understanding that comes from actually doing it. The abandonment of their old mode of life is like dust in the balance. It is done gradually, incidentally, imperceptibly. Thus the whole question of the abandonment of luxury is no question at all, but a mere incident to another question, namely, the degree to which we abandon ourselves to the remorseless logic of our love for others." ¹

¹ J. J. CHAPMAN, in the *Political Nursery*, vol. iv. p. 4, April, 1900, abridged.

But in all these matters of sentiment one must have 'been there' one's self in order to understand them. No American can ever attain to understanding the loyalty of a Briton towards his king, of a German towards his emperor; nor can a Briton or German ever understand the peace of heart of an American in having no king, no Kaiser, no spurious nonsense, between him and the common God of all. If sentiments as simple as these are mysteries which one must receive as gifts of birth, how much more is this the case with those subtler religious sentiments which we have been considering! One can never fathom an emotion or divine its dictates by standing outside of it. In the glowing hour of excitement, however, all incomprehensibilities are solved, and what was so enigmatical from without becomes transparently obvious. Each emotion obeys a logic of its own, and makes deductions which no other logic can draw. Piety and charity live in a different universe from worldly lusts and fears, and form another centre of energy altogether. As in a supreme sorrow lesser vexations may become a consolation; as a supreme love may turn minor sacrifices into gain; so a supreme trust may render common safeguards odious, and in certain glows of generous excitement it may appear unspeakably mean to retain one's hold of personal possessions. The only sound plan, if we are ourselves outside the pale of such emotions, is to observe as well as we are able those who feel them, and to record faithfully what we observe; and this, I need hardly say, is what I have striven to do in these last two descriptive lectures, which I now hope will have covered the ground sufficiently for our present needs.

LECTURES XIV AND XV

THE VALUE OF SAINTLINESS

WE have now passed in review the more important of the phenomena which are regarded as fruits of genuine religion and characteristics of men who are devout. To-day we have to change our attitude from that of description to that of appreciation; we have to ask whether the fruits in question can help us to judge the absolute value of what religion adds to human life. Were I to parody Kant, I should say that a 'Critique of pure Saintliness' must be our theme.

If, in turning to this theme, we could descend upon our subject from above like Catholic theologians, with our fixed definitions of man and man's perfection and our positive dogmas about God, we should have an easy time of it. Man's perfection would be the fulfillment of his end; and his end would be union with his Maker. That union could be pursued by him along three paths, active, purgative, and contemplative, respectively; and progress along either path would be a simple matter to measure by the application of a limited number of theological and moral conceptions and definitions. The absolute significance and value of any bit of religious experience we might hear of would thus be given almost mathematically into our hands.

If convenience were everything, we ought now to grieve at finding ourselves cut off from so admirably convenient a method as this. But we did cut ourselves off from it deliberately in those remarks which you remember we

made, in our first lecture, about the empirical method; and it must be confessed that after that act of renunciation we can never hope for clean-cut and scholastic results. *We* cannot divide man sharply into an animal and a rational part. *We* cannot distinguish natural from supernatural effects; nor among the latter know which are favors of God, and which are counterfeit operations of the demon. We have merely to collect things together without any special *a priori* theological system, and out of an aggregate of piecemeal judgments as to the value of this and that experience—judgments in which our general philosophic prejudices, our instincts, and our common sense are our only guides—decide that *on the whole* one type of religion is approved by its fruits, and another type condemned. ‘On the whole,’—I fear we shall never escape complicity with that qualification, so dear to your practical man, so repugnant to your systematizer!

I also fear that as I make this frank confession, I may seem to some of you to throw our compass overboard, and to adopt caprice as our pilot. Skepticism or wayward choice, you may think, can be the only results of such a formless method as I have taken up. A few remarks in deprecation of such an opinion, and in farther explanation of the empiricist principles which I profess, may therefore appear at this point to be in place.

Abstractly, it would seem illogical to try to measure the worth of a religion’s fruits in merely human terms of value. How *can* you measure their worth without considering whether the God really exists who is supposed to inspire them? If he really exists, then all the conduct instituted by men to meet his wants must necessarily be a reasonable fruit of his religion,—it would be

unreasonable only in case he did not exist. If, for instance, you were to condemn a religion of human or animal sacrifices by virtue of your subjective sentiments, and if all the while a deity were really there demanding such sacrifices, you would be making a theoretical mistake by tacitly assuming that the deity must be non-existent; you would be setting up a theology of your own as much as if you were a scholastic philosopher.

To this extent, to the extent of disbelieving peremptorily in certain types of deity, I frankly confess that we must be theologians. If disbeliefs can be said to constitute a theology, then the prejudices, instincts, and common sense which I chose as our guides make theological partisans of us whenever they make certain beliefs abhorrent.

But such common-sense prejudices and instincts are themselves the fruit of an empirical evolution. Nothing is more striking than the secular alteration that goes on in the moral and religious tone of men, as their insight into nature and their social arrangements progressively develop. After an interval of a few generations the mental climate proves unfavorable to notions of the deity which at an earlier date were perfectly satisfactory: the older gods have fallen below the common secular level, and can no longer be believed in. To-day a deity who should require bleeding sacrifices to placate him would be too sanguinary to be taken seriously. Even if powerful historical credentials were put forward in his favor, we would not look at them. Once, on the contrary, his cruel appetites were of themselves credentials. They positively recommended him to men's imaginations in ages when such coarse signs of power were respected and no others could be understood. Such deities then were worshiped because such fruits were relished.

Doubtless historic accidents always played some later part, but the original factor in fixing the figure of the gods must always have been psychological. The deity to whom the prophets, seers, and devotees who founded the particular cult bore witness was worth something to them personally. They could use him. He guided their imagination, warranted their hopes, and controlled their will, — or else they required him as a safeguard against the demon and a curber of other people's crimes. In any case, they chose him for the value of the fruits he seemed to them to yield. So soon as the fruits began to seem quite worthless; so soon as they conflicted with indispensable human ideals, or thwarted too extensively other values; so soon as they appeared childish, contemptible, or immoral when reflected on, the deity grew discredited, and was ere long neglected and forgotten. It was in this way that the Greek and Roman gods ceased to be believed in by educated pagans; it is thus that we ourselves judge of the Hindu, Buddhist, and Mohammedan theologies; Protestants have so dealt with the Catholic notions of deity, and liberal Protestants with older Protestant notions; it is thus that Chinamen judge of us, and that all of us now living will be judged by our descendants. When we cease to admire or approve what the definition of a deity implies, we end by deeming that deity incredible.

Few historic changes are more curious than these mutations of theological opinion. The monarchical type of sovereignty was, for example, so ineradicably planted in the mind of our own forefathers that a dose of cruelty and arbitrariness in their deity seems positively to have been required by their imagination. They called the cruelty 'retributive justice,' and a God without it would certainly have struck them as not 'sovereign' enough. But

to-day we abhor the very notion of eternal suffering inflicted; and that arbitrary dealing-out of salvation and damnation to selected individuals, of which Jonathan Edwards could persuade himself that he had not only a conviction, but a 'delightful conviction,' as of a doctrine 'exceeding pleasant, bright, and sweet,' appears to us, if sovereignly anything, sovereignly irrational and mean. Not only the cruelty, but the paltriness of character of the gods believed in by earlier centuries also strikes later centuries with surprise. We shall see examples of it from the annals of Catholic saintship which make us rub our Protestant eyes. Ritual worship in general appears to the modern transcendentalist, as well as to the ultra-puritanic type of mind, as if addressed to a deity of an almost absurdly childish character, taking delight in toy-shop furniture, tapers and tinsel, costume and mumbling and mumery, and finding his 'glory' incomprehensibly enhanced thereby;—just as on the other hand the formless spaciousness of pantheism appears quite empty to ritualistic natures, and the gaunt theism of evangelical sects seems intolerably bald and chalky and bleak. Luther, says Emerson, would have cut off his right hand rather than nail his theses to the door at Wittenberg, if he had supposed that they were destined to lead to the pale negations of Boston Unitarianism.

So far, then, although we are compelled, whatever may be our pretensions to empiricism, to employ some sort of a standard of theological probability of our own whenever we assume to estimate the fruits of other men's religion, yet this very standard has been begotten out of the drift of common life. It is the voice of human experience within us, judging and condemning all gods that stand athwart the pathway along which it feels itself to be advancing. Experience, if we take it in the largest sense, is

thus the parent of those disbeliefs which, it was charged, were inconsistent with the experiential method. The inconsistency, you see, is immaterial, and the charge may be neglected.

If we pass from disbeliefs to positive beliefs, it seems to me that there is not even a formal inconsistency to be laid against our method. The gods we stand by are the gods we need and can use, the gods whose demands on us are reinforcements of our demands on ourselves and on one another. What I then propose to do is, briefly stated, to test saintliness by common sense, to use human standards to help us decide how far the religious life commends itself as an ideal kind of human activity. If it commends itself, then any theological beliefs that may inspire it, in so far forth will stand accredited. If not, then they will be discredited, and all without reference to anything but human working principles. It is but the elimination of the humanly unfit, and the survival of the humanly fittest, applied to religious beliefs; and if we look at history candidly and without prejudice, we have to admit that no religion has ever in the long run established or proved itself in any other way. Religions have *approved* themselves; they have ministered to sundry vital needs which they found reigning. When they violated other needs too strongly, or when other faiths came which served the same needs better, the first religions were supplanted.

The needs were always many, and the tests were never sharp. So the reproach of vagueness and subjectivity and 'on the whole'-ness, which can with perfect legitimacy be addressed to the empirical method as we are forced to use it, is after all a reproach to which the entire life of man in dealing with these matters is obnoxious. No religion has ever yet owed its prevalence to 'apodictic

certainty.' In a later lecture I will ask whether objective certainty can ever be added by theological reasoning to a religion that already empirically prevails.

One word, also, about the reproach that in following this sort of an empirical method we are handing ourselves over to systematic skepticism.

Since it is impossible to deny secular alterations in our sentiments and needs, it would be absurd to affirm that one's own age of the world can be beyond correction by the next age. Skepticism cannot, therefore, be ruled out by any set of thinkers as a possibility against which their conclusions are secure; and no empiricist ought to claim exemption from this universal liability. But to admit one's liability to correction is one thing, and to embark upon a sea of wanton doubt is another. Of willfully playing into the hands of skepticism we cannot be accused. He who acknowledges the imperfectness of his instrument, and makes allowance for it in discussing his observations, is in a much better position for gaining truth than if he claimed his instrument to be infallible. Or is dogmatic or scholastic theology less doubted in point of fact for claiming, as it does, to be in point of right undoubtable? And if not, what command over truth would this kind of theology really lose if, instead of absolute certainty, she only claimed reasonable probability for her conclusions? If *we* claim only reasonable probability, it will be as much as men who love the truth can ever at any given moment hope to have within their grasp. Pretty surely it will be more than we could have had, if we were unconscious of our liability to err.

Nevertheless, dogmatism will doubtless continue to condemn us for this confession. The mere outward form of

inalterable certainty is so precious to some minds that to renounce it explicitly is for them out of the question. They will claim it even where the facts most patently pronounce its folly. But the safe thing is surely to recognize that all the insights of creatures of a day like ourselves must be provisional. The wisest of critics is an altering being, subject to the better insight of the morrow, and right at any moment, only 'up to date' and 'on the whole.' When larger ranges of truth open, it is surely best to be able to open ourselves to their reception, unfettered by our previous pretensions. "Heartily know, when half-gods go, the gods arrive."

The fact of diverse judgments about religious phenomena is therefore entirely unescapable, whatever may be one's own desire to attain the irreversible. But apart from that fact, a more fundamental question awaits us, the question whether men's opinions ought to be expected to be absolutely uniform in this field. Ought all men to have the same religion? Ought they to approve the same fruits and follow the same leadings? Are they so like in their inner needs that, for hard and soft, for proud and humble, for strenuous and lazy, for healthy-minded and despairing, exactly the same religious incentives are required? Or are different functions in the organism of humanity allotted to different types of man, so that some may really be the better for a religion of consolation and reassurance, whilst others are better for one of terror and reproof? It might conceivably be so; and we shall, I think, more and more suspect it to be so as we go on. And if it be so, how can any possible judge or critic help being biased in favor of the religion by which his own needs are best met? He aspires to impartiality; but he is too close to the struggle not to be to some degree a participant, and he is sure to approve

most warmly those fruits of piety in others which taste most good and prove most nourishing to *him*.

I am well aware of how anarchic much of what I say may sound. Expressing myself thus abstractly and briefly, I may seem to despair of the very notion of truth. But I beseech you to reserve your judgment until we see it applied to the details which lie before us. I do indeed disbelieve that we or any other mortal men can attain on a given day to absolutely incorrigible and unimprovable truth about such matters of fact as those with which religions deal. But I reject this dogmatic ideal not out of a perverse delight in intellectual instability. I am no lover of disorder and doubt as such. Rather do I fear to lose truth by this pretension to possess it already wholly. That we can gain more and more of it by moving always in the right direction, I believe as much as any one, and I hope to bring you all to my way of thinking before the termination of these lectures. Till then, do not, I pray you, harden your minds irrevocably against the empiricism which I profess.

I will waste no more words, then, in abstract justification of my method, but seek immediately to use it upon the facts.

In critically judging of the value of religious phenomena, it is very important to insist on the distinction between religion as an individual personal function, and religion as an institutional, corporate, or tribal product. I drew this distinction, you may remember, in my second lecture. The word 'religion,' as ordinarily used, is equivocal. A survey of history shows us that, as a rule, religious geniuses attract disciples, and produce groups of sympathizers. When these groups get strong enough to 'organize' themselves, they become ecclesiastical institu-

tions with corporate ambitions of their own. The spirit of politics and the lust of dogmatic rule are then apt to enter and to contaminate the originally innocent thing; so that when we hear the word 'religion' nowadays, we think inevitably of some 'church' or other; and to some persons the word 'church' suggests so much hypocrisy and tyranny and meanness and tenacity of superstition that in a wholesale undiscerning way they glory in saying that they are 'down' on religion altogether. Even we who belong to churches do not exempt other churches than our own from the general condemnation.

But in this course of lectures ecclesiastical institutions hardly concern us at all. The religious experience which we are studying is that which lives itself out within the private breast. First-hand individual experience of this kind has always appeared as a heretical sort of innovation to those who witnessed its birth. Naked comes it into the world and lonely; and it has always, for a time at least, driven him who had it into the wilderness, often into the literal wilderness out of doors, where the Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, St. Francis, George Fox, and so many others had to go. George Fox expresses well this isolation; and I can do no better at this point than read to you a page from his Journal, referring to the period of his youth when religion began to ferment within him seriously.

"I fasted much," Fox says, "walked abroad in solitary places many days, and often took my Bible, and sat in hollow trees and lonesome places until night came on; and frequently in the night walked mournfully about by myself; for I was a man of sorrows in the time of the first workings of the Lord in me.

"During all this time I was never joined in profession of religion with any, but gave up myself to the Lord, having for-

saken all evil company, taking leave of father and mother, and all other relations, and traveled up and down as a stranger on the earth, which way the Lord inclined my heart; taking a chamber to myself in the town where I came, and tarrying sometimes more, sometimes less in a place: for I durst not stay long in a place, being afraid both of professor and profane, lest, being a tender young man, I should be hurt by conversing much with either. For which reason I kept much as a stranger, seeking heavenly wisdom and getting knowledge from the Lord; and was brought off from outward things, to rely on the Lord alone. As I had forsaken the priests, so I left the separate preachers also, and those called the most experienced people; for I saw there was none among them all that could speak to my condition. And when all my hopes in them and in all men were gone so that I had nothing outwardly to help me, nor could tell what to do; then, oh then, I heard a voice which said, 'There is one, even Jesus Christ, that can speak to thy condition.' When I heard it, my heart did leap for joy. Then the Lord let me see why there was none upon the earth that could speak to my condition. I had not fellowship with any people, priests, nor professors, nor any sort of separated people. I was afraid of all carnal talk and talkers, for I could see nothing but corruptions. When I was in the deep, under all shut up, I could not believe that I should ever overcome; my troubles, my sorrows, and my temptations were so great that I often thought I should have despaired, I was so tempted. But when Christ opened to me how he was tempted by the same devil, and had overcome him, and had bruised his head; and that through him and his power, life, grace, and spirit, I should overcome also, I had confidence in him. If I had had a king's diet, palace, and attendance, all would have been as nothing; for nothing gave me comfort but the Lord by his power. I saw professors, priests, and people were whole and at ease in that condition which was my misery, and they loved that which I would have been rid of. But the Lord did stay my desires upon himself, and my care was cast upon him alone."¹

¹ GEORGE FOX: Journal, Philadelphia, 1800, pp. 59-61, abridged.

A genuine first-hand religious experience like this is bound to be a heterodoxy to its witnesses, the prophet appearing as a mere lonely madman. If his doctrine prove contagious enough to spread to any others, it becomes a definite and labeled heresy. But if it then still prove contagious enough to triumph over persecution, it becomes itself an orthodoxy; and when a religion has become an orthodoxy, its day of inwardness is over: the spring is dry; the faithful live at second hand exclusively and stone the prophets in their turn. The new church, in spite of whatever human goodness it may foster, can be henceforth counted on as a staunch ally in every attempt to stifle the spontaneous religious spirit, and to stop all later bubblings of the fountain from which in purer days it drew its own supply of inspiration. Unless, indeed, by adopting new movements of the spirit it can make capital out of them and use them for its selfish corporate designs! Of protective action of this politic sort, promptly or tardily decided on, the dealings of the Roman ecclesiasticism with many individual saints and prophets yield examples enough for our instruction.

The plain fact is that men's minds are built, as has been often said, in water-tight compartments. Religious after a fashion, they yet have many other things in them beside their religion, and unholy entanglements and associations inevitably obtain. The basenesses so commonly charged to religion's account are thus, almost all of them, not chargeable at all to religion proper, but rather to religion's wicked practical partner, the spirit of corporate dominion. And the bigotries are most of them in their turn chargeable to religion's wicked intellectual partner, the spirit of dogmatic dominion, the passion for laying down the law in the form of an absolutely closed-in theoretic system. The ecclesiastical spirit in general is the

sum of these two spirits of dominion; and I beseech you never to confound the phenomena of mere tribal or corporate psychology which it presents with those manifestations of the purely interior life which are the exclusive object of our study. The baiting of Jews, the hunting of Albigenses and Waldenses, the stoning of Quakers and ducking of Methodists, the murdering of Mormons and the massacring of Armenians, express much rather that aboriginal human neophobia, that pugnacity of which we all share the vestiges, and that inborn hatred of the alien and of eccentric and non-conforming men as aliens, than they express the positive piety of the various perpetrators. Piety is the mask, the inner force is tribal instinct. You believe as little as I do, in spite of the Christian unction with which the German emperor addressed his troops upon their way to China, that the conduct which he suggested, and in which other Christian armies went beyond them, had anything whatever to do with the interior religious life of those concerned in the performance.

Well, no more for past atrocities than for this atrocity should we make piety responsible. At most we may blame piety for not availing to check our natural passions, and sometimes for supplying them with hypocritical pretexts. But hypocrisy also imposes obligations, and with the pretext usually couples some restriction; and when the passion gust is over, the piety may bring a reaction of repentance which the irreligious natural man would not have shown.

For many of the historic aberrations which have been laid to her charge, religion as such, then, is not to blame. Yet of the charge that over-zealousness or fanaticism is one of her liabilities we cannot wholly acquit her, so I will next make a remark upon that point. But I will

preface it by a preliminary remark which connects itself with much that follows.

Our survey of the phenomena of saintliness has unquestionably produced in your minds an impression of extravagance. Is it necessary, some of you have asked, as one example after another came before us, to be quite so fantastically good as that? We who have no vocation for the extremer ranges of sanctity will surely be let off at the last day if our humility, asceticism, and devoutness prove of a less convulsive sort. This practically amounts to saying that much that it is legitimate to admire in this field need nevertheless not be imitated, and that religious phenomena, like all other human phenomena, are subject to the law of the golden mean. Political reformers accomplish their successive tasks in the history of nations by being blind for the time to other causes. Great schools of art work out the effects which it is their mission to reveal, at the cost of a one-sidedness for which other schools must make amends. We accept a John Howard, a Mazzini, a Botticelli, a Michael Angelo, with a kind of indulgence. We are glad they existed to show us that way, but we are glad there are also other ways of seeing and taking life. So of many of the saints whom we have looked at. We are proud of a human nature that could be so passionately extreme, but we shrink from advising others to follow the example. The conduct we blame ourselves for not following lies nearer to the middle line of human effort. It is less dependent on particular beliefs and doctrines. It is such as wears well in different ages, such as under different skies all judges are able to commend.

The fruits of religion, in other words, are, like all human products, liable to corruption by excess. Common

sense must judge them. It need not blame the votary ; but it may be able to praise him only conditionally, as one who acts faithfully according to his lights. He shows us heroism in one way, but the unconditionally good way is that for which no indulgence need be asked.

We find that error by excess is exemplified by every saintly virtue. Excess, in human faculties, means usually one-sidedness or want of balance ; for it is hard to imagine an essential faculty too strong, if only other faculties equally strong be there to coöperate with it in action. Strong affections need a strong will ; strong active powers need a strong intellect ; strong intellect needs strong sympathies, to keep life steady. If the balance exist, no one faculty can possibly be too strong — we only get the stronger all-round character. In the life of saints, technically so called, the spiritual faculties are strong, but what gives the impression of extravagance proves usually on examination to be a relative deficiency of intellect. Spiritual excitement takes pathological forms whenever other interests are too few and the intellect too narrow. We find this exemplified by all the saintly attributes in turn — devout love of God, purity, charity, asceticism, all may lead astray. I will run over these virtues in succession.

First of all let us take Devoutness. When unbalanced, one of its vices is called Fanaticism. Fanaticism (when not a mere expression of ecclesiastical ambition) is only loyalty carried to a convulsive extreme. When an intensely loyal and narrow mind is once grasped by the feeling that a certain superhuman person is worthy of its exclusive devotion, one of the first things that happens is that it idealizes the devotion itself. To adequately realize the merits of the idol gets to be considered the

one great merit of the worshiper; and the sacrifices and servilities by which savage tribesmen have from time immemorial exhibited their faithfulness to chieftains are now outbid in favor of the deity. Vocabularies are exhausted and languages altered in the attempt to praise him enough; death is looked on as gain if it attract his grateful notice; and the personal attitude of being his devotee becomes what one might almost call a new and exalted kind of professional specialty within the tribe.¹ The legends that gather round the lives of holy persons are fruits of this impulse to celebrate and glorify. The Buddha² and Mohammed³ and their companions and many Christian saints are incrustated with a heavy jewelry

¹ Christian saints have had their specialties of devotion, Saint Francis to Christ's wounds; Saint Anthony of Padua to Christ's childhood; Saint Bernard to his humanity; Saint Teresa to Saint Joseph, etc. The Shi-ite Mohammedans venerate Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, instead of Abu-bekr, his brother-in-law. Vambéry describes a dervish whom he met in Persia, "who had solemnly vowed, thirty years before, that he would never employ his organs of speech otherwise but in uttering, everlastingly, the name of his favorite, *Ali, Ali*. He thus wished to signify to the world that he was the most devoted partisan of that Ali who had been dead a thousand years. In his own home, speaking with his wife, children, and friends, no other word but 'Ali!' ever passed his lips. If he wanted food or drink or anything else, he expressed his wants still by repeating 'Ali!' Begging or buying at the bazaar, it was always 'Ali!' Treated ill or generously, he would still harp on his monotonous 'Ali!' Latterly his zeal assumed such tremendous proportions that, like a madman, he would race, the whole day, up and down the streets of the town, throwing his stick high up into the air, and shriek out, all the while, at the top of his voice, 'Ali!' This dervish was venerated by everybody as a saint, and received everywhere with the greatest distinction." ARMINIUS VAMBÉRY, *his Life and Adventures*, written by Himself, London, 1889, p. 69. On the anniversary of the death of Hussein, Ali's son, the Shi-ite Moslems still make the air resound with cries of his name and Ali's.

² Compare H. C. WARREN: *Buddhism in Translation*, Cambridge, U. S., 1898, *passim*.

³ Compare J. L. MERRICK: *The Life and Religion of Mohammed*, as contained in the Sheeah traditions of the Hyat-ul-Kuloob, Boston, 1850, *passim*.

of anecdotes which are meant to be honorific, but are simply *abgeschmackt* and silly, and form a touching expression of man's misguided propensity to praise.

An immediate consequence of this condition of mind is jealousy for the deity's honor. How can the devotee show his loyalty better than by sensitiveness in this regard? The slightest affront or neglect must be resented, the deity's enemies must be put to shame. In exceedingly narrow minds and active wills, such a care may become an engrossing preoccupation; and crusades have been preached and massacres instigated for no other reason than to remove a fancied slight upon the God. Theologies representing the gods as mindful of their glory, and churches with imperialistic policies, have conspired to fan this temper to a glow, so that intolerance and persecution have come to be vices associated by some of us inseparably with the saintly mind. They are unquestionably its besetting sins. The saintly temper is a moral temper, and a moral temper has often to be cruel. It is a partisan temper, and that is cruel. Between his own and Jehovah's enemies a David knows no difference; a Catherine of Siena, panting to stop the warfare among Christians which was the scandal of her epoch, can think of no better method of union among them than a crusade to massacre the Turks; Luther finds no word of protest or regret over the atrocious tortures with which the Anabaptist leaders were put to death; and a Cromwell praises the Lord for delivering his enemies into his hands for 'execution.' Politics come in in all such cases; but piety finds the partnership not quite unnatural. So, when 'freethinkers' tell us that religion and fanaticism are twins, we cannot make an unqualified denial of the charge.

Fanaticism must then be inscribed on the wrong side

of religion's account, so long as the religious person's intellect is on the stage which the despotic kind of God satisfies. But as soon as the God is represented as less intent on his own honor and glory, it ceases to be a danger.

Fanaticism is found only where the character is masterful and aggressive. In gentle characters, where devoutness is intense and the intellect feeble, we have an imaginative absorption in the love of God to the exclusion of all practical human interests, which, though innocent enough, is too one-sided to be admirable. A mind too narrow has room but for one kind of affection. When the love of God takes possession of such a mind, it expels all human loves and human uses. There is no English name for such a sweet excess of devotion, so I will refer to it as a *theopathic* condition.

The blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque may serve as an example.

"To be loved here upon the earth," her recent biographer exclaims: "to be loved by a noble, elevated, distinguished being; to be loved with fidelity, with devotion, — what enchantment! But to be loved by God! and loved by him to distraction [aimé jusqu'à la folie]! — Margaret melted away with love at the thought of such a thing. Like Saint Philip of Neri in former times, or like Saint Francis Xavier, she said to God: 'Hold back, O my God, these torrents which overwhelm me, or else enlarge my capacity for their reception.'"¹

The most signal proofs of God's love which Margaret Mary received were her hallucinations of sight, touch, and hearing, and the most signal in turn of these were the revelations of Christ's sacred heart, "surrounded with rays more brilliant than the Sun, and transparent like a crystal. The wound which he received on the cross visibly appeared upon it. There

¹ BOUGAUD: Hist. de la bienheureuse Marguerite Marie, Paris, 1894, p. 145.

was a crown of thorns round about this divine Heart, and a cross above it." At the same time Christ's voice told her that, unable longer to contain the flames of his love for mankind, he had chosen her by a miracle to spread the knowledge of them. He thereupon took out her mortal heart, placed it inside of his own and inflamed it, and then replaced it in her breast, adding: "Hitherto thou hast taken the name of my slave, hereafter thou shalt be called the well-beloved disciple of my Sacred Heart."

In a later vision the Saviour revealed to her in detail the 'great design' which he wished to establish through her instrumentality. "I ask of thee to bring it about that every first Friday after the week of holy Sacrament shall be made into a special holy day for honoring my Heart by a general communion and by services intended to make honorable amends for the indignities which it has received. And I promise thee that my Heart will dilate to shed with abundance the influences of its love upon all those who pay to it these honors, or who bring it about that others do the same."

"This revelation," says Mgr. Bougaud, "is unquestionably the most important of all the revelations which have illumined the Church since that of the Incarnation and of the Lord's Supper. . . . After the Eucharist, the supreme effort of the Sacred Heart."¹ Well, what were its good fruits for Margaret Mary's life? Apparently little else but sufferings and prayers and absences of mind and swoons and ecstasies. She became increasingly useless about the convent, her absorption in Christ's love, —

"which grew upon her daily, rendering her more and more incapable of attending to external duties. They tried her in the infirmary, but without much success, although her kindness, zeal, and devotion were without bounds, and her charity rose to acts of such a heroism that our readers would not bear the recital

¹ BOUGAUD: *Hist. de la bienheureuse Marguerite Marie*, Paris, 1894, pp. 365, 241.

of them. They tried her in the kitchen, but were forced to give it up as hopeless — everything dropped out of her hands. The admirable humility with which she made amends for her clumsiness could not prevent this from being prejudicial to the order and regularity which must always reign in a community. They put her in the school, where the little girls cherished her, and cut pieces out of her clothes [for relics] as if she were already a saint, but where she was too absorbed inwardly to pay the necessary attention. Poor dear sister, even less after her visions than before them was she a denizen of earth, and they had to leave her in her heaven.”¹

Poor dear sister, indeed! Amiable and good, but so feeble of intellectual outlook that it would be too much to ask of us, with our Protestant and modern education, to feel anything but indulgent pity for the kind of saintship which she embodies. A lower example still of theopathic saintliness is that of Saint Gertrude, a Benedictine nun of the thirteenth century, whose ‘Revelations,’ a well-known mystical authority, consist mainly of proofs of Christ’s partiality for her undeserving person. Assurances of his love, intimacies and caresses and compliments of the most absurd and puerile sort, addressed by Christ to Gertrude as an individual, form the tissue of this paltry-minded recital.² In reading such a narrative,

¹ BOUGAUD : *Op. cit.*, p. 267.

² Examples : “Suffering from a headache, she sought, for the glory of God, to relieve herself by holding certain odoriferous substances in her mouth, when the Lord appeared to her to lean over towards her lovingly, and to find comfort Himself in these odors. After having gently breathed them in, He arose, and said with a gratified air to the Saints, as if contented with what He had done : ‘See the new present which my betrothed has given Me !’

“One day, at chapel, she heard supernaturally sung the words, ‘*Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus.*’ The Son of God leaning towards her like a sweet lover, and giving to her soul the softest kiss, said to her at the second *Sanctus* : ‘In this *Sanctus* addressed to my person, receive with this kiss all the sanctity of my divinity and of my humanity, and let it be to thee a sufficient preparation for approaching the communion table.’ And the next follow-

we realize the gap between the thirteenth and the twentieth century, and we feel that saintliness of character may yield almost absolutely worthless fruits if it be associated with such inferior intellectual sympathies. What with science, idealism, and democracy, our own imagination has grown to need a God of an entirely different temperament from that Being interested exclusively in dealing out personal favors, with whom our ancestors were so contented. Smitten as we are with the vision of social righteousness, a God indifferent to everything but adulation, and full of partiality for his individual favorites, lacks an essential element of largeness; and even the best professional sainthood of former centuries, pent in as it is to such a conception, seems to us curiously shallow and unedifying.

Take Saint Teresa, for example, one of the ablest women, in many respects, of whose life we have the record. She had a powerful intellect of the practical order. She wrote admirable descriptive psychology, possessed a will equal to any emergency, great talent for politics and business, a buoyant disposition, and a first-rate literary style. She was tenaciously aspiring, and put her whole life at the service of her religious ideals. Yet so paltry were these, according to our present way of thinking, that (although I know that others have been moved differently) I confess that my only feeling in

ing Sunday, while she was thanking God for this favor, behold the Son of God, more beautiful than thousands of angels, takes her in His arms as if He were proud of her, and presents her to God the Father, in that perfection of sanctity with which He had dowered her. And the Father took such delight in this soul thus presented by His only Son, that, as if unable longer to restrain Himself, He gave her, and the Holy Ghost gave her also, the Sanctity attributed to each by His own *Sanctus* — and thus she remained endowed with the plenary fullness of the blessing of *Sanctity*, bestowed on her by Omnipotence, by Wisdom, and by Love." *Révélation de Sainte Gertrude*, Paris, 1898, i. 44, 186.

reading her has been pity that so much vitality of soul should have found such poor employment.

In spite of the sufferings which she endured, there is a curious flavor of superficiality about her genius. A Birmingham anthropologist, Dr. Jordan, has divided the human race into two types, whom he calls 'shrews' and 'non-shrews' respectively.¹ The shrew-type is defined as possessing an 'active unimpassioned temperament.' In other words, shrews are the 'motors,' rather than the 'sensories,'² and their expressions are as a rule more energetic than the feelings which appear to prompt them. Saint Teresa, paradoxical as such a judgment may sound, was a typical shrew, in this sense of the term. The bustle of her style, as well as of her life, proves it. Not only must she receive unheard-of personal favors and spiritual graces from her Saviour, but she must immediately write about them and *exploiter* them professionally, and use her expertness to give instruction to those less privileged. Her voluble egotism; her sense, not of radical bad being, as the really contrite have it, but of her 'faults' and 'imperfections' in the plural; her stereotyped humility and return upon herself, as covered with 'confusion' at each new manifestation of God's singular partiality for a person so unworthy, are typical of shrewdom: a paramously feeling nature would be objectively lost in gratitude, and silent. She had some public instincts, it is true; she hated the Lutherans, and longed for the church's triumph over them; but in the main her idea of religion seems to have been that of an endless amatory flirtation — if one may say so without irrever-

¹ FURNEAUX JORDAN: *Character in Birth and Parentage*, first edition. Later editions change the nomenclature.

² As to this distinction, see the admirably practical account in J. M. BALDWIN's little book, *The Story of the Mind*, 1898.

ence — between the devotee and the deity ; and apart from helping younger nuns to go in this direction by the inspiration of her example and instruction, there is absolutely no human use in her, or sign of any general human interest. Yet the spirit of her age, far from rebuking her, exalted her as superhuman.

We have to pass a similar judgment on the whole notion of saintship based on merits. Any God who, on the one hand, can care to keep a pedantically minute account of individual shortcomings, and on the other can feel such partialities, and load particular creatures with such insipid marks of favor, is too small-minded a God for our credence. When Luther, in his immense manly way, swept off by a stroke of his hand the very notion of a debit and credit account kept with individuals by the Almighty, he stretched the soul's imagination and saved theology from puerility.

So much for mere devotion, divorced from the intellectual conceptions which might guide it towards bearing useful human fruit.

The next saintly virtue in which we find excess is Purity. In theopathic characters, like those whom we have just considered, the love of God must not be mixed with any other love. Father and mother, sisters, brothers, and friends are felt as interfering distractions ; for sensitiveness and narrowness, when they occur together, as they often do, require above all things a simplified world to dwell in. Variety and confusion are too much for their powers of comfortable adaptation. But whereas your aggressive pietist reaches his unity objectively, by forcibly stamping disorder and divergence out, your retiring pietist reaches his subjectively, leaving disorder in the world at large, but making a smaller world in which he dwells

himself and from which he eliminates it altogether. Thus, alongside of the church militant with its prisons, dragonnades, and inquisition methods, we have the church *fugient*, as one might call it, with its hermitages, monasteries, and sectarian organizations, both churches pursuing the same object — to unify the life,¹ and simplify the spectacle presented to the soul. A mind extremely sensitive to inner discords will drop one external relation after another, as interfering with the absorption of consciousness in spiritual things. Amusements must go first, then conventional 'society,' then business, then family duties, until at last seclusion, with a subdivision of the day into hours for stated religious acts, is the only thing that can be borne. The lives of saints are a history of successive renunciations of complication, one form of contact with the outer life being dropped after another, to save the purity of inner tone.² "Is it not better," a young sister

¹ On this subject I refer to the work of M. MURISIER (*Les Maladies du Sentiment Religieux*, Paris, 1901), who makes inner unification the main-spring of the whole religious life. But *all* strongly ideal interests, religious or irreligious, unify the mind and tend to subordinate everything to themselves. One would infer from M. Murisier's pages that this formal condition was peculiarly characteristic of religion, and that one might in comparison almost neglect material content, in studying the latter. I trust that the present work will convince the reader that religion has plenty of material content which is characteristic, and which is more important by far than any general psychological form. In spite of this criticism, I find M. Murisier's book highly instructive.

² Example: "At the first beginning of the Servitor's [Suso's] interior life, after he had purified his soul properly by confession, he marked out for himself, in thought, three circles, within which he shut himself up, as in a spiritual intrenchment. The first circle was his cell, his chapel, and the choir. When he was within this circle, he seemed to himself in complete security. The second circle was the whole monastery as far as the outer gate. The third and outermost circle was the gate itself, and here it was necessary for him to stand well upon his guard. When he went outside these circles, it seemed to him that he was in the plight of some wild animal which is outside its hole, and surrounded by the hunt, and therefore in need of all its cunning and watchfulness." *The Life of the Blessed Henry Suso, by Himself*, translated by KNOX, London, 1865, p. 168.

When he was seventeen years old Louis joined the Jesuit order,¹ against his father's passionate entreaties, for he was heir of a princely house; and when a year later the father died, he took the loss as a 'particular attention' to himself on God's part, and wrote letters of stilted good advice, as from a spiritual superior, to his grieving mother. He soon became so good a monk that if any one asked him the number of his brothers and sisters, he had to reflect and count them over before replying. A Father asked him one day if he were never troubled by the thought of his family, to which, "I never think of them except when praying for them," was his only answer. Never was he seen to hold in his hand a flower or anything perfumed, that he might take pleasure in it. On the contrary, in the hospital, he used to seek for whatever was most disgusting, and eagerly snatch the bandages of ulcers, etc., from the hands of his companions. He avoided worldly talk, and immediately tried to turn every conversation on to pious subjects, or else he remained silent. He systematically refused to notice his surroundings. Being ordered one day to bring a book from the rector's seat in the refectory, he had to ask where the rector sat, for in the three months he had eaten bread there, so carefully did he guard his eyes that he had not noticed the place. One day, during recess, having looked by chance on one of his companions, he reproached himself as for a grave sin against modesty. He cultivated silence, as preserving from sins of the tongue; and his greatest penance was the limit which his superiors set to his bodily penances. He sought after

¹ In his boyish note-book he praises the monastic life for its freedom from sin, and for the imperishable treasures, which it enables us to store up, "of merit in God's eyes which makes of Him our debtor for all Eternity." *Loc. cit.*, p. 62.

false accusations and unjust reprimands as opportunities of humility; and such was his obedience that, when a room-mate, having no more paper, asked him for a sheet, he did not feel free to give it to him without first obtaining the permission of the superior, who, as such, stood in the place of God, and transmitted his orders.

I can find no other sorts of fruit than these of Louis's saintship. He died in 1591, in his twenty-ninth year, and is known in the Church as the patron of all young people. On his festival, the altar in the chapel devoted to him in a certain church in Rome "is embosomed in flowers, arranged with exquisite taste; and a pile of letters may be seen at its foot, written to the Saint by young men and women, and directed to 'Paradiso.' They are supposed to be burnt unread except by San Luigi, who must find singular petitions in these pretty little missives, tied up now with a green ribbon, expressive of hope, now with a red one, emblematic of love," etc.¹

¹ Mademoiselle Mori, a novel quoted in HARE'S *Walks in Rome*, 1900, i. 55.

I cannot resist the temptation to quote from Starbuck's book, p. 388, another case of purification by elimination. It runs as follows:—

"The signs of abnormality which sanctified persons show are of frequent occurrence. They get out of tune with other people; often they will have nothing to do with churches, which they regard as worldly; they become hypercritical towards others; they grow careless of their social, political, and financial obligations. As an instance of this type may be mentioned a woman of sixty-eight of whom the writer made a special study. She had been a member of one of the most active and progressive churches in a busy part of a large city. Her pastor described her as having reached the censorious stage. She had grown more and more out of sympathy with the church; her connection with it finally consisted simply in attendance at prayer-meeting, at which her only message was that of reproof and condemnation of the others for living on a low plane. At last she withdrew from fellowship with any church. The writer found her living alone in a little room on the top story of a cheap boarding-house, quite out of touch with all human relations, but apparently happy in the enjoyment of her

Our final judgment of the worth of such a life as this will depend largely on our conception of God, and of the sort of conduct he is best pleased with in his creatures. The Catholicism of the sixteenth century paid little heed to social righteousness; and to leave the world to the devil whilst saving one's own soul was then accounted no discreditable scheme. To-day, rightly or wrongly, helpfulness in general human affairs is, in consequence of one of those secular mutations in moral sentiment of which I spoke, deemed an essential element of worth in character; and to be of some public or private use is also reckoned as a species of divine service. Other early Jesuits, especially the missionaries among them, the Xaviers, Brébeufs, Jogues, were objective minds, and fought in their way for the world's welfare; so their lives to-day inspire us. But when the intellect, as in this Louis, is originally no larger than a pin's head, and cherishes ideas of God of corresponding smallness, the result, notwithstanding the heroism put forth, is on the whole repulsive. Purity, we see in the object-lesson, is *not* the one thing needful; and it is better that a life should contract many a dirt-mark, than forfeit usefulness in its efforts to remain unspotted.

own spiritual blessings. Her time was occupied in writing booklets on sanctification — page after page of dreamy rhapsody. She proved to be one of a small group of persons who claim that entire salvation involves three steps instead of two; not only must there be conversion and sanctification, but a third, which they call 'crucifixion' or 'perfect redemption,' and which seems to bear the same relation to sanctification that this bears to conversion. She related how the Spirit had said to her, 'Stop going to church. Stop going to holiness meetings. Go to your own room and I will teach you.' She professes to care nothing for colleges, or preachers, or churches, but only cares to listen to what God says to her. Her description of her experience seemed entirely consistent; she is happy and contented, and her life is entirely satisfactory to herself. While listening to her own story, one was tempted to forget that it was from the life of a person who could not live by it in conjunction with her fellows."

Proceeding onwards in our search of religious extravagance, we next come upon excesses of Tenderness and Charity. Here saintliness has to face the charge of preserving the unfit, and breeding parasites and beggars. 'Resist not evil,' 'Love your enemies,' these are saintly maxims of which men of this world find it hard to speak without impatience. Are the men of this world right, or are the saints in possession of the deeper range of truth?

No simple answer is possible. Here, if anywhere, one feels the complexity of the moral life, and the mysteriousness of the way in which facts and ideals are interwoven.

Perfect conduct is a relation between three terms: the actor, the objects for which he acts, and the recipients of the action. In order that conduct should be abstractly perfect, all three terms, intention, execution, and reception, should be suited to one another. The best intention will fail if it either work by false means or address itself to the wrong recipient. Thus no critic or estimator of the value of conduct can confine himself to the actor's animus alone, apart from the other elements of the performance. As there is no worse lie than a truth misunderstood by those who hear it, so reasonable arguments, challenges to magnanimity, and appeals to sympathy or justice, are folly when we are dealing with human crocodiles and boa-constrictors. The saint may simply give the universe into the hands of the enemy by his trustfulness. He may by non-resistance cut off his own survival.

Herbert Spencer tells us that the perfect man's conduct will appear perfect only when the environment is perfect: to no inferior environment is it suitably adapted. We may paraphrase this by cordially admitting that

saintly conduct would be the most perfect conduct conceivable in an environment where all were saints already ; but by adding that in an environment where few are saints, and many the exact reverse of saints, it must be ill adapted. We must frankly confess, then, using our empirical common sense and ordinary practical prejudices, that in the world that actually is, the virtues of sympathy, charity, and non-resistance may be, and often have been, manifested in excess. The powers of darkness have systematically taken advantage of them. The whole modern scientific organization of charity is a consequence of the failure of simply giving alms. The whole history of constitutional government is a commentary on the excellence of resisting evil, and when one cheek is smitten, of smiting back and not turning the other cheek also.

You will agree to this in general, for in spite of the Gospel, in spite of Quakerism, in spite of Tolstoi, you believe in fighting fire with fire, in shooting down usurpers, locking up thieves, and freezing out vagabonds and swindlers.

And yet you are sure, as I am sure, that were the world confined to these hard-headed, hard-hearted, and hard-fisted methods exclusively, were there no one prompt to help a brother first, and find out afterwards whether he were worthy ; no one willing to drown his private wrongs in pity for the wronger's person ; no one ready to be duped many a time rather than live always on suspicion ; no one glad to treat individuals passionately and impulsively rather than by general rules of prudence ; the world would be an infinitely worse place than it is now to live in. The tender grace, not of a day that is dead, but of a day yet to be born somehow, with the golden rule grown natural, would be cut out from the perspective of our imaginations.

The saints, existing in this way, may, with their extravagances of human tenderness, be prophetic. Nay, innumerable times they have proved themselves prophetic. Treating those whom they met, in spite of the past, in spite of all appearances, as worthy, they have stimulated them to *be* worthy, miraculously transformed them by their radiant example and by the challenge of their expectation.

From this point of view we may admit the human charity which we find in all saints, and the great excess of it which we find in some saints, to be a genuinely creative social force, tending to make real a degree of virtue which it alone is ready to assume as possible. The saints are authors, *auctores*, increasers, of goodness. The potentialities of development in human souls are unfathomable. So many who seemed irretrievably hardened have in point of fact been softened, converted, regenerated, in ways that amazed the subjects even more than they surprised the spectators, that we never can be sure in advance of any man that his salvation by the way of love is hopeless. We have no right to speak of human crocodiles and boa-constrictors as of fixedly incurable beings. We know not the complexities of personality, the smouldering emotional fires, the other facets of the character-polyhedron, the resources of the subliminal region. St. Paul long ago made our ancestors familiar with the idea that every soul is virtually sacred. Since Christ died for us all without exception, St. Paul said, we must despair of no one. This belief in the essential sacredness of every one expresses itself to-day in all sorts of humane customs and reformatory institutions, and in a growing aversion to the death penalty and to brutality in punishment. The saints, with their extravagance of human tenderness, are the great torch-bearers of this

belief, the tip of the wedge, the clearers of the darkness. Like the single drops which sparkle in the sun as they are flung far ahead of the advancing edge of a wave-crest or of a flood, they show the way and are forerunners. The world is not yet with them, so they often seem in the midst of the world's affairs to be preposterous. Yet they are impregnators of the world, vivifiers and animaters of potentialities of goodness which but for them would lie forever dormant. It is not possible to be quite as mean as we naturally are, when they have passed before us. One fire kindles another; and without that over-trust in human worth which they show, the rest of us would lie in spiritual stagnancy.

Momentarily considered, then, the saint may waste his tenderness and be the dupe and victim of his charitable fever, but the general function of his charity in social evolution is vital and essential. If things are ever to move upward, some one must be ready to take the first step, and assume the risk of it. No one who is not willing to try charity, to try non-resistance as the saint is always willing, can tell whether these methods will or will not succeed. When they do succeed, they are far more powerfully successful than force or worldly prudence. Force destroys enemies; and the best that can be said of prudence is that it keeps what we already have in safety. But non-resistance, when successful, turns enemies into friends; and charity regenerates its objects. These saintly methods are, as I said, creative energies; and genuine saints find in the elevated excitement with which their faith endows them an authority and impressiveness which makes them irresistible in situations where men of shallower nature cannot get on at all without the use of worldly prudence. This practical proof that worldly wisdom may be safely transcended is the saint's

magic gift to mankind.¹ Not only does his vision of a better world console us for the generally prevailing prose

¹ The best missionary lives abound in the victorious combination of non-resistance with personal authority. John G. Paton, for example, in the New Hebrides, among brutish Melanesian cannibals, preserves a charmed life by dint of it. When it comes to the point, no one ever dares actually to strike him. Native converts, inspired by him, showed analogous virtue. "One of our chiefs, full of the Christ-kindled desire to seek and to save, sent a message to an inland chief, that he and four attendants would come on Sabbath and tell them the gospel of Jehovah God. The reply came back sternly forbidding their visit, and threatening with death any Christian that approached their village. Our chief sent in response a loving message, telling them that Jehovah had taught the Christians to return good for evil, and that they would come unarmed to tell them the story of how the Son of God came into the world and died in order to bless and save his enemies. The heathen chief sent back a stern and prompt reply once more: 'If you come, you will be killed.' On Sabbath morn the Christian chief and his four companions were met outside the village by the heathen chief, who implored and threatened them once more. But the former said:—

"'We come to you without weapons of war! We come only to tell you about Jesus. We believe that He will protect us to-day.'

"As they pressed steadily forward towards the village, spears began to be thrown at them. Some they evaded, being all except one dexterous warriors; and others they literally received with their bare hands, and turned them aside in an incredible manner. The heathen, apparently thunderstruck at these men thus approaching them without weapons of war, and not even flinging back their own spears which they had caught, after having thrown what the old chief called 'a shower of spears,' desisted from mere surprise. Our Christian chief called out, as he and his companions drew up in the midst of them on the village public ground:—

"'Jehovah thus protects us. He has given us all your spears! Once we would have thrown them back at you and killed you. But now we come, not to fight but to tell you about Jesus. He has changed our dark hearts. He asks you now to lay down all these your other weapons of war, and to hear what we can tell you about the love of God, our great Father, the only living God.'

"The heathen were perfectly overawed. They manifestly looked on these Christians as protected by some Invisible One. They listened for the first time to the story of the Gospel and of the Cross. We lived to see that chief and all his tribe sitting in the school of Christ. And there is perhaps not an island in these southern seas, amongst all those won for Christ, where similar acts of heroism on the part of converts cannot be recited." JOHN G. PATON, *Missionary to the New Hebrides, An Autobiography*. second part, London, 1890, p. 243.

and barrenness ; but even when on the whole we have to confess him ill adapted, he makes some converts, and the environment gets better for his ministry. He is an effective ferment of goodness, a slow transmuter of the earthly into a more heavenly order.

In this respect the Utopian dreams of social justice in which many contemporary socialists and anarchists indulge are, in spite of their impracticability and non-adaptation to present environmental conditions, analogous to the saint's belief in an existent kingdom of heaven. They help to break the edge of the general reign of hardness, and are slow leavens of a better order.

The next topic in order is Asceticism, which I fancy you are all ready to consider without argument a virtue liable to extravagance and excess. The optimism and refinement of the modern imagination has, as I have already said elsewhere, changed the attitude of the church towards corporeal mortification, and a Suso or a Saint Peter of Alcantara¹ appear to us to-day rather in the

¹ Saint Peter, Saint Teresa tells us in her autobiography (French translation, p. 333), "had passed forty years without ever sleeping more than an hour and a half a day. Of all his mortifications, this was the one that had cost him the most. To compass it, he kept always on his knees or on his feet. The little sleep he allowed nature to take was snatched in a sitting posture, his head leaning against a piece of wood fixed in the wall. Even had he wished to lie down, it would have been impossible, because his cell was only four feet and a half long. In the course of all these years he never raised his hood, no matter what the ardor of the sun or the rain's strength. He never put on a shoe. He wore a garment of coarse sackcloth, with nothing else upon his skin. This garment was as scant as possible, and over it a little cloak of the same stuff. When the cold was great he took off the cloak and opened for a while the door and little window of his cell. Then he closed them and resumed the mantle, — his way, as he told us, of warming himself, and making his body feel a better temperature. It was a frequent thing with him to eat once only in three days ; and when I expressed my surprise, he said that it was very easy if one once had acquired the habit. One of his companions has assured me that he has

light of tragic mountebanks than of sane men inspiring us with respect. If the inner dispositions are right, we ask, what need of all this torment, this violation of the outer nature? It keeps the outer nature too important. Any one who is genuinely emancipated from the flesh will look on pleasures and pains, abundance and privation, as alike irrelevant and indifferent. He can engage in actions and experience enjoyments without fear of corruption or enslavement. As the Bhagavad-Gita says, only those need renounce worldly actions who are still inwardly attached thereto. If one be really unattached to the fruits of action, one may mix in the world with equanimity. I quoted in a former lecture Saint Augustine's antinomian saying: If you only love God enough, you may safely follow all your inclinations. "He needs no devotional practices," is one of Ramakrishna's maxims, "whose heart is moved to tears at the mere mention of the name of Hari."¹ And the Buddha, in pointing out what he called 'the middle way' to his disciples, told them to abstain from both extremes, excessive mortification being as unreal and unworthy as mere desire and pleasure. The only perfect life, he said, is that of inner wisdom, which makes one thing as indifferent to

gone sometimes eight days without food. . . . His poverty was extreme ; and his mortification, even in his youth, was such that he told me he had passed three years in a house of his order without knowing any of the monks otherwise than by the sound of their voice, for he never raised his eyes, and only found his way about by following the others. He showed this same modesty on public highways. He spent many years without ever laying eyes upon a woman ; but he confessed to me that at the age he had reached it was indifferent to him whether he laid eyes on them or not. He was very old when I first came to know him, and his body so attenuated that it seemed formed of nothing so much as of so many roots of trees. With all this sanctity he was very affable. He never spoke unless he was questioned, but his intellectual right-mindedness and grace gave to all his words an irresistible charm."

¹ F. MAX MÜLLER : *Ramakrishna, his Life and Sayings*, 1899, p. 180.

us as another, and thus leads to rest, to peace, and to Nirvâna.¹

We find accordingly that as ascetic saints have grown older, and directors of conscience more experienced, they usually have shown a tendency to lay less stress on special bodily mortifications. Catholic teachers have always professed the rule that, since health is needed for efficiency in God's service, health must not be sacrificed to mortification. The general optimism and healthy-mindedness of liberal Protestant circles to-day makes mortification for mortification's sake repugnant to us. We can no longer sympathize with cruel deities, and the notion that God can take delight in the spectacle of sufferings self-inflicted in his honor is abhorrent. In consequence of all these motives you probably are disposed, unless some special utility can be shown in some individual's discipline, to treat the general tendency to asceticism as pathological.

Yet I believe that a more careful consideration of the whole matter, distinguishing between the general good intention of asceticism and the uselessness of some of the particular acts of which it may be guilty, ought to rehabilitate it in our esteem. For in its spiritual meaning asceticism stands for nothing less than for the essence of the twice-born philosophy. It symbolizes, lamely enough no doubt, but sincerely, the belief that there is an element of real wrongness in this world, which is neither to be ignored nor evaded, but which must be squarely met and overcome by an appeal to the soul's heroic resources, and neutralized and cleansed away by suffering. As against this view, the ultra-optimistic form of the once-born philosophy thinks we may treat evil by the method of ignoring. Let a man who, by fortunate health and cir-

¹ OLDENBERG: Buddha; translated by W. HOEY, London, 1882, p. 127.

cumstances, escapes the suffering of any great amount of evil in his own person, also close his eyes to it as it exists in the wider universe outside his private experience, and he will be quit of it altogether, and can sail through life happily on a healthy-minded basis. But we saw in our lectures on melancholy how precarious this attempt necessarily is. Moreover it is but for the individual; and leaves the evil outside of him, unredeemed and unprovided for in his philosophy.

No such attempt can be a *general* solution of the problem; and to minds of sombre tinge, who naturally feel life as a tragic mystery, such optimism is a shallow dodge or mean evasion. It accepts, in lieu of a real deliverance, what is a lucky personal accident merely, a cranny to escape by. It leaves the general world unhelped and still in the clutch of Satan. The real deliverance, the twice-born folk insist, must be of universal application. Pain and wrong and death must be fairly met and overcome in higher excitement, or else their sting remains essentially unbroken. If one has ever taken the fact of the prevalence of tragic death in this world's history fairly into his mind, — freezing, drowning, entombment alive, wild beasts, worse men, and hideous diseases, — he can with difficulty, it seems to me, continue his own career of worldly prosperity without suspecting that he may all the while not be really inside the game, that he may lack the great initiation.

Well, this is exactly what asceticism thinks; and it voluntarily takes the initiation. Life is neither farce nor genteel comedy, it says, but something we must sit at in mourning garments, hoping its bitter taste will purge us of our folly. The wild and the heroic are indeed such rooted parts of it that healthy-mindedness pure and simple, with its sentimental optimism, can hardly be regarded

by any thinking man as a serious solution. Phrases of neatness, cosiness, and comfort can never be an answer to the sphinx's riddle.

In these remarks I am leaning only upon mankind's common instinct for reality, which in point of fact has always held the world to be essentially a theatre for heroism. In heroism, we feel, life's supreme mystery is hidden. We tolerate no one who has no capacity whatever for it in any direction. On the other hand, no matter what a man's frailties otherwise may be, if he be willing to risk death, and still more if he suffer it heroically, in the service he has chosen, the fact consecrates him forever. Inferior to ourselves in this or that way, if yet we cling to life, and he is able 'to fling it away like a flower' as caring nothing for it, we account him in the deepest way our born superior. Each of us in his own person feels that a high-hearted indifference to life would expiate all his shortcomings.

The metaphysical mystery, thus recognized by common sense, that he who feeds on death that feeds on men possesses life supereminently and excellently, and meets best the secret demands of the universe, is the truth of which asceticism has been the faithful champion. The folly of the cross, so inexplicable by the intellect, has yet its indestructible vital meaning.

Representatively, then, and symbolically, and apart from the vagaries into which the unenlightened intellect of former times may have let it wander, asceticism must, I believe, be acknowledged to go with the profounder way of handling the gift of existence. Naturalistic optimism is mere syllabub and flattery and sponge-cake in comparison. The practical course of action for us, as religious men, would therefore, it seems to me, not be simply to turn our backs upon the ascetic impulse, as most of us to-day

turn them, but rather to discover some outlet for it of which the fruits in the way of privation and hardship might be objectively useful. The older monastic asceticism occupied itself with pathetic futilities, or terminated in the mere egotism of the individual, increasing his own perfection.¹ But is it not possible for us to discard most of these older forms of mortification, and yet find saner channels for the heroism which inspired them?

Does not, for example, the worship of material luxury and wealth, which constitutes so large a portion of the 'spirit' of our age, make somewhat for effeminacy and unmanliness? Is not the exclusively sympathetic and facetious way in which most children are brought up to-day — so different from the education of a hundred years ago, especially in evangelical circles — in danger, in spite of its many advantages, of developing a certain trashiness of fibre? Are there not hereabouts some points of application for a renovated and revised ascetic discipline?

Many of you would recognize such dangers, but would point to athletics, militarism, and individual and national enterprise and adventure as the remedies. These contemporary ideals are quite as remarkable for the energy with which they make for heroic standards of life, as contemporary religion is remarkable for the way in which it neglects them.² War and adventure assuredly keep all who engage in them from treating themselves too tenderly. They demand such incredible efforts, depth

¹ "The vanities of all others may die out, but the vanity of a saint as regards his sainthood is hard indeed to wear away." Ramakrishna, his Life and Sayings, 1899, p. 172.

² "When a church has to be run by oysters, ice-cream, and fun," I read in an American religious paper, "you may be sure that it is running away from Christ." Such, if one may judge by appearances, is the present plight of many of our churches.

beyond depth of exertion, both in degree and in duration, that the whole scale of motivation alters. Discomfort and annoyance, hunger and wet, pain and cold, squalor and filth, cease to have any deterrent operation whatever. Death turns into a commonplace matter, and its usual power to check our action vanishes. With the annulling of these customary inhibitions, ranges of new energy are set free, and life seems cast upon a higher plane of power.

The beauty of war in this respect is that it is so congruous with ordinary human nature. Ancestral evolution has made us all potential warriors; so the most insignificant individual, when thrown into an army in the field, is weaned from whatever excess of tenderness towards his precious person he may bring with him, and may easily develop into a monster of insensibility.

But when we compare the military type of self-severity with that of the ascetic saint, we find a world-wide difference in all their spiritual concomitants.

“ ‘Live and let live,’ ” writes a clear-headed Austrian officer, “is no device for an army. Contempt for one’s own comrades, for the troops of the enemy, and, above all, fierce contempt for one’s own person, are what war demands of every one. Far better is it for an army to be too savage, too cruel, too barbarous, than to possess too much sentimentality and human reasonableness. If the soldier is to be good for anything as a soldier, he must be exactly the opposite of a reasoning and thinking man. The measure of goodness in him is his possible use in war. War, and even peace, require of the soldier absolutely peculiar standards of morality. The recruit brings with him common moral notions, of which he must seek immediately to get rid. For him victory, success, must be *everything*. The most barbaric tendencies

in men come to life again in war, and for war's uses they are incommensurably good." ¹

These words are of course literally true. The immediate aim of the soldier's life is, as Moltke said, destruction, and nothing but destruction; and whatever constructions wars result in are remote and non-military. Consequently the soldier cannot train himself to be too feelingless to all those usual sympathies and respects, whether for persons or for things, that make for conservation. Yet the fact remains that war is a school of strenuous life and heroism; and, being in the line of aboriginal instinct, is the only school that as yet is universally available. But when we gravely ask ourselves whether this wholesale organization of irrationality and crime be our only bulwark against effeminacy, we stand aghast at the thought, and think more kindly of ascetic religion. One hears of the mechanical equivalent of heat. What we now need to discover in the social realm is the moral equivalent of war: something heroic that will speak to men as universally as war does, and yet will be as compatible with their spiritual selves as war has proved itself to be incompatible. I have often thought that in the old monkish poverty-worship, in spite of the pedantry which infested it, there might be something like that moral equivalent of war which we are seeking. May not voluntarily accepted poverty be 'the strenuous life,' without the need of crushing weaker peoples?

Poverty indeed is the strenuous life, — without brass bands or uniforms or hysteric popular applause or lies or circumlocutions; and when one sees the way in which wealth-getting enters as an ideal into the very bone and marrow of our generation, one wonders whether a revival

¹ C. V. B. K. : *Friedens- und Kriegs-moral der Heere*. Quoted by HAMON : *Psychologie du Militaire professionnel*, 1895, p. xli.

of the belief that poverty is a worthy religious vocation may not be 'the transformation of military courage,' and the spiritual reform which our time stands most in need of.

Among us English-speaking peoples especially do the praises of poverty need once more to be boldly sung. We have grown literally afraid to be poor. We despise any one who elects to be poor in order to simplify and save his inner life. If he does not join the general scramble and pant with the money-making street, we deem him spiritless and lacking in ambition. We have lost the power even of imagining what the ancient idealization of poverty could have meant: the liberation from material attachments, the unbribed soul, the manlier indifference, the paying our way by what we are or do and not by what we have, the right to fling away our life at any moment irresponsibly, — the more athletic trim, in short, the moral fighting shape. When we of the so-called better classes are scared as men were never scared in history at material ugliness and hardship; when we put off marriage until our house can be artistic, and quake at the thought of having a child without a bank-account and doomed to manual labor, it is time for thinking men to protest against so unmanly and irreligious a state of opinion.

It is true that so far as wealth gives time for ideal ends and exercise to ideal energies, wealth is better than poverty and ought to be chosen. But wealth does this in only a portion of the actual cases. Elsewhere the desire to gain wealth and the fear to lose it are our chief breeders of cowardice and propagators of corruption. There are thousands of conjunctures in which a wealth-bound man must be a slave, whilst a man for whom poverty has no terrors becomes a freeman. Think of the strength which personal indifference to poverty would

give us if we were devoted to unpopular causes. We need no longer hold our tongues or fear to vote the revolutionary or reformatory ticket. Our stocks might fall, our hopes of promotion vanish, our salaries stop, our club doors close in our faces ; yet, while we lived, we would imperturbably bear witness to the spirit, and our example would help to set free our generation. The cause would need its funds, but we its servants would be potent in proportion as we personally were contented with our poverty.

I recommend this matter to your serious pondering, for it is certain that the prevalent fear of poverty among the educated classes is the worst moral disease from which our civilization suffers.

I have now said all that I can usefully say about the several fruits of religion as they are manifested in saintly lives, so I will make a brief review and pass to my more general conclusions.

Our question, you will remember, is as to whether religion stands approved by its fruits, as these are exhibited in the saintly type of character. Single attributes of saintliness may, it is true, be temperamental endowments, found in non-religious individuals. But the whole group of them forms a combination which, as such, is religious, for it seems to flow from the sense of the divine as from its psychological centre. Whoever possesses strongly this sense comes naturally to think that the smallest details of this world derive infinite significance from their relation to an unseen divine order. The thought of this order yields him a superior denomination of happiness, and a steadfastness of soul with which no other can compare. In social relations his serviceability is exemplary ; he abounds in impulses to help. His help is in-

ward as well as outward, for his sympathy reaches souls as well as bodies, and kindles unsuspected faculties therein. Instead of placing happiness where common men place it, in comfort, he places it in a higher kind of inner excitement, which converts discomforts into sources of cheer and annuls unhappiness. So he turns his back upon no duty, however thankless; and when we are in need of assistance, we can count upon the saint lending his hand with more certainty than we can count upon any other person. Finally, his humble-mindedness and his ascetic tendencies save him from the petty personal pretensions which so obstruct our ordinary social intercourse, and his purity gives us in him a clean man for a companion. Felicity, purity, charity, patience, self-severity, — these are splendid excellencies, and the saint of all men shows them in the completest possible measure.

But, as we saw, all these things together do not make saints infallible. When their intellectual outlook is narrow, they fall into all sorts of holy excesses, fanaticism or theopathic absorption, self-torment, prudery, scrupulosity, gullibility, and morbid inability to meet the world. By the very intensity of his fidelity to the paltry ideals with which an inferior intellect may inspire him, a saint can be even more objectionable and damnable than a superficial carnal man would be in the same situation. We must judge him not sentimentally only, and not in isolation, but using our own intellectual standards, placing him in his environment, and estimating his total function.

Now in the matter of intellectual standards, we must bear in mind that it is unfair, where we find narrowness of mind, always to impute it as a vice to the individual, for in religious and theological matters he probably absorbs his narrowness from his generation. Moreover, we

must not confound the essentials of saintliness, which are those general passions of which I have spoken, with its accidents, which are the special determinations of these passions at any historical moment. In these determinations the saints will usually be loyal to the temporary idols of their tribe. Taking refuge in monasteries was as much an idol of the tribe in the middle ages, as bearing a hand in the world's work is to-day. Saint Francis or Saint Bernard, were they living to-day, would undoubtedly be leading consecrated lives of some sort, but quite as undoubtedly they would not lead them in retirement. Our animosity to special historic manifestations must not lead us to give away the saintly impulses in their essential nature to the tender mercies of inimical critics.

The most inimical critic of the saintly impulses whom I know is Nietzsche. He contrasts them with the worldly passions as we find these embodied in the predaceous military character, altogether to the advantage of the latter. Your born saint, it must be confessed, has something about him which often makes the gorge of a carnal man rise, so it will be worth while to consider the contrast in question more fully.

Dislike of the saintly nature seems to be a negative result of the biologically useful instinct of welcoming leadership, and glorifying the chief of the tribe. The chief is the potential, if not the actual tyrant, the masterful, overpowering man of prey. We confess our inferiority and grovel before him. We quail under his glance, and are at the same time proud of owning so dangerous a lord. Such instinctive and submissive hero-worship must have been indispensable in primeval tribal life. In the endless wars of those times, leaders were absolutely needed for the tribe's survival. If there were any tribes who owned no leaders, they can have left no

issue to narrate their doom. The leaders always had good consciences, for conscience in them coalesced with will, and those who looked on their face were as much smitten with wonder at their freedom from inner restraint as with awe at the energy of their outward performances.

Compared with these beaked and taloned graspers of the world, saints are herbivorous animals, tame and harmless barn-yard poultry. There are saints whose beard you may, if you ever care to, pull with impunity. Such a man excites no thrills of wonder veiled in terror; his conscience is full of scruples and returns; he stuns us neither by his inward freedom nor his outward power; and unless he found within us an altogether different faculty of admiration to appeal to, we should pass him by with contempt.

In point of fact, he does appeal to a different faculty. Reënacted in human nature is the fable of the wind, the sun, and the traveler. The sexes embody the discrepancy. The woman loves the man the more admiringly the stormier he shows himself, and the world deifies its rulers the more for being willful and unaccountable. But the woman in turn subjugates the man by the mystery of gentleness in beauty, and the saint has always charmed the world by something similar. Mankind is susceptible and suggestible in opposite directions, and the rivalry of influences is unsleeping. The saintly and the worldly ideal pursue their feud in literature as much as in real life.

For Nietzsche the saint represents little but sneakiness and slavishness. He is the sophisticated invalid, the degenerate *par excellence*, the man of insufficient vitality. His prevalence would put the human type in danger.

“The sick are the greatest danger for the well. The weaker, not the stronger, are the strong’s undoing. It is not *fear* of our fellow-man, which we should wish to see diminished; for

fear rouses those who are strong to become terrible in turn themselves, and preserves the hard-earned and successful type of humanity. What is to be dreaded by us more than any other doom is not fear, but rather the great disgust, not fear, but rather the great pity — disgust and pity for our human fellows. . . . The *morbid* are our greatest peril — not the ‘bad’ men, not the predatory beings. Those born wrong, the miscarried, the broken — they it is, the *weakest*, who are undermining the vitality of the race, poisoning our trust in life, and putting humanity in question. Every look of them is a sigh, — ‘Would I were something other! I am sick and tired of what I am.’ In this swamp-soil of self-contempt, every poisonous weed flourishes, and all so small, so secret, so dishonest, and so sweetly rotten. Here swarm the worms of sensitiveness and resentment; here the air smells odious with secrecy, with what is not to be acknowledged; here is woven endlessly the net of the meanest of conspiracies, the conspiracy of those who suffer against those who succeed and are victorious; here the very aspect of the victorious is hated — as if health, success, strength, pride, and the sense of power were in themselves things vicious, for which one ought eventually to make bitter expiation. Oh, how these people would themselves like to inflict the expiation, how they thirst to be the hangmen! And all the while their duplicity never confesses their hatred to be hatred.”¹

Poor Nietzsche’s antipathy is itself sickly enough, but we all know what he means, and he expresses well the clash between the two ideals. The carnivorous-minded ‘strong man,’ the adult male and cannibal, can see nothing but mouldiness and morbidness in the saint’s gentleness and self-severity, and regards him with pure loathing. The whole feud revolves essentially upon two pivots: Shall the seen world or the unseen world be our chief sphere of adaptation? and must our means of adaptation in this seen world be aggressiveness or non-resistance?

¹ Zur Genealogie der Moral, Dritte Abhandlung, § 14. I have abridged, and in one place transposed, a sentence.

The debate is serious. In some sense and to some degree both worlds must be acknowledged and taken account of; and in the seen world both aggressiveness and non-resistance are needful. It is a question of emphasis, of more or less. Is the saint's type or the strong-man's type the more ideal?

It has often been supposed, and even now, I think, it is supposed by most persons, that there can be one intrinsically ideal type of human character. A certain kind of man, it is imagined, must be the best man absolutely and apart from the utility of his function, apart from economical considerations. The saint's type, and the knight's or gentleman's type, have always been rival claimants of this absolute ideality; and in the ideal of military religious orders both types were in a manner blended. According to the empirical philosophy, however, all ideals are matters of relation. It would be absurd, for example, to ask for a definition of 'the ideal horse,' so long as dragging drays and running races, bearing children, and jogging about with tradesmen's packages all remain as indispensable differentiations of equine function. You may take what you call a general all-round animal as a compromise, but he will be inferior to any horse of a more specialized type, in some one particular direction. We must not forget this now when, in discussing saintliness, we ask if it be an ideal type of manhood. We must test it by its economical relations.

I think that the method which Mr. Spencer uses in his *Data of Ethics* will help to fix our opinion. Ideality in conduct is altogether a matter of adaptation. A society where all were invariably aggressive would destroy itself by inner friction, and in a society where some are aggressive, others must be non-resistant, if there is to be any kind of order. This is the present constitution of soci-

ety, and to the mixture we owe many of our blessings. But the aggressive members of society are always tending to become bullies, robbers, and swindlers; and no one believes that such a state of things as we now live in is the millennium. It is meanwhile quite possible to conceive an imaginary society in which there should be no aggressiveness, but only sympathy and fairness,—any small community of true friends now realizes such a society. Abstractly considered, such a society on a large scale would be the millennium, for every good thing might be realized there with no expense of friction. To such a millennial society the saint would be entirely adapted. His peaceful modes of appeal would be efficacious over his companions, and there would be no one extant to take advantage of his non-resistance. The saint is therefore abstractly a higher type of man than the 'strong man,' because he is adapted to the highest society conceivable, whether that society ever be concretely possible or not. The strong man would immediately tend by his presence to make that society deteriorate. It would become inferior in everything save in a certain kind of bellicose excitement, dear to men as they now are.

But if we turn from the abstract question to the actual situation, we find that the individual saint may be well or ill adapted, according to particular circumstances. There is, in short, no absoluteness in the excellence of sainthood. It must be confessed that as far as this world goes, any one who makes an out-and-out saint of himself does so at his peril. If he is not a large enough man, he may appear more insignificant and contemptible, for all his saintship, than if he had remained a worldling.¹ Accordingly religion has seldom been so radically

¹ We all know *daft* saints, and they inspire a queer kind of aversion. But in comparing saints with strong men we must choose individuals on

taken in our Western world that the devotee could not mix it with some worldly temper. It has always found good men who could follow most of its impulses, but who stopped short when it came to non-resistance. Christ himself was fierce upon occasion. Cromwells, Stonewall Jacksons, Gordons, show that Christians can be strong men also.

How is success to be absolutely measured when there are so many environments and so many ways of looking at the adaptation? It cannot be measured absolutely; the verdict will vary according to the point of view adopted. From the biological point of view Saint Paul was a failure, because he was beheaded. Yet he was magnificently adapted to the larger environment of history; and so far as any saint's example is a leaven of righteousness in the world, and draws it in the direction of more prevalent habits of saintliness, he is a success, no matter what his immediate bad fortune may be. The greatest saints, the spiritual heroes whom every one acknowledges, the Francises, Bernards, Luthers, Loyolas, Wesleys, Channings, Moodys, Gratrays, the Phillips Brooks, the Agnes Joneses, Margaret Hallahans, and Dora Pattisons, are successes from the outset. They show themselves, and there is no question; every one perceives their strength and stature. Their sense of mystery in things, their passion, their goodness, irradiate about them and enlarge their outlines while they soften them. They are like pictures with an atmosphere and background; and, placed alongside of them, the strong men of this world and no other seem as dry as sticks, as hard and crude as blocks of stone or brickbats.

the same intellectual level. The under-witted strong man, homologous in his sphere with the under-witted saint, is the bully of the slums, the hooligan or rowdy. Surely on this level also the saint preserves a certain superiority.

In a general way, then, and 'on the whole,'¹ our abandonment of theological criteria, and our testing of religion by practical common sense and the empirical method, leave it in possession of its towering place in history. Economically, the saintly group of qualities is indispensable to the world's welfare. The great saints are immediate successes; the smaller ones are at least heralds and harbingers, and they may be leavens also, of a better mundane order. Let us be saints, then, if we can, whether or not we succeed visibly and temporally. But in our Father's house are many mansions, and each of us must discover for himself the kind of religion and the amount of saintship which best comports with what he believes to be his powers and feels to be his truest mission and vocation. There are no successes to be guaranteed and no set orders to be given to individuals, so long as we follow the methods of empirical philosophy.

This is my conclusion so far. I know that on some of your minds it leaves a feeling of wonder that such a method should have been applied to such a subject, and this in spite of all those remarks about empiricism which I made at the beginning of Lecture XIII.² How, you say, can religion, which believes in two worlds and an invisible order, be estimated by the adaptation of its fruits to this world's order alone? It is its *truth*, not its utility, you insist, upon which our verdict ought to depend. If religion is true, its fruits are good fruits, even though in this world they should prove uniformly ill adapted and full of naught but pathos. It goes back, then, after all, to the question of the truth of theology. The plot inevitably thickens upon us; we cannot escape theoretical considerations. I propose, then, that to some

¹ See above, p. 327.

² Above, pp. 327-334.

degree we face the responsibility. Religious persons have often, though not uniformly, professed to see truth in a special manner. That manner is known as mysticism. I will consequently now proceed to treat at some length of mystical phenomena, and after that, though more briefly, I will consider religious philosophy.

LECTURES XVI AND XVII

MYSTICISM

OVER and over again in these lectures I have raised points and left them open and unfinished until we should have come to the subject of Mysticism. Some of you, I fear, may have smiled as you noted my reiterated postponements. But now the hour has come when mysticism must be faced in good earnest, and those broken threads wound up together. One may say truly, I think, that personal religious experience has its root and centre in mystical states of consciousness; so for us, who in these lectures are treating personal experience as the exclusive subject of our study, such states of consciousness ought to form the vital chapter from which the other chapters get their light. Whether my treatment of mystical states will shed more light or darkness, I do not know, for my own constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment almost entirely, and I can speak of them only at second hand. But though forced to look upon the subject so externally, I will be as objective and receptive as I can; and I think I shall at least succeed in convincing you of the reality of the states in question, and of the paramount importance of their function.

First of all, then, I ask, What does the expression 'mystical states of consciousness' mean? How do we part off mystical states from other states?

The words 'mysticism' and 'mystical' are often used as terms of mere reproach, to throw at any opinion which we regard as vague and vast and sentimental, and with-

of the subject between the times of their recurrence. Sharp divisions in this region are, however, difficult to make, and we find all sorts of gradations and mixtures.

These four characteristics are sufficient to mark out a group of states of consciousness peculiar enough to deserve a special name and to call for careful study. Let it then be called the mystical group.

Our next step should be to gain acquaintance with some typical examples. Professional mystics at the height of their development have often elaborately organized experiences and a philosophy based thereupon. But you remember what I said in my first lecture: phenomena are best understood when placed within their series, studied in their germ and in their over-ripe decay, and compared with their exaggerated and degenerated kindred. The range of mystical experience is very wide, much too wide for us to cover in the time at our disposal. Yet the method of serial study is so essential for interpretation that if we really wish to reach conclusions we must use it. I will begin, therefore, with phenomena which claim no special religious significance, and end with those of which the religious pretensions are extreme.

The simplest rudiment of mystical experience would seem to be that deepened sense of the significance of a maxim or formula which occasionally sweeps over one. "I've heard that said all my life," we exclaim, "but I never realized its full meaning until now." "When a fellow-monk," said Luther, "one day repeated the words of the Creed: 'I believe in the forgiveness of sins,' I saw the Scripture in an entirely new light; and straightway I felt as if I were born anew. It was as if I had found the door of paradise thrown wide open."¹ This sense

¹ Newman's *Securus judicat orbis terrarum* is another instance.

of deeper significance is not confined to rational propositions. Single words,¹ and conjunctions of words, effects of light on land and sea, odors and musical sounds, all bring it when the mind is tuned aright. Most of us can remember the strangely moving power of passages in certain poems read when we were young, irrational doorways as they were through which the mystery of fact, the wildness and the pang of life, stole into our hearts and thrilled them. The words have now perhaps become mere polished surfaces for us; but lyric poetry and music are alive and significant only in proportion as they fetch these vague vistas of a life continuous with our own, beckoning and inviting, yet ever eluding our pursuit. We are alive or dead to the eternal inner message of the arts according as we have kept or lost this mystical susceptibility.

A more pronounced step forward on the mystical ladder is found in an extremely frequent phenomenon, that sudden feeling, namely, which sometimes sweeps over us, of having 'been here before,' as if at some indefinite past time, in just this place, with just these people, we were already saying just these things. As Tennyson writes:

"Moreover, something is or seems,
That touches me with mystic gleams,
Like glimpses of forgotten dreams —

"Of something felt, like something here;
Of something done, I know not where;
Such as no language may declare."²

¹ 'Mesopotamia' is the stock comic instance. — An excellent old German lady, who had done some traveling in her day, used to describe to me her *Sehnsucht* that she might yet visit 'Philadelp̄hiā,' whose wondrous name had always haunted her imagination. Of John Foster it is said that "single words (as *chalcedony*), or the names of ancient heroes, had a mighty fascination over him. 'At any time the word *hermit* was enough to transport him.' The words *woods* and *forests* would produce the most powerful emotion." Foster's Life, by RYLAND, New York, 1846, p. 3.

² The Two Voices. In a letter to Mr. B. P. Blood, Tennyson reports of himself as follows: —

Sir James Crichton-Browne has given the technical name of 'dreamy states' to these sudden invasions of vaguely reminiscent consciousness.¹ They bring a sense of mystery and of the metaphysical duality of things, and the feeling of an enlargement of perception which seems imminent but which never completes itself. In Dr. Crichton-Browne's opinion they connect themselves with the perplexed and scared disturbances of self-consciousness which occasionally precede epileptic attacks. I think that this learned alienist takes a rather absurdly alarmist view of an intrinsically insignificant phenomenon. He follows it along the downward ladder, to insanity; our path pursues the upward ladder chiefly. The divergence shows how important it is to neglect no part of a phenomenon's connections, for we make it appear admirable or dreadful according to the context by which we set it off.

Somewhat deeper plunges into mystical consciousness are met with in yet other dreamy states. Such feelings

"I have never had any revelations through anæsthetics, but a kind of waking trance — this for lack of a better word — I have frequently had, quite up from boyhood, when I have been all alone. This has come upon me through repeating my own name to myself silently, till all at once, as it were out of the intensity of the consciousness of individuality, individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this not a confused state but the clearest, the surest of the surest, utterly beyond words — where death was an almost laughable impossibility — the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction, but the only true life. I am ashamed of my feeble description. Have I not said the state is utterly beyond words?"

Professor Tyndall, in a letter, recalls Tennyson saying of this condition: "By God Almighty! there is no delusion in the matter! It is no nebulous ecstasy, but a state of transcendent wonder, associated with absolute clearness of mind." *Memoirs of Alfred Tennyson*, ii. 473.

¹ The *Lancet*, July 6 and 13, 1895, reprinted as the Cavendish Lecture, on *Dreamy Mental States*, London, Baillière, 1895. They have been a good deal discussed of late by psychologists. See, for example, BERNARD LEROY: *L'Illusion d'une Fausse Reconnaissance*, Paris, 1898.

as these which Charles Kingsley describes are surely far from being uncommon, especially in youth : —

“ When I walk the fields, I am oppressed now and then with an innate feeling that everything I see has a meaning, if I could but understand it. And this feeling of being surrounded with truths which I cannot grasp amounts to indescribable awe sometimes. . . . Have you not felt that your real soul was imperceptible to your mental vision, except in a few hallowed moments ? ” ¹

A much more extreme state of mystical consciousness is described by J. A. Symonds ; and probably more persons than we suspect could give parallels to it from their own experience.

“ Suddenly,” writes Symonds, “ at church, or in company, or when I was reading, and always, I think, when my muscles were at rest, I felt the approach of the mood. Irresistibly it took possession of my mind and will, lasted what seemed an eternity, and disappeared in a series of rapid sensations which resembled the awakening from anæsthetic influence. One reason why I disliked this kind of trance was that I could not describe it to myself. I cannot even now find words to render it intelligible. It consisted in a gradual but swiftly progressive obliteration of space, time, sensation, and the multitudinous factors of experience which seem to qualify what we are pleased to call our Self. In proportion as these conditions of ordinary consciousness were subtracted, the sense of an underlying or essential consciousness acquired intensity. At last nothing remained but a pure, absolute, abstract Self. The universe became without form and void of content. But Self persisted, formidable in its vivid keenness, feeling the most poignant doubt about reality, ready, as it seemed, to find existence break as breaks a bubble round about it. And what then ? The apprehension of a coming dissolution, the grim conviction that this state was the last state of the conscious Self, the sense that

¹ Charles Kingsley's Life, i. 55, quoted by INGE : *Christian Mysticism*, London, 1899, p. 341.

I had followed the last thread of being to the verge of the abyss, and had arrived at demonstration of eternal Maya or illusion, stirred or seemed to stir me up again. The return to ordinary conditions of sentient existence began by my first recovering the power of touch, and then by the gradual though rapid influx of familiar impressions and diurnal interests. At last I felt myself once more a human being; and though the riddle of what is meant by life remained unsolved, I was thankful for this return from the abyss — this deliverance from so awful an initiation into the mysteries of skepticism.

“This trance recurred with diminishing frequency until I reached the age of twenty-eight. It served to impress upon my growing nature the phantasmal unreality of all the circumstances which contribute to a merely phenomenal consciousness. Often have I asked myself with anguish, on waking from that formless state of denuded, keenly sentient being, Which is the unreality? — the trance of fiery, vacant, apprehensive, skeptical Self from which I issue, or these surrounding phenomena and habits which veil that inner Self and build a self of flesh-and-blood conventionality? Again, are men the factors of some dream, the dream-like unsubstantiality of which they comprehend at such eventful moments? What would happen if the final stage of the trance were reached?”¹

In a recital like this there is certainly something suggestive of pathology.² The next step into mystical states carries us into a realm that public opinion and ethical philosophy have long since branded as pathological, though private practice and certain lyric strains of poetry

¹ H. F. BROWN: J. A. Symonds, a Biography, London, 1895, pp. 29-31, abridged.

² Crichton-Browne expressly says that Symonds's “highest nerve centres were in some degree enfeebled or damaged by these dreamy mental states which afflicted him so grievously.” Symonds was, however, a perfect monster of many-sided cerebral efficiency, and his critic gives no objective grounds whatever for his strange opinion, save that Symonds complained occasionally, as all susceptible and ambitious men complain, of lassitude and uncertainty as to his life's mission.

seem still to bear witness to its ideality. I refer to the consciousness produced by intoxicants and anæsthetics, especially by alcohol. The sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its power to stimulate the mystical faculties of human nature, usually crushed to earth by the cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour. Sobriety diminishes, discriminates, and says no; drunkenness expands, unites, and says yes. It is in fact the great exciter of the *Yes* function in man. It brings its votary from the chill periphery of things to the radiant core. It makes him for the moment one with truth. Not through mere perversity do men run after it. To the poor and the unlettered it stands in the place of symphony concerts and of literature; and it is part of the deeper mystery and tragedy of life that whiffs and gleams of something that we immediately recognize as excellent should be vouchsafed to so many of us only in the fleeting earlier phases of what in its totality is so degrading a poisoning. The drunken consciousness is one bit of the mystic consciousness, and our total opinion of it must find its place in our opinion of that larger whole.

Nitrous oxide and ether, especially nitrous oxide, when sufficiently diluted with air, stimulate the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree. Depth beyond depth of truth seems revealed to the inhaler. This truth fades out, however, or escapes, at the moment of coming to; and if any words remain over in which it seemed to clothe itself, they prove to be the veriest nonsense. Nevertheless, the sense of a profound meaning having been there persists; and I know more than one person who is persuaded that in the nitrous oxide trance we have a genuine metaphysical revelation.

Some years ago I myself made some observations on this aspect of nitrous oxide intoxication, and reported

them in print. One conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time, and my impression of its truth has ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question, — for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality. Looking back on my own experiences, they all converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same genus, but *one of the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the genus, and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself.* This is a dark saying, I know, when thus expressed in terms of common logic, but I cannot wholly escape from its authority. I feel as if it must mean something, something like what the hegelian philosophy means, if one could only lay hold of it more clearly. Those who have ears to hear, let them hear;

to me the living sense of its reality only comes in the artificial mystic state of mind.¹

I just now spoke of friends who believe in the anæsthetic revelation. For them too it is a monistic insight, in which the *other* in its various forms appears absorbed into the One.

"Into this pervading genius," writes one of them, "we pass, forgetting and forgotten, and thenceforth each is all, in God. There is no higher, no deeper, no other, than the life in which we are founded. 'The One remains, the many change and pass;' and each and every one of us is the One that remains. . . . This is the ultimatum. . . . As sure as being — whence is all our care — so sure is content, beyond duplexity, antithesis, or trouble, where I have triumphed in a solitude that God is not above." ²

¹ What reader of Hegel can doubt that that sense of a perfected Being with all its otherness soaked up into itself, which dominates his whole philosophy, must have come from the prominence in his consciousness of mystical moods like this, in most persons kept subliminal? The notion is thoroughly characteristic of the mystical level, and the *Aufgabe* of making it articulate was surely set to Hegel's intellect by mystical feeling.

² BENJAMIN PAUL BLOOD: *The Anæsthetic Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy*, Amsterdam, N. Y., 1874, pp. 35, 36. Mr. Blood has made several attempts to adumbrate the anæsthetic revelation, in pamphlets of rare literary distinction, privately printed and distributed by himself at Amsterdam. Xenos Clark, a philosopher, who died young at Amherst in the '80's, much lamented by those who knew him, was also impressed by the revelation. "In the first place," he once wrote to me, "Mr. Blood and I agree that the revelation is, if anything, non-emotional. It is utterly flat. It is, as Mr. Blood says, 'the one sole and sufficient insight why, or not why, but how, the present is pushed on by the past, and sucked forward by the vacuity of the future. Its inevitableness defeats all attempts at stopping or accounting for it. It is all precedence and presupposition, and questioning is in regard to it forever too late. It is an *initiation of the past*.' The real secret would be the formula by which the 'now' keeps exfoliating out of itself, yet never escapes. What is it, indeed, that keeps existence exfoliating? The formal being of anything, the logical definition of it, is static. For mere logic every question contains its own answer — we simply fill the hole with the dirt we dug out. Why are twice two four? Because, in fact, four is twice two. Thus logic finds in life no propulsion, only a momentum. It goes because it is a-going. But the revelation adds: it goes

This has the genuine religious mystic ring! I just now quoted J. A. Symonds. He also records a mystical experience with chloroform, as follows : —

because it is and *was* a-going. You walk, as it were, round yourself in the revelation. Ordinary philosophy is like a hound hunting his own trail. The more he hunts the farther he has to go, and his nose never catches up with his heels, because it is forever ahead of them. So the present is already a foregone conclusion, and I am ever too late to understand it. But at the moment of recovery from anæsthesia, just then, *before starting on life*, I catch, so to speak, a glimpse of my heels, a glimpse of the eternal process just in the act of starting. The truth is that we travel on a journey that was accomplished before we set out ; and the real end of philosophy is accomplished, not when we arrive at, but when we remain in, our destination (being already there), — which may occur vicariously in this life when we cease our intellectual questioning. That is why there is a smile upon the face of the revelation, as we view it. It tells us that we are forever half a second too late — that 's all. 'You could kiss your own lips, and have all the fun to yourself,' it says, if you only knew the trick. It would be perfectly easy if they would just stay there till you got round to them. Why don't you manage it somehow ? "

Dialectically minded readers of this farrago will at least recognize the region of thought of which Mr. Clark writes, as familiar. In his latest pamphlet, 'Tennyson's Trances and the Anæsthetic Revelation,' Mr. Blood describes its value for life as follows : —

"The Anæsthetic Revelation is the Initiation of Man into the Immemorial Mystery of the Open Secret of Being, revealed as the Inevitable Vortex of Continuity. Inevitable is the word. Its motive is inherent — it is what has to be. It is not for any love or hate, nor for joy nor sorrow, nor good nor ill. End, beginning, or purpose, it knows not of.

"It affords no particular of the multiplicity and variety of things ; but it fills appreciation of the historical and the sacred with a secular and intimately personal illumination of the nature and motive of existence, which then seems reminiscent — as if it should have appeared, or shall yet appear, to every participant thereof.

"Although it is at first startling in its solemnity, it becomes directly such a matter of course — so old-fashioned, and so akin to proverbs, that it inspires exultation rather than fear, and a sense of safety, as identified with the aboriginal and the universal. But no words may express the imposing certainty of the patient that he is realizing the primordial, Adamic surprise of Life.

"Repetition of the experience finds it ever the same, and as if it could not possibly be otherwise. The subject resumes his normal consciousness only to partially and fitfully remember its occurrence, and to try to formulate its baffling import, — with only this consolatory afterthought : that he

"After the choking and stifling had passed away, I seemed at first in a state of utter blankness; then came flashes of intense light, alternating with blackness, and with a keen vision of what was going on in the room around me, but no sensation of touch. I thought that I was near death; when, suddenly, my soul became aware of God, who was manifestly dealing with me, handling me, so to speak, in an intense personal present reality. I felt him streaming in like light upon me. . . . I cannot describe the ecstasy I felt. Then, as I gradually awoke from the influence of the anæsthetics, the old sense of my relation to the world began to return, the new sense of my relation to God began to fade. I suddenly leapt to my feet on the chair where I was sitting, and shrieked out, 'It is too horrible, it is too horrible, it is too horrible,' meaning that I could not bear this disillusionment. Then I flung myself on the ground, and at last awoke covered with blood, calling to the two surgeons (who were frightened), 'Why did you not kill me? Why would you not let me die?' Only think of it. To have felt for that long dateless ecstasy of vision the very God, in all purity and tenderness and truth and absolute love, and then to find that I had after all had no revelation, but that I had been tricked by the abnormal excitement of my brain.

has known the oldest truth, and that he has done with human theories as to the origin, meaning, or destiny of the race. He is beyond instruction in 'spiritual things.'

"The lesson is one of central safety: the Kingdom is within. All days are judgment days: but there can be no climacteric purpose of eternity, nor any scheme of the whole. The astronomer abridges the row of bewildering figures by increasing his unit of measurement: so may we reduce the distracting multiplicity of things to the unity for which each of us stands.

"This has been my moral sustenance since I have known of it. In my first printed mention of it I declared: 'The world is no more the alien terror that was taught me. Spurning the cloud-grimed and still sultry battlements whence so lately Jehovan thunders boomed, my gray gull lifts her wing against the nightfall, and takes the dim leagues with a fearless eye.' And now, after twenty-seven years of this experience, the wing is grayer, but the eye is fearless still, while I renew and doubly emphasize that declaration. I know — as having known — the meaning of Existence: the sane centre of the universe — at once the wonder and the assurance of the soul — for which the speech of reason has as yet no name but the *Anæsthetic Revelation*." — I have considerably abridged the quotation.

"Yet, this question remains, Is it possible that the inner sense of reality which succeeded, when my flesh was dead to impressions from without, to the ordinary sense of physical relations, was not a delusion but an actual experience? Is it possible that I, in that moment, felt what some of the saints have said they always felt, the undemonstrable but irrefragable certainty of God?"¹

¹ Op. cit., pp. 78-80, abridged. I subjoin, also abridging it, another interesting anæsthetic revelation communicated to me in manuscript by a friend in England. The subject, a gifted woman, was taking ether for a surgical operation.

"I wondered if I was in a prison being tortured, and why I remembered having heard it said that people 'learn through suffering,' and in view of what I was seeing, the inadequacy of this saying struck me so much that I said, aloud, 'to suffer is to learn.'

"With that I became unconscious again, and my last dream immediately preceded my real coming to. It only lasted a few seconds, and was most vivid and real to me, though it may not be clear in words.

"A great Being or Power was traveling through the sky, his foot was on a kind of lightning as a wheel is on a rail, it was his pathway. The lightning was made entirely of the spirits of innumerable people close to one another, and I was one of them. He moved in a straight line, and each part of the streak or flash came into its short conscious existence only that he might travel. I seemed to be directly under the foot of God, and I thought he was grinding his own life up out of my pain. Then I saw that what he had been trying with all his might to do was to *change his course*, to *bend* the line of lightning to which he was tied, in the direction in which he wanted to go. I felt my flexibility and helplessness, and knew that he would succeed. He bended me, turning his corner by means of my hurt, hurting me more than I had ever been hurt in my life, and at the acutest point of this, as he passed, I *saw*. I understood for a moment things that I have now forgotten, things that no one could remember while retaining sanity. The angle was an obtuse angle, and I remember thinking as I woke that had he made it a right or acute angle, I should have both suffered and 'seen' still more, and should probably have died.

"He went on and I came to. In that moment the whole of my life passed before me, including each little meaningless piece of distress, and I *understood* them. *This* was what it had all meant, *this* was the piece of work it had all been contributing to do. I did not see God's purpose, I only saw his intentness and his entire relentlessness towards his means. He thought no more of me than a man thinks of hurting a cork when he is opening wine, or hurting a cartridge when he is firing. And yet, on waking, my first feeling was, and it came with tears, 'Domine non sum digna,' for I had been lifted into a position for which I was too small. I realized

With this we make connection with religious mysticism pure and simple. Symonds's question takes us back to those examples which you will remember my quoting in the lecture on the Reality of the Unseen, of sudden realization of the immediate presence of God. The phenomenon in one shape or another is not uncommon.

"I know," writes Mr. Trine, "an officer on our police force who has told me that many times when off duty, and on his way home in the evening, there comes to him such a vivid and vital realization of his oneness with this Infinite Power, and this Spirit of Infinite Peace so takes hold of and so fills him,

that in that half hour under ether I had served God more distinctly and purely than I had ever done in my life before, or than I am capable of desiring to do. I was the means of his achieving and revealing something, I know not what or to whom, and that, to the exact extent of my capacity for suffering.

"While regaining consciousness, I wondered why, since I had gone so deep, I had seen nothing of what the saints call the *love* of God, nothing but his relentlessness. And then I heard an answer, which I could only just catch, saying, 'Knowledge and Love are One, and the *measure* is suffering' — I give the words as they came to me. With that I came finally to (into what seemed a dream world compared with the reality of what I was leaving), and I saw that what would be called the 'cause' of my experience was a slight operation under insufficient ether, in a bed pushed up against a window, a common city window in a common city street. If I had to formulate a few of the things I then caught a glimpse of, they would run somewhat as follows : —

"The eternal necessity of suffering and its eternal vicariousness. The veiled and incommunicable nature of the worst sufferings ; — the passivity of genius, how it is essentially instrumental and defenseless, moved, not moving, it must do what it does ; — the impossibility of discovery without its price ; — finally, the excess of what the suffering 'seer' or genius pays over what his generation gains. (He seems like one who sweats his life out to earn enough to save a district from famine, and just as he staggers back, dying and satisfied, bringing a lac of rupees to buy grain with, God lifts the lac away, dropping *one* rupee, and says, 'That you may give them. That you have earned for them. The rest is for ME.') I perceived also in a way never to be forgotten, the excess of what we see over what we can demonstrate.

"And so on ! — these things may seem to you delusions, or truisms ; but for me they are dark truths, and the power to put them into even such words as these has been given me by an ether dream."

that it seems as if his feet could hardly keep to the pavement, so buoyant and so exhilarated does he become by reason of this inflowing tide." ¹

Certain aspects of nature seem to have a peculiar power of awakening such mystical moods.² Most of the striking cases which I have collected have occurred out of doors. Literature has commemorated this fact in many passages of great beauty — this extract, for example, from Amiel's *Journal Intime* : —

"Shall I ever again have any of those prodigious reveries which sometimes came to me in former days? One day, in

¹ In Tune with the Infinite, p. 137.

² The larger God may then swallow up the smaller one. I take this from Starbuck's manuscript collection : —

"I never lost the consciousness of the presence of God until I stood at the foot of the Horseshoe Falls, Niagara. Then I lost him in the immensity of what I saw. I also lost myself, feeling that I was an atom too small for the notice of Almighty God."

I subjoin another similar case from Starbuck's collection : —

"In that time the consciousness of God's nearness came to me sometimes. I say God, to describe what is indescribable. A presence, I might say, yet that is too suggestive of personality, and the moments of which I speak did not hold the consciousness of a personality, but something in myself made me feel myself a part of something bigger than I, that was controlling. I felt myself one with the grass, the trees, birds, insects, everything in Nature. I exulted in the mere fact of existence, of being a part of it all — the drizzling rain, the shadows of the clouds, the tree-trunks, and so on. In the years following, such moments continued to come, but I wanted them constantly. I knew so well the satisfaction of losing self in a perception of supreme power and love, that I was unhappy because that perception was not constant." The cases quoted in my third lecture, pp. 66, 67, 70, are still better ones of this type. In her essay, *The Loss of Personality*, in *The Atlantic Monthly* (vol. lxxxv. p. 195), Miss Ethel D. Puffer explains that the vanishing of the sense of self, and the feeling of immediate unity with the object, is due to the disappearance, in these rapturous experiences, of the motor adjustments which habitually intermediate between the constant background of consciousness (which is the Self) and the object in the foreground, whatever it may be. I must refer the reader to the highly instructive article, which seems to me to throw light upon the psychological conditions, though it fails to account for the rapture or the revelation-value of the experience in the Subject's eyes.

youth, at sunrise, sitting in the ruins of the castle of Faucigny ; and again in the mountains, under the noonday sun, above Lavey, lying at the foot of a tree and visited by three butterflies ; once more at night upon the shingly shore of the Northern Ocean, my back upon the sand and my vision ranging through the milky way ; — such grand and spacious, immortal, cosmogonic reveries, when one reaches to the stars, when one owns the infinite ! Moments divine, ecstatic hours ; in which our thought flies from world to world, pierces the great enigma, breathes with a respiration broad, tranquil, and deep as the respiration of the ocean, serene and limitless as the blue firmament ; . . . instants of irresistible intuition in which one feels one's self great as the universe, and calm as a god. . . . What hours, what memories ! The vestiges they leave behind are enough to fill us with belief and enthusiasm, as if they were visits of the Holy Ghost.”¹

Here is a similar record from the memoirs of that interesting German idealist, Malwida von Meysenbug : —

“I was alone upon the seashore as all these thoughts flowed over me, liberating and reconciling ; and now again, as once before in distant days in the Alps of Dauphiné, I was impelled to kneel down, this time before the illimitable ocean, symbol of the Infinite. I felt that I prayed as I had never prayed before, and knew now what prayer really is : to return from the solitude of individuation into the consciousness of unity with all that is, to kneel down as one that passes away, and to rise up as one imperishable. Earth, heaven, and sea resounded as in one vast world-encircling harmony. It was as if the chorus of all the great who had ever lived were about me. I felt myself one with them, and it appeared as if I heard their greeting : ‘Thou too belongest to the company of those who overcome.’ ”²

The well-known passage from Walt Whitman is a classical expression of this sporadic type of mystical experience.

¹ Op. cit., i. 43–44.

² *Memoiren einer Idealistin*, 5te Auflage, 1900, iii. 166. For years she had been unable to pray, owing to materialistic belief.

"I believe in you, my Soul . . .

Loaf with me on the grass, loose the stop from your throat ; . . .

Only the lull I like, the hum of your valved voice.

I mind how once we lay, such a transparent summer morning.

Swiftly arose and spread around me the peace and knowledge that pass
all the argument of the earth,

And I know that the hand of God is the promise of my own,

And I know that the spirit of God is the brother of my own,

And that all the men ever born are also my brothers and the women my
sisters and lovers,

And that a kelson of the creation is love."¹

I could easily give more instances, but one will suffice.
I take it from the Autobiography of J. Trevor.²

"One brilliant Sunday morning, my wife and boys went to the Unitarian Chapel in Macclesfield. I felt it impossible to accompany them — as though to leave the sunshine on the hills, and go down there to the chapel, would be for the time an act of spiritual suicide. And I felt such need for new inspiration and expansion in my life. So, very reluctantly and sadly, I left my wife and boys to go down into the town, while I went further up into the hills with my stick and my dog. In the loveliness of the morning, and the beauty of the hills and valleys, I soon lost my sense of sadness and regret. For nearly an hour I walked along the road to the 'Cat and Fiddle,' and then returned. On the way back, suddenly, without warning, I felt that I was in Heaven — an inward state of peace and joy

¹ Whitman in another place expresses in a quieter way what was probably with him a chronic mystical perception : "There is," he writes, "apart from mere intellect, in the make-up of every superior human identity, a wondrous something that realizes without argument, frequently without what is called education (though I think it the goal and apex of all education deserving the name), an intuition of the absolute balance, in time and space, of the whole of this multifariousness, this revel of fools, and incredible make-believe and general unsettledness, we call *the world* ; a soul-sight of that divine clue and unseen thread which holds the whole congeries of things, all history and time, and all events, however trivial, however momentous, like a leashed dog in the hand of the hunter. [Of] such soul-sight and root-centre for the mind mere optimism explains only the surface." Whitman charges it against Carlyle that he lacked this perception. *Specimen Days and Collect*, Philadelphia, 1882, p. 174.

² *My Quest for God*, London, 1897, pp. 268, 269, abridged.

and assurance indescribably intense, accompanied with a sense of being bathed in a warm glow of light, as though the external condition had brought about the internal effect — a feeling of having passed beyond the body, though the scene around me stood out more clearly and as if nearer to me than before, by reason of the illumination in the midst of which I seemed to be placed. This deep emotion lasted, though with decreasing strength, until I reached home, and for some time after, only gradually passing away."

The writer adds that having had further experiences of a similar sort, he now knows them well.

"The spiritual life," he writes, "justifies itself to those who live it; but what can we say to those who do not understand? This, at least, we can say, that it is a life whose experiences are proved real to their possessor, because they remain with him when brought closest into contact with the objective realities of life. Dreams cannot stand this test. We wake from them to find that they are but dreams. Wanderings of an overwrought brain do not stand this test. These highest experiences that I have had of God's presence have been rare and brief — flashes of consciousness which have compelled me to exclaim with surprise — God is *here*! — or conditions of exaltation and insight, less intense, and only gradually passing away. I have severely questioned the worth of these moments. To no soul have I named them, lest I should be building my life and work on mere phantasies of the brain. But I find that, after every questioning and test, they stand out to-day as the most real experiences of my life, and experiences which have explained and justified and unified all past experiences and all past growth. Indeed, their reality and their far-reaching significance are ever becoming more clear and evident. When they came, I was living the fullest, strongest, sanest, deepest life. I was not seeking them. What I was seeking, with resolute determination, was to live more intensely my own life, as against what I knew would be the adverse judgment of the world. It was in the most real seasons that the Real Presence

came, and I was aware that I was immersed in the infinite ocean of God." ¹

Even the least mystical of you must by this time be convinced of the existence of mystical moments as states of consciousness of an entirely specific quality, and of the deep impression which they make on those who have them. A Canadian psychiatrist, Dr. R. M. Bucke, gives to the more distinctly characterized of these phenomena the name of cosmic consciousness. "Cosmic consciousness in its more striking instances is not," Dr. Bucke says, "simply an expansion or extension of the self-conscious mind with which we are all familiar, but the superaddition of a function as distinct from any possessed by the average man as *self-consciousness* is distinct from any function possessed by one of the higher animals."

"The prime characteristic of cosmic consciousness is a consciousness of the cosmos, that is, of the life and order of the universe. Along with the consciousness of the cosmos there occurs an intellectual enlightenment which alone would place the individual on a new plane of existence — would make him almost a member of a new species. To this is added a state of moral exaltation, an indescribable feeling of elevation, elation, and joyousness, and a quickening of the moral sense, which is fully as striking, and more important than is the enhanced intellectual power. With these come what may be called a sense of immortality, a consciousness of eternal life, not a conviction that he shall have this, but the consciousness that he has it already." ²

It was Dr. Bucke's own experience of a typical onset of cosmic consciousness in his own person which led him to investigate it in others. He has printed his conclusions in a highly interesting volume, from which I take the following account of what occurred to him : —

¹ Op. cit., pp. 256, 257, abridged.

² Cosmic Consciousness : a study in the evolution of the human Mind Philadelphia, 1901, p. 2.

"I had spent the evening in a great city, with two friends, reading and discussing poetry and philosophy. We parted at midnight. I had a long drive in a hansom to my lodging. My mind, deeply under the influence of the ideas, images, and emotions called up by the reading and talk, was calm and peaceful. I was in a state of quiet, almost passive enjoyment, not actually thinking, but letting ideas, images, and emotions flow of themselves, as it were, through my mind. All at once, without warning of any kind, I found myself wrapped in a flame-colored cloud. For an instant I thought of fire, an immense conflagration somewhere close by in that great city; the next, I knew that the fire was within myself. Directly afterward there came upon me a sense of exultation, of immense joyousness accompanied or immediately followed by an intellectual illumination impossible to describe. Among other things, I did not merely come to believe, but I saw that the universe is not composed of dead matter, but is, on the contrary, a living Presence; I became conscious in myself of eternal life. It was not a conviction that I would have eternal life, but a consciousness that I possessed eternal life then; I saw that all men are immortal; that the cosmic order is such that without any peradventure all things work together for the good of each and all; that the foundation principle of the world, of all the worlds, is what we call love, and that the happiness of each and all is in the long run absolutely certain. The vision lasted a few seconds and was gone; but the memory of it and the sense of the reality of what it taught has remained during the quarter of a century which has since elapsed. I knew that what the vision showed was true. I had attained to a point of view from which I saw that it must be true. That view, that conviction, I may say that consciousness, has never, even during periods of the deepest depression, been lost."¹

We have now seen enough of this cosmic or mystic consciousness, as it comes sporadically. We must next

¹ Loc. cit., pp. 7, 8. My quotation follows the privately printed pamphlet which preceded Dr. Bucke's larger work, and differs verbally a little from the text of the latter.

pass to its methodical cultivation as an element of the religious life. Hindus, Buddhists, Mohammedans, and Christians all have cultivated it methodically.

In India, training in mystical insight has been known from time immemorial under the name of yoga. Yoga means the experimental union of the individual with the divine. It is based on persevering exercise; and the diet, posture, breathing, intellectual concentration, and moral discipline vary slightly in the different systems which teach it. The yogi, or disciple, who has by these means overcome the obscurations of his lower nature sufficiently, enters into the condition termed *samâdhi*, "and comes face to face with facts which no instinct or reason can ever know." He learns —

"That the mind itself has a higher state of existence, beyond reason, a superconscious state, and that when the mind gets to that higher state, then this knowledge beyond reasoning comes. . . . All the different steps in yoga are intended to bring us scientifically to the superconscious state or *samâdhi*. . . . Just as unconscious work is beneath consciousness, so there is another work which is above consciousness, and which, also, is not accompanied with the feeling of egoism. . . . There is no feeling of *I*, and yet the mind works, desireless, free from restlessness, objectless, bodiless. Then the Truth shines in its full effulgence, and we know ourselves — for *Samâdhi* lies potential in us all — for what we truly are, free, immortal, omnipotent, loosed from the finite, and its contrasts of good and evil altogether, and identical with the Atman or Universal Soul."¹

The Vedantists say that one may stumble into superconsciousness sporadically, without the previous discipline, but it is then impure. Their test of its purity, like

¹ My quotations are from VIVEKANANDA, *Raja Yoga*, London, 1896. The completest source of information on Yoga is the work translated by VĪHARI LALA MITRA: *Yoga Vasishtha Maha Ramayana*, 4 vols., Calcutta, 1891-99.

our test of religion's value, is empirical: its fruits must be good for life. When a man comes out of Samâdhi, they assure us that he remains "enlightened, a sage, a prophet, a saint, his whole character changed, his life changed, illumined."¹

The Buddhists use the word 'samâdhi' as well as the Hindus; but 'dhyâna' is their special word for higher states of contemplation. There seem to be four stages recognized in dhyâna. The first stage comes through concentration of the mind upon one point. It excludes desire, but not discernment or judgment: it is still intellectual. In the second stage the intellectual functions drop off, and the satisfied sense of unity remains. In the third stage the satisfaction departs, and indifference begins, along with memory and self-consciousness. In the fourth stage the indifference, memory, and self-consciousness are perfected. [Just what 'memory' and 'self-consciousness' mean in this connection is doubtful. They cannot be the faculties familiar to us in the lower life.] Higher stages still of contemplation are mentioned — a region where there exists nothing, and where the meditator says: "There exists absolutely nothing," and stops. Then he reaches another region where he says: "There are neither ideas nor absence of ideas," and stops again. Then another region where, "having reached the end of both idea and perception, he stops

¹ A European witness, after carefully comparing the results of Yoga with those of the hypnotic or dreamy states artificially producible by us, says: "It makes of its true disciples good, healthy, and happy men. . . . Through the mastery which the yogi attains over his thoughts and his body, he grows into a 'character.' By the subjection of his impulses and propensities to his will, and the fixing of the latter upon the ideal of goodness, he becomes a 'personality' hard to influence by others, and thus almost the opposite of what we usually imagine a 'medium' so-called, or 'psychic subject' to be." KARL KELLNER: *Yoga: Eine Skizze*, München, 1896, p. 21.

finally." This would seem to be, not yet Nirvâna, but as close an approach to it as this life affords.¹

In the Mohammedan world the Sufi sect and various dervish bodies are the possessors of the mystical tradition. The Sufis have existed in Persia from the earliest times, and as their pantheism is so at variance with the hot and rigid monotheism of the Arab mind, it has been suggested that Sufism must have been inoculated into Islam by Hindu influences. We Christians know little of Sufism, for its secrets are disclosed only to those initiated. To give its existence a certain liveliness in your minds, I will quote a Moslem document, and pass away from the subject.

Al-Ghazzali, a Persian philosopher and theologian, who flourished in the eleventh century, and ranks as one of the greatest doctors of the Moslem church, has left us one of the few autobiographies to be found outside of Christian literature. Strange that a species of book so abundant among ourselves should be so little represented elsewhere—the absence of strictly personal confessions is the chief difficulty to the purely literary student who would like to become acquainted with the inwardness of religions other than the Christian.

M. Schmölders has translated a part of Al-Ghazzali's autobiography into French : ² —

"The Science of the Sufis," says the Moslem author, "aims at detaching the heart from all that is not God, and at giving to it for sole occupation the meditation of the divine being. Theory being more easy for me than practice, I read [certain books] until I understood all that can be learned by study and

¹ I follow the account in C. F. KOEPPEN : *Die Religion des Buddha*, Berlin, 1857, i. 585 ff.

² For a full account of him, see D. B. MACDONALD : *The Life of Al-Ghazzali*, in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1890, vol. xx p. 71.

hearsay. Then I recognized that what pertains most exclusively to their method is just what no study can grasp, but only transport, ecstasy, and the transformation of the soul. How great, for example, is the difference between knowing the definitions of health, of satiety, with their causes and conditions, and being really healthy or filled. How different to know in what drunkenness consists, — as being a state occasioned by a vapor that rises from the stomach, — and *being* drunk effectively. Without doubt, the drunken man knows neither the definition of drunkenness nor what makes it interesting for science. Being drunk, he knows nothing; whilst the physician, although not drunk, knows well in what drunkenness consists, and what are its predisposing conditions. Similarly there is a difference between knowing the nature of abstinence, and *being* abstinent or having one's soul detached from the world. — Thus I had learned what words could teach of Sufism, but what was left could be learned neither by study nor through the ears, but solely by giving one's self up to ecstasy and leading a pious life.

“Reflecting on my situation, I found myself tied down by a multitude of bonds — temptations on every side. Considering my teaching, I found it was impure before God. I saw myself struggling with all my might to achieve glory and to spread my name. [Here follows an account of his six months' hesitation to break away from the conditions of his life at Bagdad, at the end of which he fell ill with a paralysis of the tongue.] Then, feeling my own weakness, and having entirely given up my own will, I repaired to God like a man in distress who has no more resources. He answered, as he answers the wretch who invokes him. My heart no longer felt any difficulty in renouncing glory, wealth, and my children. So I quitted Bagdad, and reserving from my fortune only what was indispensable for my subsistence, I distributed the rest. I went to Syria, where I remained about two years, with no other occupation than living in retreat and solitude, conquering my desires, combating my passions, training myself to purify my soul, to make my character perfect, to prepare my heart for meditating on God — all according to the methods of the Sufis, as I had read of them.

“This retreat only increased my desire to live in solitude, and to complete the purification of my heart and fit it for meditation. But the vicissitudes of the times, the affairs of the family, the need of subsistence, changed in some respects my primitive resolve, and interfered with my plans for a purely solitary life. I had never yet found myself completely in ecstasy, save in a few single hours; nevertheless, I kept the hope of attaining this state. Every time that the accidents led me astray, I sought to return; and in this situation I spent ten years. During this solitary state things were revealed to me which it is impossible either to describe or to point out. I recognized for certain that the Sufis are assuredly walking in the path of God. Both in their acts and in their inaction, whether internal or external, they are illumined by the light which proceeds from the prophetic source. The first condition for a Sufi is to purge his heart entirely of all that is not God. The next key of the contemplative life consists in the humble prayers which escape from the fervent soul, and in the meditations on God in which the heart is swallowed up entirely. But in reality this is only the beginning of the Sufi life, the end of Sufism being total absorption in God. The intuitions and all that precede are, so to speak, only the threshold for those who enter. From the beginning, revelations take place in so flagrant a shape that the Sufis see before them, whilst wide awake, the angels and the souls of the prophets. They hear their voices and obtain their favors. Then the transport rises from the perception of forms and figures to a degree which escapes all expression, and which no man may seek to give an account of without his words involving sin.

“Whoever has had no experience of the transport knows of the true nature of prophetism nothing but the name. He may meanwhile be sure of its existence, both by experience and by what he hears the Sufis say. As there are men endowed only with the sensitive faculty who reject what is offered them in the way of objects of the pure understanding, so there are intellectual men who reject and avoid the things perceived by the prophetic faculty. A blind man can understand nothing of colors save what he has learned by narration and hearsay. Yet God

has brought prophetism near to men in giving them all a state analogous to it in its principal characters. This state is sleep. If you were to tell a man who was himself without experience of such a phenomenon that there are people who at times swoon away so as to resemble dead men, and who [in dreams] yet perceive things that are hidden, he would deny it [and give his reasons]. Nevertheless, his arguments would be refuted by actual experience. Wherefore, just as the understanding is a stage of human life in which an eye opens to discern various intellectual objects uncomprehended by sensation; just so in the prophetic the sight is illumined by a light which uncovers hidden things and objects which the intellect fails to reach. The chief properties of prophetism are perceptible only during the transport, by those who embrace the Sufi life. The prophet is endowed with qualities to which you possess nothing analogous, and which consequently you cannot possibly understand. How should you know their true nature, since one knows only what one can comprehend? But the transport which one attains by the method of the Sufis is like an immediate perception, as if one touched the objects with one's hand." ¹

This incommunicableness of the transport is the keynote of all mysticism. Mystical truth exists for the individual who has the transport, but for no one else. In this, as I have said, it resembles the knowledge given to us in sensations more than that given by conceptual thought. Thought, with its remoteness and abstractness, has often enough in the history of philosophy been contrasted unfavorably with sensation. It is a commonplace of metaphysics that God's knowledge cannot be discursive but must be intuitive, that is, must be constructed more after the pattern of what in ourselves is called immediate feeling, than after that of proposition and judgment. But *our* immediate feelings have no content

¹ A. SCHMÖLDERS : *Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes*, Paris, 1842, pp. 54-68, abridged.

but what the five senses supply; and we have seen and shall see again that mystics may emphatically deny that the senses play any part in the very highest type of knowledge which their transports yield.

In the Christian church there have always been mystics. Although many of them have been viewed with suspicion, some have gained favor in the eyes of the authorities. The experiences of these have been treated as precedents, and a codified system of mystical theology has been based upon them, in which everything legitimate finds its place.¹ The basis of the system is 'orison' or meditation, the methodical elevation of the soul towards God. Through the practice of orison the higher levels of mystical experience may be attained. It is odd that Protestantism, especially evangelical Protestantism, should seemingly have abandoned everything methodical in this line. Apart from what prayer may lead to, Protestant mystical experience appears to have been almost exclusively sporadic. It has been left to our mind-curers to reintroduce methodical meditation into our religious life.

The first thing to be aimed at in orison is the mind's detachment from outer sensations, for these interfere with its concentration upon ideal things. Such manuals as Saint Ignatius's *Spiritual Exercises* recommend the disciple to expel sensation by a graduated series of efforts to imagine holy scenes. The acme of this kind of discipline would be a semi-hallucinatory mono-ideism — an imaginary figure of Christ, for example, coming fully to

¹ GÖRRES's *Christliche Mystik* gives a full account of the facts. So does RIBET's *Mystique Divine*, 2 vols., Paris, 1890. A still more methodical modern work is the *Mystica Theologia* of VALLGÖRNERA, 2 vols., Turin, 1890.

occupy the mind. Sensorial images of this sort, whether literal or symbolic, play an enormous part in mysticism.¹ But in certain cases imagery may fall away entirely, and in the very highest raptures it tends to do so. The state of consciousness becomes then insusceptible of any verbal description. Mystical teachers are unanimous as to this. Saint John of the Cross, for instance, one of the best of them, thus describes the condition called the 'union of love,' which, he says, is reached by 'dark contemplation.' In this the Deity compenetrates the soul, but in such a hidden way that the soul —

"finds no terms, no means, no comparison whereby to render the sublimity of the wisdom and the delicacy of the spiritual feeling with which she is filled. . . . We receive this mystical knowledge of God clothed in none of the kinds of images, in none of the sensible representations, which our mind makes use of in other circumstances. Accordingly in this knowledge, since the senses and the imagination are not employed, we get neither form nor impression, nor can we give any account or furnish any likeness, although the mysterious and sweet-tasting wisdom comes home so clearly to the inmost parts of our soul. Fancy a man seeing a certain kind of thing for the first time in his life. He can understand it, use and enjoy it, but he cannot apply a name to it, nor communicate any idea of it, even though all the while it be a mere thing of sense. How much greater will be his powerlessness when it goes beyond the senses! This is the peculiarity of the divine language. The more infused, intimate, spiritual, and supersensible it is, the more does it exceed the senses, both inner and outer, and impose silence upon them. . . . The soul then feels as if placed in a vast and profound solitude, to which no created thing has access, in an immense and boundless desert, desert the more delicious the

¹ M. RÉCÉJAC, in a recent volume, makes them essential. Mysticism he defines as "the tendency to draw near to the Absolute morally, and by the aid of *Symbols*." See his *Fondements de la Connaissance mystique*, Paris, 1897, p. 66. But there are unquestionably mystical conditions in which sensible symbols play no part.

more solitary it is. There, in this abyss of wisdom, the soul grows by what it drinks in from the well-springs of the comprehension of love, . . . and recognizes, however sublime and learned may be the terms we employ, how utterly vile, insignificant, and improper they are, when we seek to discourse of divine things by their means.”¹

I cannot pretend to detail to you the sundry stages of the Christian mystical life.² Our time would not suffice, for one thing; and moreover, I confess that the subdivisions and names which we find in the Catholic books seem to me to represent nothing objectively distinct. So many men, so many minds: I imagine that these experiences can be as infinitely varied as are the idiosyncrasies of individuals.

The cognitive aspects of them, their value in the way of revelation, is what we are directly concerned with, and it is easy to show by citation how strong an impression they leave of being revelations of new depths of truth. Saint Teresa is the expert of experts in describing such conditions, so I will turn immediately to what she says of one of the highest of them, the ‘orison of union.’

“In the orison of union,” says Saint Teresa, “the soul is fully awake as regards God, but wholly asleep as regards things of this world and in respect of herself. During the short time the union lasts, she is as it were deprived of every feeling, and even if she would, she could not think of any single thing.

¹ Saint John of the Cross: *The Dark Night of the Soul*, book ii. ch. xvii., in *Vie et Œuvres*, 3me édition, Paris, 1893, iii. 428-432. Chapter xi. of book ii. of Saint John’s *Ascent of Carmel* is devoted to showing the harmfulness for the mystical life of the use of sensible imagery.

² In particular I omit mention of visual and auditory hallucinations, verbal and graphic automatisms, and such marvels as ‘levitation,’ stigmatization, and the healing of disease. These phenomena, which mystics have often presented (or are believed to have presented), have no essential mystical significance, for they occur with no consciousness of illumination whatever, when they occur, as they often do, in persons of non-mystical mind. Consciousness of illumination is for us the essential mark of ‘mystical’ states.

Thus she needs to employ no artifice in order to arrest the use of her understanding: it remains so stricken with inactivity that she neither knows what she loves, nor in what manner she loves, nor what she wills. In short, she is utterly dead to the things of the world and lives solely in God. . . . I do not even know whether in this state she has enough life left to breathe. It seems to me she has not; or at least that if she does breathe, she is unaware of it. Her intellect would fain understand something of what is going on within her, but it has so little force now that it can act in no way whatsoever. So a person who falls into a deep faint appears as if dead. . . .

“Thus does God, when he raises a soul to union with himself, suspend the natural action of all her faculties. She neither sees, hears, nor understands, so long as she is united with God. But this time is always short, and it seems even shorter than it is. God establishes himself in the interior of this soul in such a way, that when she returns to herself, it is wholly impossible for her to doubt that she has been in God, and God in her. This truth remains so strongly impressed on her that, even though many years should pass without the condition returning, she can neither forget the favor she received, nor doubt of its reality. If you, nevertheless, ask how it is possible that the soul can see and understand that she has been in God, since during the union she has neither sight nor understanding, I reply that she does not see it then, but that she sees it clearly later, after she has returned to herself, not by any vision, but by a certitude which abides with her and which God alone can give her. I knew a person who was ignorant of the truth that God’s mode of being in everything must be either by presence, by power, or by essence, but who, after having received the grace of which I am speaking, believed this truth in the most unshakable manner. So much so that, having consulted a half-learned man who was as ignorant on this point as she had been before she was enlightened, when he replied that God is in us only by ‘grace,’ she disbelieved his reply, so sure she was of the true answer; and when she came to ask wiser doctors, they confirmed her in her belief, which much consoled her. . . .

"But how, you will repeat, *can* one have such certainty in respect to what one does not see? This question, I am powerless to answer. These are secrets of God's omnipotence which it does not appertain to me to penetrate. All that I know is that I tell the truth; and I shall never believe that any soul who does not possess this certainty has ever been really united to God." ¹

The kinds of truth communicable in mystical ways, whether these be sensible or supersensible, are various. Some of them relate to this world, — visions of the future, the reading of hearts, the sudden understanding of texts, the knowledge of distant events, for example; but the most important revelations are theological or metaphysical.

"Saint Ignatius confessed one day to Father Laynez that a single hour of meditation at Manresa had taught him more truths about heavenly things than all the teachings of all the doctors put together could have taught him. . . . One day in orison, on the steps of the choir of the Dominican church, he saw in a distinct manner the plan of divine wisdom in the creation of the world. On another occasion, during a procession, his spirit was ravished in God, and it was given him to contemplate, in a form and images fitted to the weak understanding of a dweller on the earth, the deep mystery of the holy Trinity. This last vision flooded his heart with such sweetness, that the mere memory of it in after times made him shed abundant tears." ²

¹ The Interior Castle, Fifth Abode, ch. i., in *Œuvres*, translated by BOUX, iii. 421-424.

² BARTOLI-MICHEL: *Vie de Saint Ignace de Loyola*, i. 34-36. Others have had illuminations about the created world, Jacob Boehme, for instance. At the age of twenty-five he was "surrounded by the divine light, and replenished with the heavenly knowledge; insomuch as going abroad into the fields to a green, at Görlitz, he there sat down, and viewing the herbs and grass of the field, in his inward light he saw into their essences, use, and properties, which was discovered to him by their lineaments, figures, and signatures." Of a later period of experience he writes: "In one quarter of an hour I saw and knew more than if I had been many years together at

Similarly with Saint Teresa. "One day, being in orison," she writes, "it was granted me to perceive in one instant how all things are seen and contained in God. I did not perceive them in their proper form, and nevertheless the view I had of them was of a sovereign clearness, and has remained vividly impressed upon my soul. It is one of the most signal of all the graces which the Lord has granted me. . . . The view was so subtle and delicate that the understanding cannot grasp it."¹

She goes on to tell how it was as if the Deity were an enormous and sovereignly limpid diamond, in which all our actions were contained in such a way that their full sinfulness appeared evident as never before. On another day, she relates, while she was reciting the Athanasian Creed, —

"Our Lord made me comprehend in what way it is that one God can be in three Persons. He made me see it so clearly

an university. For I saw and knew the being of all things, the Byss and the Abyss, and the eternal generation of the holy Trinity, the descent and original of the world and of all creatures through the divine wisdom. I knew and saw in myself all the three worlds, the external and visible world being of a procreation or extern birth from both the internal and spiritual worlds; and I saw and knew the whole working essence, in the evil and in the good, and the mutual original and existence; and likewise how the fruitful bearing womb of eternity brought forth. So that I did not only greatly wonder at it, but did also exceedingly rejoice, albeit I could very hardly apprehend the same in my external man and set it down with the pen. For I had a thorough view of the universe as in a chaos, wherein all things are couched and wrapt up, but it was impossible for me to explicate the same." Jacob Behmen's *Theosophic Philosophy*, etc., by EDWARD TAYLOR, London, 1691, pp. 425, 427, abridged. So George Fox: "I was come up to the state of Adam in which he was before he fell. The creation was opened to me; and it was showed me, how all things had their names given to them, according to their nature and virtue. I was at a stand in my mind, whether I should practice physic for the good of mankind, seeing the nature and virtues of the creatures were so opened to me by the Lord." *Journal*, Philadelphia, no date, p. 69. Contemporary 'Clairvoyance' abounds in similar revelations. Andrew Jackson Davis's cosmogonies, for example, or certain experiences related in the delectable 'Reminiscences and Memories of Henry Thomas Butterworth,' Lebanon, Ohio, 1886.

¹ Vie, pp. 581, 582.

that I remained as extremely surprised as I was comforted, . . . and now, when I think of the holy Trinity, or hear It spoken of, I understand how the three adorable Persons form only one God and I experience an unspeakable happiness."

On still another occasion, it was given to Saint Teresa to see and understand in what wise the Mother of God had been assumed into her place in Heaven.¹

The deliciousness of some of these states seems to be beyond anything known in ordinary consciousness. It evidently involves organic sensibilities, for it is spoken of as something too extreme to be borne, and as verging on bodily pain.² But it is too subtle and piercing a delight for ordinary words to denote. God's touches, the wounds of his spear, references to ebriety and to nuptial union have to figure in the phraseology by which it is shadowed forth. Intellect and senses both swoon away in these highest states of ecstasy. "If our understanding comprehends," says Saint Teresa, "it is in a mode which remains unknown to it, and it can understand nothing of what it comprehends. For my own part, I do not believe that it does comprehend, because, as I said, it does not understand itself to do so. I confess that it is all a mystery in which I am lost."³ In the condition called *raptus* or ravishment by theologians, breathing and circulation are so depressed that it is a question among the doctors whether the soul be or be not temporarily dis severed from the body. One must read Saint Teresa's descriptions and the very exact distinctions which she makes, to

¹ Loc. cit., p. 574.

² Saint Teresa discriminates between pain in which the body has a part and pure spiritual pain (Interior Castle, 6th Abode, ch. xi.). As for the bodily part in these celestial joys, she speaks of it as "penetrating to the marrow of the bones, whilst earthly pleasures affect only the surface of the senses. I think," she adds, "that this is a just description, and I cannot make it better." Ibid., 5th Abode, ch. i.

³ Vie, p. 198.

persuade one's self that one is dealing, not with imaginary experiences, but with phenomena which, however rare, follow perfectly definite psychological types.

To the medical mind these ecstasies signify nothing but suggested and imitated hypnoid states, on an intellectual basis of superstition, and a corporeal one of degeneration and hysteria. Undoubtedly these pathological conditions have existed in many and possibly in all the cases, but that fact tells us nothing about the value for knowledge of the consciousness which they induce. To pass a spiritual judgment upon these states, we must not content ourselves with superficial medical talk, but inquire into their fruits for life.

Their fruits appear to have been various. Stupefaction, for one thing, seems not to have been altogether absent as a result. You may remember the helplessness in the kitchen and schoolroom of poor Margaret Mary Alacoque. Many other ecstasies would have perished but for the care taken of them by admiring followers. The 'otherworldliness' encouraged by the mystical consciousness makes this over-abstraction from practical life peculiarly liable to befall mystics in whom the character is naturally passive and the intellect feeble; but in natively strong minds and characters we find quite opposite results. The great Spanish mystics, who carried the habit of ecstasy as far as it has often been carried, appear for the most part to have shown indomitable spirit and energy, and all the more so for the trances in which they indulged.

Saint Ignatius was a mystic, but his mysticism made him assuredly one of the most powerfully practical human engines that ever lived. Saint John of the Cross, writing of the intuitions and 'touches' by which God teaches the substance of the soul, tells us that —

"They enrich it marvelously. A single one of them may be sufficient to abolish at a stroke certain imperfections of which the soul during its whole life had vainly tried to rid itself, and to leave it adorned with virtues and loaded with supernatural gifts. A single one of these intoxicating consolations may reward it for all the labors undergone in its life — even were they numberless. Invested with an invincible courage, filled with an impassioned desire to suffer for its God, the soul then is seized with a strange torment — that of not being allowed to suffer enough."¹

Saint Teresa is as emphatic, and much more detailed. You may perhaps remember a passage I quoted from her in my first lecture.² There are many similar pages in her autobiography. Where in literature is a more evidently veracious account of the formation of a new centre of spiritual energy, than is given in her description of the effects of certain ecstasies which in departing leave the soul upon a higher level of emotional excitement?

"Often, infirm and wrought upon with dreadful pains before the ecstasy, the soul emerges from it full of health and admirably disposed for action . . . as if God had willed that the body itself, already obedient to the soul's desires, should share in the soul's happiness. . . . The soul after such a favor is animated with a degree of courage so great that if at that moment its body should be torn to pieces for the cause of God, it would feel nothing but the liveliest comfort. Then it is that promises and heroic resolutions spring up in profusion in us, soaring desires, horror of the world, and the clear perception of our proper nothingness. . . . What empire is comparable to that of a soul who, from this sublime summit to which God has raised her, sees all the things of earth beneath her feet, and is captivated by no one of them? How ashamed she is of her former attachments! How amazed at her blindness! What lively pity she feels for those whom she recognizes still shrouded in the darkness! . . . She groans at having ever been sensi-

¹ Œuvres, ii. 320.

² Above, p. 21.

tive to points of honor, at the illusion that made her ever see as honor what the world calls by that name. Now she sees in this name nothing more than an immense lie of which the world remains a victim. She discovers, in the new light from above, that in genuine honor there is nothing spurious, that to be faithful to this honor is to give our respect to what deserves to be respected really, and to consider as nothing, or as less than nothing, whatsoever perishes and is not agreeable to God. . . . She laughs when she sees grave persons, persons of orison, caring for points of honor for which she now feels profoundest contempt. It is suitable to the dignity of their rank to act thus, they pretend, and it makes them more useful to others. But she knows that in despising the dignity of their rank for the pure love of God they would do more good in a single day than they would effect in ten years by preserving it. . . . She laughs at herself that there should ever have been a time in her life when she made any case of money, when she ever desired it. . . . Oh! if human beings might only agree together to regard it as so much useless mud, what harmony would then reign in the world! With what friendship we would all treat each other if our interest in honor and in money could but disappear from earth! For my own part, I feel as if it would be a remedy for all our ills.”¹

Mystical conditions may, therefore, render the soul more energetic in the lines which their inspiration favors. But this could be reckoned an advantage only in case the inspiration were a true one. If the inspiration were erroneous, the energy would be all the more mistaken and misbegotten. So we stand once more before that problem of truth which confronted us at the end of the lectures on saintliness. You will remember that we turned to mysticism precisely to get some light on truth. Do mystical states establish the truth of those theological affections in which the saintly life has its root?

In spite of their repudiation of articulate self-descrip-

¹ Vie, pp. 229, 200, 231-233, 243.

tion, mystical states in general assert a pretty distinct theoretic drift. It is possible to give the outcome of the majority of them in terms that point in definite philosophical directions. One of these directions is optimism, and the other is monism. We pass into mystical states from out of ordinary consciousness as from a less into a more, as from a smallness into a vastness, and at the same time as from an unrest to a rest. We feel them as reconciling, unifying states. They appeal to the yes-function more than to the no-function in us. In them the unlimited absorbs the limits and peacefully closes the account. Their very denial of every adjective you may propose as applicable to the ultimate truth, — He, the Self, the Atman, is to be described by ‘No ! no !’ only, say the Upanishads,¹ — though it seems on the surface to be a no-function, is a denial made on behalf of a deeper yes. Whoso calls the Absolute anything in particular, or says that it is *this*, seems implicitly to shut it off from being *that* — it is as if he lessened it. So we deny the ‘this,’ negating the negation which it seems to us to imply, in the interests of the higher affirmative attitude by which we are possessed. The fountain-head of Christian mysticism is Dionysius the Areopagite. He describes the absolute truth by negatives exclusively.

“The cause of all things is neither soul nor intellect; nor has it imagination, opinion, or reason, or intelligence; nor is it reason or intelligence; nor is it spoken or thought. It is neither number, nor order, nor magnitude, nor littleness, nor equality, nor inequality, nor similarity, nor dissimilarity. It neither stands, nor moves, nor rests. . . . It is neither essence, nor eternity, nor time. Even intellectual contact does not belong to it. It is neither science nor truth. It is not even royalty or wisdom; not one; not unity; not divinity

¹ MÜLLER’S translation, part ii. p. 180.

or goodness; nor even spirit as we know it," etc., *ad libitum*.¹

But these qualifications are denied by Dionysius, not because the truth falls short of them, but because it so infinitely excels them. It is above them. It is *super-lucent*, *super-splendent*, *super-essential*, *super-sublime*, *super* everything that can be named. Like Hegel in his logic, mystics journey towards the positive pole of truth only by the 'Methode der Absoluten Negativität.'²

Thus come the paradoxical expressions that so abound in mystical writings. As when Eckhart tells of the still desert of the Godhead, "where never was seen difference, neither Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost, where there is no one at home, yet where the spark of the soul is more at peace than in itself."³ As when Boehme writes of the Primal Love, that "it may fitly be compared to Nothing, for it is deeper than any Thing, and is as nothing with respect to all things, forasmuch as it is not comprehensible by any of them. And because it is nothing respectively, it is therefore free from all things, and is that only good, which a man cannot express or utter what it is, there being nothing to which it may be compared, to express it by."⁴ Or as when Angelus Silesius sings:—

"Gott ist ein lauter Nichts, ihn rührt kein Nun noch Hier;
Je mehr du nach ihm greiffst, je mehr entwind er dir."⁵

To this dialectical use, by the intellect, of negation as

¹ T. DAVIDSON's translation, in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 1893, vol. xxii, p. 399.

² "Deus propter excellentiam non immerito Nihil vocatur." Scotus Eri-gena, quoted by ANDREW SETH: *Two Lectures on Theism*, New York, 1897, p. 55.

³ J. ROYCE: *Studies in Good and Evil*, p. 282.

⁴ Jacob Behmen's *Dialogues on the Supersensual Life*, translated by BERNARD HOLLAND, London, 1901, p. 48.

⁵ Cherubinischer Wandersmann, Strophe 25.

a mode of passage towards a higher kind of affirmation, there is correlated the subtlest of moral counterparts in the sphere of the personal will. Since denial of the finite self and its wants, since asceticism of some sort, is found in religious experience to be the only doorway to the larger and more blessed life, this moral mystery intertwines and combines with the intellectual mystery in all mystical writings.

“Love,” continues Behmen, is Nothing, for “when thou art gone forth wholly from the Creature and from that which is visible, and art become Nothing to all that is Nature and Creature, then thou art in that eternal One, which is God himself, and then thou shalt feel within thee the highest virtue of Love. . . . The treasure of treasures for the soul is where she goeth out of the Somewhat into that Nothing out of which all things may be made. The soul here saith, *I have nothing*, for I am utterly stripped and naked; *I can do nothing*, for I have no manner of power, but am as water poured out; *I am nothing*, for all that I am is no more than an image of Being, and only God is to me I AM; and so, sitting down in my own Nothingness, I give glory to the eternal Being, and *will nothing* of myself, that so God may will all in me, being unto me my God and all things.”¹

In Paul’s language, I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me. Only when I become as nothing can God enter in and no difference between his life and mine remain outstanding.²

¹ Op. cit., pp. 42, 74, abridged.

² From a French book I take this mystical expression of happiness in God’s indwelling presence : —

“Jesus has come to take up his abode in my heart. It is not so much a habitation, an association, as a sort of fusion. Oh, new and blessed life ! life which becomes each day more luminous. . . . The wall before me, dark a few moments since, is splendid at this hour because the sun shines on it. Wherever its rays fall they light up a conflagration of glory ; the smallest speck of glass sparkles, each grain of sand emits fire ; even so there is a royal song of triumph in my heart because the Lord is there. My

This overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we both become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is the everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by differences of clime or creed. In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian mysticism, in Whitmanism, we find the same recurring note, so that there is about mystical utterances an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic stop and think, and which brings it about that the mystical classics have, as has been said, neither birthday nor native land. Perpetually telling of the unity of man with God, their speech antedates languages, and they do not grow old.¹

‘That art Thou!’ say the Upanishads, and the Vedantists add: ‘Not a part, not a mode of That, but identically That, that absolute Spirit of the World.’ “As pure water poured into pure water remains the same, thus, O Gautama, is the Self of a thinker who knows.

days succeed each other; yesterday a blue sky; to-day a clouded sun; a night filled with strange dreams; but as soon as the eyes open, and I regain consciousness and seem to begin life again, it is always the same figure before me, always the same presence filling my heart. . . . Formerly the day was dulled by the absence of the Lord. I used to wake invaded by all sorts of sad impressions, and I did not find him on my path. To-day he is with me; and the light cloudiness which covers things is not an obstacle to my communion with him. I feel the pressure of his hand, I feel something else which fills me with a serene joy; shall I dare to speak it out? Yes, for it is the true expression of what I experience. The Holy Spirit is not merely making me a visit; it is no mere dazzling apparition which may from one moment to another spread its wings and leave me in my night, it is a permanent habitation. He can depart only if he takes me with him. More than that; he is not other than myself: he is one with me. It is not a juxtaposition, it is a penetration, a profound modification of my nature, a new manner of my being.” Quoted from the MS. ‘of an old man’ by WILFRED MONOD: *Il Vit: six méditations sur le mystère chrétien*, pp. 280-283.

¹ Compare M. MAETERLINCK: *L’Ornement des Noces spirituelles de Ruysbroeck*, Bruxelles, 1891, Introduction, p. xix.

Water in water, fire in fire, ether in ether, no one can distinguish them ; likewise a man whose mind has entered into the Self.”¹ “ ‘Every man,’ says the Sufi Gulshan-Râz, ‘whose heart is no longer shaken by any doubt, knows with certainty that there is no being save only One. . . . In his divine majesty the *me*, the *we*, the *thou*, are not found, for in the One there can be no distinction. Every being who is annulled and entirely separated from himself, hears resound outside of him this voice and this echo : *I am God* : he has an eternal way of existing, and is no longer subject to death.’ ”² In the vision of God, says Plotinus, “what sees is not our reason, but something prior and superior to our reason. . . . He who thus sees does not properly see, does not distinguish or imagine two things. He changes, he ceases to be himself, preserves nothing of himself. Absorbed in God, he makes but one with him, like a centre of a circle coinciding with another centre.”³ “Here,” writes Suso, “the spirit dies, and yet is all alive in the marvels of the Godhead . . . and is lost in the stillness of the glorious dazzling obscurity and of the naked simple unity. It is in this modeless *where* that the highest bliss is to be found.”⁴ “Ich bin so gross als Gott,” sings Angelus Silesius again, “Er ist als ich so klein ; Er kann nicht über mich, ich unter ihm nicht sein.”⁵

In mystical literature such self-contradictory phrases as ‘dazzling obscurity,’ ‘whispering silence,’ teeming desert,’ are continually met with. They prove that not conceptual speech, but music rather, is the element through which we

¹ Upanishads, M. MÜLLER’s translation, ii. 17, 334.

² SCHMÖLDERS : Op. cit., p. 210.

³ Enneads, BOUILLIER’s translation. Paris, 1861, iii. 561. Compare pp. 473-477, and vol. i. p. 27.

⁴ Autobiography, pp. 309, 310.

⁵ Op. cit., Strophe 10.

are best spoken to by mystical truth. Many mystical scriptures are indeed little more than musical compositions.

“He who would hear the voice of Nada, ‘the Soundless Sound,’ and comprehend it, he has to learn the nature of Dhâranâ. . . . When to himself his form appears unreal, as do on waking all the forms he sees in dreams; when he has ceased to hear the many, he may discern the ONE — the inner sound which kills the outer. . . . For then the soul will hear, and will remember. And then to the inner ear will speak THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE. . . . And now thy *Self* is lost in SELF, *thyself* unto THYSELF, merged in that SELF from which thou first didst radiate. . . . Behold! thou hast become the Light, thou hast become the Sound, thou art thy Master and thy God. Thou art THYSELF the object of thy search: the VOICE unbroken, that resounds throughout eternities, exempt from change, from sin exempt, the seven sounds in one, the VOICE OF THE SILENCE. *Om tat Sat.*”¹

These words, if they do not awaken laughter as you receive them, probably stir chords within you which music and language touch in common. Music gives us ontological messages which non-musical criticism is unable to contradict, though it may laugh at our foolishness in minding them. There is a verge of the mind which these things haunt; and whispers therefrom mingle with the operations of our understanding, even as the waters of the infinite ocean send their waves to break among the pebbles that lie upon our shores.

“Here begins the sea that ends not till the world’s end. Where we stand, Could we know the next high sea-mark set beyond these waves that gleam, We should know what never man hath known, nor eye of man hath scanned. . . .

Ah, but here man’s heart leaps, yearning towards the gloom with venturous glee,

From the shore that hath no shore beyond it, set in all the sea.”²

¹ H. P. BLAVATSKY : The Voice of the Silence.

² SWINBURNE : On the Verge, in ‘A Midsummer Vacation.’

That doctrine, for example, that eternity is timeless, that our 'immortality,' if we live in the eternal, is not so much future as already now and here, which we find so often expressed to-day in certain philosophic circles, finds its support in a 'hear, hear!' or an 'amen,' which floats up from that mysteriously deeper level.¹ We recognize the passwords to the mystical region as we hear them, but we cannot use them ourselves; it alone has the keeping of 'the password primeval.'²

I have now sketched with extreme brevity and insufficiency, but as fairly as I am able in the time allowed, the general traits of the mystic range of consciousness. *It is on the whole pantheistic and optimistic, or at least the opposite of pessimistic. It is anti-naturalistic, and harmonizes best with twice-bornness and so-called other-worldly states of mind.*

My next task is to inquire whether we can invoke it as authoritative. Does it furnish any *warrant for the truth* of the twice-bornness and supernaturality and pantheism which it favors? I must give my answer to this question as concisely as I can.

In brief my answer is this,—and I will divide it into three parts:—

(1) Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come.

(2) No authority emanates from them which should make it a duty for those who stand outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically.

¹ Compare the extracts from Dr. Bucke, quoted on pp. 398, 399.

² As serious an attempt as I know to mediate between the mystical region and the discursive life is contained in an article on Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, by F. C. S. SCHILLER, in *Mind*, vol. ix., 1900.

(3) They break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith.

I will take up these points one by one.

1.

As a matter of psychological fact, mystical states of a well-pronounced and emphatic sort *are* usually authoritative over those who have them.¹ They have been 'there,' and know. It is vain for rationalism to grumble about this. If the mystical truth that comes to a man proves to be a force that he can live by, what mandate have we of the majority to order him to live in another way? We can throw him into a prison or a madhouse, but we cannot change his mind—we commonly attach it only the more stubbornly to its beliefs.² It mocks our utmost efforts, as a matter of fact, and in point of logic it absolutely escapes our jurisdiction. Our own more 'rational' beliefs are based on evidence exactly similar in nature to that which mystics quote for theirs. Our senses, namely, have assured us of certain states of fact; but mystical experiences are as direct perceptions

¹ I abstract from weaker states, and from those cases of which the books are full, where the director (but usually not the subject) remains in doubt whether the experience may not have proceeded from the demon.

² Example: Mr. John Nelson writes of his imprisonment for preaching Methodism: "My soul was as a watered garden, and I could sing praises to God all day long; for he turned my captivity into joy, and gave me to rest as well on the boards, as if I had been on a bed of down. Now could I say, 'God's service is perfect freedom,' and I was carried out much in prayer that my enemies might drink of the same river of peace which my God gave so largely to me." *Journal*, London, no date, p. 172.

of fact for those who have them as any sensations ever were for us. The records show that even though the five senses be in abeyance in them, they are absolutely sensational in their epistemological quality, if I may be pardoned the barbarous expression, — that is, they are face to face presentations of what seems immediately to exist.

The mystic is, in short, *invulnerable*, and must be left, whether we relish it or not, in undisturbed enjoyment of his creed. Faith, says Tolstoy, is that by which men live. And faith-state and mystic state are practically convertible terms.

2.

But I now proceed to add that mystics have no right to claim that we ought to accept the deliverance of their peculiar experiences, if we are ourselves outsiders and feel no private call thereto. The utmost they can ever ask of us in this life is to admit that they establish a presumption. They form a consensus and have an unequivocal outcome; and it would be odd, mystics might say, if such a unanimous type of experience should prove to be altogether wrong. At bottom, however, this would only be an appeal to numbers, like the appeal of rationalism the other way; and the appeal to numbers has no logical force. If we acknowledge it, it is for 'suggestive,' not for logical reasons: we follow the majority because to do so suits our life.

But even this presumption from the unanimity of mystics is far from being strong. In characterizing mystic states as pantheistic, optimistic, etc., I am afraid I over-simplified the truth. I did so for expository reasons, and to keep the closer to the classic mystical tradition. The classic religious mysticism, it now must be con-

fessed, is only a 'privileged case.' It is an *extract*, kept true to type by the selection of the fittest specimens and their preservation in 'schools.' It is carved out from a much larger mass; and if we take the larger mass as seriously as religious mysticism has historically taken itself, we find that the supposed unanimity largely disappears. To begin with, even religious mysticism itself, the kind that accumulates traditions and makes schools, is much less unanimous than I have allowed. It has been both ascetic and antinomianly self-indulgent within the Christian church.¹ It is dualistic in Sankhya, and monistic in Vedanta philosophy. I called it pantheistic; but the great Spanish mystics are anything but pantheists. They are with few exceptions non-metaphysical minds, for whom 'the category of personality' is absolute. The 'union' of man with God is for them much more like an occasional miracle than like an original identity.² How different again, apart from the happiness common to all, is the mysticism of Walt Whitman, Edward Carpenter, Richard Jefferies, and other naturalistic pantheists, from the more distinctively Christian sort.³ The fact is that the mystical feeling of enlargement, union, and emancipation has no specific intellectual content whatever of its own. It is capable of forming matrimonial alliances with material furnished by the most diverse philosophies and theologies, provided only they

¹ RUYSBROECK, in the work which Maeterlinck has translated, has a chapter against the antinomianism of disciples. H. DELACROIX's book (*Essai sur le mysticisme spéculatif en Allemagne au XIV^{me} Siècle*, Paris, 1900) is full of antinomian material. Compare also A. JUNDT: *Les Amis de Dieu au XIV^{me} Siècle*, Thèse de Strasbourg, 1879.

² Compare PAUL ROUSSELOT: *Les Mystiques Espagnols*, Paris, 1869, ch. xii.

³ See CARPENTER'S *Towards Democracy*, especially the latter parts, and JEFFERIES'S wonderful and splendid mystic rhapsody, *The Story of my Heart*.

can find a place in their framework for its peculiar emotional mood. We have no right, therefore, to invoke its prestige as distinctively in favor of any special belief, such as that in absolute idealism, or in the absolute monistic identity, or in the absolute goodness, of the world. It is only relatively in favor of all these things — it passes out of common human consciousness in the direction in which they lie.

So much for religious mysticism proper. But more remains to be told, for religious mysticism is only one half of mysticism. The other half has no accumulated traditions except those which the text-books on insanity supply. Open any one of these, and you will find abundant cases in which 'mystical ideas' are cited as characteristic symptoms of enfeebled or deluded states of mind. In delusional insanity, paranoia, as they sometimes call it, we may have a *diabolical* mysticism, a sort of religious mysticism turned upside down. The same sense of ineffable importance in the smallest events, the same texts and words coming with new meanings, the same voices and visions and leadings and missions, the same controlling by extraneous powers; only this time the emotion is pessimistic: instead of consolations we have desolations; the meanings are dreadful; and the powers are enemies to life. It is evident that from the point of view of their psychological mechanism, the classic mysticism and these lower mysticisms spring from the same mental level, from that great subliminal or transmarginal region of which science is beginning to admit the existence, but of which so little is really known. That region contains every kind of matter: 'seraph and snake' abide there side by side. To come from thence is no infallible credential. What comes must be sifted and tested, and run the gauntlet of confrontation with the total context of experience,

just like what comes from the outer world of sense. Its value must be ascertained by empirical methods, so long as we are not mystics ourselves.

Once more, then, I repeat that non-mystics are under no obligation to acknowledge in mystical states a superior authority conferred on them by their intrinsic nature.¹

3.

Yet, I repeat once more, the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what we may believe. As a rule, mystical states merely add a supersensuous meaning to the ordinary outward data of consciousness. They are excitements like the emotions of love or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which facts already objectively before us fall into a new expressiveness and make a new connection with our active life. They do not contradict these facts as such, or deny anything that our senses have immediately seized.² It is the rationalistic critic rather who plays the part of denier in

¹ In chapter i. of book ii. of his work *Degeneration*, 'MAX NORDAU' seeks to undermine all mysticism by exposing the weakness of the lower kinds. Mysticism for him means any sudden perception of hidden significance in things. He explains such perception by the abundant uncompleted associations which experiences may arouse in a degenerate brain. These give to him who has the experience a vague and vast sense of its leading further, yet they awaken no definite or useful consequent in his thought. The explanation is a plausible one for certain sorts of feeling of significance; and other alienists (WERNICKE, for example, in his *Grundriss der Psychiatrie*, Theil ii., Leipzig, 1896) have explained 'paranoiac' conditions by a laming of the association-organ. But the higher mystical flights, with their positiveness and abruptness, are surely products of no such merely negative condition. It seems far more reasonable to ascribe them to inroads from the subconscious life, of the cerebral activity correlative to which we as yet know nothing.

² They sometimes add subjective *audita et visa* to the facts, but as these are usually interpreted as transmundane, they oblige no alteration in the facts of sense.

the controversy, and his denials have no strength, for there never can be a state of facts to which new meaning may not truthfully be added, provided the mind ascend to a more enveloping point of view. It must always remain an open question whether mystical states may not possibly be such superior points of view, windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world. The difference of the views seen from the different mystical windows need not prevent us from entertaining this supposition. The wider world would in that case prove to have a mixed constitution like that of this world, that is all. It would have its celestial and its infernal regions, its tempting and its saving moments, its valid experiences and its counterfeit ones, just as our world has them; but it would be a wider world all the same. We should have to use its experiences by selecting and subordinating and substituting just as is our custom in this ordinary naturalistic world; we should be liable to error just as we are now; yet the counting in of that wider world of meanings, and the serious dealing with it, might, in spite of all the perplexity, be indispensable stages in our approach to the final fullness of the truth.

In this shape, I think, we have to leave the subject. Mystical states indeed wield no authority due simply to their being mystical states. But the higher ones among them point in directions to which the religious sentiments even of non-mystical men incline. They tell of the supremacy of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety, and of rest. They offer us *hypotheses*, hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset. The supernaturalism and optimism to which they would persuade us may, interpreted in one way or another, be after all the truest of insights into the meaning of this life.

“ Oh, the little more, and how much it is ; and the little less, and what worlds away ! ” It may be that possibility and permission of this sort are all that the religious consciousness requires to live on. In my last lecture I shall have to try to persuade you that this is the case. Meanwhile, however, I am sure that for many of my readers this diet is too slender. If supernaturalism and inner union with the divine are true, you think, then not so much permission, as compulsion to believe, ought to be found. Philosophy has always professed to prove religious truth by coercive argument ; and the construction of philosophies of this kind has always been one favorite function of the religious life, if we use this term in the large historic sense. But religious philosophy is an enormous subject, and in my next lecture I can only give that brief glance at it which my limits will allow.

LECTURE XVIII

PHILOSOPHY

THE subject of Saintliness left us face to face with the question, Is the sense of divine presence a sense of anything objectively true? We turned first to mysticism for an answer, and found that although mysticism is entirely willing to corroborate religion, it is too private (and also too various) in its utterances to be able to claim a universal authority. But philosophy publishes results which claim to be universally valid if they are valid at all, so we now turn with our question to philosophy. Can philosophy stamp a warrant of veracity upon the religious man's sense of the divine?

I imagine that many of you at this point begin to indulge in guesses at the goal to which I am tending. I have undermined the authority of mysticism, you say, and the next thing I shall probably do is to seek to discredit that of philosophy. Religion, you expect to hear me conclude, is nothing but an affair of faith, based either on vague sentiment, or on that vivid sense of the reality of things unseen of which in my second lecture and in the lecture on Mysticism I gave so many examples. It is essentially private and individualistic; it always exceeds our powers of formulation; and although attempts to pour its contents into a philosophic mould will probably always go on, men being what they are, yet these attempts are always secondary processes which in no way add to the authority, or warrant the veracity, of the sentiments from which they derive their own stimulus

and borrow whatever glow of conviction they may themselves possess. In short, you suspect that I am planning to defend feeling at the expense of reason, to rehabilitate the primitive and unreflective, and to dissuade you from the hope of any Theology worthy of the name.

To a certain extent I have to admit that you guess rightly. I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products, like translations of a text into another tongue. But all such statements are misleading from their brevity, and it will take the whole hour for me to explain to you exactly what I mean.

When I call theological formulas secondary products, I mean that in a world in which no religious feeling had ever existed, I doubt whether any philosophic theology could ever have been framed. I doubt if dispassionate intellectual contemplation of the universe, apart from inner unhappiness and need of deliverance on the one hand and mystical emotion on the other, would ever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we now possess. Men would have begun with animistic explanations of natural fact, and criticised these away into scientific ones, as they actually have done. In the science they would have left a certain amount of 'psychical research,' even as they now will probably have to re-admit a certain amount. But high-flying speculations like those of either dogmatic or idealistic theology, these they would have had no motive to venture on, feeling no need of commerce with such deities. These speculations must, it seems to me, be classed as over-beliefs, buildings-out performed by the intellect into directions of which feeling originally supplied the hint.

But even if religious philosophy had to have its first hint supplied by feeling, may it not have dealt in a supe-

rior way with the matter which feeling suggested? Feeling is private and dumb, and unable to give an account of itself. It allows that its results are mysteries and enigmas, declines to justify them rationally, and on occasion is willing that they should even pass for paradoxical and absurd. Philosophy takes just the opposite attitude. Her aspiration is to reclaim from mystery and paradox whatever territory she touches. To find an escape from obscure and wayward personal persuasion to truth objectively valid for all thinking men has ever been the intellect's most cherished ideal. To redeem religion from unwholesome privacy, and to give public status and universal right of way to its deliverances, has been reason's task.

I believe that philosophy will always have opportunity to labor at this task.¹ We are thinking beings, and we cannot exclude the intellect from participating in any of our functions. Even in soliloquizing with ourselves, we construe our feelings intellectually. Both our personal ideals and our religious and mystical experiences must be interpreted congruously with the kind of scenery which our thinking mind inhabits. The philosophic climate of our time inevitably forces its own clothing on us. Moreover, we must exchange our feelings with one another, and in doing so we have to speak, and to use general and abstract verbal formulas. Conceptions and constructions are thus a necessary part of our religion; and as moderator amid the clash of hypotheses, and mediator among the criticisms of one man's constructions by another, philosophy will always have much to do. It would be strange if I disputed this, when these very lectures which I am giving are (as you will see more clearly

¹ Compare Professor W. WALLACE's Gifford Lectures, in *Lectures and Essays*, Oxford. 1898, pp. 17 ff.

from now onwards) a laborious attempt to extract from the privacies of religious experience some general facts which can be defined in formulas upon which everybody may agree.

Religious experience, in other words, spontaneously and inevitably engenders myths, superstitions, dogmas, creeds, and metaphysical theologies, and criticisms of one set of these by the adherents of another. Of late, impartial classifications and comparisons have become possible, alongside of the denunciations and anathemas by which the commerce between creeds used exclusively to be carried on. We have the beginnings of a 'Science of Religions,' so-called; and if these lectures could ever be accounted a crumb-like contribution to such a science, I should be made very happy.

But all these intellectual operations, whether they be constructive or comparative and critical, presuppose immediate experiences as their subject-matter. They are interpretative and inductive operations, operations after the fact, consequent upon religious feeling, not coördinate with it, not independent of what it ascertains.

The intellectualism in religion which I wish to discredit pretends to be something altogether different from this. It assumes to construct religious objects out of the resources of logical reason alone, or of logical reason drawing rigorous inference from non-subjective facts. It calls its conclusions dogmatic theology, or philosophy of the absolute, as the case may be; it does not call them science of religions. It reaches them in an a priori way, and warrants their veracity.

Warranted systems have ever been the idols of aspiring souls. All-inclusive, yet simple; noble, clean, luminous, stable, rigorous, true; — what more ideal refuge could

there be than such a system would offer to spirits vexed by the muddiness and accidentality of the world of sensible things? Accordingly, we find inculcated in the theological schools of to-day, almost as much as in those of the fore-time, a disdain for merely possible or probable truth, and of results that only private assurance can grasp. Scholastics and idealists both express this disdain. Principal John Caird, for example, writes as follows in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*: —

“Religion must indeed be a thing of the heart; but in order to elevate it from the region of subjective caprice and waywardness, and to distinguish between that which is true and false in religion, we must appeal to an objective standard. That which enters the heart must first be discerned by the intelligence to be *true*. It must be seen as having in its own nature a *right* to dominate feeling, and as constituting the principle by which feeling must be judged.¹ In estimating the religious character of individuals, nations, or races, the first question is, not how they feel, but what they think and believe — not whether their religion is one which manifests itself in emotions, more or less vehement and enthusiastic, but what are the *conceptions* of God and divine things by which these emotions are called forth. Feeling is necessary in religion, but it is by the *content* or intelligent basis of a religion, and not by feeling, that its character and worth are to be determined.”²

Cardinal Newman, in his work, *The Idea of a University*, gives more emphatic expression still to this disdain for sentiment.³ Theology, he says, is a science in the strictest sense of the word. I will tell you, he says, what it is not — not ‘physical evidences’ for God, not ‘natural religion,’ for these are but vague subjective interpretations: —

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 174, abridged.

² *Ibid.*, p. 186, abridged and italicized.

³ *Discourse II.* § 7.

"If," he continues, "the Supreme Being is powerful or skillful, just so far as the telescope shows power, or the microscope shows skill, if his moral law is to be ascertained simply by the physical processes of the animal frame, or his will gathered from the immediate issues of human affairs, if his Essence is just as high and deep and broad as the universe and no more; if this be the fact, then will I confess that there is no specific science about God, that theology is but a name, and a protest in its behalf an hypocrisy. Then, pious as it is to think of Him, while the pageant of experiment or abstract reasoning passes by, still such piety is nothing more than a poetry of thought, or an ornament of language, a certain view taken of Nature which one man has and another has not, which gifted minds strike out, which others see to be admirable and ingenious, and which all would be the better for adopting. It is but the theology of Nature, just as we talk of the *philosophy* or the *romance* of history, or the *poetry* of childhood, or the picturesque or the sentimental or the humorous, or any other abstract quality which the genius or the caprice of the individual, or the fashion of the day, or the consent of the world, recognizes in any set of objects which are subjected to its contemplation. I do not see much difference between avowing that there is no God, and implying that nothing definite can be known for certain about Him."

What I mean by Theology, continues Newman, is none of these things: "I simply mean the *Science of God*, or the truths we know about God, put into a system, just as we have a science of the stars and call it astronomy, or of the crust of the earth and call it geology."

In both these extracts we have the issue clearly set before us: Feeling valid only for the individual is pitted against reason valid universally. The test is a perfectly plain one of fact. Theology based on pure reason must in point of fact convince men universally. If it did not, wherein would its superiority consist? If it only formed sects and schools, even as sentiment and mysticism form them, how would it fulfill its programme of freeing us

from personal caprice and waywardness? This perfectly definite practical test of the pretensions of philosophy to found religion on universal reason simplifies my procedure to-day. I need not discredit philosophy by laborious criticism of its arguments. It will suffice if I show that as a matter of history it fails to prove its pretension to be 'objectively' convincing. In fact, philosophy does so fail. It does not banish differences; it founds schools and sects just as feeling does. I believe, in fact, that the logical reason of man operates in this field of divinity exactly as it has always operated in love, or in patriotism, or in politics, or in any other of the wider affairs of life, in which our passions or our mystical intuitions fix our beliefs beforehand. It finds arguments for our conviction, for indeed it *has* to find them. It amplifies and defines our faith, and dignifies it and lends it words and plausibility. It hardly ever engenders it; it cannot now secure it.¹

Lend me your attention while I run through some of the points of the older systematic theology. You find them in both Protestant and Catholic manuals, best of all in the innumerable text-books published since Pope Leo's Encyclical recommending the study of Saint Thomas. I glance first at the arguments by which dogmatic the-

¹ As regards the secondary character of intellectual constructions, and the primacy of feeling and instinct in founding religious beliefs, see the striking work of H. FIELDING, *The Hearts of Men*, London, 1902, which came into my hands after my text was written. "Creeds," says the author, "are the grammar of religion, they are to religion what grammar is to speech. Words are the expression of our wants; grammar is the theory formed afterwards. Speech never proceeded from grammar, but the reverse. As speech progresses and changes from unknown causes, grammar must follow" (p. 313). The whole book, which keeps unusually close to concrete facts, is little more than an amplification of this text.

ology establishes God's existence, after that at those by which it establishes his nature.¹

The arguments for God's existence have stood for hundreds of years with the waves of unbelieving criticism breaking against them, never totally discrediting them in the ears of the faithful, but on the whole slowly and surely washing out the mortar from between their joints. If you have a God already whom you believe in, these arguments confirm you. If you are atheistic, they fail to set you right. The proofs are various. The 'cosmological' one, so-called, reasons from the contingency of the world to a First Cause which must contain whatever perfections the world itself contains. The 'argument from design' reasons, from the fact that Nature's laws are mathematical, and her parts benevolently adapted to each other, that this cause is both intellectual and benevolent. The 'moral argument' is that the moral law presupposes a lawgiver. The 'argument *ex consensu gentium*' is that the belief in God is so widespread as to be grounded in the rational nature of man, and should therefore carry authority with it.

As I just said, I will not discuss these arguments technically. The bare fact that all idealists since Kant have felt entitled either to scout or to neglect them shows that they are not solid enough to serve as religion's all-sufficient foundation. Absolutely impersonal reasons would be in duty bound to show more general convincingness. Causation is indeed too obscure a principle to bear the weight of the whole structure of theology. As for the

¹ For convenience' sake, I follow the order of A. STÖCKL's *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, 5te Auflage, Mainz, 1881, Band ii. B. BOEDDER's *Natural Theology*, London, 1891, is a handy English Catholic Manual; but an almost identical doctrine is given by such Protestant theologians as C. HODGE: *Systematic Theology*, New York, 1873, or A. H. STRONG: *Systematic Theology*, 5th edition, New York, 1896.

argument from design, see how Darwinian ideas have revolutionized it. Conceived as we now conceive them, as so many fortunate escapes from almost limitless processes of destruction, the benevolent adaptations which we find in Nature suggest a deity very different from the one who figured in the earlier versions of the argument.¹

¹ It must not be forgotten that any form of disorder in the world might, by the design argument, suggest a God for just that kind of disorder. The truth is that any state of things whatever that can be named is logically susceptible of teleological interpretation. The ruins of the earthquake at Lisbon, for example : the whole of past history had to be planned exactly as it was to bring about in the fullness of time just that particular arrangement of debris of masonry, furniture, and once living bodies. No other train of causes would have been sufficient. And so of any other arrangement, bad or good, which might as a matter of fact be found resulting anywhere from previous conditions. To avoid such pessimistic consequences and save its beneficent designer, the design argument accordingly invokes two other principles, restrictive in their operation. The first is physical : Nature's forces tend of their own accord only to disorder and destruction, to heaps of ruins, not to architecture. This principle, though plausible at first sight, seems, in the light of recent biology, to be more and more improbable. The second principle is one of anthropomorphic interpretation. No arrangement that for us is 'disorderly' can possibly have been an object of design at all. This principle is of course a mere assumption in the interests of anthropomorphic Theism.

When one views the world with no definite theological bias one way or the other, one sees that order and disorder, as we now recognize them, are purely human inventions. We are interested in certain types of arrangement, useful, æsthetic, or moral, — so interested that whenever we find them realized, the fact emphatically rivets our attention. The result is that we work over the contents of the world selectively. It is overflowing with disorderly arrangements from our point of view, but order is the only thing we care for and look at, and by choosing, one can always find some sort of orderly arrangement in the midst of any chaos. If I should throw down a thousand beans at random upon a table, I could doubtless, by eliminating a sufficient number of them, leave the rest in almost any geometrical pattern you might propose to me, and you might then say that that pattern was the thing prefigured beforehand, and that the other beans were mere irrelevance and packing material. Our dealings with Nature are just like this. She is a vast *plenum* in which our attention draws capricious lines in innumerable directions. We count and name whatever lies upon the special lines we trace, whilst the other things and the untraced lines are neither named nor counted. There are in reality infinitely more things

The fact is that these arguments do but follow the combined suggestions of the facts and of our feeling. They prove nothing rigorously. They only corroborate our pre-existent partialities.

If philosophy can do so little to establish God's existence, how stands it with her efforts to define his attributes? It is worth while to look at the attempts of systematic theology in this direction.

Since God is First Cause, this science of sciences says, he differs from all his creatures in possessing existence *a se*. From this 'a-se-ity' on God's part, theology deduces by mere logic most of his other perfections. For instance, he must be both *necessary* and *absolute*, cannot not be, and cannot in any way be determined by anything else. This makes Him absolutely unlimited from without, and unlimited also from within; for limitation is non-being; and God is being itself. This unlimitedness makes God infinitely perfect. Moreover, God is *One*, and *Only*, for the infinitely perfect can admit no peer. He is *Spiritual*, for were He composed of physical parts, some other power would have to combine them into the total, and his aseity would thus be contradicted. He is therefore both simple and non-physical in nature. He is *simple metaphysically* also, that is to say, his nature and his existence can-

'unadapted' to each other in this world than there are things 'adapted'; infinitely more things with irregular relations than with regular relations between them. But we look for the regular kind of thing exclusively, and ingeniously discover and preserve it in our memory. It accumulates with other regular kinds, until the collection of them fills our encyclopædias. Yet all the while between and around them lies an infinite anonymous chaos of objects that no one ever thought of together, of relations that never yet attracted our attention.

The facts of order from which the physico-theological argument starts are thus easily susceptible of interpretation as arbitrary human products. So long as this is the case, although of course no argument against God follows, it follows that the argument for him will fail to constitute a knock-down proof of his existence. It will be convincing only to those who on other grounds believe in him already.

not be distinct, as they are in finite substances which share their formal natures with one another, and are individual only in their material aspect. Since God is one and only, his *essentia* and his *esse* must be given at one stroke. This excludes from his being all those distinctions, so familiar in the world of finite things, between potentiality and actuality, substance and accidents, being and activity, existence and attributes. We can talk, it is true, of God's powers, acts, and attributes, but these discriminations are only 'virtual,' and made from the human point of view. In God all these points of view fall into an absolute identity of being.

This absence of all potentiality in God obliges Him to be *immutable*. He is actuality, through and through. Were there anything potential about Him, He would either lose or gain by its actualization, and either loss or gain would contradict his perfection. He cannot, therefore, change. Furthermore, He is *immense, boundless*; for could He be outlined in space, He would be composite, and this would contradict his indivisibility. He is therefore *omnipresent*, indivisibly there, at every point of space. He is similarly wholly present at every point of time, — in other words *eternal*. For if He began in time, He would need a prior cause, and that would contradict his aseity. If He ended, it would contradict his necessity. If He went through any succession, it would contradict his immutability.

He has *intelligence* and *will* and every other creature-perfection, for *we* have them, and *effectus nequit superare causam*. In Him, however, they are absolutely and eternally in act, and their *object*, since God can be bounded by naught that is external, can primarily be nothing else than God himself. He knows himself, then, in one eternal indivisible act, and wills himself with an infinite self-pleasure.¹ Since He must of logical necessity thus love and will himself, He cannot be called 'free' *ad intra*, with the freedom of contrarieties that characterizes finite creatures. *Ad extra*, however, or with respect to his creation, God is free. He cannot *need* to create, being perfect in being and in happiness already. He *wills* to create, then, by an absolute freedom.

¹ For the scholastics the *facultas appetendi* embraces feeling, desire, and will.

Being thus a substance endowed with intellect and will and freedom, God is a *person*; and a *living* person also, for He is both object and subject of his own activity, and to be this distinguishes the living from the lifeless. He is thus absolutely *self-sufficient*: his *self-knowledge* and *self-love* are both of them infinite and adequate, and need no extraneous conditions to perfect them.

He is *omniscient*, for in knowing himself as Cause He knows all creature things and events by implication. His knowledge is *previsive*, for He is present to all time. Even our free acts are known beforehand to Him, for otherwise his wisdom would admit of successive moments of enrichment, and this would contradict his immutability. He is *omnipotent* for everything that does not involve logical contradiction. He can make *being* — in other words his power includes *creation*. If what He creates were made of his own substance, it would have to be infinite in essence, as that substance is; but it is finite; so it must be non-divine in substance. If it were made of a substance, an eternally existing matter, for example, which God found there to his hand, and to which He simply gave its form, that would contradict God's definition as First Cause, and make Him a mere mover of something caused already. The things he creates, then, He creates *ex nihilo*, and gives them absolute being as so many finite substances additional to himself. The forms which he imprints upon them have their prototypes in his ideas. But as in God there is no such thing as multiplicity, and as these ideas for us are manifold, we must distinguish the ideas as they are in God and the way in which our minds externally imitate them. We must attribute them to Him only in a *terminative* sense, as differing aspects, from the finite point of view, of his unique essence.

God of course is holy, good, and just. He can do no evil, for He is positive being's fullness, and evil is negation. It is true that He has created physical evil in places, but only as a means of wider good, for *bonum totius præeminet bonum partis*. Moral evil He cannot will, either as end or means, for that would contradict his holiness. By creating free beings He *permits* it only, neither his justice nor his goodness obliging

Him to prevent the recipients of freedom from misusing the gift.

As regards God's purpose in creating, primarily it can only have been to exercise his absolute freedom by the manifestation to others of his glory. From this it follows that the others must be rational beings, capable in the first place of knowledge, love, and honor, and in the second place of happiness, for the knowledge and love of God is the mainspring of felicity. In so far forth one may say that God's secondary purpose in creating is *love*.

I will not weary you by pursuing these metaphysical determinations farther, into the mysteries of God's Trinity, for example. What I have given will serve as a specimen of the orthodox philosophical theology of both Catholics and Protestants. Newman, filled with enthusiasm at God's list of perfections, continues the passage which I began to quote to you by a couple of pages of a rhetoric so magnificent that I can hardly refrain from adding them, in spite of the inroad they would make upon our time.¹ He first enumerates God's attributes sonorously, then celebrates his ownership of everything in earth and Heaven, and the dependence of all that happens upon his permissive will. He gives us scholastic philosophy 'touched with emotion,' and every philosophy should be touched with emotion to be rightly understood. Emotionally, then, dogmatic theology is worth something to minds of the type of Newman's. It will aid us to estimate what it is worth intellectually, if at this point I make a short digression.

What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder. The Continental schools of philosophy have too often overlooked the fact that man's thinking is organically connected with his conduct. It seems to me to be

¹ Op. cit., Discourse III. § 7.

the chief glory of English and Scottish thinkers to have kept the organic connection in view. The guiding principle of British philosophy has in fact been that every difference must *make* a difference, every theoretical difference somewhere issue in a practical difference, and that the best method of discussing points of theory is to begin by ascertaining what practical difference would result from one alternative or the other being true. What is the particular truth in question *known as*? In what facts does it result? What is its cash-value in terms of particular experience? This is the characteristic English way of taking up a question. In this way, you remember, Locke takes up the question of personal identity. What you mean by it is just your chain of particular memories, says he. That is the only concretely verifiable part of its significance. All further ideas about it, such as the oneness or manyness of the spiritual substance on which it is based, are therefore void of intelligible meaning; and propositions touching such ideas may be indifferently affirmed or denied. So Berkeley with his 'matter.' The cash-value of matter is our physical sensations. That is what it is known as, all that we concretely verify of its conception. That, therefore, is the whole meaning of the term 'matter' — any other pretended meaning is mere wind of words. Hume does the same thing with causation. It is known as a habitual antecedence, and as tendency on our part to look for something definite to come. Apart from this practical meaning it has no significance whatever, and books about it may be committed to the flames, says Hume. Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown, James Mill, John Mill, and Professor Bain, have followed more or less consistently the same method; and Shadworth Hodgson has used the principle with full explicitness. When all is

said and done, it was English and Scotch writers, and not Kant, who introduced 'the critical method' into philosophy, the one method fitted to make philosophy a study worthy of serious men. For what seriousness can possibly remain in debating philosophic propositions that will never make an appreciable difference to us in action? And what could it matter, if all propositions were practically indifferent, which of them we should agree to call true or which false?

An American philosopher of eminent originality, Mr. Charles Sanders Peirce, has rendered thought a service by disentangling from the particulars of its application the principle by which these men were instinctively guided, and by singling it out as fundamental and giving to it a Greek name. He calls it the principle of *pragmatism*, and he defends it somewhat as follows:¹—

Thought in movement has for its only conceivable motive the attainment of belief, or thought at rest. Only when our thought about a subject has found its rest in belief can our action on the subject firmly and safely begin. Beliefs, in short, are rules for action; and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of active habits. If there were any part of a thought that made no difference in the thought's practical consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought's significance. To develop a thought's meaning we need therefore only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance; and the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our

¹ In an article, *How to make our Ideas Clear*, in the *Popular Science Monthly* for January, 1878, vol. xii. p. 286.

thoughts of an object, we need then only consider what sensations, immediate or remote, we are conceivably to expect from it, and what conduct we must prepare in case the object should be true. Our conception of these practical consequences is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.

This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. Such a principle will help us on this occasion to decide, among the various attributes set down in the scholastic inventory of God's perfections, whether some be not far less significant than others.

If, namely, we apply the principle of pragmatism to God's metaphysical attributes, strictly so called, as distinguished from his moral attributes, I think that, even were we forced by a coercive logic to believe them, we still should have to confess them to be destitute of all intelligible significance. Take God's aseity, for example; or his necessariness; his immateriality; his 'simplicity' or superiority to the kind of inner variety and succession which we find in finite beings, his indivisibility, and lack of the inner distinctions of being and activity, substance and accident, potentiality and actuality, and the rest; his repudiation of inclusion in a genus; his actualized infinity; his 'personality,' apart from the moral qualities which it may comport; his relations to evil being permissive and not positive; his self-sufficiency, self-love, and absolute felicity in himself:—candidly speaking, how do such qualities as these make any definite connection with our life? And if they severally call for no distinctive adaptations of our conduct, what vital difference can it possibly make to a man's religion whether they be true or false?

For my own part, although I dislike to say aught that

may grate upon tender associations, I must frankly confess that even though these attributes were faultlessly deduced, I cannot conceive of its being of the smallest consequence to us religiously that any one of them should be true. Pray, what specific act can I perform in order to adapt myself the better to God's simplicity? Or how does it assist me to plan my behavior, to know that his happiness is anyhow absolutely complete? In the middle of the century just past, Mayne Reid was the great writer of books of out-of-door adventure. He was forever extolling the hunters and field-observers of living animals' habits, and keeping up a fire of invective against the 'closet-naturalists,' as he called them, the collectors and classifiers, and handlers of skeletons and skins. When I was a boy, I used to think that a closet-naturalist must be the vilest type of wretch under the sun. But surely the systematic theologians are the closet-naturalists of the deity, even in Captain Mayne Reid's sense. What is their deduction of metaphysical attributes but a shuffling and matching of pedantic dictionary-adjectives, aloof from morals, aloof from human needs, something that might be worked out from the mere word 'God' by one of those logical machines of wood and brass which recent ingenuity has contrived as well as by a man of flesh and blood. They have the trail of the serpent over them. One feels that in the theologians' hands, they are only a set of titles obtained by a mechanical manipulation of synonyms; verballity has stepped into the place of vision, professionalism into that of life. Instead of bread we have a stone; instead of a fish, a serpent. Did such a conglomeration of abstract terms give really the gist of our knowledge of the deity, schools of theology might indeed continue to flourish, but religion, vital religion, would have taken its flight from

this world. What keeps religion going is something else than abstract definitions and systems of concatenated adjectives, and something different from faculties of theology and their professors. All these things are after-effects, secondary accretions upon those phenomena of vital conversation with the unseen divine, of which I have shown you so many instances, renewing themselves *in sæcula sæculorum* in the lives of humble private men.

So much for the metaphysical attributes of God! From the point of view of practical religion, the metaphysical monster which they offer to our worship is an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly mind.

What shall we now say of the attributes called moral? Pragmatically, they stand on an entirely different footing. They positively determine fear and hope and expectation, and are foundations for the saintly life. It needs but a glance at them to show how great is their significance.

God's holiness, for example: being holy, God can will nothing but the good. Being omnipotent, he can secure its triumph. Being omniscient, he can see us in the dark. Being just, he can punish us for what he sees. Being loving, he can pardon too. Being unalterable, we can count on him securely. These qualities enter into connection with our life, it is highly important that we should be informed concerning them. That God's purpose in creation should be the manifestation of his glory is also an attribute which has definite relations to our practical life. Among other things it has given a definite character to worship in all Christian countries. If dogmatic theology really does prove beyond dispute that a God with characters like these exists, she may well claim to give a solid basis to religious sentiment. But verily, how stands it with her arguments?

It stands with them as ill as with the arguments for his existence. Not only do post-Kantian idealists reject them root and branch, but it is a plain historic fact that they never have converted any one who has found in the moral complexion of the world, as he experienced it, reasons for doubting that a good God can have framed it. To prove God's goodness by the scholastic argument that there is no non-being in his essence would sound to such a witness simply silly.

No! the book of Job went over this whole matter once for all and definitively. Ratiocination is a relatively superficial and unreal path to the deity: "I will lay mine hand upon my mouth; I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee." An intellect perplexed and baffled, yet a trustful sense of presence — such is the situation of the man who is sincere with himself and with the facts, but who remains religious still.¹

We must therefore, I think, bid a definitive good-by to dogmatic theology. In all sincerity our faith must do without that warrant. Modern idealism, I repeat, has said good-by to this theology forever. Can modern idealism give faith a better warrant, or must she still rely on her poor self for witness?

The basis of modern idealism is Kant's doctrine of the

¹ Pragmatically, the most important attribute of God is his punitive justice. But who, in the present state of theological opinion on that point, will dare maintain that hell fire or its equivalent in some shape is rendered certain by pure logic? Theology herself has largely based this doctrine upon revelation; and, in discussing it, has tended more and more to substitute conventional ideas of criminal law for a priori principles of reason. But the very notion that this glorious universe, with planets and winds, and laughing sky and ocean, should have been conceived and had its beams and rafters laid in technicalities of criminality, is incredible to our modern imagination. It weakens a religion to hear it argued upon such a basis.

Transcendental Ego of Apperception. By this formidable term Kant merely meant the fact that the consciousness 'I think them' must (potentially or actually) accompany all our objects. Former skeptics had said as much, but the 'I' in question had remained for them identified with the personal individual. Kant abstracted and depersonalized it, and made it the most universal of all his categories, although for Kant himself the Transcendental Ego had no theological implications.

It was reserved for his successors to convert Kant's notion of *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, or abstract consciousness, into an infinite concrete self-consciousness which is the soul of the world, and in which our sundry personal self-consciousnesses have their being. It would lead me into technicalities to show you even briefly how this transformation was in point of fact effected. Suffice it to say that in the Hegelian school, which to-day so deeply influences both British and American thinking, two principles have borne the brunt of the operation.

The first of these principles is that the old logic of identity never gives us more than a post-mortem dissection of *disjecta membra*, and that the fullness of life can be construed to thought only by recognizing that every object which our thought may propose to itself involves the notion of some other object which seems at first to negate the first one.

The second principle is that to be conscious of a negation is already virtually to be beyond it. The mere asking of a question or expression of a dissatisfaction proves that the answer or the satisfaction is already imminent; the finite, realized as such, is already the infinite *in posse*.

Applying these principles, we seem to get a propulsive force into our logic which the ordinary logic of a bare,

stark self-identity in each thing never attains to. The objects of our thought now *act* within our thought, act as objects act when given in experience. They change and develop. They introduce something other than themselves along with them; and this other, at first only ideal or potential, presently proves itself also to be actual. It supersedes the thing at first supposed, and both verifies and corrects it, in developing the fullness of its meaning.

The program is excellent; the universe is a place where things are followed by other things that both correct and fulfill them; and a logic which gave us something like this movement of fact would express truth far better than the traditional school-logic, which never gets of its own accord from anything to anything else, and registers only predictions and subsumptions, or static resemblances and differences. Nothing could be more unlike the methods of dogmatic theology than those of this new logic. Let me quote in illustration some passages from the Scottish transcendentalist whom I have already named.

"How are we to conceive," Principal Caird writes, "of reality in which all intelligence rests?" He replies: "Two things may without difficulty be proved, viz., that this reality is an absolute Spirit, and conversely that it is only in communion with this absolute Spirit or Intelligence that the finite Spirit can realize itself. It is absolute; for the faintest movement of human intelligence would be arrested, if it did not presuppose the absolute reality of intelligence, of thought itself. Doubt or denial themselves presuppose and indirectly affirm it. When I pronounce anything to be true, I pronounce it, indeed, to be relative to thought, but not to be relative to my thought, or to the thought of any other individual mind. From the existence of all individual minds as such I can abstract; I can think them away. But that which I cannot think away is thought or self-consciousness itself, in its independence

and absoluteness, or, in other words, an Absolute Thought or Self-Consciousness."

Here, you see, Principal Caird makes the transition which Kant did not make: he converts the omnipresence of consciousness in general as a condition of 'truth' being anywhere possible, into an omnipresent universal consciousness, which he identifies with God in his concreteness. He next proceeds to use the principle that to acknowledge your limits is in essence to be beyond them; and makes the transition to the religious experience of individuals in the following words: —

"If [Man] were only a creature of transient sensations and impulses, of an ever coming and going succession of intuitions, fancies, feelings, then nothing could ever have for him the character of objective truth or reality. But it is the prerogative of man's spiritual nature that he can yield himself up to a thought and will that are infinitely larger than his own. As a thinking, self-conscious being, indeed, he may be said, by his very nature, to live in the atmosphere of the Universal Life. As a thinking being, it is possible for me to suppress and quell in my consciousness every movement of self-assertion, every notion and opinion that is merely mine, every desire that belongs to me as this particular Self, and to become the pure medium of a thought that is universal — in one word, to live no more my own life, but let my consciousness be possessed and suffused by the Infinite and Eternal life of spirit. And yet it is just in this renunciation of self that I truly gain myself, or realize the highest possibilities of my own nature. For whilst in one sense we give up self to live the universal and absolute life of reason, yet that to which we thus surrender ourselves is in reality our truer self. The life of absolute reason is not a life that is foreign to us."

Nevertheless, Principal Caird goes on to say, so far as we are able outwardly to realize this doctrine, the balm it offers remains incomplete. Whatever we may be *in posse*, the very best of us *in actu* falls very short of

being absolutely divine. Social morality, love, and self-sacrifice even, merge our Self only in some other finite self or selves. They do not quite identify it with the Infinite. Man's ideal destiny, infinite in abstract logic, might thus seem in practice forever unrealizable.

"Is there, then," our author continues, "no solution of the contradiction between the ideal and the actual? We answer, There is such a solution, but in order to reach it we are carried beyond the sphere of morality into that of religion. It may be said to be the essential characteristic of religion as contrasted with morality, that it changes aspiration into fruition, anticipation into realization; that instead of leaving man in the interminable pursuit of a vanishing ideal, it makes him the actual partaker of a divine or infinite life. Whether we view religion from the human side or the divine — as the surrender of the soul to God, or as the life of God in the soul — in either aspect it is of its very essence that the Infinite has ceased to be a far-off vision, and has become a present reality. The very first pulsation of the spiritual life, when we rightly apprehend its significance, is the indication that the division between the Spirit and its object has vanished, that the ideal has become real, that the finite has reached its goal and become suffused with the presence and life of the Infinite.

"Oneness of mind and will with the divine mind and will is not the future hope and aim of religion, but its very beginning and birth in the soul. To enter on the religious life is to terminate the struggle. In that act which constitutes the beginning of the religious life — call it faith, or trust, or self-surrender, or by whatever name you will — there is involved the identification of the finite with a life which is eternally realized. It is true indeed that the religious life is progressive; but understood in the light of the foregoing idea, religious progress is not progress *towards*, but *within* the sphere of the Infinite. It is not the vain attempt by endless finite additions or increments to become possessed of infinite wealth, but it is the endeavor, by the constant exercise of spiritual activity, to appropriate that infinite inheritance of which we are already in

possession. The whole future of the religious life is given in its beginning, but it is given implicitly. The position of the man who has entered on the religious life is that evil, error, imperfection, do not really belong to him: they are excrescences which have no organic relation to his true nature: they are already virtually, as they will be actually, suppressed and annulled, and in the very process of being annulled they become the means of spiritual progress. Though he is not exempt from temptation and conflict, [yet] in that inner sphere in which his true life lies, the struggle is over, the victory already achieved. It is not a finite but an infinite life which the spirit lives. Every pulse-beat of its [existence] is the expression and realization of the life of God.”¹

You will readily admit that no description of the phenomena of the religious consciousness could be better than these words of your lamented preacher and philosopher. They reproduce the very rapture of those crises of conversion of which we have been hearing; they utter what the mystic felt but was unable to communicate; and the saint, in hearing them, recognizes his own experience. It is indeed gratifying to find the content of religion reported so unanimously. But when all is said and done, has Principal Caird — and I only use him as an example of that whole mode of thinking — transcended the sphere of feeling and of the direct experience of the individual, and laid the foundations of religion in impartial reason? Has he made religion universal by coercive reasoning, transformed it from a private faith into a public certainty? Has he rescued its affirmations from obscurity and mystery?

I believe that he has done nothing of the kind, but that he has simply reaffirmed the individual's experiences in a more generalized vocabulary. And again, I can be

¹ John Caird: *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, London and New York, 1880, pp. 243-250, and 291-299, much abridged.

excused from proving technically that the transcendentalist reasonings fail to make religion universal, for I can point to the plain fact that a majority of scholars, even religiously disposed ones, stubbornly refuse to treat them as convincing. The whole of Germany, one may say, has positively rejected the Hegelian argumentation. As for Scotland, I need only mention Professor Fraser's and Professor Pringle-Pattison's memorable criticisms, with which so many of you are familiar.¹ Once more, I ask, if transcendental idealism were as objectively and absolutely rational as it pretends to be, could it possibly fail so egregiously to be persuasive?

What religion reports, you must remember, always purports to be a fact of experience: the divine is actually present, religion says, and between it and ourselves relations of give and take are actual. If definite perceptions of fact like this cannot stand upon their own feet,

¹ A. C. FRASER: *Philosophy of Theism*, second edition, Edinburgh and London, 1899, especially part ii. chaps. vii. and viii.; A. SETH [PRINGLE-PATTISON]: *Hegelianism and Personality*, *Ibid.*, 1890, *passim*.

The most persuasive arguments in favor of a concrete individual Soul of the world, with which I am acquainted, are those of my colleague, Josiah Royce, in his *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Boston, 1885; in his *Conception of God*, New York and London, 1897; and lately in his *Aberdeen Gifford Lectures, The World and the Individual*, 2 vols., New York and London, 1901-02. I doubtless seem to some of my readers to evade the philosophic duty which my thesis in this lecture imposes on me, by not even attempting to meet Professor Royce's arguments articulately. I admit the momentary evasion. In the present lectures, which are cast throughout in a popular mould, there seemed no room for subtle metaphysical discussion, and for tactical purposes it was sufficient, the contention of philosophy being what it is (namely, that religion can be transformed into a universally convincing science), to point to the fact that no religious philosophy has actually convinced the mass of thinkers. Meanwhile let me say that I hope that the present volume may be followed by another, if I am spared to write it, in which not only Professor Royce's arguments, but others for monistic absolutism shall be considered with all the technical fullness which their great importance calls for. At present I resign myself to lying passive under the reproach of superficiality.

surely abstract reasoning cannot give them the support they are in need of. Conceptual processes can class facts, define them, interpret them; but they do not produce them, nor can they reproduce their individuality. There is always a *plus*, a *thisness*, which feeling alone can answer for. Philosophy in this sphere is thus a secondary function, unable to warrant faith's veracity, and so I revert to the thesis which I announced at the beginning of this lecture.

In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless.

It would be unfair to philosophy, however, to leave her under this negative sentence. Let me close, then, by briefly enumerating what she *can* do for religion. If she will abandon metaphysics and deduction for criticism and induction, and frankly transform herself from theology into science of religions, she can make herself enormously useful.

The spontaneous intellect of man always defines the divine which it feels in ways that harmonize with its temporary intellectual prepossessions. Philosophy can by comparison eliminate the local and the accidental from these definitions. Both from dogma and from worship she can remove historic incrustations. By confronting the spontaneous religious constructions with the results of natural science, philosophy can also eliminate doctrines that are now known to be scientifically absurd or incongruous.

Sifting out in this way unworthy formulations, she can leave a residuum of conceptions that at least are possible. With these she can deal as *hypotheses*, testing them in

all the manners, whether negative or positive, by which hypotheses are ever tested. She can reduce their number, as some are found more open to objection. She can perhaps become the champion of one which she picks out as being the most closely verified or verifiable. She can refine upon the definition of this hypothesis, distinguishing between what is innocent over-belief and symbolism in the expression of it, and what is to be literally taken. As a result, she can offer mediation between different believers, and help to bring about consensus of opinion. She can do this the more successfully, the better she discriminates the common and essential from the individual and local elements of the religious beliefs which she compares.

I do not see why a critical Science of Religions of this sort might not eventually command as general a public adhesion as is commanded by a physical science. Even the personally non-religious might accept its conclusions on trust, much as blind persons now accept the facts of optics — it might appear as foolish to refuse them. Yet as the science of optics has to be fed in the first instance, and continually verified later, by facts experienced by seeing persons; so the science of religions would depend for its original material on facts of personal experience, and would have to square itself with personal experience through all its critical reconstructions. It could never get away from concrete life, or work in a conceptual vacuum. It would forever have to confess, as every science confesses, that the subtlety of nature flies beyond it, and that its formulas are but approximations. Philosophy lives in words, but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed verbal formulation. There is in the living act of perception always something that glimmers and twinkles and will not be caught, and for which reflection

comes too late. No one knows this as well as the philosopher. He must fire his volley of new vocables out of his conceptual shotgun, for his profession condemns him to this industry, but he secretly knows the hollowness and irrelevancy. His formulas are like stereoscopic or kinetoscopic photographs seen outside the instrument; they lack the depth, the motion, the vitality. In the religious sphere, in particular, belief that formulas are true can never wholly take the place of personal experience.

In my next lecture I will try to complete my rough description of religious experience; and in the lecture after that, which is the last one, I will try my own hand at formulating conceptually the truth to which it is a witness.

LECTURE XIX

OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

WE have wound our way back, after our excursion through mysticism and philosophy, to where we were before: the uses of religion, its uses to the individual who has it, and the uses of the individual himself to the world, are the best arguments that truth is in it. We return to the empirical philosophy: the true is what works well, even though the qualification 'on the whole' may always have to be added. In this lecture we must revert to description again, and finish our picture of the religious consciousness by a word about some of its other characteristic elements. Then, in a final lecture, we shall be free to make a general review and draw our independent conclusions.

The first point I will speak of is the part which the æsthetic life plays in determining one's choice of a religion. Men, I said awhile ago, involuntarily intellectualize their religious experience. They need formulas, just as they need fellowship in worship. I spoke, therefore, too contemptuously of the pragmatic uselessness of the famous scholastic list of attributes of the deity, for they have one use which I neglected to consider. The eloquent passage in which Newman enumerates them¹ puts us on the track of it. Intoning them as he would intone a cathedral service, he shows how high is their æsthetic value. It enriches our bare piety to carry these exalted and mysterious verbal additions just as it enriches

¹ *Idea of a University*, Discourse III. § 7.

a church to have an organ and old brasses, marbles and frescoes and stained windows. Epithets lend an atmosphere and overtones to our devotion. They are like a hymn of praise and service of glory, and may sound the more sublime for being incomprehensible. Minds like Newman's¹ grow as jealous of their credit as heathen priests are of that of the jewelry and ornaments that blaze upon their idols.

Among the buildings-out of religion which the mind spontaneously indulges in, the æsthetic motive must never be forgotten. I promised to say nothing of ecclesiastical systems in these lectures. I may be allowed, however, to put in a word at this point on the way in which their satisfaction of certain æsthetic needs contributes to their hold on human nature. Although some persons aim most at intellectual purity and simplification, for others *richness* is the supreme imaginative requirement.² When one's mind is strongly of this type, an individual religion will hardly serve the purpose. The inner need is rather

¹ Newman's imagination so innately craved an ecclesiastical system that he can write : "From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion : I know no other religion ; I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of religion." And again, speaking of himself about the age of thirty, he writes : "I loved to act as feeling myself in my Bishop's sight, as if it were the sight of God." *Apologia*, 1897, pp. 48, 50.

² The intellectual difference is quite on a par in practical importance with the analogous difference in character. We saw, under the head of Saintliness, how some characters resent confusion and must live in purity, consistency, simplicity (above, p. 280 ff.). For others, on the contrary, superabundance, over-pressure, stimulation, lots of superficial relations, are indispensable. There are men who would suffer a very syncope if you should pay all their debts, bring it about that their engagements had been kept, their letters answered, their perplexities relieved, and their duties fulfilled, down to one which lay on a clean table under their eyes with nothing to interfere with its immediate performance. A day stripped so staringly bare would be for them appalling. So with ease, elegance, tributes of affection, social recognitions — some of us require amounts of these things which to others would appear a mass of lying and sophistication.

of something institutional and complex, majestic in the hierarchic interrelatedness of its parts, with authority descending from stage to stage, and at every stage objects for adjectives of mystery and splendor, derived in the last resort from the Godhead who is the fountain and culmination of the system. One feels then as if in presence of some vast incrusted work of jewelry or architecture; one hears the multitudinous liturgical appeal; one gets the honorific vibration coming from every quarter. Compared with such a noble complexity, in which ascending and descending movements seem in no way to jar upon stability, in which no single item, however humble, is insignificant, because so many august institutions hold it in its place, how flat does evangelical Protestantism appear, how bare the atmosphere of those isolated religious lives whose boast it is that "man in the bush with God may meet."¹ What a pulverization and leveling of what a gloriously piled-up structure! To an imagination used to the perspectives of dignity and glory, the naked gospel scheme seems to offer an almshouse for a palace.

It is much like the patriotic sentiment of those brought up in ancient empires. How many emotions must be frustrated of their object, when one gives up the titles of dignity, the crimson lights and blare of brass, the gold embroidery, the plumed troops, the fear and trembling, and puts up with a president in a black coat who shakes hands with you, and comes, it may be, from a 'home' upon a veldt or prairie with one sitting-room and a Bible on its centre-table. It pauperizes the monarchical imagination!

The strength of these æsthetic sentiments makes it

¹ In Newman's *Lectures on Justification*, Lecture VIII. § 6, there is a splendid passage expressive of this æsthetic way of feeling the Christian scheme. It is unfortunately too long to quote.

rigorously impossible, it seems to me, that Protestantism, however superior in spiritual profundity it may be to Catholicism, should at the present day succeed in making many converts from the more venerable ecclesiasticism. The latter offers a so much richer pasturage and shade to the fancy, has so many cells with so many different kinds of honey, is so indulgent in its multiform appeals to human nature, that Protestantism will always show to Catholic eyes the almshouse physiognomy. The bitter negativity of it is to the Catholic mind incomprehensible. To intellectual Catholics many of the antiquated beliefs and practices to which the Church gives countenance are, if taken literally, as childish as they are to Protestants. But they are childish in the pleasing sense of 'childlike,' — innocent and amiable, and worthy to be smiled on in consideration of the undeveloped condition of the dear people's intellects. To the Protestant, on the contrary, they are childish in the sense of being idiotic falsehoods. He must stamp out their delicate and lovable redundancy, leaving the Catholic to shudder at his literalness. He appears to the latter as morose as if he were some hard-eyed, numb, monotonous kind of reptile. The two will never understand each other — their centres of emotional energy are too different. Rigorous truth and human nature's intricacies are always in need of a mutual interpreter.¹ So much for the æsthetic diversities in the religious consciousness.

¹ Compare the informality of Protestantism, where the 'meek lover of the good,' alone with his God, visits the sick, etc., for their own sakes, with the elaborate 'business' that goes on in Catholic devotion, and carries with it the social excitement of all more complex businesses. An essentially worldly-minded Catholic woman can become a visitor of the sick on purely coquettish principles, with her confessor and director, her 'merit' storing up, her patron saints, her privileged relation to the Almighty, drawing his attention as a professional *dévôte*, her definite 'exercises,' and her definitely recognized social *pose* in the organization.

In most books on religion, three things are represented as its most essential elements. These are Sacrifice, Confession, and Prayer. I must say a word in turn of each of these elements, though briefly. First of Sacrifice.

Sacrifices to gods are omnipresent in primeval worship ; but, as cults have grown refined, burnt offerings and the blood of he-goats have been superseded by sacrifices more spiritual in their nature. Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism get along without ritual sacrifice ; so does Christianity, save in so far as the notion is preserved in transfigured form in the mystery of Christ's atonement. These religions substitute offerings of the heart, renunciations of the inner self, for all those vain oblations. In the ascetic practices which Islam, Buddhism, and the older Christianity encourage we see how indestructible is the idea that sacrifice of some sort is a religious exercise. In lecturing on asceticism I spoke of its significance as symbolic of the sacrifices which life, whenever it is taken strenuously, calls for.¹ But, as I said my say about those, and as these lectures expressly avoid earlier religious usages and questions of derivation, I will pass from the subject of Sacrifice altogether and turn to that of Confession.

In regard to Confession I will also be most brief, saying my word about it psychologically, not historically. Not nearly as widespread as sacrifice, it corresponds to a more inward and moral stage of sentiment. It is part of the general system of purgation and cleansing which one feels one's self in need of, in order to be in right relations to one's deity. For him who confesses, shams are over and realities have begun ; he has exteriorized his rottenness. If he has not actually got rid of it, he at least

¹ Above, p. 362 ff.

no longer smears it over with a hypocritical show of virtue — he lives at least upon a basis of veracity. The complete decay of the practice of confession in Anglo-Saxon communities is a little hard to account for. Reaction against popery is of course the historic explanation, for in popery confession went with penances and absolution, and other inadmissible practices. But on the side of the sinner himself it seems as if the need ought to have been too great to accept so summary a refusal of its satisfaction. One would think that in more men the shell of secrecy would have had to open, the pent-in abscess to burst and gain relief, even though the ear that heard the confession were unworthy. The Catholic church, for obvious utilitarian reasons, has substituted auricular confession to one priest for the more radical act of public confession. We English-speaking Protestants, in the general self-reliance and unsociability of our nature, seem to find it enough if we take God alone into our confidence.¹

The next topic on which I must comment is Prayer, — and this time it must be less briefly. We have heard much talk of late against prayer, especially against prayers for better weather and for the recovery of sick people. As regards prayers for the sick, if any medical fact can be considered to stand firm, it is that in certain environments prayer may contribute to recovery, and should be encouraged as a therapeutic measure. Being a normal factor of moral health in the person, its omission would be deleterious. The case of the weather is different. Notwithstanding the recency of the opposite belief,²

¹ A fuller discussion of confession is contained in the excellent work by FRANK GRANGER : *The Soul of a Christian*, London, 1900, ch. xii.

² Example : "The minister at Sudbury, being at the Thursday lecture in

every one now knows that droughts and storms follow from physical antecedents, and that moral appeals cannot avert them. But petitional prayer is only one department of prayer; and if we take the word in the wider sense as meaning every kind of inward communion or conversation with the power recognized as divine, we can easily see that scientific criticism leaves it untouched.

Prayer in this wide sense is the very soul and essence of religion. "Religion," says a liberal French theologian, "is an intercourse, a conscious and voluntary relation, entered into by a soul in distress with the mysterious power upon which it feels itself to depend, and upon which its fate is contingent. This intercourse with God is realized by prayer. Prayer is religion in act; that is, prayer is real religion. It is prayer that distinguishes the religious phenomenon from such similar or neighboring phenomena as purely moral or æsthetic sentiment. Religion is nothing if it be not the vital act by which the entire mind seeks to save itself by clinging to the principle from which it draws its life. This act is prayer, by which term I understand no vain exercise of words, no mere repetition of certain sacred formulæ, but the very movement itself of the soul, putting itself in a personal relation of contact with the mysterious power of which it feels the presence, — it may be even before it has a name by which to call it. Wherever this interior prayer is lacking, there is no religion; wherever, on the other hand, this prayer rises and stirs the soul, even in the absence of forms or of doctrines, we have living religion. One sees from this why 'natural religion,' so-

Boston, heard the officiating clergyman praying for rain. As soon as the service was over, he went to the petitioner and said, 'You Boston ministers, as soon as a tulip wilts under your windows, go to church and pray for rain, until all Concord and Sudbury are under water.'" R. W. EMERSON: *Lectures and Biographical Sketches*, p. 363.

called, is not properly a religion. It cuts man off from prayer. It leaves him and God in mutual remoteness, with no intimate commerce, no interior dialogue, no interchange, no action of God in man, no return of man to God. At bottom this pretended religion is only a philosophy. Born at epochs of rationalism, of critical investigations, it never was anything but an abstraction. An artificial and dead creation, it reveals to its examiner hardly one of the characters proper to religion.”¹

It seems to me that the entire series of our lectures proves the truth of M. Sabatier's contention. The religious phenomenon, studied as an inner fact, and apart from ecclesiastical or theological complications, has shown itself to consist everywhere, and at all its stages, in the consciousness which individuals have of an intercourse between themselves and higher powers with which they feel themselves to be related. This intercourse is realized at the time as being both active and mutual. If it be not effective; if it be not a give and take relation; if nothing be really transacted while it lasts; if the world is in no whit different for its having taken place; then prayer, taken in this wide meaning of a sense that *something is transacting*, is of course a feeling of what is illusory, and religion must on the whole be classed, not simply as containing elements of delusion, — these undoubtedly everywhere exist, — but as being rooted in delusion altogether, just as materialists and atheists have always said it was. At most there might remain, when the direct experiences of prayer were ruled out as false witnesses, some inferential belief that the whole order of existence must have a divine cause. But this way of contemplating nature, pleasing as it would doubtless be

¹ AUGUSTE SABATIER : *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, 2me éd., 1897, pp. 24-26, abridged.

to persons of a pious taste, would leave to them but the spectators' part at a play, whereas in experimental religion and the prayerful life, we seem ourselves to be actors, and not in a play, but in a very serious reality.

The genuineness of religion is thus indissolubly bound up with the question whether the prayerful consciousness be or be not deceitful. The conviction that something is genuinely transacted in this consciousness is the very core of living religion. As to what is transacted, great differences of opinion have prevailed. The unseen powers have been supposed, and are yet supposed, to do things which no enlightened man can nowadays believe in. It may well prove that the sphere of influence in prayer is subjective exclusively, and that what is immediately changed is only the mind of the praying person. But however our opinion of prayer's effects may come to be limited by criticism, religion, in the vital sense in which these lectures study it, must stand or fall by the persuasion that effects of some sort genuinely do occur. Through prayer, religion insists, things which cannot be realized in any other manner come about: energy which but for prayer would be bound is by prayer set free and operates in some part, be it objective or subjective, of the world of facts.

This postulate is strikingly expressed in a letter written by the late Frederic W. H. Myers to a friend, who allows me to quote from it. It shows how independent the prayer-instinct is of usual doctrinal complications. Mr. Myers writes: —

“I am glad that you have asked me about prayer, because I have rather strong ideas on the subject. First consider what are the facts. There exists around us a spiritual universe, and that universe is in actual relation with the material. From the spiritual universe comes the energy which maintains the mate-

rial ; the energy which makes the life of each individual spirit. Our spirits are supported by a perpetual indrawal of this energy, and the vigor of that indrawal is perpetually changing, much as the vigor of our absorption of material nutriment changes from hour to hour.

“I call these ‘facts’ because I think that some scheme of this kind is the only one consistent with our actual evidence ; too complex to summarize here. How, then, should we *act* on these facts ? Plainly we must endeavor to draw in as much spiritual life as possible, and we must place our minds in any attitude which experience shows to be favorable to such indrawal. *Prayer* is the general name for that attitude of open and earnest expectancy. If we then ask to *whom* to pray, the answer (strangely enough) must be that *that* does not much matter. The prayer is not indeed a purely subjective thing ; — it means a real increase in intensity of absorption of spiritual power or grace ; — but we do not know enough of what takes place in the spiritual world to know how the prayer operates ; — *who* is cognizant of it, or through what channel the grace is given. Better let children pray to Christ, who is at any rate the highest individual spirit of whom we have any knowledge. But it would be rash to say that Christ himself *hears us* ; while to say that *God* hears us is merely to restate the first principle, — that grace flows in from the infinite spiritual world.”

Let us reserve the question of the truth or falsehood of the belief that power is absorbed until the next lecture, when our dogmatic conclusions, if we have any, must be reached. Let this lecture still confine itself to the description of phenomena ; and as a concrete example of an extreme sort, of the way in which the prayerful life may still be led, let me take a case with which most of you must be acquainted, that of George Müller of Bristol, who died in 1898. Müller’s prayers were of the crassest petitional order. Early in life he resolved on taking certain Bible promises in literal sincerity, and on letting himself be fed, not by his own worldly foresight,

but by the Lord's hand. He had an extraordinarily active and successful career, among the fruits of which were the distribution of over two million copies of the Scripture text, in different languages; the equipment of several hundred missionaries; the circulation of more than a hundred and eleven million of scriptural books, pamphlets, and tracts; the building of five large orphanages, and the keeping and educating of thousands of orphans; finally, the establishment of schools in which over a hundred and twenty-one thousand youthful and adult pupils were taught. In the course of this work Mr. Müller received and administered nearly a million and a half of pounds sterling, and traveled over two hundred thousand miles of sea and land.¹ During the sixty-eight years of his ministry, he never owned any property except his clothes and furniture, and cash in hand; and he left, at the age of eighty-six, an estate worth only a hundred and sixty pounds.

His method was to let his general wants be publicly known, but not to acquaint other people with the details of his temporary necessities. For the relief of the latter, he prayed directly to the Lord, believing that sooner or later prayers are always answered if one have trust enough. "When I lose such a thing as a key," he writes, "I ask the Lord to direct me to it, and I look for an answer to my prayer; when a person with whom I have made an appointment does not come, according to the fixed time, and I begin to be inconvenienced by it, I ask the Lord to be pleased to hasten him to me, and I look for an answer; when I do not understand a passage of the word of God, I lift up my heart to the Lord that he would be pleased by his Holy Spirit to instruct me, and I expect to be taught, though I do not fix the time when, and the manner how it should be; when I am going to minister in the Word, I seek help from the Lord, and . . . am not cast down, but of good cheer because I look for his assistance."

¹ My authority for these statistics is the little work on Müller, by FREDERIC G. WARNE, New York, 1898.

Müller's custom was to never run up bills, not even for a week. "As the Lord deals out to us by the day, . . . the week's payment might become due and we have no money to meet it; and thus those with whom we deal might be inconvenienced by us, and we be found acting against the commandment of the Lord: 'Owe no man anything.' From this day and henceforward whilst the Lord gives to us our supplies by the day, we purpose to pay at once for every article as it is purchased, and never to buy anything except we can pay for it at once, however much it may seem to be needed, and however much those with whom we deal may wish to be paid only by the week."

The articles needed of which Müller speaks were the food, fuel, etc., of his orphanages. Somehow, near as they often come to going without a meal, they hardly ever seem actually to have done so. "Greater and more manifest nearness of the Lord's presence I have never had than when after breakfast there were no means for dinner for more than a hundred persons; or when after dinner there were no means for the tea, and yet the Lord provided the tea; and all this without one single human being having been informed about our need. . . . Through Grace my mind is so fully assured of the faithfulness of the Lord, that in the midst of the greatest need, I am enabled in peace to go about my other work. Indeed, did not the Lord give me this, which is the result of trusting in him, I should scarcely be able to work at all; for it is now comparatively a rare thing that a day comes when I am not in need for one or another part of the work."¹

In building his orphanages simply by prayer and faith, Müller affirms that his prime motive was "to have something to point to as a visible proof that our God and Father is the same faithful God that he ever was, — as willing as ever to prove himself the living God, in our day as formerly, to all that put their trust in him."² For this reason he refused to borrow money for any of his enterprises. "How does it work

¹ The Life of Trust; Being a Narrative of the Lord's Dealings with George Müller, New American edition, N. Y., Crowell, pp. 228, 194, 219.

² Ibid., p. 126.

when we thus anticipate God by going our own way? We certainly weaken faith instead of increasing it; and each time we work thus a deliverance of our own we find it more and more difficult to trust in God, till at last we give way entirely to our natural fallen reason and unbelief prevails. How different if one is enabled to wait God's own time, and to look alone to him for help and deliverance! When at last help comes, after many seasons of prayer it may be, how sweet it is, and what a present recompense! Dear Christian reader, if you have never walked in this path of obedience before, do so now, and you will then know experimentally the sweetness of the joy which results from it."¹

When the supplies came in but slowly, Müller always considered that this was for the trial of his faith and patience. When his faith and patience had been sufficiently tried, the Lord would send more means. "And thus it has proved," — I quote from his diary, — "for to-day was given me the sum of 2050 pounds, of which 2000 are for the building fund [of a certain house], and 50 for present necessities. It is impossible to describe my joy in God when I received this donation. I was neither excited nor surprised; for I *look out* for answers to my prayers. *I believe that God hears me.* Yet my heart was so full of joy that I could only *sit* before God, and admire him, like David in 2 Samuel vii. At last I cast myself flat down upon my face and burst forth in thanksgiving to God and in surrendering my heart afresh to him for his blessed service."²

George Müller's is a case extreme in every respect, and in no respect more so than in the extraordinary narrowness of the man's intellectual horizon. His God was, as he often said, his business partner. He seems to have been for Müller little more than a sort of supernatural clergyman interested in the congregation of tradesmen and others in Bristol who were his saints, and in the orphanages and other enterprises, but unpossessed of

¹ Op. cit., p. 383, abridged.

² Ibid., p. 323.

any of those vaster and wilder and more ideal attributes with which the human imagination elsewhere has invested him. Müller, in short, was absolutely unphilosophical. His intensely private and practical conception of his relations with the Deity continued the traditions of the most primitive human thought.¹ When we compare a mind like his with such a mind as, for example, Emerson's or Phillips Brooks's, we see the range which the religious consciousness covers.

There is an immense literature relating to answers to petitional prayer. The evangelical journals are filled

¹ I cannot resist the temptation of quoting an expression of an even more primitive style of religious thought, which I find in Arber's English Garland, vol. vii. p. 440. Robert Lyde, an English sailor, along with an English boy, being prisoners on a French ship in 1689, set upon the crew, of seven Frenchmen, killed two, made the other five prisoners, and brought home the ship. Lyde thus describes how in this feat he found his God a very present help in time of trouble :—

“With the assistance of God I kept my feet when they three and one more did strive to throw me down. Feeling the Frenchman which hung about my middle hang very heavy, I said to the boy, ‘Go round the binnacle, and knock down that man that hangeth on my back.’ So the boy did strike him one blow on the head which made him fall. . . . Then I looked about for a marlin spike or anything else to strike them withal. But seeing nothing, I said, ‘LORD ! what shall I do ?’ Then casting up my eye upon my left side, and seeing a marlin spike hanging, I jerked my right arm and took hold, and struck the point four times about a quarter of an inch deep into the skull of that man that had hold of my left arm. [One of the Frenchmen then hauled the marlin spike away from him.] But through GOD’S wonderful providence ! it either fell out of his hand, or else he threw it down, and at this time the Almighty GOD gave me strength enough to take one man in one hand, and throw at the other’s head : and looking about again to see anything to strike them withal, but seeing nothing, I said, ‘LORD ! what shall I do now ?’ And then it pleased GOD to put me in mind of my knife in my pocket. And although two of the men had hold of my right arm, yet GOD Almighty strengthened me so that I put my right hand into my right pocket, drew out the knife and sheath, . . . put it between my legs and drew it out, and then cut the man’s throat with it that had his back to my breast : and he immediately dropt down, and scarce ever stirred after.”—I have slightly abridged Lyde’s narrative.

with such answers, and books are devoted to the subject,¹ but for us Müller's case will suffice.

A less sturdy beggar-like fashion of leading the prayerful life is followed by innumerable other Christians. Persistence in leaning on the Almighty for support and guidance will, such persons say, bring with it proofs, palpable but much more subtle, of his presence and active influence. The following description of a 'led' life, by a German writer whom I have already quoted, would no doubt appear to countless Christians in every country as if transcribed from their own personal experience. One finds in this guided sort of life, says Dr. Hilty, —

“ That books and words (and sometimes people) come to one's cognizance just at the very moment in which one needs them; that one glides over great dangers as if with shut eyes, remaining ignorant of what would have terrified one or led one astray, until the peril is past — this being especially the case with temptations to vanity and sensuality; that paths on which one ought not to wander are, as it were, hedged off with thorns; but that on the other side great obstacles are suddenly removed; that when the time has come for something, one suddenly receives a courage that formerly failed, or perceives the root of a matter that until then was concealed, or discovers thoughts, talents, yea, even pieces of knowledge and insight, in one's self, of which it is impossible to say whence they come; finally, that persons help us or decline to help us, favor us or refuse us, as if they had to do so against their will, so that often those indifferent or even unfriendly to us yield us the greatest service and furtherance. (God takes often their worldly goods, from those whom he leads, at just the right

¹ As, for instance, *In Answer to Prayer*, by the BISHOP OF RIPON and others, London, 1898; *Touching Incidents and Remarkable Answers to Prayer*, Harrisburg, Pa., 1898 (?); H. L. HASTINGS: *The Guiding Hand, or Providential Direction, illustrated by Authentic Instances*, Boston 1898 (?).

moment, when they threaten to impede the effort after higher interests.)

“ Besides all this, other noteworthy things come to pass, of which it is not easy to give account. There is no doubt whatever that now one walks continually through ‘ open doors ’ and on the easiest roads, with as little care and trouble as it is possible to imagine.

“ Furthermore one finds one’s self settling one’s affairs neither too early nor too late, whereas they were wont to be spoiled by untimeliness, even when the preparations had been well laid. In addition to this, one does them with perfect tranquillity of mind, almost as if they were matters of no consequence, like errands done by us for another person, in which case we usually act more calmly than when we act in our own concerns. Again, one finds that one can *wait* for everything patiently, and that is one of life’s great arts. One finds also that each thing comes duly, one thing after the other, so that one gains time to make one’s footing sure before advancing farther. And then everything occurs to us at the right moment, just what we ought to do, etc., and often in a very striking way, just as if a third person were keeping watch over those things which we are in easy danger of forgetting.

“ Often, too, persons are sent to us at the right time, to offer or ask for what is needed, and what we should never have had the courage or resolution to undertake of our own accord.

“ Through all these experiences one finds that one is kindly and tolerant of other people, even of such as are repulsive, negligent, or ill-willed, for they also are instruments of good in God’s hand, and often most efficient ones. Without these thoughts it would be hard for even the best of us always to keep our equanimity. But with the consciousness of divine guidance, one sees many a thing in life quite differently from what would otherwise be possible.

“ All these are things that every human being *knows*, who has had experience of them ; and of which the most speaking examples could be brought forward. The highest resources of worldly wisdom are unable to attain that which, under divine leading, comes to us of its own accord.”¹

¹ C. HILTY : Glück, Dritter Theil, 1900, pp. 92 ff.

Such accounts as this shade away into others where the belief is, not that particular events are tempered more towardly to us by a superintending providence, as a reward for our reliance, but that by cultivating the continuous sense of our connection with the power that made things as they are, we are tempered more towardly for their reception. The outward face of nature need not alter, but the expressions of meaning in it alter. It was dead and is alive again. It is like the difference between looking on a person without love, or upon the same person with love. In the latter case intercourse springs into new vitality. So when one's affections keep in touch with the divinity of the world's authorship, fear and egotism fall away; and in the equanimity that follows, one finds in the hours, as they succeed each other, a series of purely benignant opportunities. It is as if all doors were opened, and all paths freshly smoothed. We meet a new world when we meet the old world in the spirit which this kind of prayer infuses.

Such a spirit was that of Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus.¹ It is that of mind-curers, of the transcendentalists, and of the so-called 'liberal' Christians. As an expres-

¹ "Good Heaven!" says Epictetus, "any one thing in the creation is sufficient to demonstrate a Providence, to a humble and grateful mind. The mere possibility of producing milk from grass, cheese from milk, and wool from skins; who formed and planned it? Ought we not, whether we dig or plough or eat, to sing this hymn to God? Great is God, who has supplied us with these instruments to till the ground; great is God, who has given us hands and instruments of digestion; who has given us to grow insensibly and to breathe in sleep. These things we ought forever to celebrate. . . . But because the most of you are blind and insensible, there must be some one to fill this station, and lead, in behalf of all men, the hymn to God; for what else can I do, a lame old man, but sing hymns to God? Were I a nightingale, I would act the part of a nightingale; were I a swan, the part of a swan. But since I am a reasonable creature, it is my duty to praise God . . . and I call on you to join the same song." Works, book i. ch. xvi., CARTER-HIGGINSON translation, abridged.

sion of it, I will quote a page from one of Martineau's sermons : —

“The universe, open to the eye to-day, looks as it did a thousand years ago : and the morning hymn of Milton does but tell the beauty with which our own familiar sun dressed the earliest fields and gardens of the world. We see what all our fathers saw. And if we cannot find God in your house or in mine, upon the roadside or the margin of the sea ; in the bursting seed or opening flower ; in the day duty or the night musing ; in the general laugh and the secret grief ; in the procession of life, ever entering afresh, and solemnly passing by and dropping off ; I do not think we should discern him any more on the grass of Eden, or beneath the moonlight of Gethsemane. Depend upon it, it is not the want of greater miracles, but of the soul to perceive such as are allowed us still, that makes us push all the sanctities into the far spaces we cannot reach. The devout feel that wherever God's hand is, *there* is miracle : and it is simply an indevoutness which imagines that only where miracle is, can there be the real hand of God. The customs of Heaven ought surely to be more sacred in our eyes than its anomalies ; the dear old ways, of which the Most High is never tired, than the strange things which he does not love well enough ever to repeat. And he who will but discern beneath the sun, as he rises any morning, the supporting finger of the Almighty, may recover the sweet and reverent surprise with which Adam gazed on the first dawn in Paradise. It is no outward change, no shifting in time or place ; but only the loving meditation of the pure in heart, that can reawaken the Eternal from the sleep within our souls : that can render him a reality again, and reassert for him once more his ancient name of ‘the Living God.’ ”¹

When we see all things in God, and refer all things to him, we read in common matters superior expressions of

¹ JAMES MARTINEAU : end of the sermon ‘Help Thou Mine Unbelief,’ in *Endeavours after a Christian Life*, 2d series. Compare with this page the extract from *Voysey* on p. 275, above, and those from *Pascal* and *Madame Guyon* on p. 286.

meaning. The deadness with which custom invests the familiar vanishes, and existence as a whole appears transfigured. The state of a mind thus awakened from torpor is well expressed in these words, which I take from a friend's letter : —

“ If we occupy ourselves in summing up all the mercies and bounties we are privileged to have, we are overwhelmed by their number (so great that we can imagine ourselves unable to give ourselves time even to begin to review the things we may imagine *we have not*). We sum them and realize that *we are actually killed with God's kindness* ; that we are surrounded by bounties upon bounties, without which all would fall. Should we not love it ; should we not feel buoyed up by the Eternal Arms ? ”

Sometimes this realization that facts are of divine sending, instead of being habitual, is casual, like a mystical experience. Father Gratry gives this instance from his youthful melancholy period : —

“ One day I had a moment of consolation, because I met with something which seemed to me ideally perfect. It was a poor drummer beating the tattoo in the streets of Paris. I walked behind him in returning to the school on the evening of a holiday. His drum gave out the tattoo in such a way that, at that moment at least, however peevish I were, I could find no pretext for fault-finding. It was impossible to conceive more nerve or spirit, better time or measure, more clearness or richness, than were in this drumming. Ideal desire could go no farther in that direction. I was enchanted and consoled ; the perfection of this wretched act did me good. Good is at least possible, I said, since the ideal can thus sometimes get embodied.” ¹

In Sénancour's novel of *Obermann* a similar transient lifting of the veil is recorded. In Paris streets, on a March day, he comes across a flower in bloom, a jonquil :

¹ *Souvenirs de ma Jeunesse*, 1897, p. 122.

"It was the strongest expression of desire: it was the first perfume of the year. I felt all the happiness destined for man. This unutterable harmony of souls, the phantom of the ideal world, arose in me complete. I never felt anything so great or so instantaneous. I know not what shape, what analogy, what secret of relation it was that made me see in this flower a limitless beauty. . . . I shall never inclose in a conception this power, this immensity that nothing will express; this form that nothing will contain; this ideal of a better world which one feels, but which, it seems, nature has not made actual."¹

We heard in previous lectures of the vivified face of the world as it may appear to converts after their awakening.² As a rule, religious persons generally assume that whatever natural facts connect themselves in any way with their destiny are significant of the divine purposes with them. Through prayer the purpose, often far from obvious, comes home to them, and if it be 'trial,' strength to endure the trial is given. Thus at all stages of the prayerful life we find the persuasion that in the process of communion energy from on high flows in to meet demand, and becomes operative within the phenomenal world. So long as this operativeness is admitted to be real, it makes no essential difference whether its immediate effects be subjective or objective. The fundamental religious point is that in prayer, spiritual energy, which otherwise would slumber, does become active, and spiritual work of some kind is effected really.

So much for Prayer, taken in the wide sense of any kind of communion. As the core of religion, we must return to it in the next lecture.

The last aspect of the religious life which remains for

¹ Op. cit., Letter XXX.

² Above, p. 248 ff. Compare the withdrawal of expression from the world, in *Melancholiacs*, p. 151.

me to touch upon is the fact that its manifestations so frequently connect themselves with the subconscious part of our existence. You may remember what I said in my opening lecture¹ about the prevalence of the psychopathic temperament in religious biography. You will in point of fact hardly find a religious leader of any kind in whose life there is no record of automatisms. I speak not merely of savage priests and prophets, whose followers regard automatic utterance and action as by itself tantamount to inspiration, I speak of leaders of thought and subjects of intellectualized experience. Saint Paul had his visions, his ecstasies, his gift of tongues, small as was the importance he attached to the latter. The whole array of Christian saints and heresiarchs, including the greatest, the Bernards, the Loyolas, the Luthers, the Foxes, the Wesleys, had their visions, voices, rapt conditions, guiding impressions, and 'openings.' They had these things, because they had exalted sensibility, and to such things persons of exalted sensibility are liable. In such liability there lie, however, consequences for theology. Beliefs are strengthened wherever automatisms corroborate them. Incursions from beyond the transmarginal region have a peculiar power to increase conviction. The inchoate sense of presence is infinitely stronger than conception, but strong as it may be, it is seldom equal to the evidence of hallucination. Saints who actually see or hear their Saviour reach the acme of assurance. Motor automatisms, though rarer, are, if possible, even more convincing than sensations. The subjects here actually feel themselves played upon by powers beyond their will. The evidence is dynamic; the God or spirit moves the very organs of their body.²

¹ Above, pp. 24, 25.

² A friend of mine, a first-rate psychologist, who is a subject of graphia

The great field for this sense of being the instrument of a higher power is of course 'inspiration.' It is easy to discriminate between the religious leaders who have been habitually subject to inspiration and those who have not. In the teachings of the Buddha, of Jesus, of Saint Paul (apart from his gift of tongues), of Saint Augustine, of Huss, of Luther, of Wesley, automatic or semi-automatic composition appears to have been only occasional. In the Hebrew prophets, on the contrary, in Mohammed, in some of the Alexandrians, in many minor Catholic saints, in Fox, in Joseph Smith, something like it appears to have been frequent, sometimes habitual. We have distinct professions of being under the direction of a foreign power, and serving as its mouthpiece. As regards the Hebrew prophets, it is extraordinary, writes an author who has made a careful study of them, to see —

“How, one after another, the same features are reproduced in the prophetic books. The process is always extremely different from what it would be if the prophet arrived at his insight into spiritual things by the tentative efforts of his own

automatism, tells me that the appearance of independent actuation in the movements of his arm, when he writes automatically, is so distinct that it obliges him to abandon a psychophysical theory which he had previously believed in, the theory, namely, that we have no feeling of the discharge downwards of our voluntary motor-centres. We must normally have such a feeling, he thinks, or the *sense of an absence* would not be so striking as it is in these experiences. Graphic automatism of a fully developed kind is rare in religious history, so far as my knowledge goes. Such statements as Antonia Bourignon's, that “I do nothing but lend my hand and spirit to another power than mine,” is shown by the context to indicate inspiration rather than directly automatic writing. In some eccentric sects this latter occurs. The most striking instance of it is probably the bulky volume called, ‘Oahspe, a new Bible in the Words of Jehovah and his angel ambassadors,’ Boston and London, 1891, written and illustrated automatically by DR. NEWBROUGH of New York, whom I understand to be now, or to have been lately, at the head of the spiritistic community of Shalam in New Mexico. The latest automatically written book which has come under my notice is ‘Zertoulem's Wisdom of the Ages,’ by GEORGE A. FULLER, Boston, 1901.

genius. There is something sharp and sudden about it. He can lay his finger, so to speak, on the moment when it came. And it always comes in the form of an overpowering force from without, against which he struggles, but in vain. Listen, for instance, [to] the opening of the book of Jeremiah. Read through in like manner the first two chapters of the prophecy of Ezekiel.

“It is not, however, only at the beginning of his career that the prophet passes through a crisis which is clearly not self-caused. Scattered all through the prophetic writings are expressions which speak of some strong and irresistible impulse coming down upon the prophet, determining his attitude to the events of his time, constraining his utterance, making his words the vehicle of a higher meaning than their own. For instance, this of Isaiah’s: ‘The Lord spake thus to me with a strong hand,’ — an emphatic phrase which denotes the overmastering nature of the impulse, — ‘and instructed me that I should not walk in the way of this people.’ . . . Or passages like this from Ezekiel: ‘The hand of the Lord God fell upon me,’ ‘The hand of the Lord was strong upon me.’ The one standing characteristic of the prophet is that he speaks with the authority of Jehovah himself. Hence it is that the prophets one and all preface their addresses so confidently, ‘The Word of the Lord,’ or ‘Thus saith the Lord.’ They have even the audacity to speak in the first person, as if Jehovah himself were speaking. As in Isaiah: ‘Hearken unto me, O Jacob, and Israel my called; I am He, I am the First, I also am the last,’ — and so on. The personality of the prophet sinks entirely into the background; he feels himself for the time being the mouth-piece of the Almighty.”¹

“We need to remember that prophecy was a profession, and that the prophets formed a professional class. There were schools of the prophets, in which the gift was regularly cultivated. A group of young men would gather round some commanding figure — a Samuel or an Elisha — and would not only record or spread the knowledge of his sayings and doings, but seek to catch themselves something of his inspiration. It

¹ W. SANDAY: *The Oracles of God*, London, 1892, pp. 49-56, abridged.

seems that music played its part in their exercises. . . . It is perfectly clear that by no means all of these Sons of the prophets ever succeeded in acquiring more than a very small share in the gift which they sought. It was clearly possible to 'counterfeit' prophecy. Sometimes this was done deliberately. . . . But it by no means follows that in all cases where a false message was given, the giver of it was altogether conscious of what he was doing." ¹

Here, to take another Jewish case, is the way in which Philo of Alexandria describes his inspiration : —

"Sometimes, when I have come to my work empty, I have suddenly become full; ideas being in an invisible manner showered upon me, and implanted in me from on high; so that through the influence of divine inspiration, I have become greatly excited, and have known neither the place in which I was, nor those who were present, nor myself, nor what I was saying, nor what I was writing; for then I have been conscious of a richness of interpretation, an enjoyment of light, a most penetrating insight, a most manifest energy in all that was to be done; having such effect on my mind as the clearest ocular demonstration would have on the eyes." ²

If we turn to Islam, we find that Mohammed's revelations all came from the subconscious sphere. To the question in what way he got them, —

"Mohammed is said to have answered that sometimes he heard a knell as from a bell, and that this had the strongest effect on him; and when the angel went away, he had received the revelation. Sometimes again he held converse with the angel as with a man, so as easily to understand his words. The later authorities, however, . . . distinguish still other kinds. In the Itgân (103) the following are enumerated: 1, revelations with

¹ Op. cit., p. 91. This author also cites Moses's and Isaiah's commissions, as given in Exodus, chaps. iii. and iv., and Isaiah, chap. vi.

² Quoted by AUGUSTUS CLISSOLD: *The Prophetic Spirit in Genius and Madness*, 1870, p. 67. Mr. Clissold is a Swedenborgian. Swedenborg's case is of course the palmary one of *audita et visa*, serving as a basis of religious revelation.

sound of bell, 2, by inspiration of the holy spirit in M.'s heart, 3, by Gabriel in human form, 4, by God immediately, either when awake (as in his journey to heaven) or in dream. . . . In *Almawâhib alladuniya* the kinds are thus given: 1, Dream, 2, Inspiration of Gabriel in the Prophet's heart, 3, Gabriel taking Dabya's form, 4, with the bell-sound, etc., 5, Gabriel in propriâ personâ (only twice), 6, revelation in heaven, 7, God appearing in person, but veiled, 8, God revealing himself immediately without veil. Others add two other stages, namely: 1, Gabriel in the form of still another man, 2, God showing himself personally in dream."¹

In none of these cases is the revelation distinctly motor. In the case of Joseph Smith (who had prophetic revelations innumerable in addition to the revealed translation of the gold plates which resulted in the Book of Mormon), although there may have been a motor element, the inspiration seems to have been predominantly sensorial. He began his translation by the aid of the 'peep-stones' which he found, or thought or said that he found, with the gold plates, — apparently a case of 'crystal gazing.' For some of the other revelations he used the peep-stones, but seems generally to have asked the Lord for more direct instruction.²

¹ NÖLDEKE, *Geschichte des Qurâns*, 1860, p. 16. Compare the fuller account in Sir WILLIAM MUIR's *Life of Mahomet*, 3d ed., 1894, ch. iii.

² The Mormon theocracy has always been governed by direct revelations accorded to the President of the Church and its Apostles. From an obliging letter written to me in 1899 by an eminent Mormon, I quote the following extract: —

"It may be very interesting for you to know that the President [Mr. Snow] of the Mormon Church claims to have had a number of revelations very recently from heaven. To explain fully what these revelations are, it is necessary to know that we, as a people, believe that the Church of Jesus Christ has again been established through messengers sent from heaven. This Church has at its head a prophet, seer, and revelator, who gives to man God's holy will. Revelation is the means through which the will of God is declared directly and in fullness to man. These revelations are got through dreams of sleep or in waking visions of the mind, by

Other revelations are described as 'openings' — Fox's, for example, were evidently of the kind known in spiritistic circles of to-day as 'impressions.' As all effective initiators of change must needs live to some degree upon this psychopathic level of sudden perception or conviction of new truth, or of impulse to action so obsessive that it must be worked off, I will say nothing more about so very common a phenomenon.

When, in addition to these phenomena of inspiration, we take religious mysticism into the account, when we recall the striking and sudden unifications of a discordant self which we saw in conversion, and when we review the extravagant obsessions of tenderness, purity, and self-severity met with in saintliness, we cannot, I think, avoid the conclusion that in religion we have a department of human nature with unusually close relations to the trans-marginal or subliminal region. If the word 'subliminal' is offensive to any of you, as smelling too much of psychological research or other aberrations, call it by any other name you please, to distinguish it from the level of full sunlit consciousness. Call this latter the A-region of personality, if you care to, and call the other the B-region. The B-region, then, is obviously the larger part of each of us, for it is the abode of everything that is latent and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded or unobserved. It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily inactive memories, and it harbors the springs of all our obscurely motivated passions, impulses, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions, and in general all our non-rational operations, come from it.

voices without visional appearance, or by actual manifestations of the Holy Presence before the eye. We believe that God has come in person and spoken to our prophet and revelator."

It is the source of our dreams, and apparently they may return to it. In it arise whatever mystical experiences we may have, and our automatisms, sensory or motor; our life in hypnotic and 'hypnoid' conditions, if we are subjects to such conditions; our delusions, fixed ideas, and hysterical accidents, if we are hysteric subjects; our supra-normal cognitions, if such there be, and if we are telepathic subjects. It is also the fountain-head of much that feeds our religion. In persons deep in the religious life, as we have now abundantly seen, — and this is my conclusion, — the door into this region seems unusually wide open; at any rate, experiences making their entrance through that door have had emphatic influence in shaping religious history.

With this conclusion I turn back and close the circle which I opened in my first lecture, terminating thus the review which I then announced of inner religious phenomena as we find them in developed and articulate human individuals. I might easily, if the time allowed, multiply both my documents and my discriminations, but a broad treatment is, I believe, in itself better, and the most important characteristics of the subject lie, I think, before us already. In the next lecture, which is also the last one, we must try to draw the critical conclusions which so much material may suggest.

LECTURE XX

CONCLUSIONS

THE material of our study of human nature is now spread before us; and in this parting hour, set free from the duty of description, we can draw our theoretical and practical conclusions. In my first lecture, defending the empirical method, I foretold that whatever conclusions we might come to could be reached by spiritual judgments only, appreciations of the significance for life of religion, taken 'on the whole.' Our conclusions cannot be as sharp as dogmatic conclusions would be, but I will formulate them, when the time comes, as sharply as I can.

Summing up in the broadest possible way the characteristics of the religious life, as we have found them, it includes the following beliefs:—

1. That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance;

2. That union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end;

3. That prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof—be that spirit 'God' or 'law'—is a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world.

Religion includes also the following psychological characteristics:—

4. A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the form either of lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism.

It is the source of our dreams, and apparently they may return to it. In it arise whatever mystical experiences we may have, and our automatisms, sensory or motor; our life in hypnotic and 'hypnoid' conditions, if we are subjects to such conditions; our delusions, fixed ideas, and hysterical accidents, if we are hysteric subjects; our supra-normal cognitions, if such there be, and if we are telepathic subjects. It is also the fountain-head of much that feeds our religion. In persons deep in the religious life, as we have now abundantly seen, — and this is my conclusion, — the door into this region seems unusually wide open; at any rate, experiences making their entrance through that door have had emphatic influence in shaping religious history.

With this conclusion I turn back and close the circle which I opened in my first lecture, terminating thus the review which I then announced of inner religious phenomena as we find them in developed and articulate human individuals. I might easily, if the time allowed, multiply both my documents and my discriminations, but a broad treatment is, I believe, in itself better, and the most important characteristics of the subject lie, I think, before us already. In the next lecture, which is also the last one, we must try to draw the critical conclusions which so much material may suggest.

LECTURE XX

CONCLUSIONS

THE material of our study of human nature is now spread before us ; and in this parting hour, set free from the duty of description, we can draw our theoretical and practical conclusions. In my first lecture, defending the empirical method, I foretold that whatever conclusions we might come to could be reached by spiritual judgments only, appreciations of the significance for life of religion, taken 'on the whole.' Our conclusions cannot be as sharp as dogmatic conclusions would be, but I will formulate them, when the time comes, as sharply as I can.

Summing up in the broadest possible way the characteristics of the religious life, as we have found them, it includes the following beliefs : —

1. That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance ;

2. That union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end ;

3. That prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof — be that spirit 'God' or 'law' — is a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world.

Religion includes also the following psychological characteristics : —

4. A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the form either of lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism.

5. An assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relation to others, a preponderance of loving affections.

In illustrating these characteristics by documents, we have been literally bathed in sentiment. In re-reading my manuscript, I am almost appalled at the amount of emotionality which I find in it. After so much of this, we can afford to be dryer and less sympathetic in the rest of the work that lies before us.

The sentimentality of many of my documents is a consequence of the fact that I sought them among the extravagances of the subject. If any of you are enemies of what our ancestors used to brand as enthusiasm, and are, nevertheless, still listening to me now, you have probably felt my selection to have been sometimes almost perverse, and have wished I might have stuck to soberer examples. I reply that I took these extremer examples as yielding the profounder information. To learn the secrets of any science, we go to expert specialists, even though they may be eccentric persons, and not to commonplace pupils. We combine what they tell us with the rest of our wisdom, and form our final judgment independently. Even so with religion. We who have pursued such radical expressions of it may now be sure that we know its secrets as authentically as any one can know them who learns them from another; and we have next to answer, each of us for himself, the practical question: what are the dangers in this element of life? and in what proportion may it need to be restrained by other elements, to give the proper balance?

But this question suggests another one which I will answer immediately and get it out of the way, for it has more than once already vexed us.¹ Ought it to be as-

¹ For example, on pages 135, 163, 333, above.

sumed that in all men the mixture of religion with other elements should be identical? Ought it, indeed, to be assumed that the lives of all men should show identical religious elements? In other words, is the existence of so many religious types and sects and creeds regrettable?

To these questions I answer 'No' emphatically. And my reason is that I do not see how it is possible that creatures in such different positions and with such different powers as human individuals are, should have exactly the same functions and the same duties. No two of us have identical difficulties, nor should we be expected to work out identical solutions. Each, from his peculiar angle of observation, takes in a certain sphere of fact and trouble, which each must deal with in a unique manner. One of us must soften himself, another must harden himself; one must yield a point, another must stand firm,—in order the better to defend the position assigned him. If an Emerson were forced to be a Wesley, or a Moody forced to be a Whitman, the total human consciousness of the divine would suffer. The divine can mean no single quality, it must mean a group of qualities, by being champions of which in alternation, different men may all find worthy missions. Each attitude being a syllable in human nature's total message, it takes the whole of us to spell the meaning out completely. So a 'god of battles' must be allowed to be the god for one kind of person, a god of peace and heaven and home, the god for another. We must frankly recognize the fact that we live in partial systems, and that parts are not interchangeable in the spiritual life. If we are peevish and jealous, destruction of the self must be an element of our religion; why need it be one if we are good and sympathetic from the outset? If we are sick souls, we require a religion of deliverance; but why think so much

of deliverance, if we are healthy-minded? ¹ Unquestionably, some men have the completer experience and the higher vocation, here just as in the social world; but for each man to stay in his own experience, whate'er it be, and for others to tolerate him there, is surely best.

But, you may now ask, would not this one-sidedness be cured if we should all espouse the science of religions as our own religion? In answering this question I must open again the general relations of the theoretic to the active life.

Knowledge about a thing is not the thing itself. You remember what Al-Ghazzali told us in the Lecture on Mysticism, — that to understand the causes of drunkenness, as a physician understands them, is not to be drunk. A science might come to understand everything about the causes and elements of religion, and might even

¹ From this point of view, the contrasts between the healthy and the morbid mind, and between the once-born and the twice-born types, of which I spoke in earlier lectures (see pp. 162–167), cease to be the radical antagonisms which many think them. The twice-born look down upon the rectilinear consciousness of life of the once-born as being ‘mere morality,’ and not properly religion. “Dr. Channing,” an orthodox minister is reported to have said, “is excluded from the highest form of religious life by the extraordinary rectitude of his character.” It is indeed true that the outlook upon life of the twice-born — holding as it does more of the element of evil in solution — is the wider and completer. The ‘heroic’ or ‘solemn’ way in which life comes to them is a ‘higher synthesis’ into which healthy-mindedness and morbidness both enter and combine. Evil is not evaded, but sublated in the higher religious cheer of these persons (see pp. 47–52, 362–365). But the final consciousness which each type reaches of union with the divine has the same practical significance for the individual; and individuals may well be allowed to get to it by the channels which lie most open to their several temperaments. In the cases which were quoted in Lecture IV, of the mind-cure form of healthy-mindedness, we found abundant examples of regenerative process. The severity of the crisis in this process is a matter of degree. How long one shall continue to drink the consciousness of evil, and when one shall begin to short-circuit and get rid of it, are also matters of amount and degree, so that in many instances it is quite arbitrary whether we class the individual as a once-born or a twice-born subject.

decide which elements were qualified, by their general harmony with other branches of knowledge, to be considered true; and yet the best man at this science might be the man who found it hardest to be personally devout. *Tout savoir c'est tout pardonner.* The name of Renan would doubtless occur to many persons as an example of the way in which breadth of knowledge may make one only a dilettante in possibilities, and blunt the acuteness of one's living faith.¹ If religion be a function by which either God's cause or man's cause is to be really advanced, then he who lives the life of it, however narrowly, is a better servant than he who merely knows about it, however much. Knowledge about life is one thing; effective occupation of a place in life, with its dynamic currents passing through your being, is another.

For this reason, the science of religions may not be an equivalent for living religion; and if we turn to the inner difficulties of such a science, we see that a point comes when she must drop the purely theoretic attitude, and either let her knots remain uncut, or have them cut by active faith. To see this, suppose that we have our science of religions constituted as a matter of fact. Suppose that she has assimilated all the necessary historical material and distilled out of it as its essence the same conclusions which I myself a few moments ago pronounced. Suppose that she agrees that religion, wherever it is an active thing, involves a belief in ideal presences, and a belief that in our prayerful communion with them,² work is done, and something real comes to pass. She has now to exert her critical activity, and to decide how far, in the light of other sciences and in that of general philosophy, such beliefs can be considered *true*.

¹ Compare, e. g., the quotation from Renan on p. 37, above.

² 'Prayerful' taken in the broader sense explained above on pp. 463 ff.

Dogmatically to decide this is an impossible task. Not only are the other sciences and the philosophy still far from being completed, but in their present state we find them full of conflicts. The sciences of nature know nothing of spiritual presences, and on the whole hold no practical commerce whatever with the idealistic conceptions towards which general philosophy inclines. The scientist, so-called, is, during his scientific hours at least, so materialistic that one may well say that on the whole the influence of science goes against the notion that religion should be recognized at all. And this antipathy to religion finds an echo within the very science of religions itself. The cultivator of this science has to become acquainted with so many groveling and horrible superstitions that a presumption easily arises in his mind that any belief that is religious probably is false. In the 'prayerful communion' of savages with such mumbo-jumbos of deities as they acknowledge, it is hard for us to see what genuine spiritual work — even though it were work relative only to their dark savage obligations — can possibly be done.

The consequence is that the conclusions of the science of religions are as likely to be adverse as they are to be favorable to the claim that the essence of religion is true. There is a notion in the air about us that religion is probably only an anachronism, a case of 'survival,' an atavistic relapse into a mode of thought which humanity in its more enlightened examples has outgrown; and this notion our religious anthropologists at present do little to counteract.

This view is so widespread at the present day that I must consider it with some explicitness before I pass to my own conclusions. Let me call it the 'Survival theory,' for brevity's sake.

The pivot round which the religious life, as we have traced it, revolves, is the interest of the individual in his private personal destiny. Religion, in short, is a monumental chapter in the history of human egotism. The gods believed in — whether by crude savages or by men disciplined intellectually — agree with each other in recognizing personal calls. Religious thought is carried on in terms of personality, this being, in the world of religion, the one fundamental fact. To-day, quite as much as at any previous age, the religious individual tells you that the divine meets him on the basis of his personal concerns.

Science, on the other hand, has ended by utterly repudiating the personal point of view. She catalogues her elements and records her laws indifferent as to what purpose may be shown forth by them, and constructs her theories quite careless of their bearing on human anxieties and fates. Though the scientist may individually nourish a religion, and be a theist in his irresponsible hours, the days are over when it could be said that for Science herself the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Our solar system, with its harmonies, is seen now as but one passing case of a certain sort of moving equilibrium in the heavens, realized by a local accident in an appalling wilderness of worlds where no life can exist. In a span of time which as a cosmic interval will count but as an hour, it will have ceased to be. The Darwinian notion of chance production, and subsequent destruction, speedy or deferred, applies to the largest as well as to the smallest facts. It is impossible, in the present temper of the scientific imagination, to find in the driftings of the cosmic atoms, whether they work on the universal or on the particular scale, anything but a kind of aimless weather, doing and

undoing, achieving no proper history, and leaving no result. Nature has no one distinguishable ultimate tendency with which it is possible to feel a sympathy. In the vast rhythm of her processes, as the scientific mind now follows them, she appears to cancel herself. The books of natural theology which satisfied the intellects of our grandfathers seem to us quite grotesque,¹ represent-

¹ How was it ever conceivable, we ask, that a man like Christian Wolff, in whose dry-as-dust head all the learning of the early eighteenth century was concentrated, should have preserved such a baby-like faith in the personal and human character of Nature as to expound her operations as he did in his work on the uses of natural things? This, for example, is the account he gives of the sun and its utility:—

“We see that God has created the sun to keep the changeable conditions on the earth in such an order that living creatures, men and beasts, may inhabit its surface. Since men are the most reasonable of creatures, and able to infer God’s invisible being from the contemplation of the world, the sun in so far forth contributes to the primary purpose of creation: without it the race of man could not be preserved or continued. . . . The sun makes daylight, not only on our earth, but also on the other planets; and daylight is of the utmost utility to us; for by its means we can commodiously carry on those occupations which in the night-time would either be quite impossible, or at any rate impossible without our going to the expense of artificial light. The beasts of the field can find food by day which they would not be able to find at night. Moreover we owe it to the sunlight that we are able to see everything that is on the earth’s surface, not only near by, but also at a distance, and to recognize both near and far things according to their species, which again is of manifold use to us not only in the business necessary to human life, and when we are traveling, but also for the scientific knowledge of Nature, which knowledge for the most part depends on observations made with the help of sight, and, without the sunshine, would have been impossible. If any one would rightly impress on his mind the great advantages which he derives from the sun, let him imagine himself living through only one month, and see how it would be with all his undertakings, if it were not day but night. He would then be sufficiently convinced out of his own experience, especially if he had much work to carry on in the street or in the fields. . . . From the sun we learn to recognize when it is midday, and by knowing this point of time exactly, we can set our clocks right, on which account astronomy owes much to the sun. . . . By help of the sun one can find the meridian. . . . But the meridian is the basis of our sun-dials, and generally speaking, we should have no sun-dials if we had no sun.” *Vernünftige Gedanken von den Absichten der natürlichen Dinge*, 1782, pp. 74–84.

ing, as they did, a God who conformed the largest things of nature to the paltriest of our private wants. The

Or read the account of God's beneficence in the institution of "the great variety throughout the world of men's faces, voices, and handwriting," given in Derham's *Physico-theology*, a book that had much vogue in the eighteenth century. "Had Man's body," says Dr. Derham, "been made according to any of the Atheistical Schemes, or any other Method than that of the infinite Lord of the World, this wise Variety would never have been : but Men's Faces would have been cast in the same, or not a very different Mould, their Organs of Speech would have sounded the same or not so great a Variety of Notes ; and the same Structure of Muscles and Nerves would have given the Hand the same Direction in Writing. And in this Case, what Confusion, what Disturbance, what Mischiefs would the world eternally have lain under ! No Security could have been to our persons ; no Certainty, no Enjoyment of our Possessions ; no Justice between Man and Man ; no Distinction between Good and Bad, between Friends and Foes, between Father and Child, Husband and Wife, Male or Female ; but all would have been turned topsy-turvy, by being exposed to the Malice of the Envious and ill-Natured, to the Fraud and Violence of Knaves and Robbers, to the Forgeries of the crafty Cheat, to the Lusts of the Effeminate and Debauched, and what not ! Our Courts of Justice can abundantly testify the dire Effects of Mistaking Men's Faces, of counterfeiting their Hands, and forging Writings. But now as the infinitely wise Creator and Ruler hath ordered the Matter, every man's Face can distinguish him in the Light, and his Voice in the Dark ; his Hand-writing can speak for him though absent, and be his Witness, and secure his Contracts in future Generations. A manifest as well as admirable Indication of the divine Superintendence and Management."

A God so careful as to make provision even for the unmistakable signing of bank checks and deeds was a deity truly after the heart of eighteenth century Anglicanism.

I subjoin, omitting the capitals, Derham's 'Vindication of God by the Institution of Hills and Valleys,' and Wolff's altogether culinary account of the institution of Water :—

"The uses," says Wolff, "which water serves in human life are plain to see and need not be described at length. Water is a universal drink of man and beasts. Even though men have made themselves drinks that are artificial, they could not do this without water. Beer is brewed of water and malt, and it is the water in it which quenches thirst. Wine is prepared from grapes, which could never have grown without the help of water ; and the same is true of those drinks which in England and other places they produce from fruit. . . . Therefore since God so planned the world that men and beasts should live upon it and find there everything required for their necessity and convenience, he also made water as one means whereby

God whom science recognizes must be a God of universal laws exclusively, a God who does a wholesale, not a retail business. He cannot accommodate his processes to the

to make the earth into so excellent a dwelling. And this is all the more manifest when we consider the advantages which we obtain from this same water for the cleaning of our household utensils, of our clothing, and of other matters. . . . When one goes into a grinding-mill one sees that the grindstone must always be kept wet and then one will get a still greater idea of the use of water."

Of the hills and valleys, Derham, after praising their beauty, discourses as follows : "Some constitutions are indeed of so happy a strength, and so confirmed an health, as to be indifferent to almost any place or temperature of the air. But then others are so weakly and feeble, as not to be able to bear one, but can live comfortably in another place. With some the more subtle and finer air of the hills doth best agree, who are languishing and dying in the feculent and grosser air of great towns, or even the warmer and vaporous air of the valleys and waters. But contrariwise, others languish on the hills, and grow lusty and strong in the warmer air of the valleys.

"So that this opportunity of shifting our abode from the hills to the vales, is an admirable easement, refreshment, and great benefit to the valedudinarian, feeble part of mankind ; affording those an easy and comfortable life, who would otherwise live miserably, languish, and pine away.

"To this salutary conformation of the earth we may add another great convenience of the hills, and that is affording commodious places for habitation, serving (as an eminent author wordeth it) as screens to keep off the cold and nipping blasts of the northern and easterly winds, and reflecting the benign and cherishing sunbeams, and so rendering our habitations both more comfortable and more cheerly in winter.

"Lastly, it is to the hills that the fountains owe their rise and the rivers their conveyance, and consequently those vast masses and lofty piles are not, as they are charged, such rude and useless excrescences of our ill-formed globe ; but the admirable tools of nature, contrived and ordered by the infinite Creator, to do one of its most useful works. For, was the surface of the earth even and level, and the middle parts of its islands and continents not mountainous and high as now it is, it is most certain there could be no descent for the rivers, no conveyance for the waters ; but, instead of gliding along those gentle declivities which the higher lands now afford them quite down to the sea, they would stagnate and perhaps stink, and also drown large tracts of land.

"[Thus] the hills and vales, though to a peevish and weary traveler they may seem incommodious and troublesome, yet are a noble work of the great Creator, and wisely appointed by him for the good of our sublunary world."

convenience of individuals. The bubbles on the foam which coats a stormy sea are floating episodes, made and unmade by the forces of the wind and water. Our private selves are like those bubbles, — epiphenomena, as Clifford, I believe, ingeniously called them ; their destinies weigh nothing and determine nothing in the world's irremediable currents of events.

You see how natural it is, from this point of view, to treat religion as a mere survival, for religion does in fact perpetuate the traditions of the most primeval thought. To coerce the spiritual powers, or to square them and get them on our side, was, during enormous tracts of time, the one great object in our dealings with the natural world. For our ancestors, dreams, hallucinations, revelations, and cock-and-bull stories were inextricably mixed with facts. Up to a comparatively recent date such distinctions as those between what has been verified and what is only conjectured, between the impersonal and the personal aspects of existence, were hardly suspected or conceived. Whatever you imagined in a lively manner, whatever you thought fit to be true, you affirmed confidently ; and whatever you affirmed, your comrades believed. Truth was what had not yet been contradicted, most things were taken into the mind from the point of view of their human suggestiveness, and the attention confined itself exclusively to the æsthetic and dramatic aspects of events.¹

¹ Until the seventeenth century this mode of thought prevailed. One need only recall the dramatic treatment even of mechanical questions by Aristotle, as, for example, his explanation of the power of the lever to make a small weight raise a larger one. This is due, according to Aristotle, to the generally miraculous character of the circle and of all circular movement. The circle is both convex and concave ; it is made by a fixed point and a moving line, which contradict each other ; and whatever moves in a circle moves in opposite directions. Nevertheless, movement in a circle is the most 'natural' movement ; and the long arm of the lever, moving, as

How indeed could it be otherwise? The extraordinary value, for explanation and prevision, of those mathemati-

it does, in the larger circle, has the greater amount of this natural motion, and consequently requires the lesser force. Or recall the explanation by Herodotus of the position of the sun in winter: It moves to the south because of the cold which drives it into the warm parts of the heavens over Libya. Or listen to Saint Augustine's speculations: "Who gave to chaff such power to freeze that it preserves snow buried under it, and such power to warm that it ripens green fruit? Who can explain the strange properties of fire itself, which blackens all that it burns, though itself bright, and which, though of the most beautiful colors, discolours almost all that it touches and feeds upon, and turns blazing fuel into grimy cinders? . . . Then what wonderful properties do we find in charcoal, which is so brittle that a light tap breaks it, and a slight pressure pulverizes it, and yet is so strong that no moisture rots it, nor any time causes it to decay." City of God, book xxi. ch. iv.

Such aspects of things as these, their naturalness and unnaturalness, the sympathies and antipathies of their superficial qualities, their eccentricities, their brightness and strength and destructiveness, were inevitably the ways in which they originally fastened our attention.

If you open early medical books, you will find sympathetic magic invoked on every page. Take, for example, the famous vulnerary ointment attributed to Paracelsus. For this there were a variety of receipts, including usually human fat, the fat of either a bull, a wild boar, or a bear; powdered earthworms, the *usnia*, or mossy growth on the weathered skull of a hanged criminal, and other materials equally unpleasant — the whole prepared under the planet Venus if possible, but never under Mars or Saturn. Then, if a splinter of wood, dipped in the patient's blood, or the bloodstained weapon that wounded him, be immersed in this ointment, the wound itself being tightly bound up, the latter infallibly gets well, — I quote now Van Helmont's account, — for the blood on the weapon or splinter, containing in it the spirit of the wounded man, is roused to active excitement by the contact of the ointment, whence there results to it a full commission or power to cure its cousin-german, the blood in the patient's body. This it does by sucking out the dolorous and exotic impression from the wounded part. But to do this it has to implore the aid of the bull's fat, and other portions of the unguent. The reason why bull's fat is so powerful is that the bull at the time of slaughter is full of secret reluctance and vindictive murmurs, and therefore dies with a higher flame of revenge about him than any other animal. And thus we have made it out, says this author, that the admirable efficacy of the ointment ought to be imputed, not to any auxiliary concurrence of Satan, but simply to the energy of the *posthumous character of Revenge* remaining firmly impressed upon the blood and concentered fat in the unguent. J. B. VAN HELMONT: A Ternary of Para-

cal and mechanical modes of conception which science uses, was a result that could not possibly have been expected in advance. Weight, movement, velocity, direction, position, what thin, pallid, uninteresting ideas! How could the richer animistic aspects of Nature, the peculiarities and oddities that make phenomena picturesquely striking or expressive, fail to have been first singled out and followed by philosophy as the more promising avenue to the knowledge of Nature's life? Well, it is still in these richer animistic and dramatic aspects that religion de-

doxes, translated by WALTER CHARLETON, London, 1650. — I much abridge the original in my citations.

The author goes on to prove by the analogy of many other natural facts that this sympathetic action between things at a distance is the true rationale of the case. "If," he says, "the heart of a horse, slain by a witch, taken out of the yet reeking carcase, be impaled upon an arrow and roasted, immediately the whole witch becomes tormented with the insufferable pains and cruelty of the fire, which could by no means happen unless there preceded a conjunction of the spirit of the witch with the spirit of the horse. In the reeking and yet panting heart, the spirit of the witch is kept captive, and the retreat of it prevented by the arrow transfixed. Similarly hath not many a murdered carcase at the coroner's inquest suffered a fresh hæmorrhage or cruentation at the presence of the assassin? — the blood being, as in a furious fit of anger, enraged and agitated by the impress of revenge conceived against the murderer, at the instant of the soul's compulsive exile from the body. So, if you have dropsy, gout, or jaundice, by including some of your warm blood in the shell and white of an egg, which, exposed to a gentle heat, and mixed with a bait of flesh, you shall give to a hungry dog or hog, the disease shall instantly pass from you into the animal, and leave you entirely. And similarly again, if you burn some of the milk either of a cow or of a woman, the gland from which it issued will dry up. A gentleman at Brussels had his nose mowed off in a combat, but the celebrated surgeon Tagliacozzus digged a new nose for him out of the skin of the arm of a porter at Bologna. About thirteen months after his return to his own country, the engrafted nose grew cold, putrefied, and in a few days dropped off, and it was then discovered that the porter had expired, near about the same punctilio of time. There are still at Brussels eye-witnesses of this occurrence," says Van Helmont; and adds, "I pray what is there in this of superstition or of exalted imagination?"

Modern mind-cure literature — the works of Prentice Mulford, for example — is full of sympathetic magic.

lights to dwell. It is the terror and beauty of phenomena, the 'promise' of the dawn and of the rainbow, the 'voice' of the thunder, the 'gentleness' of the summer rain, the 'sublimity' of the stars, and not the physical laws which these things follow, by which the religious mind still continues to be most impressed; and just as of yore, the devout man tells you that in the solitude of his room or of the fields he still feels the divine presence, that inflowings of help come in reply to his prayers, and that sacrifices to this unseen reality fill him with security and peace.

Pure anachronism! says the survival-theory; — anachronism for which deanthropomorphization of the imagination is the remedy required. The less we mix the private with the cosmic, the more we dwell in universal and impersonal terms, the truer heirs of Science we become.

In spite of the appeal which this impersonality of the scientific attitude makes to a certain magnanimity of temper, I believe it to be shallow, and I can now state my reason in comparatively few words. That reason is that, so long as we deal with the cosmic and the general, we deal only with the symbols of reality, but *as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term.* I think I can easily make clear what I mean by these words.

The world of our experience consists at all times of two parts, an objective and a subjective part, of which the former may be incalculably more extensive than the latter, and yet the latter can never be omitted or suppressed. The objective part is the sum total of whatsoever at any given time we may be thinking of, the

subjective part is the inner 'state' in which the thinking comes to pass. What we think of may be enormous, — the cosmic times and spaces, for example, — whereas the inner state may be the most fugitive and paltry activity of mind. Yet the cosmic objects, so far as the experience yields them, are but ideal pictures of something whose existence we do not inwardly possess but only point at outwardly, while the inner state is our very experience itself; its reality and that of our experience are one. A conscious field *plus* its object as felt or thought of *plus* an attitude towards the object *plus* the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs — such a concrete bit of personal experience may be a small bit, but it is a solid bit as long as it lasts; not hollow, not a mere abstract element of experience, such as the 'object' is when taken all alone. It is a *full* fact, even though it be an insignificant fact; it is of the *kind* to which all realities whatsoever must belong; the motor currents of the world run through the like of it; it is on the line connecting real events with real events. That unsharable feeling which each one of us has of the pinch of his individual destiny as he privately feels it rolling out on fortune's wheel may be disparaged for its egotism, may be sneered at as unscientific, but it is the one thing that fills up the measure of our concrete actuality, and any would-be existent that should lack such a feeling, or its analogue, would be a piece of reality only half made up.¹

If this be true, it is absurd for science to say that the egotistic elements of experience should be suppressed. The axis of reality runs solely through the egotistic

¹ Compare Lotze's doctrine that the only meaning we can attach to the notion of a thing as it is 'in itself' is by conceiving it as it is *for* itself; i. e., as a piece of full experience with a private sense of 'pinch' or inner activity of some sort going with it.

places, — they are strung upon it like so many beads. To describe the world with all the various feelings of the individual pinch of destiny, all the various spiritual attitudes, left out from the description — they being as describable as anything else — would be something like offering a printed bill of fare as the equivalent for a solid meal. Religion makes no such blunder. The individual's religion may be egotistic, and those private realities which it keeps in touch with may be narrow enough; but at any rate it always remains infinitely less hollow and abstract, as far as it goes, than a science which prides itself on taking no account of anything private at all.

A bill of fare with one real raisin on it instead of the word 'raisin,' with one real egg instead of the word 'egg,' might be an inadequate meal, but it would at least be a commencement of reality. The contention of the survival-theory that we ought to stick to non-personal elements exclusively seems like saying that we ought to be satisfied forever with reading the naked bill of fare. I think, therefore, that however particular questions connected with our individual destinies may be answered, it is only by acknowledging them as genuine questions, and living in the sphere of thought which they open up, that we become profound. But to live thus is to be religious; so I unhesitatingly repudiate the survival-theory of religion, as being founded on an egregious mistake. It does not follow, because our ancestors made so many errors of fact and mixed them with their religion, that we should therefore leave off being religious at all.¹ By being religious we establish ourselves in

¹ Even the errors of fact may possibly turn out not to be as wholesale as the scientist assumes. We saw in Lecture IV how the religious conception of the universe seems to many mind-curers 'verified' from day to day by

possession of ultimate reality at the only points at which reality is given us to guard. Our responsible concern is with our private destiny, after all.

You see now why I have been so individualistic throughout these lectures, and why I have seemed so bent on rehabilitating the element of feeling in religion and subordinating its intellectual part. Individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and

their experience of fact. 'Experience of fact' is a field with so many things in it that the sectarian scientist, methodically declining, as he does, to recognize such 'facts' as mind-curers and others like them experience, otherwise than by such rude heads of classification as 'bosh,' 'rot,' 'folly,' certainly leaves out a mass of raw fact which, save for the industrious interest of the religious in the more personal aspects of reality, would never have succeeded in getting itself recorded at all. We know this to be true already in certain cases; it may, therefore, be true in others as well. Miraculous healings have always been part of the supernaturalist stock in trade, and have always been dismissed by the scientist as figments of the imagination. But the scientist's tardy education in the facts of hypnotism has recently given him an apperceiving mass for phenomena of this order, and he consequently now allows that the healings may exist, provided you expressly call them effects of 'suggestion.' Even the stigmata of the cross on Saint Francis's hands and feet may on these terms not be a fable. Similarly, the time-honored phenomenon of diabolical possession is on the point of being admitted by the scientist as a fact, now that he has the name of 'hystero-demonopathy' by which to apperceive it. No one can foresee just how far this legitimation of occultist phenomena under newly found scientist titles may proceed — even 'prophecy,' even 'levitation,' might creep into the pale.

Thus the divorce between scientist facts and religious facts may not necessarily be as eternal as it at first sight seems, nor the personalism and romanticism of the world, as they appeared to primitive thinking, be matters so irrevocably outgrown. The final human opinion may, in short, in some manner now impossible to foresee, revert to the more personal style, just as any path of progress may follow a spiral rather than a straight line. If this were so, the rigorously impersonal view of science might one day appear as having been a temporarily useful eccentricity rather than the definitively triumphant position which the sectarian scientist at present so confidently announces it to be.

directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done.¹ Compared with this world of living individualized feelings, the world of generalized objects which the intellect contemplates is without solidity or life. As in stereoscopic or kinetoscopic pictures seen outside the instrument, the third dimension, the movement, the vital element, are not there. We get a beautiful picture of an express train supposed to be moving, but where in the picture, as I have heard a friend say, is the energy or the fifty miles an hour?²

¹ Hume's criticism has banished causation from the world of physical objects, and 'Science' is absolutely satisfied to define cause in terms of concomitant change—read Mach, Pearson, Ostwald. The 'original' of the notion of causation is in our inner personal experience, and only there can causes in the old-fashioned sense be directly observed and described.

² When I read in a religious paper words like these: "Perhaps the best thing we can say of God is that he is *the Inevitable Inference*," I recognize the tendency to let religion evaporate in intellectual terms. Would martyrs have sung in the flames for a mere inference, however inevitable it might be? Original religious men, like Saint Francis, Luther, Behmen, have usually been enemies of the intellect's pretension to meddle with religious things. Yet the intellect, everywhere invasive, shows everywhere its shal- lowing effect. See how the ancient spirit of Methodism evaporates under those wonderfully able rationalistic booklets (which every one should read) of a philosopher like Professor Bowne (*The Christian Revelation, The Christian Life, The Atonement*: Cincinnati and New York, 1898, 1899, 1900). See the positively expulsive purpose of philosophy properly so called:—

"Religion," writes M. Vacherot (*La Religion*, Paris, 1869, pp. 313, 436, *et passim*), "answers to a transient state or condition, not to a permanent determination of human nature, being merely an expression of that stage of the human mind which is dominated by the imagination. . . . Christianity has but a single possible final heir to its estate, and that is scientific philosophy."

In a still more radical vein, Professor Ribot (*Psychologie des Sentiments*, p. 310) describes the evaporation of religion. He sums it up in a single formula—the ever-growing predominance of the rational intellectual element, with the gradual fading out of the emotional element, this latter tending to enter into the group of purely intellectual sentiments. "Of religious sentiment properly so called, nothing survives at last save a vague respect for the unknowable x which is a last relic of the fear, and a certain attraction towards the ideal, which is a relic of the love, that characterized the earlier periods of religious growth. To state this more

Let us agree, then, that Religion, occupying herself with personal destinies and keeping thus in contact with the only absolute realities which we know, must necessarily play an eternal part in human history. The next thing to decide is what she reveals about those destinies, or whether indeed she reveals anything distinct enough to be considered a general message to mankind. We have done as you see, with our preliminaries, and our final summing up can now begin.

I am well aware that after all the palpitating documents which I have quoted, and all the perspectives of emotion-inspiring institution and belief that my previous lectures have opened, the dry analysis to which I now advance may appear to many of you like an anticlimax, a tapering-off and flattening out of the subject, instead of a crescendo of interest and result. I said awhile ago that the religious attitude of Protestants appears poverty-stricken to the Catholic imagination. Still more poverty-stricken, I fear, may my final summing up of the subject appear at first to some of you. On which account I pray you now to bear this point in mind, that in the present part of it I am expressly trying to reduce religion to its lowest admissible terms, to that minimum, free from individualistic excrescences, which all religions contain as their nucleus, and on which it may be hoped that all religious persons may agree. That

simply, religion tends to turn into religious philosophy. — These are psychologically entirely different things, the one being a theoretic construction of ratiocination, whereas the other is the living work of a group of persons, or of a great inspired leader, calling into play the entire thinking and feeling organism of man."

I find the same failure to recognize that the stronghold of religion lies in individuality in attempts like those of Professor Baldwin (*Mental Development, Social and Ethical Interpretations*, ch. x.) and Mr. H. R. Marshall (*Instinct and Reason*, chaps. viii. to xii.) to make it a purely 'conservative social force.'

established, we should have a result which might be small, but would at least be solid ; and on it and round it the ruddier additional beliefs on which the different individuals make their venture might be grafted, and flourish as richly as you please. I shall add my own over-belief (which will be, I confess, of a somewhat pallid kind, as befits a critical philosopher), and you will, I hope, also add your over-beliefs, and we shall soon be in the varied world of concrete religious constructions once more. For the moment, let me dryly pursue the analytic part of the task.

Both thought and feeling are determinants of conduct, and the same conduct may be determined either by feeling or by thought. When we survey the whole field of religion, we find a great variety in the thoughts that have prevailed there ; but the feelings on the one hand and the conduct on the other are almost always the same, for Stoic, Christian, and Buddhist saints are practically indistinguishable in their lives. The theories which Religion generates, being thus variable, are secondary ; and if you wish to grasp her essence, you must look to the feelings and the conduct as being the more constant elements. It is between these two elements that the short circuit exists on which she carries on her principal business, while the ideas and symbols and other institutions form loop-lines which may be perfections and improvements, and may even some day all be united into one harmonious system, but which are not to be regarded as organs with an indispensable function, necessary at all times for religious life to go on. This seems to me the first conclusion which we are entitled to draw from the phenomena we have passed in review.

The next step is to characterize the feelings. To what psychological order do they belong ?

The resultant outcome of them is in any case what Kant calls a 'sthenic' affection, an excitement of the cheerful, expansive, 'dynamogenic' order which, like any tonic, freshens our vital powers. In almost every lecture, but especially in the lectures on Conversion and on Saintliness, we have seen how this emotion overcomes temperamental melancholy and imparts endurance to the Subject, or a zest, or a meaning, or an enchantment and glory to the common objects of life.¹ The name of 'faith-state,' by which Professor Leuba designates it, is a good one.² It is a biological as well as a psychological condition, and Tolstoy is absolutely accurate in classing faith among the forces *by which men live*.³ The total absence of it, anhedonia,⁴ means collapse.

The faith-state may hold a very minimum of intellectual content. We saw examples of this in those sudden raptures of the divine presence, or in such mystical seizures as Dr. Bucke described.⁵ It may be a mere vague enthusiasm, half spiritual, half vital, a courage, and a feeling that great and wondrous things are in the air.⁶

¹ Compare, for instance, pages 203, 219, 223, 226, 249 to 256, 275 to 278.

² American Journal of Psychology, vii. 345.

³ Above, p. 184.

⁴ Above, p. 145.

⁵ Above, p. 400.

⁶ Example: Henri Perreyve writes to Gratry: "I do not know how to deal with the happiness which you aroused in me this morning. It overwhelms me; I want to *do* something, yet I can do nothing and am fit for nothing. . . . I would fain do *great things*." Again, after an inspiring interview, he writes: "I went homewards, intoxicated with joy, hope, and strength. I wanted to feed upon my happiness in solitude, far from all men. It was late; but, unheeding that, I took a mountain path and went on like a madman, looking at the heavens, regardless of earth. Suddenly an instinct made me draw hastily back—I was on the very edge of a precipice, one step more and I must have fallen. I took fright and gave up

When, however, a positive intellectual content is associated with a faith-state, it gets invincibly stamped in upon belief,¹ and this explains the passionate loyalty of religious persons everywhere to the minutest details of their so widely differing creeds. Taking creeds and faith-state together, as forming 'religions,' and treating these as purely subjective phenomena, without regard to the question of their 'truth,' we are obliged, on account of their extraordinary influence upon action and endurance, to class them amongst the most important biological functions of mankind. Their stimulant and anæsthetic effect is so great that Professor Leuba, in a recent article,² goes so far as to say that so long as men can use their God, they care very little who he is, or even whether he is at all. "The truth of the matter can be put," says Leuba, "in this way: *God is not known, he is not understood; he is used* — sometimes as meat-purveyor, sometimes as moral support, sometimes as friend, sometimes as an object of love. If he proves himself useful, the re-

my nocturnal promenade." A. GRATY : Henri Perreyve, London, 1872, pp. 92, 89.

This primacy, in the faith-state, of vague expansive impulse over direction is well expressed in Walt Whitman's lines (*Leaves of Grass*, 1872, p. 190) : —

"O to confront night, storms, hunger, ridicule, accidents, rebuffs, as the trees and animals do. . . .

Dear Camerado! I confess I have urged you onward with me, and still urge you, without the least idea what is our destination,

Or whether we shall be victorious, or utterly quell'd and defeated."

This readiness for great things, and this sense that the world by its importance, wonderfulness, etc., is apt for their production, would seem to be the undifferentiated germ of all the higher faiths. Trust in our own dreams of ambition, or in our country's expansive destinies, and faith in the providence of God, all have their source in that ourush of our sanguine impulses, and in that sense of the exceedingness of the possible over the real.

¹ Compare LEUBA : *Loc. cit.*, pp. 346-349.

² The Contents of Religious Consciousness, in *The Monist*, xi. 536, July, 1901.

ligious consciousness asks for no more than that. Does God really exist? How does he exist? What is he? are so many irrelevant questions. Not God, but life, more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of religion. The love of life, at any and every level of development, is the religious impulse.”¹

At this purely subjective rating, therefore, Religion must be considered vindicated in a certain way from the attacks of her critics. It would seem that she cannot be a mere anachronism and survival, but must exert a permanent function, whether she be with or without intellectual content, and whether, if she have any, it be true or false.

We must next pass beyond the point of view of merely subjective utility, and make inquiry into the intellectual content itself.

First, is there, under all the discrepancies of the creeds, a common nucleus to which they bear their testimony unanimously?

And second, ought we to consider the testimony true?

I will take up the first question first, and answer it immediately in the affirmative. The warring gods and

¹ Loc. cit., pp. 571, 572, abridged. See, also, this writer's extraordinarily true criticism of the notion that religion primarily seeks to solve the intellectual mystery of the world. Compare what W. BENDER says (in his *Wesen der Religion*, Bonn, 1888, pp. 85, 38) : “Not the question about God, and not the inquiry into the origin and purpose of the world is religion, but the question about Man. All religious views of life are anthropocentric.” “Religion is that activity of the human impulse towards self-preservation by means of which Man seeks to carry his essential vital purposes through against the adverse pressure of the world by raising himself freely towards the world's ordering and governing powers when the limits of his own strength are reached.” The whole book is little more than a development of these words.

formulas of the various religions do indeed cancel each other, but there is a certain uniform deliverance in which religions all appear to meet. It consists of two parts:—

1. An uneasiness; and

2. Its solution.

1. The uneasiness, reduced to its simplest terms, is a sense that there is *something wrong about us* as we naturally stand.

2. The solution is a sense that *we are saved from the wrongness* by making proper connection with the higher powers.

In those more developed minds which alone we are studying, the wrongness takes a moral character, and the salvation takes a mystical tinge. I think we shall keep well within the limits of what is common to all such minds if we formulate the essence of their religious experience in terms like these:—

The individual, so far as he suffers from his wrongness and criticises it, is to that extent consciously beyond it, and in at least possible touch with something higher, if anything higher exist. Along with the wrong part there is thus a better part of him, even though it may be but a most helpless germ. With which part he should identify his real being is by no means obvious at this stage; but when stage 2 (the stage of solution or salvation) arrives,¹ the man identifies his real being with the germinal higher part of himself; and does so in the following way. *He becomes conscious that this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck.*

¹ Remember that for some men it arrives suddenly, for others gradually, whilst others again practically enjoy it all their life.

It seems to me that all the phenomena are accurately describable in these very simple general terms.¹ They allow for the divided self and the struggle; they involve the change of personal centre and the surrender of the lower self; they express the appearance of exteriority of the helping power and yet account for our sense of union with it;² and they fully justify our feelings of security and joy. There is probably no autobiographic document, among all those which I have quoted, to which the description will not well apply. One need only add such specific details as will adapt it to various theologies and various personal temperaments, and one will then have the various experiences reconstructed in their individual forms.

So far, however, as this analysis goes, the experiences are only psychological phenomena. They possess, it is true, enormous biological worth. Spiritual strength really increases in the subject when he has them, a new life opens for him, and they seem to him a place of conflux where the forces of two universes meet; and yet this may be nothing but his subjective way of feeling things, a mood of his own fancy, in spite of the effects produced. I now turn to my second question: What is the objective 'truth' of their content?³

The part of the content concerning which the question

¹ The practical difficulties are: 1, to 'realize the reality' of one's higher part; 2, to identify one's self with it exclusively; and 3, to identify it with all the rest of ideal being.

² "When mystical activity is at its height, we find consciousness possessed by the sense of a being at once *excessive* and *identical* with the self: great enough to be God; interior enough to be *me*. The 'objectivity' of it ought in that case to be called *excessivity*, rather, or *exceedingness*." RÉCÉLIAC: *Essai sur les fondements de la conscience mystique*, 1897, p. 46.

³ The word 'truth' is here taken to mean something additional to bare value for life, although the natural propensity of man is to believe that whatever has great value for life is thereby certified as true.

of truth most pertinently arises is that 'MORE of the same quality' with which our own higher self appears in the experience to come into harmonious working relation. Is such a 'more' merely our own notion, or does it really exist? If so, in what shape does it exist? Does it act, as well as exist? And in what form should we conceive of that 'union' with it of which religious geniuses are so convinced?

It is in answering these questions that the various theologies perform their theoretic work, and that their divergencies most come to light. They all agree that the 'more' really exists; though some of them hold it to exist in the shape of a personal god or gods, while others are satisfied to conceive it as a stream of ideal tendency embedded in the eternal structure of the world. They all agree, moreover, that it acts as well as exists, and that something really is effected for the better when you throw your life into its hands. It is when they treat of the experience of 'union' with it that their speculative differences appear most clearly. Over this point pantheism and theism, nature and second birth, works and grace and karma, immortality and reincarnation, rationalism and mysticism, carry on inveterate disputes.

At the end of my lecture on Philosophy¹ I held out the notion that an impartial science of religions might sift out from the midst of their discrepancies a common body of doctrine which she might also formulate in terms to which physical science need not object. This, I said, she might adopt as her own reconciling hypothesis, and recommend it for general belief. I also said that in my last lecture I should have to try my own hand at framing such an hypothesis.

The time has now come for this attempt. Who says

¹ Above, p. 455.

'hypothesis' renounces the ambition to be coercive in his arguments. The most I can do is, accordingly, to offer something that may fit the facts so easily that your scientific logic will find no plausible pretext for vetoing your impulse to welcome it as true.

The 'more,' as we called it, and the meaning of our 'union' with it, form the nucleus of our inquiry. Into what definite description can these words be translated, and for what definite facts do they stand? It would never do for us to place ourselves offhand at the position of a particular theology, the Christian theology, for example, and proceed immediately to define the 'more' as Jehovah, and the 'union' as his imputation to us of the righteousness of Christ. That would be unfair to other religions, and, from our present standpoint at least, would be an over-belief.

We must begin by using less particularized terms; and, since one of the duties of the science of religions is to keep religion in connection with the rest of science, we shall do well to seek first of all a way of describing the 'more,' which psychologists may also recognize as real. The *subconscious self* is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity; and I believe that in it we have exactly the mediating term required. Apart from all religious considerations, there is actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of. The exploration of the transmarginal field has hardly yet been seriously undertaken, but what Mr. Myers said in 1892 in his essay on the Subliminal Consciousness¹ is

¹ Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, vol. vii. p. 305. For a full statement of Mr. Myers's views, I may refer to his posthumous work, 'Human Personality in the Light of Recent Research,' which is already announced by Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co. as being in press. Mr. Myers for the first time proposed as a general psychological problem the explora-

as true as when it was first written: "Each of us is in reality an abiding psychical entity far more extensive than he knows — an individuality which can never express itself completely through any corporeal manifestation. The Self manifests through the organism; but there is always some part of the Self unmanifested; and always, as it seems, some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve."¹ Much of the content of this larger background against which our conscious being stands out in relief is insignificant. Imperfect memories, silly jingles, inhibitive timidities, 'dissolutive' phenomena of various sorts, as Myers calls them, enter into it for a large part. But in it many of the performances of genius seem also to have their origin; and in our study of conversion, of mystical experiences, and of prayer, we have seen how striking a part invasions from this region play in the religious life.

Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its *farther* side, the 'more' with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its *hither* side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our basis, we seem to preserve a contact with 'science' which the ordinary theologian lacks. At the same time the theologian's contention that the religious man is moved by an external power is vindicated, for it is one of the peculiarities of invasions from the

tion of the subliminal region of consciousness throughout its whole extent, and made the first methodical steps in its topography by treating as a natural series a mass of subliminal facts hitherto considered only as curious isolated facts, and subjecting them to a systematized nomenclature. How important this exploration will prove, future work upon the path which Myers has opened can alone show. Compare my paper: 'Frederic Myers's Services to Psychology,' in the said Proceedings, part xlii., May, 1901.

¹ Compare the inventory given above on pp. 483-4, and also what is said of the subconscious self on pp. 233-236, 240-242.

subconscious region to take on objective appearances, and to suggest to the Subject an external control. In the religious life the control is felt as 'higher'; but since on our hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of our own hidden mind which are controlling, the sense of union with the power beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally true.

This doorway into the subject seems to me the best one for a science of religions, for it mediates between a number of different points of view. Yet it is only a doorway, and difficulties present themselves as soon as we step through it, and ask how far our transmarginal consciousness carries us if we follow it on its remoter side. Here the over-beliefs begin: here mysticism and the conversion-rapture and Vedantism and transcendental idealism bring in their monistic interpretations¹ and tell us that the finite self rejoins the absolute self, for it was always one with God and identical with the soul of the world.² Here the prophets of all the different religions

¹ Compare above, pp. 419 ff.

² One more expression of this belief, to increase the reader's familiarity with the notion of it:—

"If this room is full of darkness for thousands of years, and you come in and begin to weep and wail, 'Oh, the darkness,' will the darkness vanish? Bring the light in, strike a match, and light comes in a moment. So what good will it do you to think all your lives, 'Oh, I have done evil, I have made many mistakes'? It requires no ghost to tell us that. Bring in the light, and the evil goes in a moment. Strengthen the real nature, build up yourselves, the effulgent, the resplendent, the ever pure, call that up in every one whom you see. I wish that every one of us had come to such a state that even when we see the vilest of human beings we can see the God within, and instead of condemning, say, 'Rise, thou effulgent One, rise thou who art always pure, rise thou birthless and deathless, rise almighty, and manifest your nature.' . . . This is the highest prayer that the Advaita teaches. This is the one prayer: remembering our nature." . . . "Why does man go out to look for a God? . . . It is your own heart beating, and you did not know, you were mistaking it for something external. He, nearest of the near, my own self, the reality of my own life, my body and my

come with their visions, voices, raptures, and other openings, supposed by each to authenticate his own peculiar faith.

Those of us who are not personally favored with such specific revelations must stand outside of them altogether and, for the present at least, decide that, since they corroborate incompatible theological doctrines, they neutralize one another and leave no fixed result. If we follow any one of them, or if we follow philosophical theory and embrace monistic pantheism on non-mystical grounds, we do so in the exercise of our individual freedom, and build out our religion in the way most congruous with our personal susceptibilities. Among these susceptibilities intellectual ones play a decisive part. Although the religious question is primarily a question of life, of living or not living in the higher union which opens itself to us as a gift, yet the spiritual excitement in which the gift appears a real one will often fail to be aroused in an individual until certain particular intellectual beliefs or ideas which, as we say, come home to him, are touched.¹ These ideas will thus be essential to

soul. — I am Thee and Thou art Me. That is your own nature. Assert it, manifest it. Not to become pure, you are pure already. You are not to be perfect, you are that already. Every good thought which you think or act upon is simply tearing the veil, as it were, and the purity, the Infinity, the God behind, manifests itself — the eternal Subject of everything, the eternal Witness in this universe, your own Self. Knowledge is, as it were, a lower step, a degradation. We are It already; how to know It?" SWAMI VIVEKANANDA: Addresses, No. XII., Practical Vedanta, part iv. pp. 172, 174, London, 1897; and Lectures, The Real and the Apparent Man, p. 24, abridged.

¹ For instance, here is a case where a person exposed from her birth to Christian ideas had to wait till they came to her clad in spiritistic formulas before the saving experience set in: —

"For myself I can say that spiritualism has saved me. It was revealed to me at a critical moment of my life, and without it I don't know what I should have done. It has taught me to detach myself from worldly things and to place my hope in things to come. Through it I have learned to see in

that individual's religion ; — which is as much as to say that over-beliefs in various directions are absolutely indispensable, and that we should treat them with tenderness and tolerance so long as they are not intolerant themselves. As I have elsewhere written, the most interesting and valuable things about a man are usually his over-beliefs.

Disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining ourselves to what is common and generic, we have in *the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come*,¹ a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is *literally and objectively true as far as it goes*. If I now proceed to state my own hypothesis about the farther limits of this extension of our personality, I shall be offering my own over-belief — though I know it will appear a sorry under-belief to some of you — for which I can only bespeak the same indulgence which in a converse case I should accord to yours.

The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely 'understandable' world. Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you

all men, even in those most criminal, even in those from whom I have most suffered, undeveloped brothers to whom I owed assistance, love, and forgiveness. I have learned that I must lose my temper over nothing, despise no one, and pray for all. Most of all I have learned to pray ! And although I have still much to learn in this domain, prayer ever brings me more strength, consolation, and comfort. I feel more than ever that I have only made a few steps on the long road of progress ; but I look at its length without dismay, for I have confidence that the day will come when all my efforts shall be rewarded. So Spiritualism has a great place in my life, indeed it holds the first place there." Flournoy Collection.

¹ "The influence of the Holy Spirit, exquisitely called the Comforter, is a matter of actual experience, as solid a reality as that of electro-magnetism." W. C. BROWNELL, *Scribner's Magazine*, vol. xxx. p. 112.

choose. So far as our ideal impulses originate in this region (and most of them do originate in it, for we find them possessing us in a way for which we cannot articulately account), we belong to it in a more intimate sense than that in which we belong to the visible world, for we belong in the most intimate sense wherever our ideals belong. Yet the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. When we commune with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, for we are turned into new men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative change.¹ But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical world unreal.

God is the natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the name of God.² We and God

¹ That the transaction of opening ourselves, otherwise called prayer, is a perfectly definite one for certain persons, appears abundantly in the preceding lectures. I append another concrete example to reinforce the impression on the reader's mind:—

“Man can learn to transcend these limitations [of finite thought] and draw power and wisdom at will. . . . The divine presence is known through experience. The turning to a higher plane is a distinct act of consciousness. It is not a vague, twilight or semi-conscious experience. It is not an ecstasy; it is not a trance. It is not super-consciousness in the Vedantic sense. It is not due to self-hypnotization. It is a perfectly calm, sane, sound, rational, common-sense shifting of consciousness from the phenomena of sense-perception to the phenomena of seership, from the thought of self to a distinctively higher realm. . . . For example, if the lower self be nervous, anxious, tense, one can in a few moments compel it to be calm. This is not done by a word simply. Again I say, it is not hypnotism. It is by the exercise of power. One feels the spirit of peace as definitely as heat is perceived on a hot summer day. The power can be as surely used as the sun's rays can be focused and made to do work, to set fire to wood.” *The Higher Law*, vol. iv. pp. 4, 6, Boston, August, 1901.

² Transcendentalists are fond of the term ‘Over-soul,’ but as a rule they

have business with each other ; and in opening ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled. The universe, at those parts of it which our personal being constitutes, takes a turn genuinely for the worse or for the better in proportion as each one of us fulfills or evades God's demands. As far as this goes I probably have you with me, for I only translate into schematic language what I may call the instinctive belief of mankind : God is real since he produces real effects.

The real effects in question, so far as I have as yet admitted them, are exerted on the personal centres of energy of the various subjects, but the spontaneous faith of most of the subjects is that they embrace a wider sphere than this. Most religious men believe (or 'know,' if they be mystical) that not only they themselves, but the whole universe of beings to whom the God is present, are secure in his parental hands. There is a sense, a dimension, they are sure, in which we are *all* saved, in spite of the gates of hell and all adverse terrestrial appearances. God's existence is the guarantee of an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. This world may indeed, as science assures us, some day burn up or freeze ; but if it is part of his order, the old ideals are sure to be brought elsewhere to fruition, so that where God is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution are not the absolutely final things. Only when this farther step of faith concerning God is taken, and remote objective consequences are predicted, does religion, as it seems to me, get wholly free from the first immediate subjective experience, and bring a *real hypothesis* into play. A good hypothesis in science must have

use it in an intellectualist sense, as meaning only a medium of communion. 'God' is a causal agent as well as a medium of communion, and that is the aspect which I wish to emphasize.

other properties than those of the phenomenon it is immediately invoked to explain, otherwise it is not prolific enough. God, meaning only what enters into the religious man's experience of union, falls short of being an hypothesis of this more useful order. He needs to enter into wider cosmic relations in order to justify the subject's absolute confidence and peace.

That the God with whom, starting from the hither side of our own extra-marginal self, we come at its remoter margin into commerce should be the absolute world-ruler, is of course a very considerable over-belief. Over-belief as it is, though, it is an article of almost every one's religion. Most of us pretend in some way to prop it upon our philosophy, but the philosophy itself is really propped upon this faith. What is this but to say that Religion, in her fullest exercise of function, is not a mere illumination of facts already elsewhere given, not a mere passion, like love, which views things in a rosier light. It is indeed that, as we have seen abundantly. But it is something more, namely, a postulator of new *facts* as well. The world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic world over again, with an altered expression; it must have, over and above the altered expression, *a natural constitution* different at some point from that which a materialistic world would have. It must be such that different events can be expected in it, different conduct must be required.

This thoroughly 'pragmatic' view of religion has usually been taken as a matter of course by common men. They have interpolated divine miracles into the field of nature, they have built a heaven out beyond the grave. It is only transcendentalist metaphysicians who think that, without adding any concrete details to Nature, or subtracting any, but by simply calling it the expression of absolute spirit, you make it more divine just as it stands.

I believe the pragmatic way of taking religion to be the deeper way. It gives it body as well as soul, it makes it claim, as everything real must claim, some characteristic realm of fact as its very own. What the more characteristically divine facts are, apart from the actual inflow of energy in the faith-state and the prayer-state, I know not. But the over-belief on which I am ready to make my personal venture is that they exist. The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and that although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in. By being faithful in my poor measure to this over-belief, I seem to myself to keep more sane and true. I *can*, of course, put myself into the sectarian scientist's attitude, and imagine vividly that the world of sensations and of scientific laws and objects may be all. But whenever I do this, I hear that inward monitor of which W. K. Clifford once wrote, whispering the word 'bosh!' Humbug is humbug, even though it bear the scientific name, and the total expression of human experience, as I view it objectively, invincibly urges me beyond the narrow 'scientific' bounds. Assuredly, the real world is of a different temperament, — more intricately built than physical science allows. So my objective and my subjective conscience both hold me to the over-belief which I express. Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks?

POSTSCRIPT

IN writing my concluding lecture I had to aim so much at simplification that I fear that my general philosophic position received so scant a statement as hardly to be intelligible to some of my readers. I therefore add this epilogue, which must also be so brief as possibly to remedy but little the defect. In a later work I may be enabled to state my position more amply and consequently more clearly.

Originality cannot be expected in a field like this, where all the attitudes and tempers that are possible have been exhibited in literature long ago, and where any new writer can immediately be classed under a familiar head. If one should make a division of all thinkers into naturalists and supernaturalists, I should undoubtedly have to go, along with most philosophers, into the supernaturalist branch. But there is a crasser and a more refined supernaturalism, and it is to the refined division that most philosophers at the present day belong. If not regular transcendental idealists, they at least obey the Kantian direction enough to bar out ideal entities from interfering causally in the course of phenomenal events. Refined supernaturalism is universalistic supernaturalism ; for the 'crasser' variety 'piecemeal' supernaturalism would perhaps be the better name. It went with that older theology which to-day is supposed to reign only among uneducated people, or to be found among the few belated professors of the dualisms which Kant is thought to have displaced. It admits miracles

and providential leadings, and finds no intellectual difficulty in mixing the ideal and the real worlds together by interpolating influences from the ideal region among the forces that causally determine the real world's details. In this the refined supernaturalists think that it muddles disparate dimensions of existence. For them the world of the ideal has no efficient causality, and never bursts into the world of phenomena at particular points. The ideal world, for them, is not a world of facts, but only of the meaning of facts; it is a point of view for judging facts. It appertains to a different '-ology,' and inhabits a different dimension of being altogether from that in which existential propositions obtain. It cannot get down upon the flat level of experience and interpolate itself piecemeal between distinct portions of nature, as those who believe, for example, in divine aid coming in response to prayer, are bound to think it must.

Notwithstanding my own inability to accept either popular Christianity or scholastic theism, I suppose that my belief that in communion with the Ideal new force comes into the world, and new departures are made here below, subjects me to being classed among the supernaturalists of the piecemeal or crasser type. Universalistic supernaturalism surrenders, it seems to me, too easily to naturalism. It takes the facts of physical science at their face-value, and leaves the laws of life just as naturalism finds them, with no hope of remedy, in case their fruits are bad. It confines itself to sentiments about life as a whole, sentiments which may be admiring and adoring, but which need not be so, as the existence of systematic pessimism proves. In this universalistic way of taking the ideal world, the essence of practical religion seems to me to evaporate. Both instinctively and for logical reasons, I find it hard to

believe that principles can exist which make no difference in facts.¹ But all facts are particular facts, and the whole interest of the question of God's existence seems to me to lie in the consequences for particulars which that existence may be expected to entail. That no concrete particular of experience should alter its complexion in consequence of a God being there seems to me an incredible proposition, and yet it is the thesis to which (implicitly at any rate) refined supernaturalism seems to cling. It is only with experience *en bloc*, it says, that the Absolute maintains relations. It condescends to no transactions of detail.

I am ignorant of Buddhism and speak under correction, and merely in order the better to describe my general point of view; but as I apprehend the Buddhistic doctrine of Karma, I agree in principle with that. All supernaturalists admit that facts are under the judgment of higher law; but for Buddhism as I interpret it, and for religion generally so far as it remains unweakened by transcendentalistic metaphysics, the word 'judgment' here means no such bare academic verdict or platonic appreciation as it means in Vedantic or modern absolutist systems; it carries, on the contrary, *execution* with it, is in

¹ Transcendental idealism, of course, insists that its ideal world makes *this* difference, that facts *exist*. We owe it to the Absolute that we have a world of fact at all. 'A world' of fact!—that exactly is the trouble. An entire world is the smallest unit with which the Absolute can work, whereas to our finite minds work for the better ought to be done within this world, setting in at single points. Our difficulties and our ideals are all piecemeal affairs, but the Absolute can do no piecework for us; so that all the interests which our poor souls compass raise their heads too late. We should have spoken earlier, prayed for another world absolutely, before this world was born. It is strange, I have heard a friend say, to see this blind corner into which Christian thought has worked itself at last, with its God who can raise no particular weight whatever, who can help us with no private burden, and who is on the side of our enemies as much as he is on our own. Odd evolution from the God of David's psalms!

rebus as well as *post rem*, and operates 'causally' as partial factor in the total fact. The universe becomes a gnosticism¹ pure and simple on any other terms. But this view that judgment and execution go together is that of the crasser supernaturalist way of thinking, so the present volume must on the whole be classed with the other expressions of that creed.

I state the matter thus bluntly, because the current of thought in academic circles runs against me, and I feel like a man who must set his back against an open door quickly if he does not wish to see it closed and locked. In spite of its being so shocking to the reigning intellectual tastes, I believe that a candid consideration of piecemeal supernaturalism and a complete discussion of all its metaphysical bearings will show it to be the hypothesis by which the largest number of legitimate requirements are met. That of course would be a program for other books than this; what I now say sufficiently indicates to the philosophic reader the place where I belong.

If asked just where the differences in fact which are due to God's existence come in, I should have to say that in general I have no hypothesis to offer beyond what the phenomenon of 'prayerful communion,' especially when certain kinds of incursion from the subconscious region take part in it, immediately suggests. The appearance is that in this phenomenon something ideal, which in one sense is part of ourselves and in another sense is not ourselves, actually exerts an influence, raises our centre of personal energy, and produces regenerative effects unattainable in other ways. If, then, there be a wider world of being than that of our every-day consciousness, if in it there be forces whose effects on us are intermittent, if

¹ See my *Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, 1897, p. 165.

one facilitating condition of the effects be the openness of the 'subliminal' door, we have the elements of a theory to which the phenomena of religious life lend plausibility. I am so impressed by the importance of these phenomena that I adopt the hypothesis which they so naturally suggest. At these places at least, I say, it would seem as though transmundane energies, God, if you will, produced immediate effects within the natural world to which the rest of our experience belongs.

The difference in natural 'fact' which most of us would assign as the first difference which the existence of a God ought to make would, I imagine, be personal immortality. Religion, in fact, for the great majority of our own race *means* immortality, and nothing else. God is the producer of immortality; and whoever has doubts of immortality is written down as an atheist without farther trial. I have said nothing in my lectures about immortality or the belief therein, for to me it seems a secondary point. If our ideals are only cared for in 'eternity,' I do not see why we might not be willing to resign their care to other hands than ours. Yet I sympathize with the urgent impulse to be present ourselves, and in the conflict of impulses, both of them so vague yet both of them noble, I know not how to decide. It seems to me that it is eminently a case for facts to testify. Facts, I think, are yet lacking to prove 'spirit-return,' though I have the highest respect for the patient labors of Messrs. Myers, Hodgson, and Hyslop, and am somewhat impressed by their favorable conclusions. I consequently leave the matter open, with this brief word to save the reader from a possible perplexity as to why immortality got no mention in the body of this book.

The ideal power with which we feel ourselves in connection, the 'God' of ordinary men, is, both by ordinary

men and by philosophers, endowed with certain of those metaphysical attributes which in the lecture on philosophy I treated with such disrespect. He is assumed as a matter of course to be 'one and only' and to be 'infinite'; and the notion of many finite gods is one which hardly any one thinks it worth while to consider, and still less to uphold. Nevertheless, in the interests of intellectual clearness, I feel bound to say that religious experience, as we have studied it, cannot be cited as unequivocally supporting the infinitist belief. The only thing that it unequivocally testifies to is that we can experience union with *something* larger than ourselves and in that union find our greatest peace. Philosophy, with its passion for unity, and mysticism with its monoideistic bent, both 'pass to the limit' and identify the something with a unique God who is the all-inclusive soul of the world. Popular opinion, respectful to their authority, follows the example which they set.

Meanwhile the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all.¹ Thus would a sort of

¹ Such a notion is suggested in my Ingersoll Lecture On Human Immortality, Boston and London, 1899.

polytheism return upon us—a polytheism which I do not on this occasion defend, for my only aim at present is to keep the testimony of religious experience clearly within its proper bounds. [Compare p. 132 above.]

Upholders of the monistic view will say to such a polytheism (which, by the way, has always been the real religion of common people, and is so still to-day) that unless there be one all-inclusive God, our guarantee of security is left imperfect. In the Absolute, and in the Absolute only, *all* is saved. If there be different gods, each caring for his part, some portion of some of us might not be covered with divine protection, and our religious consolation would thus fail to be complete. It goes back to what was said on pages 131–133, about the possibility of there being portions of the universe that may irretrievably be lost. Common sense is less sweeping in its demands than philosophy or mysticism have been wont to be, and can suffer the notion of this world being partly saved and partly lost. The ordinary moralistic state of mind makes the salvation of the world conditional upon the success with which each unit does its part. Partial and conditional salvation is in fact a most familiar notion when taken in the abstract, the only difficulty being to determine the details. Some men are even disinterested enough to be willing to be in the unsaved remnant as far as their persons go, if only they can be persuaded that their cause will prevail—all of us are willing, whenever our activity-excitement rises sufficiently high. I think, in fact, that a final philosophy of religion will have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously than it has hitherto been willing to consider it. For practical life at any rate, the *chance* of salvation is enough. No fact in human nature is more characteristic than its willingness to live on a chance. The existence of the chance makes

the difference, as Edmund Gurney says, between a life of which the keynote is resignation and a life of which the keynote is hope.¹ But all these statements are unsatisfactory from their brevity, and I can only say that I hope to return to the same questions in another book.

¹ *Tertium Quid*, 1887, p. 99. See also pp. 148, 149.

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